Saturday, July 15, 2023

Bargaining with the Nazis

Kastner train passengers from Bergen-Belsen to Switzerland, 1944 Natan Sharansky's story had a happy ending. After risking his life by refusing to negotiate with the KGB, he won his freedom and was celebrated as a hero. Rudolf Kasztner made the opposite decision. As a Jewish leader in Nazi- occupied Hungary during World War II, he chose to bargain with Nazi devils—including SS colonel Adolf Eichmann—in an effort to save Jewish lives. Kasztner's negotiations succeeded in saving some lives, but his story is infinitely more complicated than Sharansky's and presents some of the most difficult questions in this book. Were Kasztner's decisions wise? ~~~ Rudolf (Rezsö) Kasztner was born in 1906 in Kolozsvár, Transylvania, a proud, cosmopolitan city of sixty thousand. The city was part of the kingdom of Hungary and had a significant Jewish community. Kasztner's parents were successful merchants. Kasztner, educated at the elite Jewish gymnasium, was a gifted student with a facility for languages. In addition to his native Magyar (Hungarian), he learned to speak German, French, Latin, and Romanian, the last of which became essential. Before he graduated from high school, his hometown became part of Romania—a less hospitable country for Jews—and was known as Cluj. The young Kasztner also showed other talents, including a knack for maneuvering himself quickly onto center stage. At the age of fifteen, he joined a Zionist youth movement. Within a year, he was the leader of his group. After finishing high school and collecting a law degree (to please his mother), he turned to his real passions: politics, journalism, and Zionism. He took a job with a Jewish newspaper in Cluj and began to write bold political commentary, which alienated some readers but brought him to the attention of Dr. Joseph Fischer, one of the city's wealthiest and most respected Jews. Indeed, Fischer stood at the very apex of Jewish society in Cluj: he was the president of the city's Jewish Community and a member of Parliament—and thus a national spokesman for Romania's seven hundred thousand Jews. It did not take long for Kasztner to become Fischer's assistant, protégé, and eventually son-in-law (when Kasztner married Fischer's daughter, Elizabeth). The two men developed a strong bond. The Kasztner of those years was already demonstrating the strengths of character that would also become his weaknesses. “Not only was Kasztner smarter and better read than others, but he also let everyone know that he was superior in wit and knowledge. … Kasztner often dismissed people as stupid, incompetent, or intellectually cowardly.” A law school friend recalled: “He had no sense of other people's sensitivities, or he didn't care whether he alienated his friends.” A member of his Zionist youth group recalls him as “sharp-witted and shrewd” but unreliable: “he often made promises he couldn't keep.” But he was dedicated to helping Jews in trouble. His fellow citizens were often harassed by Romanian authorities, and Kasztner “was one of the few who could deal with the authorities as an equal,” writes Anna Porter. In local government, Kasztner was remembered as a “fixer,” a man others trusted to solve their problems, but he was too smart to be much loved even by those he had helped. Still, he was sought out. The Jews of [Cluj] needed someone like Kasztner to help them survive the difficult years after Transylvania was ceded to the Romanians. … Kasztner managed to keep in touch with bureaucrats and gentile functionaries of all political stripes. He knew whom to bribe and how much to offer, whom to flatter and how. By the late 1930s, Kasztner was also helping Jewish refugees who had fled Nazi-occupied Europe and ended up in Cluj. He raised money for them, organized food and shelter, and helped them obtain safe passage to Palestine, which was then controlled by the British. Some of this work waslegal—for example, obtaining exit visas from the Romanian government— but much of it was not. The British kept strict control over entry visas to Palestine, so getting Jews aboard ships often required the liberal use of bribes. This was Kasztner's forte. He worked closely with the Jewish Agency in Palestine, which encouraged illegal immigration. Anna Porter provides a vivid portrait of the Kasztner of this period: Kasztner was outspoken, brash, unafraid. He could be seen striding toward government offices and into police headquarters, a pale, muscular, slender man, his dark hair swept back, his well-tailored black suit stark even during the summer heat, his tie loosened over his white shirt, the collar perfectly starched. He was confident, in a hurry, his briefcase casually swinging from one hand, the other ready to wave to all his acquaintances. ~~~ In 1940, Kasztner moved to Budapest, where his skills as a fixer would soon be needed. Kasztner's hometown of Cluj had once again become part of Hungary, and Kasztner was now a Hungarian citizen. By this time Jewish refugees had begun pouring into Budapest from Nazi-occupied Poland and Slovakia, telling of Nazi atrocities. Hungary and Nazi Germany became wartime allies in that year but Hungary retained its autonomy. In comparison to Nazi-occupied Europe or Germany itself, Hungary seemed like a safe haven for Jews. The Budapest Jewish establishment was wealthy, cultured, and among the most assimilated in Europe. Its members had dominated Hungarian industry, finance, and the professions. Some socialized with Hungarian aristocracy and had political influence. Unlike Kasztner, they considered themselves Hungarians first, and Jews second. Few in the establishment would have dreamed of moving to Palestine. Indeed, you couldn't have gotten them out of Budapest with a crowbar—a fact that was soon to contribute to their downfall. Moreover, the Jewish establishment was utterly unprepared for the needy horde of terrified Jewish refugees flooding into Hungary. Where would the refugees go? They didn't even speak Hungarian. Kasztner, however, had grown up in the harsher climate of Romania, where Jews did not dine with the local aristocracy. He knew exactly what to do—and much of it was illegal. Kasztner and about a dozen other “Zionist mavericks” got together and formed a Relief and Rescue Committee, later known by its He-brew name, Va'ada. The Relief and Rescue Committee's core mission became the hiding and transport of Jews. Between 1941 and 1944, the committee fed and clothed refugees, obtained emigration documents (both genuine and forged), smuggled people across borders, and of course, paid bribes. This work was made possible by an outstanding network of un- derground contacts—not only Zionists in other cities, but diplomats, couriers, smugglers, petty criminals, and bribable officials of every stripe— who kept them informed of what was happening to Jews elsewhere. One of the best-connected Relief and Rescue Committee founders, and a key player in this story, was Joel Brand, who in many ways was Kasztner's opposite. Where Kasztner was widely seen as an intellectual snob, Brand was a drinker, a gambler, and a “playboy” who spent most of his time in cafés and nightclubs. This dissolute life had allowed him to develop an extensive network of double agents and Nazi intelligence officials who would prove useful in the days ahead. Although the Jewish establishment disdained the Zionists and their methods, the two groups would soon come to need each other. ~~~ On March 19, 1944, German troops marched into Budapest and imposed a new puppet government. In the Nazi vanguard was Adolf Eichmann, who that day celebrated his thirty-eighth birthday. An SS colonel, Eichmann was under secret orders to implement Hitler's “Final Solution” in Hungary as quickly as possible—that is, to round up seven hundred thousand Jews and transport them to death camps or forced labor camps. Why did the Nazis invade their own ally? For two reasons: they feared that Hungary was about to negotiate a separate peace with the Allies, and they believed that Hungary was being too lenient toward its own Jews. By this time, Germany's war efforts were faltering. The Soviets had repelled the Nazi invasion and were advancing on the eastern front. The Allies had invaded Italy. The realization that a German defeat was a real possibility, and almost within sight, created complicated crosscurrents that were difficult to read accurately at the time. Within a day of the invasion, Nazi officials demanded a meeting with the leaders of Budapest's Jewish establishment. At the meeting, the Nazis addressed the Jewish leaders with respect and promised that as long as the Jews followed orders and didn't panic, no Jew would be harmed. These assurances fell on receptive ears. Rumors about the fate of Polish Jews had circulated widely among Hungarian Jews, but many could not believe that this could happen in a “civilised country like Hungary.”16 So when the Nazis ordered that Jewish Councils be set up throughout Hungary, ostensibly to promote a measure of Jewish self-government, the Jewish leaders complied. Soon, however, the intended role of the Jewish Councils became clear: they were to be instruments for carrying out the Nazis' orders. Through a combination of threats and false promises, the Jewish leaders were co-opted into “contribut[ing] to the smooth running of the Holocaust.” Among other things, the Jewish Councils “published the newsletters announcing Eichmann's orders, … delivered Jewish money and valuables to the Germans” and “compiled the lists of Jews” that would later be used for roundups and deportations. When Jewish leaders protested, Eichmann assured them that these orders were simply wartime necessities and that cooperative Jews would not be in danger. The Nazis were, of course, lying. According to German records, within four months of the invasion, some 437,000 Jews from the Hungarian provinces were shipped to Auschwitz. By the end of the German occupation, more than 500,000 Hungarian Jews had been killed. Much of Kasztner's work, and the