This note is less about accessing Twitter API but more about Cyber Security where you run a curl command and based on the output from that command you try to figure out the firewall settings of the system.
System 1 Configuration With Strict Firewall Where Our Curl Command For Accessing Twitter API is Not Working:
(base) C:\Users\ash\Desktop>systeminfo
OS Name: Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise
OS Version: 10.0.19042 N/A Build 19042
Processor(s): 1 Processor(s) Installed.
[01]: AMD64 Family 23 Model 24 Stepping 1 AuthenticAMD ~2100 Mhz
BIOS Version: HP R79 Ver. 01.10.03, 3/24/2020
Network Card(s): 4 NIC(s) Installed.
[01]: Realtek RTL8822BE 802.11ac PCIe Adapter
Connection Name: Wi-Fi
DHCP Enabled: Yes
DHCP Server: 192.168.1.1
IP address(es)
[01]: 192.168.1.100
[02]: fe80::b1b2:6d59:f669:1b96
[03]: 2401:4900:47f1:b174:70f4:de28:6287:b1c9
[04]: 2401:4900:47f1:b174:b1b2:6d59:f669:1b96
[02]: Realtek PCIe GbE Family Controller
Connection Name: Ethernet
Status: Media disconnected
[03]: Bluetooth Device (Personal Area Network)
Connection Name: Bluetooth Network Connection
Status: Media disconnected
[04]: Check Point Virtual Network Adapter For Endpoint VPN Client
Connection Name: Ethernet 2
DHCP Enabled: Yes
DHCP Server: 10.79.251.145
IP address(es)
[01]: 10.79.251.146
[02]: fe80::3df2:2a4:b2e1:cb0
Hyper-V Requirements: VM Monitor Mode Extensions: Yes
Virtualization Enabled In Firmware: Yes
Second Level Address Translation: Yes
Data Execution Prevention Available: Yes
System 2 Without Strict Firewall Where Curl Command is Working:
C:\Users\Ashish Jain>systeminfo
Host Name: LAPTOP-79RV456R
OS Name: Microsoft Windows 10 Home Single Language
OS Version: 10.0.19043 N/A Build 19043
OS Manufacturer: Microsoft Corporation
OS Configuration: Standalone Workstation
OS Build Type: Multiprocessor Free
Registered Owner: Ashish Jain
Registered Organization:
Product ID: 00327-35105-52167-AAOEM
Original Install Date: 3/14/2021, 6:33:25 AM
System Boot Time: 7/14/2022, 5:34:13 PM
System Manufacturer: LENOVO
System Model: 81H7
System Type: x64-based PC
Processor(s): 1 Processor(s) Installed.
[01]: Intel64 Family 6 Model 78 Stepping 3 GenuineIntel ~2000 Mhz
BIOS Version: LENOVO 8QCN26WW(V1.14), 12/29/2020
Windows Directory: C:\WINDOWS
System Directory: C:\WINDOWS\system32
Boot Device: \Device\HarddiskVolume1
System Locale: en-us;English (United States)
Input Locale: 00004009
Time Zone: (UTC+05:30) Chennai, Kolkata, Mumbai, New Delhi
Total Physical Memory: 12,154 MB
Available Physical Memory: 7,634 MB
Virtual Memory: Max Size: 14,010 MB
Virtual Memory: Available: 8,057 MB
Virtual Memory: In Use: 5,953 MB
Page File Location(s): C:\pagefile.sys
Domain: WORKGROUP
Logon Server: \\LAPTOP-79RV456R
Hotfix(s): 15 Hotfix(s) Installed.
[01]: KB5013887
[02]: KB4562830
[03]: KB4577586
[04]: KB4580325
[05]: KB4589212
[06]: KB5000736
[07]: KB5015807
[08]: KB5006753
[09]: KB5007273
[10]: KB5011352
[11]: KB5011651
[12]: KB5014032
[13]: KB5014035
[14]: KB5014671
[15]: KB5005699
Network Card(s): 4 NIC(s) Installed.
[01]: VirtualBox Host-Only Ethernet Adapter
Connection Name: VirtualBox Host-Only Network
DHCP Enabled: No
IP address(es)
[01]: 192.168.56.1
[02]: fe80::f839:dc84:9a7b:3087
[02]: Realtek 8821CE Wireless LAN 802.11ac PCI-E NIC
Connection Name: Wi-Fi
Status: Media disconnected
[03]: Realtek PCIe FE Family Controller
Connection Name: Ethernet
Status: Media disconnected
[04]: Bluetooth Device (Personal Area Network)
Connection Name: Bluetooth Network Connection
Status: Media disconnected
Hyper-V Requirements: VM Monitor Mode Extensions: Yes
Virtualization Enabled In Firmware: Yes
Second Level Address Translation: Yes
Data Execution Prevention Available: Yes
C:\Users\Ashish Jain>
I was able to make a successful request from System 2:
(base) C:\Users\Ashish Jain>curl "https://api.twitter.com/2/users/by/username/vantagepoint21" -H "Authorization: Bearer A***V"
{"data":{"id":"96529689","name":"Ashish Jain","username":"vantagepoint21"}}
(base) C:\Users\Ashish Jain>curl "https://api.twitter.com/2/users/by/username/elonmusk" -H "Authorization: Bearer A***V"
{"data":{"id":"44196397","name":"Elon Musk","username":"elonmusk"}}
The curl command is not working on the System 1.
I think there is some issue being created by Network Firewall settings in my office laptop. From which I was not able to get a response from Twitter API.
(base) C:\Users\ash\Desktop\twitter_api>curl "https://api.twitter.com/2/users/by/username/vantagepoint21" -H "Authorization: Bearer 9***2"
curl: (35) schannel: next InitializeSecurityContext failed: Unknown error (0x80092012) - The revocation function was unable to check revocation for the certificate.
On further testing the "curl" command on 'System 1' for URLs with "http" and "https" protocols:
(base) C:\Users\ash\Desktop>curl www.survival8.blogspot.com
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Moved Permanently</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF" TEXT="#000000">
<H1>Moved Permanently</H1>
The document has moved <A HREF="http://survival8.blogspot.com/">here</A>.
</BODY>
</HTML>
Success for HTTP based URL
---
(base) C:\Users\ash\Desktop>curl https://survival8.blogspot.com
curl: (35) schannel: next InitializeSecurityContext failed: Unknown error (0x80092012) - The revocation function was unable to check revocation for the certificate.
(base) C:\Users\ash\Desktop>curl https://survival8.blogspot.com/2022/08/lets-talk-about-whataboutery.html
curl: (35) schannel: next InitializeSecurityContext failed: Unknown error (0x80092012) - The revocation function was unable to check revocation for the certificate.
Failure for HTTPS based URL.
