Wednesday, February 25, 2026

Why We Won't Say No (Ch8)


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In 2016, when AlphaGo defeated Lee Sedol, it looked like a technological milestone. But beneath the spectacle was something more consequential: a geopolitical tremor. What seemed like a scientific achievement was interpreted, especially in Asia, as a signal flare in a new global competition.

Chapter 8 makes a sobering argument: the coming wave of AI, biotech, robotics, and quantum computing is not unstoppable because of fate or techno-determinism. It’s unstoppable because of incentives. Powerful, deeply embedded, mutually reinforcing incentives.

And they are everywhere.

The first is geopolitics. Technology is no longer just an economic driver; it is the sharp edge of national power. The author invokes “Sputnik moments” to describe how breakthroughs trigger strategic panic. Just as the Soviet satellite galvanized American investment in space and science, AlphaGo became China’s wake-up call. Beijing responded with a national AI strategy aiming for global leadership by 2030. The United States, Europe, India, and others have similar ambitions. AI is framed not as optional innovation but as strategic necessity.

This creates an arms-race dynamic. Even if no one wants an arms race, everyone assumes others are racing. In that logic, slowing down becomes tantamount to surrender. Technological leadership promises economic growth, military advantage, and geopolitical leverage. Falling behind feels existential.

The second driver is the culture of openness. Science runs on publication, prestige, and peer review. Researchers are rewarded for sharing, not hoarding. Open-source code, preprint servers, global collaboration—knowledge flows faster than ever. The future is being built in public on arXiv and GitHub. That openness accelerates progress, but it also makes containment extraordinarily difficult. There is no central switch to flip. Innovation is distributed across thousands of labs, companies, and start-ups.

Add to this the unpredictability of discovery. CRISPR emerged from obscure research into bacteria thriving in brackish water. GPUs, developed for video games, became the engine of deep learning. Breakthroughs often come from unexpected directions. Trying to steer research away from danger risks missing its most important developments altogether.

Then there is money.

The chapter draws a vivid parallel with the railway mania of the 1840s—a frenzy of speculation that crashed spectacularly but permanently reshaped Britain’s infrastructure. Technology booms are often bubbles. But even when investors lose, society keeps the rails.

Today’s version is far larger. AI alone is forecast to add trillions to global GDP. Venture capital pours over $100 billion a year into AI ventures. Tech giants spend tens of billions annually on R&D. These numbers are not abstract—they are fuel. Shareholders demand returns. Companies that fail to adopt efficiency-enhancing technologies risk extinction. The mantra is simple: innovate or be destroyed.

Profit is not merely greed; it is tied to demand. The modern world’s extraordinary rise in living standards—from agricultural yields to reduced poverty—was powered by technological innovation in pursuit of gain. The same incentives that lifted billions from extreme poverty now drive AI labs and biotech start-ups. The coming wave represents perhaps the largest economic opportunity in history.

But incentives extend beyond wealth and rivalry.

There are also global challenges. Climate change, biodiversity collapse, aging populations, resource scarcity—these are not abstract threats. They require new materials, new energy systems, new medical tools. The author is clear: technology alone is not salvation. But without it, solving these problems is implausible. Carbon capture, sustainable batteries, AI-designed enzymes, hyper-efficient agriculture—these are not luxuries. They are necessities.

And then there is ego.

Scientists want to be first. Entrepreneurs want to build empires. Engineers are drawn to technically “sweet” problems. The Manhattan Project physicists pressed forward not only for national security but because the problem was solvable. That mindset persists. The desire to push boundaries, to leave a mark, to win the race—these are deeply human forces.

Taken together, these incentives form what the author likens to a kind of slime mold—an organism rolling forward through countless small contributions, finding gaps when blocked, advancing without central coordination. National competition reinforces corporate rivalry. Academic prestige feeds start-up formation. Profit amplifies research. Fear accelerates investment. Everything compounds.

This is the central tension: we debate whether we should build certain technologies. But the incentives to build them are already locked in. The option of simply saying “no” is largely illusory.

Containing the wave would require dismantling geopolitical rivalry, reengineering global capitalism, curbing research culture, restraining ego, and still solving urgent planetary crises.

That is the collective action problem of our century.

The wave is not coming because of inevitability. It is coming because of us.

From Chapter 8 of the book: 'The Coming Wave' by Mustafa Suleyman and Michael Bhaskar

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