critical events of this story, happened during this very short period. ~~~ From the beginning of the invasion, Kasztner believed the Jewish Councils were pursuing the wrong strategy. His knowledge of Nazi procedures elsewhere—the creation of Jewish Councils, which then were enlisted in the creation of ghettos that were a prelude to mass deportations—persuaded him that Hungarian Jews were in serious danger. Moreover, he knew that some Nazi officials could be bribed. In 1942, a Jewish group in Bratislava, Slovakia, had paid the Nazis some twenty thousand dollars to stop deporting Slovakian Jews. Because the deportations had halted around the same time, the Bratislava group was firmly convinced that their bribe had been the cause of the reprieve. That inspired them to concoct a much bigger plan, offering the Nazis $2 million (which they didn't have) to stop deporting Jews from other occupied countries. This scheme sputtered for lack of funds,23 but the Relief and Rescue Committee group was well aware of it. Kasztner thought the best approach was to contact the Nazis directly and try to negotiate protection for the Jews. But he had a problem: Whom did he represent? For whom could he speak? His first challenge was to negotiate with the Budapest Jewish establishment for permission to speak on behalf of Hungary's Jews. Three days after the invasion, he met in an elegant café with Samuel Stern, the patrician president of the Jewish Community and the head of the Budapest Jewish Council. Kasztner laid out his case: that Hungarian Jews were in danger; that Nazis were bribable, and that Zionists—not the Jewish Council—should handle this effort because they were experienced hands at this game. Stern was not persuaded. Confident of his contacts with the Hungarian government, the Jewish Community leader refused to believe that his constituents could possibly meet the same fate as Polish Jews. Consequently, he expressed disinterest in receiving any assistance from the Zionists. Kasztner and his cohorts were on their own. Through Brand's Nazi contacts, however, a meeting was soon arranged with two SS officers, both members of Eichmann's “Sonderkommando” (Special Action Commando). One of these men, Captain Dieter Wisliceny, was the same Nazi who had negotiated with the Bra-tislava group. Kasztner and Brand thought this was a good sign. In preparing for the meeting, Kasztner and Brand focused on two goals. One was to establish the Relief and Rescue Committee as a credible negotiating partner. They couldn't claim to speak for the Jews of Hungary, so they came up with an even grander idea: they would claim to represent all of “World Jewry.” They knew that many Nazis genuinely believed in a vast international conspiracy of Jews who were immensely rich and controlled the Allies and the Soviets. Kasztner and Brand decided to take full advantage of that myth—and for good measure, to claim linkage to the Bratislava group. Their second goal was equally ambitious: to reach a deal that would protect all the Jews in Hungary. They decided to offer the Nazis $2 million —which, like the Bratislava group, they did not have—in exchange for a series of conditions. ~~~ Before we get to the substance of this meeting, let's step back and analyze Kasztner's decision in favor of negotiation. How did he analyze the benefits and risks? We can assume that, like Sharansky, he had a strong interest in physical survival. The best way to save his own skin would be to avoid the Nazis entirely and go into hiding or flee. But Kasztner seems to have ignored that interest. The only goal he seems to have recognized was to save as many Jewish lives as possible. No doubt because of his experience as a “fixer,” he thought he could achieve that through negotiation. He had no moral qualms about negotiating with devils. He was far too cynical for that. In fact, I think he believed that negotiating with the Nazis was justified on both pragmatic and moral grounds, because lives might be saved. Did he experience any conflict between pragmatism and principle? Only to the extent that the personally safe choice—to head for the hills—would have meant not engaging in this negotiation. But there is no evidence he even considered that option. In fact, there is no evidence that he really did a cost-benefit analysis at all, at least one that Spock would recognize. Kasztner was a fixer, not a hider. He had been negotiating with devils all his life. That was his public identity. All his skills called for negotiation, and so did his temperament. His decision to negotiate may well have been based largely on such intuitive judgments. So let's look more closely at his decision to negotiate with the Nazis as an occupying power. Did it make any sense? What would Spock say? We must take care to base the analysis on what was known at the time and not on how things turned out. ~~~ The sweeping deal Kasztner and Brand envisioned, if implemented, would clearly serve the interests of the entire Jewish community in Hungary. So if Spock were to advise the Relief and Rescue Committee negotiators, he would focus on implementation. He would remind Kasztner and Brand of the risks of bluffing. They had no money. They were not authorized to speak for a single Hungarian Jew, much less the Jewish Agency in Palestine or the representatives of the American Jewish community in Switzerland. “What makes you think you can pull this off?” Spock would ask. “How confident are you of raising the money? What might be the consequences if you can't deliver?” Kasztner would probably respond that the chances were reasonably good that money could be raised; Stern would likely help raise funds within Hungary and the balance might be secured from Jewish sources abroad— and paid over time. Playing for time was valuable. In the meantime, Germany might lose the war. Spock would then turn to the Nazi side of the bargain. Why should the Nazis agree to such a deal? Why would it be in their interests? Even if they did make a deal, there was a significant risk they wouldn't honor it. Spock would also want to know whether Wisliceny had authority to make promises on behalf of the Nazis, especially about deportation. Wisliceny might simply be taking the money for himself. Kasztner would probably respond that, in his experience, not all Nazis were committed to exterminating Jews. Some cared little for Nazi ideology and were willing to bend the rules in exchange for cash. The Bratislava episode appeared to be a prime example of this—and was presumably approved at high levels. The Nazi war machine needed money, and the Reich was under increasing international pressure to stop killing Jews. It wasn't entirely out of the question that the Reich would trade Jews for cash. Kasztner would surely admit, however, that the whole plan was tenuous; the Relief and Rescue Committee held a very weak hand. It had no way of enforcing a deal with the Nazis, so there was substantial risk of paying a bribe and getting nothing in return. But—and this was the key question—what were the alternatives? To Kasztner, who understood the Nazis' intentions, there were only three real alternatives to negotiation:32 fight, flee, or hide. None was feasible on an organized, massive scale. Armed resistance was hopeless: Hungarian Jews had hardly any weapons, most of the young men had already been sent to work camps, and the Jewish leadership opposed open resistance as too risky. Flight en masse was impossible. Much of nearby Yugoslavia was occupied by the Nazis and the border was heavily patrolled. Individuals might be able to escape to nearby Romania, but it was hard to imagine spiriting Jews en masse across that border. The final possibility was to go into hiding. But outside of Budapest, there was nowhere to hide large numbers of Jews. Certainly not in open fields, or small towns where everyone knew each other. So what would Spock say? Having weighed all of these factors, I believe he would conclude that it was reasonable for the Relief and Rescue Committee to see whether it could negotiate a deal with the Nazis. The prospects of success weren't great, and Nazi promises were hardly worth banking on, but it was a desperate situation. Why not try? I suspect, however, that Spock would have urged Kasztner to have a backup plan, a “Plan B.” The alternatives to negotiation were terrible, but the best of the lot would involve spreading the alarm and warning Jews to avoid the ghettos and Nazi transports at all costs; better to go underground or flee. The Relief and Rescue Committee's first meeting with the Nazis took place on April 5, 1944. Two Nazis were present: Captain Dieter Wis-liceny and another SS officer. Brand and Kasztner, introducing themselves as agents of World Jewry, immediately put an offer on the table by referring to the negotiations in Bratislava. They offered $2 mil-lion, with an immediate down payment of $200,000, subject to “four stipulations”: (1) no ghettos or concentration camps in Hungary; (2) no mass executions or pogroms; (3) no deportations from Hungary; and (4) permission for all Jews who held valid entry certificates to emigrate to Palestine. Wisliceny's response was a masterful blend of promises and quasi- promises. He appeared to accept at least one of the conditions, explicitly stating, “We can guarantee that there will be no deportations out of Hungary.” His response to the other terms was ambiguous. For $2 million, he said, it might be possible to prevent ghettoization and to allow some Jews to emigrate. But over time, $2 million would not be enough. There would have to be more payments later. Furthermore, to demonstrate goodwill, the Relief and Rescue Committee would have to deliver the $200,000 down payment within a week. “Your people will not be harmed,” he promised, “so long as our negotiations are going on.”35 Brand and Kasztner agreed to raise the money but added another condition: in order to coordinate the fund-raising effort, they and their colleagues would need to move freely around the city. The SS officers agreed and gave