---
Successful Testing With Another HTTP based URL:
(base) C:\Users\ash\Desktop>curl http://survival8.blogspot.com/2022/08/lets-talk-about-whataboutery.html
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html class='v2' dir='ltr' lang='en'>
<head>
<link href='https://www.blogger.com/static/v1/widgets/2975350028-css_bundle_v2.css' rel='stylesheet' type='text/css'/>
<meta content='width=1100' name='viewport'/>
<meta content='text/html; charset=UTF-8' http-equiv='Content-Type'/>
<meta content='blogger' name='generator'/>
<link href='http://survival8.blogspot.com/favicon.ico' rel='icon' type='image/x-icon'/>
<link href='http://survival8.blogspot.com/2022/08/lets-talk-about-whataboutery.html' rel='canonical'/>
<link rel="alternate" type="application/atom+xml" title="survival8 - Atom" href="http://survival8.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default" />
<link rel="alternate" type="application/rss+xml" title="survival8 - RSS" href="http://survival8.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default?alt=rss" />
<link rel="service.post" type="application/atom+xml" title="survival8 - Atom" href="https://draft.blogger.com/feeds/7823701911930369175/posts/default" />
<link rel="alternate" type="application/atom+xml" title="survival8 - Atom" href="http://survival8.blogspot.com/feeds/1169952638388485943/comments/default" />
<!--Can't find substitution for tag [blog.ieCssRetrofitLinks]-->
<meta content='http://survival8.blogspot.com/2022/08/lets-talk-about-whataboutery.html' property='og:url'/>
<meta content='Let’s talk about ‘Whataboutery’' property='og:title'/>
<meta content=' what·about·ery [ˌwɒtəˈbaʊtəri] NOUN BRITISH the technique or practice of responding to an accusation or dif...' property='og:description'/>
<title>survival8: Let’s talk about ‘Whataboutery’</title>
<style id='page-skin-1' type='text/css'><!--
/*
-----------------------------------------------
Blogger Template Style
Name: Simple
Designer: Blogger
URL: www.blogger.com
----------------------------------------------- */
/* Content
----------------------------------------------- */
body { ...
Also, note that if that was Authorization failure from Twitter API, then the output would still be a JSON format informative message:
(base) C:\Users\Ashish Jain>curl "https://api.twitter.com/2/users/by/username/elonmusk" -H "Authorization: Bearer 9***INCORRECT_BEARER_TOKEN***2"
{
"title": "Unauthorized",
"type": "about:blank",
"status": 401,
"detail": "Unauthorized"
}
On a Side Note: Take a look at another error message from Twitter API:
(base) C:\Users\Ashish Jain>curl "https://api.twitter.com/2/users/by/username/elonmusj" -H "Authorization: Bearer A***V"
{ "errors":
[
{
"parameter":"username",
"resource_id":"elonmusj",
"value":"elonmusj",
"detail":"User has been suspended: [elonmusj].",
"title":"Forbidden",
"resource_type":"user",
"type":"https://api.twitter.com/2/problems/resource-not-found"
}
]
}
Notice the typo in Elon Musk's user handle we provided in query: elonmusj
Showing posts with label Cyber Security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cyber Security. Show all posts
Monday, August 8, 2022
Accessing Twitter API From Two Systems. One With Firewall and Second Without Firewall
Sunday, May 22, 2022
What is this l.facebook.com in Blogger Top Referrers (2022-May-23)
1. Before Top Referer - l.facebook.com
2. Click on this blue 'learn more' button (below banner) that generates leads wrt l.facebook.com
3. Before The Link Goes Out to survival8, look at the intermediate URL
4. After Top Referrer - l.facebook.com
Friday, May 20, 2022
Testing Anti-virus Functionality of Google Drive (2022-May-20)
1. Virus found in .zip file due to the presence of an .exe Executable file.
2. Can't download all files Suspicious files will be skipped.
3. As an owner, I can download the files individually at my own risk
4. As an owner, I can download the files individually at my own risk
5. The Deleting the Executable Files from 'CD1' Directory
Ashish Jain@LAPTOP-79RV456R MINGW64 ~/OneDrive/Desktop/CD1 $ ls 0others/ 1allaboutmba/ 2bschool/ 3writtentest/ Ashish Jain@LAPTOP-79RV456R MINGW64 ~/OneDrive/Desktop/CD1 $ cd 0others/ Ashish Jain@LAPTOP-79RV456R MINGW64 ~/OneDrive/Desktop/CD1/0others $ ls -lR | grep exe -rwxr-xr-x 1 Ashish Jain 197121 6603173 Jan 5 2000 acrobat.exe* -rw-r--r-- 1 Ashish Jain 197121 1039 Jul 20 2004 menu_link_exe.gif Ashish Jain@LAPTOP-79RV456R MINGW64 ~/OneDrive/Desktop/CD1/0others $ cd ../3writtentest/ Ashish Jain@LAPTOP-79RV456R MINGW64 ~/OneDrive/Desktop/CD1/3writtentest $ ls -lR | grep exe -rwxr-xr-x 1 Ashish Jain 197121 753664 May 7 2001 307vocabsoftware1.exe* -rwxr-xr-x 1 Ashish Jain 197121 240218 Jul 3 2004 310mathsoft.exe* -rwxr-xr-x 1 Ashish Jain 197121 1602560 Mar 2 2004 311gmattest.exe* Ashish Jain@LAPTOP-79RV456R MINGW64 ~/OneDrive/Desktop/CD1/3writtentest Logs post deletion of Executables: Ashish Jain@LAPTOP-79RV456R MINGW64 ~/OneDrive/Desktop/CD1 $ ls -lR | grep exe -rw-r--r-- 1 Ashish Jain 197121 1039 Jul 20 2004 menu_link_exe.gif
Thursday, May 19, 2022
Full Lumen Complaint Notice from TIME Institute against survival8 Blog for CAT Preparation Content
DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google
sender
Naxap Technology Private Limited
on behalf of TRIUMPHANT INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT EDUCATION PVT.LTD (Triumphant Institute of Management Education Private Limited)
[Private] IN Sent on COUNTRY: INrecipient
Google LLC
[Private] Mountain View, CA, 94043, USsubmitter
Google LLC
Other Entities:
- Principal
Re: Unknown
- Notice Type:
- DMCA
-
Copyright claim #1
Kind of Work: UnspecifiedDescription The course is published by 'TRIUMPHANT INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT EDUCATION PVT.LTD'. You can find all the listings on their website and samples mentioned in the work. Check Authorization Letter Here: https://bit.ly/3usTzrC You can further contact the organisation for any information from their website https://www.time4education.com/ or by [REDACTED]Original URLs:- https://www.time4education.com/
Allegedly Infringing URLs:- https://freesoff.com/t/get-cat-exam-materials-collection/3506
- https://fssquad.com/threads/collections-cat-exam-material-2020.57323/
- https://unibrowngirl.business.blog/2020/06/09/t-i-m-e-cat-material/
- https://www.testcrackers.org/gmat-prep-courses
-
Copyright claim #2
Kind of Work: UnspecifiedDescription The material is published by 'TRIUMPHANT INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT EDUCATION PVT.LTD'. You can find all the book listings in their e-store and samples mentioned in the work. Check Authorization Letter Here: https://bit.ly/3usTzrC You can further contact the organisation for any information from their website https://www.time4education.com/ or by [REDACTED]Original URLs:- https://www.time4education.com/
Allegedly Infringing URLs:- http://cat.xaam.in/2015/05/time-aimcat-mock-test-paper-for.html
- https://pastebin.com/heneszPc
- https://pdfcoffee.com/aimcat-1801-pdf-free.html
- https://pdfcoffee.com/qdownload/aimcat-1801-pdf-free.html
- https://pdfcoffee.com/qdownload/aimcat--pdf-free.html
- http://survival8.blogspot.com/p/download-cat-2014-books-may-2019.html
- https://wakelet.com/wake/-XzZpjVYGfy-9_GPVGnWy
Tuesday, May 17, 2022
Limitations LinkedIn puts on you when you add too many people (2022-May-17)
At 60 Invitations Sent
Nice job building your network! Tip: If it's someone you don't know yet, you can follow them to see their updates or send an InMail.
