The Grand Bargain (Ch9)

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In Chapter 9, the author introduces what he calls the “grand bargain” of the modern nation-state — a deal so deeply embedded in our lives that we barely notice it. The bargain is simple: we hand over enormous power to a centralized state — including a monopoly on violence — and in return, we get peace, prosperity, and stability. For five centuries, this exchange has largely worked. Centralized authority has underwritten economic growth, social order, and rising living standards.

But here’s the uncomfortable thesis at the heart of the chapter: that bargain is fracturing — and the coming wave of transformative technologies is accelerating the cracks.

The state has always walked a tightrope. On one side lies dystopian overreach — tyranny, repression, unchecked surveillance. On the other lies dysfunction — paralysis, fragmentation, decay. The miracle of the liberal democratic state has been its ability to balance power with accountability, central authority with checks and balances. That balance is fragile. And today, it’s wobbling .

The author grounds this argument in personal experience. From chaotic UN climate negotiations in Copenhagen to bureaucratic inertia in London’s city government, he describes institutions that are well-intentioned but slow, divided, and often incapable of coordinated action. Even among actors supposedly “on the same team,” consensus proved elusive. Politics, he suggests, is not just complicated — it is structurally prone to gridlock .

Meanwhile, technology moves at a different speed. While governments stalled, Facebook scaled to 100 million users in a few years. That contrast becomes a framing device: public institutions operate on glacial timelines, while digital platforms move at exponential velocity. This mismatch matters because the state is supposed to regulate technology. What happens when the regulator cannot keep up with the regulated?

The chapter pushes back against two simplistic narratives. First, the idea that technology is neutral and only its use determines political consequences. That’s too reductive. Technology shapes incentives, possibilities, and power structures. Writing enabled bureaucracies. The printing press forged national identities. Gunpowder consolidated state violence. Radio and television unified national consciousness. Technology and political order have always evolved together .

Second, the author rejects the techno-libertarian fantasy that the state is obsolete. He invokes Syria as a visceral reminder of what state failure actually looks like. A weakened state is not liberation — it is chaos. Yet he also warns against the opposite extreme: hyper-empowered authoritarian regimes using AI, robotics, and synthetic biology to create “supercharged Leviathans.” Between hollowed-out “zombie” democracies and tech-enabled techno-dictatorships lies a perilous spectrum .

This is the chapter’s core dilemma: the coming technological wave requires competent, agile, trusted states to manage it. But trust is collapsing. Across democracies, public confidence in government has plummeted. Inequality is rising. Populism is spreading. Institutions are strained. The wave is arriving in what the author calls a combustible environment .

And the wave itself is not abstract. Imagine robots with human dexterity priced like microwaves. AI systems embedded in health care, law enforcement, military planning. Synthetic biology reshaping medicine and agriculture. These tools promise extraordinary gains — cheaper health care, better education, climate solutions. But they also redistribute power. Who owns them? Who controls them? Who regulates failure modes? Each technological advance subtly reconfigures the political economy .

The risk is not just misuse. It is structural destabilization. The same technologies that could help states deliver prosperity might also erode their authority, amplify polarization, and overwhelm regulatory capacity. Social media already demonstrated how digital platforms can amplify distrust and fracture civic discourse . The next wave will be more powerful.

Why does this matter today? Because we are not debating technology in a vacuum. We are debating it in societies already anxious, unequal, and distrustful. Containment — the author’s term for guiding technology toward net benefit — demands coordination, legitimacy, and expertise. It demands states that work “really, really well” . That is a tall order in an era of democratic backsliding and institutional fatigue.

The chapter leaves us with a sobering tension. Technology is our most powerful lever for solving twenty-first-century problems. Yet it is also a force capable of unravelling the very political structures required to manage it. The grand bargain of the state — centralized power in exchange for collective security and prosperity — is under strain.

The question is not whether the wave is coming. It is whether our political institutions can evolve fast enough to survive it.

From Chapter 9 of the book: 'The Coming Wave' by Mustafa Suleyman and Michael Bhaskar