the Relief and Rescue Committee officers special “immunity passes” that exempted them from the restrictions that applied to other Jews. (Thus, for the rest of the war, Kasztner would not be required to wear a yellow star. He would also be allowed to use cars and phones and to largely ignore curfews and travel restrictions.) Kasztner also demanded a good-faith gesture from the Nazis. “World Jewry,” he explained, would want proof that its money was actually helping Jews; it would “want to see results.”37 To this end, Kasztner proposed that one hundred Jews be allowed to leave Hungary for Romania, where the Jewish Agency had chartered a ship that would take them to Turkey and then to Palestine. Such a gesture from the Nazis, Kasztner asserted confidently, “would mean that we could ask for much more money from our people in Constantinople and Jerusalem.”38 Wisliceny made no promises but agreed to consider the matter. “Meanwhile,” he suggested, “you can prepare a list of the people you want to send.” Thus, almost as an afterthought, a seed was planted that would later blossom into what became known as the “Kasztner Train.” ~~~ As Kasztner had hoped, Samuel Stern, the leader of the Budapest Jewish establishment, made a complete about-face and agreed to raise the down payment. By now, alarmed by the Nazis' anti-Jewish measures, Stern also authorized Kasztner to negotiate with the SS on behalf of all Hungarian Jews. But over the next few weeks, even as the Relief and Rescue Committee was delivering the down payment in installments, Kasztner began receiving terrible news. Through sources in German counterintelligence he learned that, despite all public claims to the contrary, the Nazis planned to ghettoize all Jews in Hungary and then deport them.Kasztner immediately looked for Wisliceny, who was nowhere to be found. The other SS officials were no help. Kasztner accused them of reneging on Wisliceny's promise, but they just shrugged and feigned ignorance. However, they still wanted to negotiate. For the down payment already delivered, they said, perhaps a small number of Jews could be allowed to leave Hungary. A scant day later, the same officials announced to Kasztner that “as a gesture of good will,” their supe-riors had given permission to allow six hundred Jewish families to emigrate—half from the provinces and half from Budapest. Once again, they suggested that the Relief and Rescue Committee draw up a list. Kasztner was alarmed. What had happened to the original deal? One moment they had been talking about saving the entire Jewish community; now they were down to only six hundred families. Kasztner was determined to find Wisliceny and confront him. But before he could do so, he was distracted by another stunning development. On April 25, Eichmann summoned Brand to his office and made a proposal. (Kasztner was annoyed at having been passed over. Why Brand?) Brand later described the meeting as surreal: Eichmann chain-smoked, paced around the room, and bragged about having rounded up all the Jews in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria. Finally getting to the point, Eichmann said that the Reich needed trucks for its war effort and was willing to trade one million Jews for ten thousand winterized trucks. (This proposal would come to be known as blut gegen waren—“blood for goods.”) Eichmann instructed Brand to go to Istanbul, in neutral Turkey, to present this offer to “World Jewry.” “I want you to go abroad and get in direct touch with your people and with representatives of the Allied powers. Then come back to me with a concrete proposal.”47 Brand left the meeting in shock. He thought the deal was preposterous. How could “World Jewry” produce ten thousand trucks? It would require the full cooperation of the Western Allies, who would never allow the Nazis to receive war materiel in the middle of a war. What was Eichmann up to? In his postwar report of these events, Kasztner recalled asking himself: “What was behind these suddenly generous offers on one side, and the absurd demands on the other side? Were they lunatics or clumsy plotters, who would make such proposals?”48 Ultimately, however, it was decided to play along and attempt to meet Eichmann's terms. ~~~ In early May, Kasztner finally got permission to travel to Cluj, where Wisliceny had been reassigned. He soon discovered what Wisliceny was doing there. Local police had just begun rounding up Jews and moving them into a brickyard—a makeshift ghetto. Wisliceny himself was supervising the effort. When Kasztner confronted him about his earlier promise, Wisliceny admitted that he really had no authority to prevent deportations. “[Eichmann] gave me the dirtiest job, and I am now the one who has to transfer the Jews into Ghettos. … I wear a uniform, I must follow orders.”50 “At least tell me the truth,” Kasztner insisted. Was it true, as he had heard, that the Nazis planned to deport all the Jews in Hungary? Wis-liceny waffled but promised to find out. In the meantime, he said, Kasztner could prepare the list of six hundred families who would emigrate in exchange for the ransom already paid. Let's step back again and ask: What was going on? Was it time to reassess? There is no evidence that Kasztner asked himself this question, but Spock would have strongly recommended it. The original decision to negotiate with the Nazis had been made in March. It was now May and Kasztner had new information. The Nazis had lied to his face about the deportations. His original, glorious deal was dead. He had paid a substantial bribe and so far had nothing to show for it. Eichmann was pushing a bizarre proposal that would probably go nowhere (although it might allow the Jews to buy valuable time). Wisliceny and his cohorts were dangling a carrot— the prospect of emigration for a small group—but they weren't trustworthy. Spock would say: Slow down. Think. What should be your strategy? And what should you tell your family and the Jewish leaders in Cluj? Kasztner would probably respond that he was thinking, but that he couldn't exactly slow down. As he would write later, events were happening so fast that “even thoughts were too slow.”53 In that respect he was right: the ghettoization process in Cluj went so quickly that it was completed in a week.What did Kasztner do while he was in Cluj? He met with local Jewish leaders, including his father-in-law, but it is not clear what he told them. Years later, the exact content of these discussions would be-come highly controversial. How much did Kasztner know about the Nazis' plans for Hungary, and how clearly did he warn his fellow Jews about the disaster that was coming? Although many Hungarian Jews had heard reports about Nazi atrocities elsewhere, and therefore had reason to understand that they, too, were in danger, others didn't know—or refused to believe—just how bad things were. Kasztner was much better informed than most. He knew from reliable sources that the Nazis planned to deport all Hungarian Jews. He also knew that Auschwitz was an extermination camp, not simply a forced labor camp as the Nazis claimed, and that deportation to Auschwitz was a probable prelude to extermination. Kasztner later claimed that he had warned the Jewish leadership of Cluj, and his family and friends, of precisely this danger. Others said he had not. What is undisputed is that no dire warning ever reached the rest of the community and that no Jews were advised, by Kasztner or the Cluj leadership, to flee Hungary or go into hiding. Kasztner did, however, tell the Jewish leaders about his negotiations with the Nazis. He said he was working on a deal that might allow some Jews, including a number from Cluj, to emigrate. One can easily imagine Kasztner, the fixer, wanting to hold out hope to those closest to him. One can also imagine his tendency to believe that if anyone could pull off a miracle, he could. Kasztner decided not to abandon the negotiation track, despite Wisliceny's broken promise. Indeed, I think he was burning to go up the chain of command. To hell with Wisliceny … How could he get to Eichmann? ~~~ With the Nazis' help, Brand left for Istanbul on May 17 to carry Eichmann's proposal to a representative of the Jewish Agency. On Eichmann's orders, Brand was forced to leave his wife, Hansi, behind as a hostage. No member of the Relief and Rescue Committee had much confidence that the deal would succeed, but they hoped that by keeping the prospect of negotiations alive, they could stall for time and perhaps stop the deportations. That hope would prove to be misplaced. Nothing ever came of the Brand mission, and Brand himself was never able to return to Hungary. In the meantime, mass deportations of Jews to Auschwitz began on May 15 and continued at horrifying speed. But for about a month, the Jewish Agency pretended to take the “Jews for trucks” deal seriously, and these sham negotiations gave Kasztner the opportunity he needed to take Brand's place in Budapest. First he began an affair with Brand's wife, Hansi. It was Hansi who served as the bridge to Eichmann. Through her own contacts, she set up Kasztner's first meeting with Eichmann and attended it with him. Thus Kasztner was finally able to establish himself with Eichmann as the chief agent of World Jewry in Hungary. The relationship between the two men would last for the remainder of the war and test all of Kasztner's skills. At their first meeting, Eichmann—who Kasztner knew “ruled over life and death”57—greeted Kasztner and Hansi with characteristic bullying, boasting that he had served as commissar of Jewish affairs in Austria and Czechoslovakia. Abruptly, however, Eichmann grew amiable and spoke of his support of Zionism, including the Jews' right to have their own state. Eventually, they got down to business. Kasztner tried to persuade Eichmann to stop the deportations while Brand carried on the negotiations in Istanbul. He was unsuccessful. Kasztner then reminded Eichmann of the promises his subordinates had made: that six hundred Jewish families would be allowed