At 100
You've sent more invitations than most On LinkedIn, it's best to only connect with people you know. You can still send an InMail if you want to introduce yourself.
At 150
You're close to the weekly invitation limit To avoid overwhelming the inbox of other members, only connect with people you know. For people you don't know, consider following them or sending an InMail instead.
At 180
You're close to the weekly invitation limit To avoid overwhelming the inbox of other members, only connect with people you know. For people you don't know, consider following them or sending an InMail instead.
At 190
You're close to the weekly invitation limit To avoid overwhelming the inbox of other members, only connect with people you know. For people you don't know, consider following them or sending an InMail instead. Unable to connect to Gaurav Harbola. Try again later.
At 200
You’ve reached the weekly invitation limit Connections benefit you more when you know them personally, so we have weekly limits to encourage better networks. For people you don’t know, you can follow them to see their posts or send an InMail instead. If you’d still like to send an invitation, please try again next week.
If you continue to add people in the following week after the "Weekly Limit" is removed, your account would be temporarily blocked.
We've restricted your account temporarily We think you may be using an automation tool to send invitations. To help guard against abuse, we don’t permit the use of software tools that automate activity on LinkedIn. We showed you a warning about this previously, so for now, we have locked your account until May 28, 2022 11:27 PM PDT. Please try signing in again after this time. Please note that engaging further in such activity may result in permanent restriction of your account. For more details, please visit our Help Center.
Tuesday, January 25, 2022
SaveFrom to exit from USA (Jan 2022)
Subject: Discontinuation of Service in the United States April 16, 2020 Dear Savefrom User: As you may have heard, our industry has been under strenuous attacks by certain US copyright holders. Because of these attacks, it has become financially impractical for Savefrom to continue to provide services in the United States. Accordingly, Savefrom will be terminating its services in the United States as of April 28, 2020. We thank you for your past loyalty and patronage and wish you health and safety during the present health crisis and beyond. Very truly yours, Savefrom
Friday, September 3, 2021
Google Sites, Tor Exit Nodes and Captcha
Top 10 Websites
Rank - Website - Monthly Visitors - Country of Origin - Category 1 Google.com 92.5B U.S. Search Engines 2 Youtube.com 34.6B U.S. TV Movies and Streaming 3 Facebook.com 25.5B U.S. Social Networks and Online Communities 4 Twitter.com 6.6B U.S. Social Networks and Online Communities 5 Wikipedia.org 6.1B U.S. Dictionaries and Encyclopedias 6 Instagram.com 6.1B U.S. Social Networks and Online Communities 7 Baidu.com 5.6B China Search Engines 8 Yahoo.com 3.8B U.S. News and Media 9 xvideos.com 3.4B Czech Republic Adult 10 pornhub.com 3.3B Canada Adult ... 41 Walmart.com 718.6M U.S. Marketplace 42 Bilibili.com 686.0M China Animation and Comics 43 Tiktok.com 663.2M China Social Networks and Online Communities 44 Paypal.com 657.2M U.S. Financial Planning and Management 45 Google.de 624.5M Germany Search Engines 46 Amazon.co.jp 619.2M Japan Marketplace 47 Aliexpress.com 611.0M China Marketplace 48 Amazon.de 608.8M Germany Marketplace 49 Rakuten.co.jp 593.4M Japan Marketplace 50 Amazon.co.uk 579.7M United Kingdom MarketplaceTop 50 Websites
Google.com
YouTube
2021-Sep-02
2021-Aug-24
survival8.blogspot.com
Ref: visualcapitalist
Monday, August 23, 2021
Multifactor Authentication protects you from scrapers and automation tools (Case study of LinkedIn)
1. Linkedin Scraping and Logging Issue with MFA2. LinkedIn Scraping - Google Auth fails as Google knows that you in an automated environment
Sunday, August 8, 2021
Censorship in India, Torrenting and Tribler (Aug 2021)
1: Censorship in India (Part 1)
Your requested URL has been blocked as per the directions received from Department of Telecommunications, Government of India. Please contact administrator for more information. Note: You can still open the link the Tor Browser.2: Censorship in India (Part 2)
Censorship of trackers (discovered using qBit)3: Now comes in the Tribler. What's that?
4: Getting the Magnet link for a Torrent download via qBitTorrent
5: Paste the Magnet link from qBit to Tribler
Then wait for Metadata to load.6: Trackers information in Tribler
7: Peer info in Tribler
8: Caveat: Performance Issue in Tribler
Saturday, July 3, 2021
Before you continue to YouTube, Google uses cookies and data to...
The above screeshot was taken from Tor Browser on 20210704. Before you continue to YouTube Google uses cookies and data to: 1. Deliver and maintain services, like tracking outages and protecting against spam, fraud, and abuse 2. Measure audience engagement and site statistics to understand how our services are used If you agree, we’ll also use cookies and data to: 1. Improve the quality of our services and develop new ones 2. Deliver and measure the effectiveness of ads 3. Show personalized content, depending on your settings 4. Show personalized or generic ads, depending on your settings, on Google and across the web For non-personalized content and ads, what you see may be influenced by things like the content you’re currently viewing and your location (ad serving is based on general location). Personalized content and ads can be based on those things and your activity like Google searches and videos you watch on YouTube. Personalized content and ads include things like more relevant results and recommendations, a customized YouTube homepage, and ads that are tailored to your interests. Click “Customize” to review options, including controls to reject the use of cookies for personalization and information about browser-level controls to reject some or all cookies for other uses. You can also visit g.co/privacytools anytime.