to leave Hungary. Kasztner cannily linked this prior agreement with the Brand mission, and this connection, at least, he succeeded in making stick. World Jewry needed a showing of good faith, Kasztner argued. If Eichmann couldn't follow through on a simple promise to release six hundred families, there would be no hope of progress on the “Jews for trucks” deal. Eichmann agreed to nothing at that first meeting, but he asked Kasztner to prepare a list of six hundred Jewish families who might be sent by train out of Hungary. On May 22, Eichmann explicitly agreed that six hundred families might be spared. In the following weeks, Kasztner and Eichmann played a game of “double-bluff,”60 both sides playing for time, each aware that the other was unlikely to meet his commitments. Kasztner falsely claimed that Brand was making progress with the Allies in Istanbul and argued that if the deportations continued, Eichmann would have no Jews left to trade. Eichmann pretended to negotiate the “blood for goods” deal while herding ten to fifteen thousand Jews a day into boxcars for transport to Poland. Eichmann proved to be a thoroughly unreliable negotiating partner, constantly making promises and breaking them. In Hansi Brand's words, “What we had established on one day … the next day was found to be nothing at all.”61 A showdown came in early June when Eichmann reneged on yet another promise—to bring several hundred provincial Jews to Budapest for inclusion on the emigration train. Kasztner decided to push back. Instead of confronting Eichmann directly, Kasztner taunted him by making provocative statements to two of his officers. To one, Kasztner complained that Eichmann had broken his word and that Kasztner was going to inform Istanbul that all further discussions should be ended. To another, he declared that Eichmann's behavior was unworthy of an SS officer. As expected, these comments got back to Eichmann, who summoned Kasztner to his office and threw a “fit of rage.” Kasztner reports that he simply didn't respond. Eventually Eichmann calmed down and asked Kasztner, “What do you really want?” “I must insist on our agreements being kept. Will you bring the people suggested by us from the provinces to Budapest?” Eichmann retorted, “Once I have said no, it's no!” “Then there's no point in continuing to negotiate,” Kasztner said. He stood up and started to leave the room. Eichmann responded with a threat: “You are a bundle of nerves, Kasztner. I will send you to Theresienstadt to recover. Or do you prefer Auschwitz?” Kasztner shot back: “It would be pointless. Nobody else would take my place.” Hours of haggling followed, during which a significant shift occurred. Eichmann stopped talking about Jews from the “provinces” generally, and started talking about Jews from Cluj, Kasztner's hometown. Was this a new aspect of the devil's bargain? The record is not clear on whether Eichmann or Kasztner initiated this change in emphasis, but eventually Eichmann relented and said: “All right. The [Cluj] people are coming to Budapest.” By the end of the meeting, Kasztner had negotiated the number of Cluj Jews up to about 200, but eventually the number rose to 388. (Later, Jews from other provinces would be added.) In retrospect, commentators say that Kasztner was uniquely suited to the task of dealing with Eichmann. Although Kasztner often felt nothing but despair, his smooth façade never cracked in Eichmann's presence. He got invaluable help from Hansi. Early on, Kasztner had told Hansi that he was terrified of Eichmann, who chain-smoked in Kasztner's presence and never offered Kasztner a cigarette. Hansi suggested that Kasztner bring his own cigarettes, and advised him to chain-smoke as well. Kasztner took her advice and his bravado won Eichmann's grudging admiration and respect. As Eichmann recalled in his memoir: This Dr. Kasztner was a young man about my age, an ice-cold lawyer and a fanatical Zionist. … Except perhaps for the first few sessions, Kasztner never came to me fearful of the Gestapo strongman. We negotiated entirely as equals. … When he was with me, Kasztner smoked cigarets, as though he were in a coffeehouse. While we talked he would smoke one aromatic cigaret after another, taking them from a silver case and lighting them with a little silver lighter. With his great polish and reserve he would have made an ideal Gestapo officer himself. ~~~ For Kasztner, dealing with Eichmann's tirades and treachery was easy compared to the task of drawing up “the list.” Here was another aspect of the devil's bargain, which Kasztner may not have anticipated. Which Jews should be chosen for emigration, and how should they be selected? It was an agonizing and chaotic process. Kasztner later called it a “merciless chore.”68 Not wanting to take on the burden alone, he asked a small group of members from the Relief and Rescue Committee to direct the effort, with input from other Jewish leaders. In an effort to be fair, the committee established categories for selection, such as “deserving figures in Jewish public life” and “widows and orphans of slave labourers.”69 Not surprisingly, this process sparked intense conflict; committee members were barraged with desperate appeals and charges of favoritism. Meanwhile, Kasztner successfully haggled with Eichmann to expand the list to 1,300 people in exchange for a ransom of a thousand dollars per head. To raise the money, the committee created a new category: Jews who could pay far more than their pro rata share. In this way, 150 wealthy Jews bought their way onto the list and subsidized the others, who had no money. The list was in constant flux, and the Relief and Rescue Committee did not have full control over it. Some people declined a spot on the train, fearing that the deal was a Nazi trap. Others on the list were deported before they could take advantage of the opportunity. Still other names were added by Nazi officials in exchange for individual bribes. And then there was SS colonel Kurt Becher, an opportunist who was soon to play a crucial role in Kasztner's life. Becher's rank was equal to Eichmann's—both reported to Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler and had similar clout. But they had opposite temperaments. Whereas Eichmann was an ideologue who wanted to deport every last Jew, Becher was a pragmatist who cared only about his own career, self-enrichment, and survival after the war. Recognizing the train as a gold mine for himself, Becher maneuvered his way into the negotiation and reserved fifty places on the train, which he sold separately to Jews who bribed him directly. There is no evidence that Kasztner objected to this development. To the contrary, Kasztner recognized in Becher someone he could do business with. In the coming months, Kasztner would find Becher a more cooperative partner than Eichmann and would work increasingly closely with him. On June 30, some 1,684 Jews finally left Budapest on the “Kasztner Train.” But the passengers' ordeal continued for months more. Again Eichmann broke his word. The train's destination was not Spain or Switzerland, as promised, but a concentration camp in Bergen-Belsen, Germany, where the émigrés were held hostage as “privileged” inmates. Kasztner was in despair. He had intended the train to be the first step in a much larger rescue. But while he had been matching wits with the wily Eichmann, the latter had succeeded in shipping off to Ausch-witz nearly all of the Jews outside of Budapest. Only about 250,000 Jews remained in Hungary, nearly all in Budapest. And now Kasztner's train was trapped in Bergen-Belsen. But Kasztner did not give up. Eventually, by December 1944, nearly everyone on the train made it to safety in Switzerland. Shortly thereafter, Kasztner joined his wife, Elizabeth, in Switzerland. But their reunion was temporary. Rather than remain in safety, Kasztner returned to Nazi-occupied Europe to try to save more Jews, a mission he pursued until the war's last days. In April 1945, as the Nazis were in their final retreat, Kasztner conducted a final rescue effort with Becher. Himmler had offered to make Becher responsible for final oversight of various concentration camps. And here Kasztner made what would later prove to be another devil's bargain. He persuaded Becher to accept this duty so that together they could save Jewish lives before the now-inevitable German defeat. In exchange, Kasztner promised to help save Becher's skin by telling the Allies about his good deeds. Becher agreed. So the SS officer Becher and the Jew Kasztner (traveling with German papers) went from camp to camp, trying to prevent further wholesale deaths of inmates by asking that the camps be handed peacefully over to the Allies. In the end, what did Kasztner achieve? This question has never been definitively answered. Certainly, his negotiation efforts were indispensable in saving the nearly seventeen hundred Jews who reached Switzerland via the Kasztner train. But Kasztner also had some luck. The release of the Jews from Bergen-Belsen was very much tied to Himmler's desire, at the end of the war, to negotiate a separate peace with the Western Allies. Kasztner also claimed credit for saving tens of thousands more Jews, but these claims are harder to assess. He was very proud of a deal he negotiated with Eichmann in which, for a money bribe, Eichmann agreed to send some seventeen thousand Jews to a work camp instead of to Auschwitz. But as it turned out, Eichmann was independently under orders to send Jewish laborers to that work camp, so some commentators believe that Eichmann outsmarted Kasztner by making him pay for something that would have happened anyway. As to Kasztner's negotiations with the Nazis on behalf of other Jews—including those in Budapest74 and concentration camps—it is hard to determine with any precision what difference his intervention made. Historians differ in how much credit they give Kasztner for saving these additional lives, but most acknowledge that Kasztner played a role, and possibly a significant one.

Three Tribunals Judge Kasztner

When the war ended, Kasztner had no doubts about his own conduct. In his own mind, he was a hero. He continued to work for the Jewish cause, remaining in Europe for more than two years, participating in the Nuremberg trials of German war criminals, working to recover Jewish property stolen by the Germans, and trying to track down Eichmann so he could be brought to justice. Kasztner also made good on his promise to SS officer Becher, who was arrested by the Allies shortly after the war's end. Kasztner submitted an affidavit that credited Becher with saving many Jews, and as a result Becher was soon released. Kasztner also sought broader recognition for his accomplishments in negotiating with the Nazis. But instead, he found himself the object of ugly innuendos and even open attacks. Critics accused him of collaborating with the Nazis and enriching himself in the process. His accusers were a “mixed bunch … personal or ideological enemies, survivors who had lost relatives or had themselves suffered in the camps, and even some members of [the Kasztner train].”75 These attacks would last his entire life, and questions about his actions would prove so persistent that even today there is no consensus. During his lifetime, three different tribunals would consider charges against him and each would come to a different conclusion. The first inquiry arose soon after the war at Kasztner's insistence. Furious about the nasty rumors swirling around him,76 he demanded in 1946 that the World Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland, conduct hearings in a “court of honour.” A fact-finding committee was appointed and Kasztner prepared a 200-page report of his wartime activities. But after two meetings, the committee was unable to reach a decision. It was hardly an exoneration. In 1947, just before Israel attained statehood, Kasztner moved to Israel with his wife and infant daughter, where the second inquiry was destined to occur. At first, things went reasonably well for him in the new state. Although anonymous rumors about his past Nazi “collaboration” continued occasionally to haunt him, he successfully established a new public life. He was welcomed by the governing Mapai (later Labor) Party and appointed to a succession of government posts. But Israeli politics were deeply affected by the Holocaust and Kasztner was an open target. Within a few years he became the center of a sensational trial. It started with Mikhail Grunwald, a bitter, right-wing crank who wrote an obscure mimeographed newsletter. In 1952, Grunwald published a tirade about Kasztner: Dr. Rudolph Kasztner must be liquidated! For three years I have been waiting for the moment to unmask this careerist who grew fat on Hitler's lootings and murders. Because of his criminal machinations and collaborations with the Nazis I consider him implicated in the murder of our beloved brothers. The whole thing would probably have blown over if the Mapai party had not been feeling vulnerable. Grunwald's salvo was partly an attack on the governing party, and the attorney general decided to file charges of criminal libel against Grunwald. That meant he needed Kasztner as the government's star witness. He gave Kasztner a choice: either act to clear his name or resign his government post. Kasztner was ambivalent about the prospect of a trial in which he would be the central focus. He saw the wisdom of ignoring Grunwald's insults, but he didn't want to resign his position and he wanted to fight back. Moreover, Kasztner, who always loved the limelight, assumed that the trial would “shine a light on his actions” and win him the recognition he felt he deserved. So finally he agreed to fight Grunwald, and the government filed criminal libel charges against Grunwald. The trial proved to be an unmitigated disaster for Kasztner. Grunwald's newsletter rant had been a confused jumble of charges, but the trial judge organized them into four potential instances of libel: that Kasztner had (1) collaborated with the Nazis; (2) worked to save his own relatives and a few elite Jews while leaving the masses to die; (3) stolen money intended for rescue operations; and (4) helped Becher evade justice after the war. The trial lasted for months and there were scores of witnesses. A good deal of the testimony focused on May 3, 1944—the day Kasztner had spent talking with the Jewish leadership in his hometown of Cluj. At issue was what Kasztner had said in those discussions. Did he simply tell the Jews about the train, or did he also warn them of the danger of deportation? Although Grunwald was technically the defendant in the case, he had a brilliant right-wing lawyer who successfully turned the trial into an indictment of Kasztner—and by extension, of the entire Israeli political establishment for its failure to do more during World War II to save European Jewry. In 1955, Judge Benjamin Halevi delivered a 240-page judgment that has been called “one of the most heartless in the history of Israel, perhaps the most heartless ever.”84 The judge not only cleared Grunwald of all but one of the libel charges,85 but he took the opportunity to condemn Kasztner for having actively colluded in the Holocaust. In the judge's view, Kasztner had known full well about the Nazis' extermination plans but had deliberately withheld this knowledge from the Jewish masses. Indeed, the judge found that Kasztner had made a deal with the Nazis, a quid pro quo: in order to save a small number of privileged Jews—the Kasztner train— Kasztner had agreed not to warn the larger Jewish community of the true danger they were in. The judge framed this deal as a contract in which Kasztner and the Nazis had exchanged promises,87 with Kasztner agreeing not to warn “so that the deportations could proceed without encountering panic or resistance.” In essence, the judge held Kasztner responsible for the fact that some half million Hungarian Jews had gone passively to their deaths, never knowing they were bound for Auschwitz. The judge ended by drawing on two literary metaphors—he compared the Nazis' release of Kasztner's train to the idea of Greeks bearing gifts (the Trojan Horse) and Kasztner's deal with Eichmann to the legend of Faust, stating that Kasztner had “sold his soul to Satan.”88 As I see it, the judge's opinion was not only heartless, but gratuitous. The judge could have spared Grunwald from a criminal conviction, on the grounds that the essential facts could not be established “beyond areasonable doubt.” He did not have to cruelly demonize Kasztner. Much of the judge's opinion is overblown, rhetorical nonsense. The Nazis, not Kasztner, were responsible for rounding up and slaughtering Hungary's Jews. Nothing Kasztner could have done would have saved most of those who perished. Moreover, I find it stunning that the judge blamed Kasztner alone and said nothing to condemn the behavior of the leaders of the Jewish council (“Judenrat”) in Cluj. There was a great deal of testimony at the trial suggesting that these leaders urged people to cooperate with the SS and to board the Nazi trains. They were not encouraging people to flee. Moreover, some of these leaders, including Kasztner's father-in-law, probably suspected that these trains might be headed for an extermination camp. So what explains the vicious nature of this opinion? In part, the opinion reflects the broader attitudes in Israel in the 1950s. The Holocaust had traumatized the Jewish world. The slaughter of six million Jews raised profoundly troubling questions. How did the Holocaust happen? Why had so little been done to prevent it? Why had so many Jews died without putting up a fight? Israel, a fledgling state surrounded by hostile Arab armies, was creating a new identity as a nation of warriors who would fight for their survival. Kasztner, by contrast, could be portrayed as the old-style Jew of Europe, who would haggle and make concessions rather than take a stand. As one scholar writes: [T]he Jews who had settled in Palestine before the war and watched the Holocaust from a safe distance felt impatient with the Jews of Europe who had allowed the Nazis to drive them “like lambs to the slaughter” while the survivors from Europe, in their turn, struggled to get over the loss of their loved ones and their own sufferings. In addition, there was guilt—on one side from failing to give help when it was needed, on the other side for surviving when so many died. Regrettably, Kasztner also played a role in his own destruction. Early in the trial, he was his usual self-confident self, swaggering and strutting, enjoying being the center of attention. But under cross-examination he was asked whether he had testified in Becher's favor after the war. He denied it. When his affidavit on Becher's behalf was introduced into evidence, he was caught in the trap. That lie, and a few others, destroyed Kasztner's credibility in the judge's eyes on issues far more central to the case. As a result, many historians believe, the judge lost all sympathy for Kasztner's predicament. The impact of the ruling on Kasztner and his family was devastating. “Their block of flats was daubed with graffiti saying 'Kasztner is a murderer' and worse.”94 There were death threats. There was also political fallout. The Mapai party was tarnished, its coalition government lost its majority, and new elections were called. Kasztner was advised to leave the country until things calmed down, but he issued a defiant statement: “History and all those who know what really happened during those woeful times will bear witness for me. … I will do everything in my power to clear my name and regain my honour.”95 The third tribunal to judge him was the Israeli Supreme Court, which reviewed the case on appeal. In 1958, the Supreme Court reversed—with a four-to-one majority—the trial court's judgment and resoundingly cleared Kasztner of collaboration with the Nazis and complicity in mass murder. The majority opinion, written by Justice Shimon Agranat, criticized the trial judge for evaluating Kasztner's actions with the benefit of hindsight. The court held that Kasztner: (1) did not know for certain what the fate of the Jews not selected for the rescue train would be; and (2) had reason to hope that many more might be saved through negotiations. Agranat's opinion was also rich with commentary. He affirmed that Kasztner's sole intention had been to save the Jews of Hungary. Although the train was only meant for a small group, this “was just part of his goal and never became for him an exclusive objective.” (The judge noted in passing that Kasztner also provided money and resources to help others not on the train escape Hungary.) Moreover, the judge wrote, Kasztner did not negotiate with Eichmann as an equal. To the contrary, Eichmann held life- and-death power over Kasztner, who behaved reasonably as a Jewish leader under the circumstances. Agranat described Kasztner as a leader with no real power who was forced to make on-the-spot decisions under conditions of extreme pressure and great uncertainty. Against such odds, Agranat wrote, “God forbid us to regard Kasztner as guilty.”This ruling should have been a vindication for Kasztner, and in some ways it was. But he did not live long enough to know that his honor had been restored. While the appeal was pending, on the evening of March 3, 1957, a member of a radical Jewish underground movement approached him outside his home and shot him at close range. Although he survived for eight days, he died in the hospital. Eichmann was tried, convicted, and hanged in Israel in 1962. Becher was never convicted of any war crimes. He prospered in postwar Bremen, Germany, and died a rich old man in 1995—nearly forty years after Kasztner's assassination.