Wednesday, June 23, 2021
Tor Browser, Anonymity and Your IP Address
1 - What is my IP Address When I Use Tor Browser URL: WhatIsMyIPAddress.com2 - GitHub Security Logs for IP Address on Tor Browser
3 - What is my IP address as reported by Google Search
4 - IP Address Lookup for 'whatIsMyIPAddress.com'
5 - IP Address Lookup for IP Address showed by Google search
This is a Tor Exit Router: 156.146.58.134
Most likely you are accessing this website because you had some issue with the traffic coming from this IP. This router is part of the Tor Anonymity Network, which is dedicated to providing privacy to people who need it most: average computer users. This router IP should be generating no other traffic, unless it has been compromised.
Tor sees use by many important segments of the population, including whistle blowers, journalists, Chinese dissidents skirting the Great Firewall and oppressive censorship, abuse victims, stalker targets, the US military, and law enforcement, just to name a few. While Tor is not designed for malicious computer users, it is true that they can use the network for malicious ends. In reality however, the actual amount of abuse is quite low. This is largely because criminals and hackers have significantly better access to privacy and anonymity than do the regular users whom they prey upon. Criminals can and do build, sell, and trade far larger and more powerful networks than Tor on a daily basis. Thus, in the mind of this operator, the social need for easily accessible censorship-resistant private, anonymous communication trumps the risk of unskilled bad actors, who are almost always more easily uncovered by traditional police work than by extensive monitoring and surveillance anyway.
In terms of applicable law, the best way to understand Tor is to consider it a network of routers operating as common carriers, much like the Internet backbone. However, unlike the Internet backbone routers, Tor routers explicitly do not contain identifiable routing information about the source of a packet, and no single Tor node can determine both the origin and destination of a given transmission.
As such, there is little the operator of this router can do to help you track the connection further. This router maintains no logs of any of the Tor traffic, so there is little that can be done to trace either legitimate or illegitimate traffic (or to filter one from the other). Attempts to seize this router will accomplish nothing.
Furthermore, this machine also serves as a carrier of email, which means that its contents are further protected under the ECPA. 18 USC 2707 explicitly allows for civil remedies ($1000/account plus legal fees) in the event of a seizure executed without good faith or probable cause (it should be clear at this point that traffic with an originating IP address of nyc-exit.privateinternetaccess.com should not constitute probable cause to seize the machine). Similar considerations exist for 1st amendment content on this machine.
If you are a representative of a company who feels that this router is being used to violate the DMCA, please be aware that this machine does not host or contain any illegal content. Also be aware that network infrastructure maintainers are not liable for the type of content that passes over their equipment, in accordance with DMCA "safe harbor" provisions. In other words, you will have just as much luck sending a takedown notice to the Internet backbone providers. Please consult EFF's prepared response for more information on this matter.
For more information, please consult the following documentation:
That being said, if you still have a complaint about the router, you may email the maintainer. If complaints are related to a particular service that is being abused, I will consider removing that service from my exit policy, which would prevent my router from allowing that traffic to exit through it. I can only do this on an IP+destination port basis, however. Common P2P ports are already blocked.
You also have the option of blocking this IP address and others on the Tor network if you so desire. The Tor project provides a web service to fetch a list of all IP addresses of Tor exit nodes that allow exiting to a specified IP:port combination, and an official DNSRBL is also available to determine if a given IP address is actually a Tor exit server. Please be considerate when using these options. It would be unfortunate to deny all Tor users access to your site indefinitely simply because of a few bad apples.
Tuesday, June 15, 2021
Art of War (by Sun Tzu) - Summary
The Art of War (By Sun Tzu) Index: Ch 1: Laying Plans Ch 2: Waging War Ch 3: Attack by Stratagem Ch 4: Tactical Dispositions Ch 5: Energy Ch 6: Weak Points and Strong Ch 7: Maneuvering Ch 8: Variation in Tactics Ch 9: The Army on the March Ch 10: Terrain Ch 11: The Nine Situations Ch 12: The Attack by Fire Ch 13: The Use of SpiesCh 1: Laying Plans
The art of war is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline. (1) The Moral Law: The moral law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger. (2) Heaven: Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. (3) Earth: Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. (4) The Commander: The Commander stands for the virtues of: 4.1 wisdom, 4.2 sincerely, 4.3 benevolence, 4.4 courage and 4.5 strictness. The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are: (1) humanity or benevolence; (2) uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self-control, or “proper feeling;” (4) wisdom; (5) sincerity or good faith. Here “wisdom” and “sincerity” are put before “humanity or benevolence,” and the two military virtues of “courage” and “strictness” substituted for “uprightness of mind” and “self-respect, self-control, or ‘proper feeling.’” (5) Method and discipline. By Method and Discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure. ~ ~ ~ Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise: (a) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law? [I.e., “is in harmony with his subjects..] (b) Which of the two generals has most ability? (c) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? (d) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? [Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts`ao Ts`ao (a.d. 155-220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned himself to death for having allowed him horse to shy into a field of corn! However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice by cutting off his hair. Ts`ao Ts`ao’s own comment on the present passage is characteristically curt: “when you lay down a law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the offender must be put to death.”] (e) Which army is stronger? [Morally as well as physically.] (f) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? [Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: “Without constant practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand.”] (g) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment? [On which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?] ~ ~ ~ On the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said: “Who will attack the fir st tomorrow — I or Bonaparte?” “Bonaparte,” replied Lord Uxbridge. “Well,” continued the Duke, “Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?” ~ ~ ~ All warfare is based on deception. Hence: 1# when able to attack, we must seem unable; 2# when using our forces, we must seem inactive; 3# when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; 4# when far away, we must make him believe we are near. 5# Hold out baits to entice the enemy. 6# Feign disorder, and crush him. 7# If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. 8# If he is in superior strength, evade him. 9# If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. 10# Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. 11# If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. 12# If his forces are united, separate them. 13# Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple where the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.Ch 2: Waging War
Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. [This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the commentators. Ts`ao Kung, Li Ch`uan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch`en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: “Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they bring calamity in their train.” Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remarking: “Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the people; true cleverness insures against the occurrence of such calamities.” Chang Yu says: “So long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness.”] Now Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better than ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something much more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but foolish — if only because it means impoverishment to the nation. ~ ~ ~ # There is no instance of a country having benefitted from prolonged warfare. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on. # The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice. [Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh supplies, but crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may seem an audacious policy to recommend, but with all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the value of time — that is, being a little ahead of your opponent —has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to commissariat.] # Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs. # Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished. # On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions. # With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; [Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: “The people being regarded as the essential part of the State, and food as the people’s heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value and be careful of both?”] while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles, drought-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue. # Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a single picul (65.5 kilograms) of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store. # Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards. [Tu Mu says: “Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his own account.”] # Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength. # In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. [As Ho Shih remarks: “War is not a thing to be trifled with.”]Ch 3: Attack by Stratagem
Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting. Thus the highest form of generalship is: 1) to balk the enemy’s plans; “When the enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate him by delivering our own attack first.” - Ho Shih 2) the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; 3) the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; [When he is already at full strength.] and 4) the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem. It is the rule in war: a) If our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; b) If five to one, to attack him; [Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.] c) If twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. d) If equally matched, we can offer battle; e) If slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; [The meaning, “we can watch the enemy,” is certainly a great improvement on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be no very good authority for the variant.] f) If quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:— a) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. (b) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier’s minds. c) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, [That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.] through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. Tu Mu quotes: “The skillful employer of men will employ: I) the wise man, II) the brave man, III) the covetous man, and IV) the stupid man. For the wise man delights in establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man has no fear of death. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: a) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. b) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces. c) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks. d) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. e) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign. Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: “It is the sovereign’s function to give broad instructions, but to decide on battle it is the function of the general.” It is needless to dilate on the military disasters which have been caused by undue interference with operations in the field on the part of the home government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to the fact that he was not hampered by central authority. Hence the saying: I) If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. II) If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. III) If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. Chang Yu said: “Knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive.” He adds: “Attack is the secret of defense; defense is the planning of an attack.” Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.Ch 4: Tactical Dispositions
Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. [That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy’s part.] Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. Chang Yu says this is done, “By concealing the disposition of his troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions.” Hence the saying: One may Know how to conquer without being able to do it. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, “Well done!” [True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: “To plan secretly, to move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy’s intentions and balk his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood.” Sun Tzu reserves his approbation for things that “the world’s coarse thumb And finger fail to plumb.”] To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; [“Autumn” hair” is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in Chinese writers.] to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. [The last half is literally “one who, conquering, excels in easy conquering.” Mei Yao-ch`en says: “He who only sees the obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things, wins with ease.”] Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. [Ch`en Hao says: “He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile attacks.” The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu: “One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably win.”] Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory. [Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: “In warfare, first lay plans which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be assured.”] The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success. In respect of military method, we have, I) firstly, Measurement; II) secondly, Estimation of quantity; III) thirdly, Calculation; IV) fourthly, Balancing of chances; V) fifthly, Victory. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances. [It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the Chinese.] A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight placed in the scale against a single grain. A routed army is a 1/24 oz. weighed against an 20 oz.” The point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over one demoralized by defeat.” The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.Ch 5: Energy
Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain unshaken — this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect. [We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzu’s treatise, the discussion of the Cheng and the Ch`i.” As it is by no means easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to render them consistently by good English equivalents; it may be as well to tabulate some of the commentators’ remarks on the subject before proceeding further. Li Ch`uan: “Facing the enemy is Cheng, making lateral diversion is Ch`i. Chia Lin: “In presence of the enemy, your troops should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal maneuvers must be employed.” Mei Yao-ch`en: “Ch`i is active, Cheng is passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity, activity beings the victory itself.” Ho Shih: “We must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, and vice versa; thus Cheng may also be Ch`i, and Ch`i may also be Cheng.”] I) Wei Liao Tzu [4th cent. B.C.] says: ‘Direct warfare favors frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.’ II) Ts`ao Kung says: ‘Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation; appearing on the enemy’s rear is an indirect maneuver.’ III) Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent . a.d.] says: ‘In war, to march straight ahead is Cheng; turning movements, on the other hand, are Ch`i.’ That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg — this is effected by the science of weak points and strong. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more. I) There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. II) There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen. III) There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted. IV) In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack — the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle — you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination? The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the releasing of a trigger. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. [Mei Yao-ch`en says: “The subdivisions of the army having been previously fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the separating and joining, the dispersing and collecting which will take place in the course of a battle, may give the appearance of disorder when no real disorder is possible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question.”] Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. Tu Mu says: “If our force happens to be superior to the enemy’s, weakness may be simulated in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he must be led to believe that we are strong, in order that he may keep off. In fact, all the enemy’s movements should be determined by the signs that we choose to give him.” Note the following anecdote of Sun Pin, a descendent of Sun Wu: In 341 B.C., the Ch`I State being at war with Wei, sent T`ien Chi and Sun Pin against the general P`ang Chuan, who happened to be a deadly personal enemy of the later. Sun Pin said: “The Ch`I State has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to account.” Accordingly, when the army had crossed the border into Wei territory, he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on the first night, 50,000 on the next, and the night after only 20,000. P`ang Chuan pursued them hotly, saying to himself: “I knew these men of Ch`I were cowards: their numbers have already fallen away by more than half.” In his retreat, Sun Pin came to a narrow defile, with he calculated that his pursuers would reach after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon it the words: “Under this tree shall P`ang Chuan die.” Then, as night began to fall, he placed a strong body of archers in ambush near by, with orders to shoot directly they saw a light. Later on, P`ang Chuan arrived at the spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in order to read what was written on it. His body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows, and his whole army thrown into confusion. ~ ~ ~ He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too much from individuals. Tu Mu says: “He first of all considers the power of his army in the bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses each men according to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from the untalented.” Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy. The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu’s opinion, is the paramount importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes. “Great results,” he adds, “can thus be achieved with small forces.”Ch 6: Weak Points and Strong
Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him. [One mark of a great soldier is that he fights on his own terms or fights not at all.] By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near. In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he will strike at some important point which the enemy will have to defend. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force him to move. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not. [Ts`ao Kung sums up very well: “Emerge from the void like “a bolt from the blue”, strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are defended, attack in unexpected quarters.”] You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended. [Wang Hsi explains “undefended places” as “weak points; that is to say, where the general is lacking in capacity, or the soldiers in spirit; where the walls are not strong enough, or the precautions not strict enough; where relief comes too late, or provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst themselves.”] You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked. [i.e., where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this later clause. Tu Mu, Ch`en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch`en assume the meaning to be: “In order to make your defense quite safe, you must defend even those places that are not likely to be attacked;” and Tu Mu adds: “How much more, then, those that will be attacked.” Taken thus, however, the clause balances less well with the preceding—always a consideration in the highly antithetical style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark in saying: “He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven, making it impossible for the enemy to guard against him. This being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the enemy cannot defend... He who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack.”] Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack. [An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.] O, divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; [Literally, “without form or sound,” but it is said of course with reference to the enemy] and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. [Tu Mu says: “If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line of communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to return; if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign himself.” It is clear that Sun Tzu, unlike certain generals in the late Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.] If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way. What Sun Tzu is advocating here, therefore, is nothing more nor less than the timely use of “bluff.” By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided. [The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu (after Mei Yao-ch`en) rightly explains it thus: “If the enemy’s dispositions are visible, we can make for him in one body; whereas, our own dispositions being kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in order to guard against attack from every quarter.”] We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak. [In Frederick the Great’s instructions to his generals we read: “A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every point, while those who are better acquainted with their profession, having only the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in small misfortunes to avoid greater.”] Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us. [The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson’s words, is “to compel the enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force against each fraction in turn.”] Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight. [What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of distances and that masterly employment of strategy which enable a general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the right spot and the right hour in order to confront the enemy in overwhelming strength.] But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest port ions of the army are anything under a hundred li apart, and even the nearest are separated by several li! Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success. [An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: “Know beforehand all plans conducive to our success and to the enemy’s failure.”] Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. [Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by the enemy on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether his policy is to lie low or the reverse.] Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains. [The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. Concealment is perhaps not so much actual invisibility as “showing no sign” of what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your brain. Tu Mu explains: “Though the enemy may have clever and capable officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against us.”] How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. [i.e., everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which has preceded the battle. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances]. [As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: “There is but one root-principle underlying victory, but the tactics which lead up to it are infinite in number.” With this compare Col. Henderson: “The rules of strategy are few and simple. They may be learned in a week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams. But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon.”] Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak. [Like water, taking the line of least resistance.] Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant. That is, as Wang Hsi says: “they predominate alternately”. The four seasons make way for each other in turn. [Literally, “have no invariable seat.”] There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing. [The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the want of fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in Nature. The comparison is not very happy because the regularity of the phenomena which Sun Tzu mentions is by no means paralleled in war.]Ch 7: Maneuvering
Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. Wu Tzu said: “Without harmony in the State, no military expedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the army, no battle array can be formed.” In an historical romance Sun Tzu is represented as saying to Wu Yuan: “As a general rule, those who are waging war should get rid of all the domestic troubles before proceeding to attack the external foe.” After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. Tu Yu also observes that “the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in seizing favorable position.” The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores. [On the whole, it is clear that Sun Tzu does not approve of a lengthy march being undertaken without supplies.] Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundred li in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination. [The moral is, as Ts`ao Kung and others point out: Don’t march a hundred li to gain a tactical advantage, either with or without impedimenta. Maneuvers of this description should be confined to short distances. Stonewall Jackson said: “The hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the dangers of battle.” He did not often call upon his troops for extraordinary exertions. It was only when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he sacrificed everything for speed.] If you march fifty li in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal. If you march thirty li with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, [The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift but, as Mei Yao-ch`en points out, “invisible and leaves no tracks.”] your compactness that of the forest. [Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: “When slowly marching, order and ranks must be preserved”—so as to guard against surprise attacks. But natural forest do not grow in rows, whereas they do generally possess the quality of density or compactness.] In raiding and plundering be like fire, in immovability like a mountain. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt. [Tu Yu quotes a saying of T`ai Kung which has passed into a proverb: “You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the lighting—so rapid are they.” Likewise, an attack should be made so quickly that it cannot be parried.] When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; [Sun Tzu wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which may afterwards be fairly divided amongst all.] when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery. [Ch`en Hao says “quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow and plant it.”] Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. [Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzu as saying that we must not break camp until we have gained the resisting power of the enemy and the cleverness of the opposing general.] He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the art of maneuvering. The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point. [Chang Yu says: “If sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the same object, the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be like those of a single man.”!] The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. [Chuang Yu quotes a saying: “Equally guilty are those who advance against orders and those who retreat against orders.” Tu Mu tells a story in this connection of Wu Ch`I, when he was fighting against the Ch`in State. Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of matchless daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and returned to camp. Wu Ch`I had the man instantly executed, whereupon an officer ventured to remonstrate, saying: “This man was a good soldier, and ought not to have been beheaded.” Wu Ch`I replied: “I fully believe he was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he acted without orders.”] This is the art of handling large masses of men. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; [“In war,” says Chang Yu, “if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy’s soldiers will be keenest when they have newly arrived on the scene, and it is therefore our cue not to fight at once, but to wait until their ardor and enthusiasm have worn off, and then strike. It is in this way that they may be robbed of their keen spirit.” Li Ch`uan and others tell an anecdote (to be found in the Tso C Huan, year 10.) of Ts`ao Kuei, a protégé of Duke Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by Ch`I, and the duke was about to join battle at Ch`ang-cho, after the first roll of the enemy’s drums, when Ts`ao said: “Not just yet.”] [Only after their drums had beaten for the third time, did he give the word for attack. Then they fought, and the men of Ch`I were utterly defeated. Questioned afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts`ao Kuei replied: “In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the first roll of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is already on the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence our victory.” Wu Tzu (chap. 4) puts “spirit” first among the “four important influences” in war, and continues: “The value of a whole army—a mighty host of a million men—is dependent on one man alone: such is the influence of spirit!”] a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. [Chang Yu says: “Presence of mind is the general’s most important asset. It is the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire courage into the panic-stricken.” The great general Li Ching (a.d. 571-649) has a saying: “Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled cities or striking at an army in battle array; it must include the art of assailing the enemy’s mental equilibrium.”] Now a solider’s spirit is keenest in the morning; [Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting, whereas Hannibal’s men had breakfasted at their leisure. ] by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:—this is the art of studying circumstances. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. [Li Ch`uan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor, take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been poisoned by the enemy. Ch`en Hao and Chang Yu carefully point out that the saying has a wider application.] Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. [The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to the death against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yu quote s the words of Han Hsin: “Invincible is the soldier who hath his desire and returneth homewards.” A marvelous tale is told of Ts`ao Ts`ao’s courage and resource in ch. 1 of the San Kuo Chi: In 198 a.d., he was besieging Chang Hsiu in Jang, when Liu Pi ao sent reinforcements with a view to cutting off Ts`ao’s retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off his troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two enemies, who were guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged himself. In this desperate plight Ts`ao waited until nightfall, when he bored a tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. As soon as the whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on his rear, while Ts`ao himself turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were thrown into confusion and annihilated. Ts`ao Ts`ao said afterwards: “The brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a desperate position: hence I knew how to overcome them.”] When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. [This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The object, as Tu Mu puts it, is “to make him believe that there is a road to safety, and thus prevent his fighting with the courage of despair.” Tu Mu adds pleasantly: “After that, you may crush him.”] Do not press a desperate foe too hard. [Ch`en Hao quotes the saying: “Birds and beasts when brought to bay will use their claws and teeth.” Chang Yu says: “If your adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities.”] Such is the art of warfare.Ch 8: Variation in Tactics
Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate position, you must fight. There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which must not be besieged, positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed. Chang Yu says: “No town should be attacked which, if taken, cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble.” Hsun Ying, when urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: “The city is small and well-fortified; even if I succeed in taking it, it will be no great feat of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock.” In the seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. It was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and maneuvers. He said: “It is a great mistake to waste men in taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a province.” This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for authority, and Wei Liao Tzu (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim: “Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the negation of civil order!” The unpalatable fact remains, however, that even Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men. Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and generally advantageous lines of action, namely: 1. if a certain road is short, it must be followed; 2. if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; 3. if a town is in a parlous condition, it must be besieged; 4. if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted; and 5. if consistent with military operations, the ruler’s commands must be obeyed. But there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these advantages. For instance, “a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but if he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking,” and so on. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together. [“Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one,” says Ts`ao Kung, “the opposite state should be always present to your mind. “] If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes. [Tu Mu says: “If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into our calculations.”] If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune. [Tu Mu says: “If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, I must consider not only the enemy’s ability to injure me, but also my own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels these two considerations are properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating myself.... For instance; if I am surrounded by the enemy and only think of effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy will incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy’s toils.”] Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; [Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of which would only occur to the Oriental mind:— 1. Entice away the enemy’s best and wisest men, so that he may be left without counselors. 2. Introduce traitors into his country, that the government policy may be rendered futile. 3. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his ministers. 4. By means of every artful contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure. 5. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess. 6. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women.” Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of Sun Tzu here: 1. Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer injury, and he will submit of his own accord.”] and 2. make trouble for them, [Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that trouble should be make for the enemy affecting their “possessions,” or, as we might say, “assets,” which he considers to be: 2.1. a large army, 2.2. a rich exchequer, 2.3. harmony amongst the soldiers, 2.4. punctual fulfillment of commands. These give us a whip-hand over the enemy.] and keep them constantly engaged; [Literally, “make servants of them.” Tu Yu says “prevent the from having any rest.”] hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point. [Meng Shih’s note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use of: “cause them to forget pien (the reasons for acting otherwise than on their first impulse), and hasten in our direction.”] The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (a) Recklessness, which leads to destruction; [“Bravery without forethought,” as Ts`ao Kung analyzes it, which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an opponent, says Chang Yu, “must not be encountered with brute force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain. In estimating the character of a general, men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting that courage is only one out of many qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, without any perception of what is expedient, must be condemned.” Ssu-ma Fa, too, make the incisive remark: “Simply going to one’s death does not bring about victory.”] (b) Cowardice, which leads to capture; [Ts`ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as “cowardice” as being of the man “whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an advantage,” and Wang Hsi adds “who is quick to flee at the sight of danger.” Meng Shih gives the closer paraphrase “he who is bent on returning alive,” this is, the man who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzu knew, nothing is to be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks. T`ai Kung said: “He who lets an advantage slip will subsequently bring upon himself real disaster.” In 404 a.d., Liu Yu pursued the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle with him at the island of Ch`eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered only a few thousands, while their opponents were in great force. But Hu an Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him should be overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of his war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary, at a moment’s notice. The natural result was that the fighting spirit of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made an attack from windward with fireships, all striving with the utmost ardor to be first in the fray, Huan Hsuan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled for two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a somewhat similar story of Chao Ying-ch`I, a general of the Chin State who during a battle with the army of Ch`u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first t o get across.] (c) A hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; [Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 a.d. by Huang Mei, Teng Ch`iang and others shut himself up behind his walls and refused to fight. Teng Ch`iang said: “Our adversary is of a choleric temper and easily provoked; let us make constant s allies and break down his walls, then he will grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to be our prey.” This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to fight, was lured as far as San-yuan by the enemy’s pretended flight, and finally attacked and slain.] (d) A delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame; [This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honor is really a defect in a general. What Sun Tzu condemns is rather an exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch`en truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: “The seek after glory should be careless of public opinion.”] (e) Over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble. [Here again, Sun Tzu does not mean that the general is to be careless of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasize is the danger of sacrificing any important military advantage to the immediate comfort of his men. This is a shortsighted poli cy, because in the long run the troops will suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And in the end, relief came through the very man who started out with the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to sentiment in favor of a part. An old soldier of one of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was always “so good to his men.” By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him out of Sun Tzu’s mouth.] These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.Ch 9: The Army on the March
Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys. [The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to keep close to supplies of water and grass. “Abide not in natural ovens,” i.e. “the openings of valleys.” Camp in high places, [Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the surrounding country.] facing the sun. [Tu Mu takes this to mean “facing south,” and Ch`en Hao “facing east.”] Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. [“In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you,” according to Ts`ao Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, “in order not to be impeded in your evolutions.” When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross. [For fear of preventing his crossing.] Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. [The repetition of these words in connection with water is very awkward. Chang Yu has the note: “Said either of troops marshaled on the river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is essential to be high er than the enemy and facing the sun.”] Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. [There is also the danger, noted by other commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be carried down to us.] So much for river warfare. ~ ~ ~ In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them quickly, without any delay. [Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage, and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to attack.] If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass near you, and get your back to a clump of trees. [Li Ch`uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous where there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they will serve to protect the rear.] So much for operations in salt-marches. ~ ~ ~ In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with rising ground to your right and on your rear, [Tu Mu quotes T`ai Kung as saying: “An army should have a stream or a marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its right.”] so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for campaigning in flat country. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge [Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes, and (4) plains.] ~ ~ ~ All armies prefer high ground to low. [“High Ground,” says Mei Yao-ch`en, “is not only more agreement and salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for fight ing.”] and sunny places to dark. ~ ~ ~ If you are careful of your men, [Ts`ao Kung says: “Make for fresh water and pasture, where you can turn out your animals to graze.”] and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind, [Chang Yu says: “The dryness of the climate will prevent the outbreak of illness.”] and this will spell victory. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural advantages of the ground. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides. ~ ~ ~ Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running between, deep natural hollows, confined places, tangled thickets, quagmires and crevasses, should be left with all possible speed and not approached. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his rear. If in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched; for these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the natural strength of his position. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the other side to advance. [Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to dislodge us. “If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, “and tried to force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and there would be less probability of our responding to the challenge. “] If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing. [Ts`ao Kung explains this as “felling trees to clear a passage,” and Chang Yu says: “Every man sends out scouts to climb high places and observe the enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are moving and shaking, he may know that they are being cut down to clear a passage for the enemy’s march.”] The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious. [Tu Yu’s explanation, borrowed from Ts`ao Kung’s, is as follows: “The presence of a number of screens or sheds in the midst of thick vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit, has constructed these hiding-places in order to make us suspect an ambush.” It appears that these “screens” were hastily knotted together out of any long grass which the retreating enemy happened to come across.] The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. [Chang Yu’s explanation is doubtless right: “When birds that are flying along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers are in ambush at the spot beneath.”] Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. ~ ~ ~ When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry. When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about to advance. Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will retreat. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot. When there is much running about [Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental banner.] and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want of food. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst. [As Tu Mu remarks: “One may know the condition of a whole army from the behavior of a single man.”] If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. [A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch`en Hao says, the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.] Clamor by night betokens nervousness. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary. [Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: “If all the officers of an army are angry with their general, it means that they are broken with fatigue” owing to the exertions which he has demanded from them.] When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food, [In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on grain and the horses chiefly on grass.] and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing that they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are determined to fight to the death. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources; [Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is always a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good temper.] too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. [Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity is necessary to keep the men to their duty.] To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce. If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made. What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to be captured by them. [Ch`en Hao, quoting from the Tso Chuan, says: “If bees and scorpions carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even a puny opponent, then, should not be treated with contempt.”] If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be practically useless. If, when the soldiers have 85 become attached to you, punishments are not enforced, they will still be unless. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders being obeyed, [Tu Mu says: “A general ought in time of peace to show kindly confidence in his men and also make his authority respected, so that when they come to face the enemy, orders may be executed and discipline maintained, because they all trust and look up to him.” What Sun Tzu has said, however, would lead one rather to expect something like this: “If a general is always confident that his orders will be carried out,” etc.”] the gain will be mutual. [Chang Yu says: “The general has confidence in the men under his command, and the men are docile, having confidence in him. Thus the gain is mutual” He quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzu: “The art of giving orders is not to try to rectify minor blunders and not to be swayed by petty doubts.” Vacillation and fussiness are the surest means of sapping the confidence of an army.]Ch 10: Terrain
Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (a) Accessible ground; [Mei Yao-ch`en says: “plentifully provided with roads and means of communications.”] (b) Entangling ground; [The same commentator says: “Net-like country, venturing into which you become entangled.”] (c) Temporizing ground; [Ground which allows you to “stave off” or “delay.”] (d) Narrow passes; (e) Precipitous heights; (f) Positions at a great distance from the enemy. [It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in the Chinese unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as the above.] Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called accessible. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies. [The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as Tu Yu says, “not to allow the enemy to cut your communications.” In view of Napoleon’s dictum, “the secret of war lies in the communications,” we could wish that Sun Tzu had done more than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I. Col. Henderson says: “The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duelist who finds his adversary’s point menacing him with certain death, and his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary’s movements, and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the commander whose communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his plans, to split up his force into more or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or surrender of his whole army.”] Then you will be able to fight with advantage. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called entangling. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first move, it is called temporizing ground. [Tu Mu says: “Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the situation remains at a deadlock.”] In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an attractive bait, [Tu Yu says, “turning their backs on us and pretending to flee.” But this is only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our position.] it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage. With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy. [Because then, as Tu Yu observes, “the initiative will lie with us, and by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy.”] Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned. With regard to precipitous heights, if you are beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up. [Ts`ao Kung says: “The particular advantage of securing heights and defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy.” Chang Yu tells the following anecdote of P`ei Hsing-chien (a.d. 619-682), who was sent on a punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. “At night he pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been completely fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P`ei Hsing-chien, however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which flooded their former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. ‘How did you know what was going to happen?’ they asked. P`ei Hsing-chien replied: ‘From this time forward be content to obey orders without asking unnecessary questions.’ From this it may be seen,” Chang Yu continues, “that high and sunny places are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are immune from disastrous floods.”] If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle, [The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long and wearisome march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, “we should be exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen.”] and fighting will be to your disadvantage. These six are the principles connected with Earth. The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: a) Flight; b) Insubordination; c) Collapse; d) Ruin; e) Disorganization; e) Rout. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten times its size, the result will be the flight of the former. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is insubordination. When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is collapse. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight, the result is ruin. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct; when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men, [Tu Mu says: “Neither officers nor men have any regular routine.”] and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter disorganization. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be rout. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible post. The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally; but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler’s bidding. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete. [Li Ch`uan sums up as follows: “Given a knowledge of three things—the affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of earth—, victory will invariably crown your battles.”]Ch 11: The Nine Situations
Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground: (1) Dispersive ground — When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground; (2) Facile ground — When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground; (3) Contentious ground — Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is contentious ground; (4) Open ground — Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground; (5) Ground of intersecting highways — Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, is a ground of intersecting highways; (6) Serious ground — When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground; (7) Difficult ground — Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground; (8) Hemmed-in ground — Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground; (9) Desperate ground — Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay, is desperate ground. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way. On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies. On serious ground, gather in plunder. In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. On desperate ground, fight. Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy’s front and rear; to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their me n. When the enemy’s men were united, they managed to keep them in disorder. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: “Begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will.” Rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you. (1) Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food; (2) Carefully study the well-being of your men, and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength. Keep your army continually on the move, and devise unfathomable plans; (3) Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve. Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength; (4) Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will fight hard. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to be asked, they will do your will; without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can be trusted. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined to longevity. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks. But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of a Chu or a Kuei. The skillful tactician may be likened to the shuai-jan. Now the shuai-jan is a snake that is found in the ChUng mountains. Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will be attacked by head and tail both. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan, I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the right. Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of courage which all must reach. How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question involving the proper use of ground. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and appearances, and thus keep them in total ignorance. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and nothing knows whither he is going. To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the business of the general. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground. When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground. When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of purpose. On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between all parts of my army. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defenses. On ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies. On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives. For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes until we are acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides. To be ignored of any one of the following four or five principles does not befit a warlike prince. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy’s forces. He overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe. Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, issue orders without regard to previous arrangements; and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but a single man. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your design. When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when the situation is gloomy. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that is capable of striking a blow for victory. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the enemy’s purpose. By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank, we shall succeed in the long run in killing the commander-in-chief. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies, and stop the passage of all emissaries. Be stern in the council-chamber, so that you may control the situation. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. Walk in the path defined by rule, and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you.Ch 12: The Attack by Fire
Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp; the second is to burn stores; the third is to burn baggage trains; the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the opponent. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. The material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for starting a conflagration. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar; for these four are all days of rising wind. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible developments: (1) When fire breaks out inside to opponent’s camp, respond at once with an attack from without; (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the opponent’s soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack; (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are; (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favorable moment; (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from the leeward. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength. By means of water, an opponent may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his belongings. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general stagnation. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content. No leader should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; no leader should fight a battle simply out of pique. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being; nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. Hence the enlightened leader is heedful, and the good leader full of caution.Ch 13: The Use of Spies
Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and engaging them in war entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop out exhausted. Opposing forces may face each other for years, striving for the victory which may be decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver is the height of stupidity. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his cause, no master of victory. Thus, what enables the wise commander to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local spies — Having local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of an enemy territory; (2) Moles — Having moles means making use of officials of the enemy; (3) Double agents — Having double agents means getting hold of the enemy’s spies and using them for our own purposes; (4) Doomed spies — Having doomed spies means doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and report them to the enemy; (5) Surviving spies — Surviving spies means are those who bring back news from the enemy’s camp. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called “divine manipulation of the threads”. It is the commander’s most precious faculty. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other fields should greater secrecy be preserved. (1) Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity; (2) They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straight forwardness; (3) Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports; (4) Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of warfare; (5) If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told. Whether the object be to crush an enemy, to storm a territory, or to kill an enemy general, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these. The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become double agents and available for our service. It is through the information brought by the double agent that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the double agent . Hence it is essential that the double agent be treated with the utmost liberality. Hence it is only the enlightened and wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results. Spies are the most important asset, because on them depends an army’s ability to march. Link to PDF: GitHub
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