Assessment

What are my own thoughts about this case? Was Kasztner wise to negotiate with the Nazis? I approach this task with reticence. Attempting to assess decisions made in such dark times is treacherous. Primo Levi, himself a Holocaust survivor and a renowned Italian author, eloquently warned that those who haven't lived in such times have difficulty grasping what life was like in what he called this “Grey Zone.”97 I am not critical of Kasztner's initial decision to negotiate with the Nazis. Wisliceny's first response to the Relief and Rescue Committee proposal was promising. But it was hardly reliable. Like Spock, I believe it would have been wiser for Kasztner and his colleagues to begin to develop a Plan B as well—to make every effort to warn the Jews in the provinces to go into hiding or flee. Such a mixed strategy would have been optimal. What of Kasztner's decisions in Cluj on May 3, when he obtained new information? He learned that Wisliceny's earlier promises were worthless and that Eichmann was in charge. He also learned that the Nazis were beginning to round up provincial Jews and that in all probability this was a prelude to mass deportations to Auschwitz. This information demanded two decisions. One was whether to continue negotiating with the Nazis, despite their lies. Kasztner decided to continue, and I don't quarrel with that. I agree that the negotiation track was still worth pursuing. The second decision was whether to spread the alarm among the Jews of Cluj. We will never know for certain what Kasztner said or did. At the trial he testified that he issued a warning. If he was telling the truth, I have no real complaint, since he would have done what wisdom required. But his testimony was contradicted by several Cluj witnesses at the trial who testified that they were unaware of the dangers of ghettoization and deportation. The trial court found these witnesses more credible than Kasztner, and the Israeli Supreme Court did not reverse the trial court's findings on this factual point. On balance, I am skeptical about Kasztner's testimony that he issued warnings during his visit to Cluj. My best guess is that he and his colleagues didn't pursue a mixed strategy, either on May 3 or in the weeks that followed. But even if he had warned, would it have made any difference? Would it have saved more lives? Some commentators suggest the answer is no: that what Kasztner knew about the danger facing Hungary's Jews, nearly everybody knew. Additional warnings would have made no difference in people's behavior. I don't buy the first part of this argument. Kasztner knew more—much more—about the danger than most Jews in Hungary. He knew with certainty that Auschwitz was an extermination camp, not simply a labor camp, and that there was a substantial possibility that many Hungarian Jews would be deported there—to be murdered, not to work. Other Hungarian Jews, especially in the provinces, did not know these things with certainty. They may have heard that many Polish Jews had been killed by the Nazis, but they knew far less than Kasztner about Nazi procedures with regard to trains and deportation. Would strong warnings have saved additional lives? I believe that if Kasztner and his colleagues had acted early enough—in May 1944, just as the ghettoization process was beginning in the provinces—Plan B might have saved additional lives. How many? We will never know, and certainly Kasztner could not have known at the time. And that is my point. When one is negotiating under conditions of such terrible uncertainty, it is wiser to bet on two horses, if possible, than one. Why didn't they pursue a mixed strategy? I am sure many factors were at work. As Kasztner wrote later, events happened too fast. There wasn't an efficient mechanism to “spread the alarm” in any systematic way through the provinces. He was probably being carefully watched by the Nazis. Anything he said, especially in Cluj, to disrupt the deportation could be reported back to Nazi headquarters in Budapest. As I see it, on May 3 Kasztner was in a very complicated and somewhat compromised position. On the one hand, he wanted to encourage some number of people from Cluj to accept the invitation to be on his rescue train. To do so, he had every incentive to make sure they understood the danger of not joining his train. On the other hand, he obviously realized that only a small number could be accommodated, at least on this initial train. He may have (wrongly, in my view) emphasized his hope that there would be many more trains and that maybe the “big deal” would be accomplished. I suspect there was another factor: Kasztner's love of danger and intrigue and being at the center of the action. He was like a riverboat gambler who was willing to take chances, and who probably thought of himself as rationally calculating the opportunities and risks of various “bets.” Indeed, he often described his activities in terms of gambling—roulette, poker, etc. In assessing the costs and benefits of alternative strategies, how realistic was Kasztner? Kasztner didn't fall into any of the negative traps I discussed in chapter 3. He was always prepared to negotiate with the Nazis, and he had no illusions about the regime being evil. And he was far too cynical to fall into the “positive” traps that push people into negotiating when they shouldn't. But in analyzing the costs and benefits of his alternatives, his apparent failure to pursue a mixed strategy may have been the result of three other common cognitive errors that psychologists suggest can distort decision- making. 1. Kasztner's primary focus was on the train and on the lives that would be lost if the train project didn't work. Because of the phenomenon known as “loss aversion,” Kasztner may have given less weight in his decision-making to the number of lives that might have been saved had there been a mixed strategy that encouraged flight, hiding, etc.. The people listed for Kasztner's train were individual human beings who could be identified. Those who might have been saved with a better warning could not be identified in advance but were instead nameless “statistical lives.” In decision-making, saving a few identified people counts for much more than saving more statistical lives. There is research suggesting that more money will be spent more readily to save an identified worker trapped in a mine than a similar amount on mine safety measures that might save many more (unidentified) miners in the future. 3. Kasztner may have also fallen into the trap of overconfidence—he may have exaggerated the chances of his own success in pulling off the “blood for goods” negotiation. How did Kasztner himself evaluate the prospects that he and Brand could pull off Eichmann's proposal of exchanging trucks and war materiel for hundreds of thousands of Jewish lives? Certainly, he should have recognized all along that the deal was nearly inconceivable. It would require the full cooperation of the Western Allies. Spock would have ridiculed the notion that somehow World Jewry might persuade the Western Allies—in the middle of a war in which Roosevelt and Churchill had called for “unconditional” German surrender—to allow the Nazis to receive war materiel. It seems highly unlikely that Hitler had any intention of allowing a large number of Jews to escape. A better rationale for Kasztner's negotiation was that it might buy time and slow down the deportations. Abstractly, this is plausible. Why not try? Moreover, I applaud him for shrewdly linking the “small plan” (the train) to the “big plan” (blood for goods), and for his skill in persuading Eichmann to expand the number of Jews allowed on the train. But as time went on, this second rationale became less and less persuasive. Eichmann flatly refused to stop or slow down the deportations. Boxcars were leaving the provinces daily. In other words, Kasztner's plan wasn't working. Yet he refused to give up: he continued to go to Eichmann's office, smoke cigarettes, tell lies about Brand's “progress” in Istanbul, and argue that Eichmann should stop the deportations. He never lost his focus or shifted his attention to another strategy. In a sense, his persistence washeroic. In another sense, it was perhaps willful blindness. Did he start to believe his own arguments that World Jewry could pull off the deal?107 Did he fool himself into thinking that if he just talked long enough, he could persuade Eichmann to stop the deportations? I suspect that he got so caught up in the intensity of the negotiation that he exaggerated its potential, even to himself. He was negotiating with Adolf Eichmann, after all. The scope of the deal was huge. Foreign governments were involved. When the dream ended, Kasztner was devastated. Porter writes: “When it seemed clear in Budapest that Joel [Brand's] mission had been a failure, only Hansi managed to remain calm. Rezso wept like a child. She cradled his head in her arms and kept repeating that they could not give up.”108 Kasztner wrote a revealing, nearly contemporaneous letter to a friend on July 12, 1944. He acknowledged that “the dream of a big plan is finished, the hundreds of thousands went to Auschwitz in such a way that they were not conscious until the last moment what it was all about and what was happening. We who did know tried to act against it … without our being able to do anything of importance to prevent it.” He added that “we did not forget the flight to Romania, to Slovakia and attempts at hiding people.” But “the speed of the collapse was so wild that help and actions of succor and rescue could not keep up with it; even thoughts were too slow.”109 This last phrase is especially poignant, for it suggests that in retrospect Kasztner may have felt that he had not thought things through carefully enough—that his “thoughts were too slow.” And whose “dream of a big plan” could he have been referring to, if not his own? Did Kasztner sell his soul to the Devil? Absolutely not. But he may have been outsmarted. One scholar argues that Eichmann pursued a brilliant strategy that distracted and beguiled not only the Jewish Councils, but Kasztner and the Relief and Rescue Committee as well. By dangling bait such as the rescue train, the Nazis raised false hopes and kept the Jewish leaders in a constant state of turmoil. Once there was a train, there was a “list” that had to be drawn up—which created bitter conflicts that consumed and divided the Jewish community. Perhaps Kasztner, too, was drawn in. He thought he was Eichmann's equal, and this may have blinded him to the fact that he was being toyed with and bought off for a modest price. I am not persuaded that the Nazis were quite as diabolically clever as all that, but I find the argument intriguing. In sum, from a cost-benefit standpoint, I think Kasztner's decision to bargain with Eichmann was wise but his apparent failure to pursue a mixed strategy was not. What about the charges that Kasztner's actions were immoral? The trial judge accused Kasztner of making a devil's bargain—that in exchange for the Nazis' sparing the lives of those on the train, Kasztner had promised not to urge resistance or flight. It's entirely plausible that Kasztner would make such a promise to Eichmann. My view is, so what if he did? Kasztner would promise Eichmann anything if he thought it would help save Jews. The critical question isn't whether he made such a promise, but whether he honored it. As noted, the historical record is far from clear. But let's assume the worst. Suppose Kasztner made a vow of silence and kept it—that is, he chose not to warn in order to maximize the chance that the train would succeed. Would that be immoral? In my view, no. Such a choice would be morally culpable only if Kasztner knew or should have known that he would save more lives by making the opposite choice. At the time, there was no way for Kasztner to know which strategy would save more lives: negotiating with Eichmann or urging escape. It is simply preposterous to claim that Kasztner was morally responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths because, in hindsight, he may have failed to make the very best decision under conditions of such extreme uncertainty. The second moral issue also relates to the train: Was the selection process fair? Whatever its flaws, these cannot be laid at Kasztner's door. Many people played a role in the process, and a reasonably diverse group of Jews ended up being chosen. The selection process wasn't perfect—it wasn't a lottery—but under the circumstances, it could not have been perfect. Certain groups were overrepresented, mainly wealthy Jews, prominent Jewish leaders, and Jews from Cluj, including members of Kasztner's family. But was it so terrible for Kasztner's relatives to be included? Perhaps a saint would refuse to do so, but if I had been inKasztner's place I would have made sure my family members were on the train. What could be more human than favoring your own family?113 This dilemma is similar to “Sophie's choice” in the William Styron novel of that name. In the novel, a Nazi tells Sophie that he will permit her to save only one of her two children—she has to choose which child or the Nazi will kill both children and Sophie as well. Eichmann and the Nazis, not Kasztner, deserve moral condemnation for forcing such a choice on Kasztner and his colleagues. Kasztner and his colleagues deserve sympathy. A third moral issue relates to lying, and I find it the easiest. Having decided to negotiate with a devil, is it morally permissible to lie in order to save lives? One of Kasztner's strengths was his ability to lie, bluff, evade, and mislead. In less extreme contexts, one might persuasively argue that it is wrong to lie, even if the lie has beneficial results, be-cause if everybody lies the social fabric falls apart; people stop relying on each other to keep promises. But what moral or social fabric existed in the Nazi regime? None. Even those philosophers with a very strict view, who broadly condemn all sorts of lies, acknowledge certain exceptions to interactions between oppressor and oppressed, especially if necessary to save lives. Several lessons can be drawn from this inquiry. If you bargain with the Devil, develop alternatives. You will need them if the deal doesn't work out. If you bargain with the Devil, you'd better win big. Otherwise you may be harshly judged by history—and by your own people. You may even be demonized. If you lie to the Devil, don't get seduced by your own lies. I am pleased that more sympathetic accounts of Kasztner's rescue efforts are now emerging, after years in which he was vilified and then largely forgotten. I admire his courage. But I must confess to some ambivalence about his style of negotiation. I don't fault Kasztner for lying to Eichmann. But I find troubling that at his trial he lied under oath about helping Becher. I wonder whether Kasztner was someone who lied, apparently without moral qualms, whenever he thought it was expedient. Kasztner's style of negotiation is definitely not the approach that I teach and practice. My hunch is that Kasztner would claim that lying in negotiation—like bluffing in poker—is an appropriate part of the game. You must simply be clever enough not to get caught. I disagree. I can typically achieve good results—as good as someone like Kasztner—without lying. Getting caught can ruin your reputation and have long-term consequences that outweigh any benefits. Besides, it's wrong. This is what I teach my students. But this case strains the limits of any notion of principled nego-tiation. If you were dealing with a devil like Eichmann, who would you want to negotiate on your behalf—a negotiator like me who hates to lie, or someone like Kasztner, who lies persuasively because he's had lots of practice?118 The answer is pretty obvious and it troubles me.
Tags: Book Summary,Negotiation,

Monday, July 10, 2023

If, Elif, Else, For, While, Pass, Break and Continue

IF-ELIF-ELSE

If-Elif-Else is a class of statements that are known as conditional statements.

They accept a conditional expression (which we can also call as only ‘condition’ or only ‘expression’), and process a piece of code based on that.

A conditional statement evaluates to True or False.

Note: In Python, 0 is considered as False and 1 is considered as True.

IF-ELSE Statement in Code

Simple if-else program to check voter eligibility:

age = int(input("Enter your age: "))

if age >= 18:

print("Eligible to vote")

else:

print("Not eligible to vote")

# One more example

a = 9

b = 2

if a > b :

print("a is greater than b")

ELIF

We know about IF.

If the condition is met, execute the IF block.

If the condition is not met, execute the ELSE block.

But there is a third possibility: of checking a second condition if the first condition is not met.

In this case if the second condition is met (after the first condition is not met), the ELIF block executes.

ELIF Statement in Code (Part 1)

# Elif stands for "else if"

a = 33

b = 32

if b > a:

print("b is greater than a")

elif a == b:

print("a and b are equal")

else:

print(" b is less than a")

ELIF Statement in Code (Part 2)

day = input("Enter a week day's name: ")

if day == "Sunday":

print(1)

elif day == "Monday":

print(2)

elif day == "Tuesday":

print(3)

elif day == "Wednesday":

print(4)

elif day == "Thursday":

print(5)

elif day == "Friday":

print(6)

elif day == "Saturday":

print(7)

else:

print("Enter a valid day like Sunday, Monday,...")

Problem

What is the output of the following code:

var = 0

if var:

print("In If")

else:

print("In Else")

var = 1

if var:

print("In If")

else:

print("In Else")

Shorthand If-Else

# Shorthand if else statment

# This technique is known as Ternary Operators, or Conditional Expressions

a = 2

b = 330

print("A") if a > b else print("B")

Here four lines of code have been reduced to one.

For Loop

Purpose of For loop is pure iteration.

For example: if we want to print first 10 natural numbers then we would simply iterate over those numbers using the range() built-in.

Code:

#1

for i in range(1, 11):

print(i)

#2

l = ['Ashish', 'Lijiya', 'Bala']

for i in l:

print(i)

Ashish

Lijiya

Bala

Q2: Python program to print all the even numbers within the given range.

x = int(input("input range: "))

for i in range(1, x):

if i % 2 == 0:

print(i)

Q3: Write a program to read 10 numbers from the keyboard and find their sum and average.

#Write a program to read 10 numbers from the keyboard and find their sum and average.

Sum() and Average() : Way 1

l = []

for i in range(10):

l.append(int(input("Enter the number: ")))

s = sum(l)

print(s)

avg = sum(l) / len(l)

print(avg)

Sum() and Average() : Way 2 (Using statistics module)

import statistics

#Write a program to read 10 numbers from the keyboard and find their sum and average.

l = []

for i in range(10):

l.append(int(input("Enter the number: ")))

s = sum(l)

print(s)

m = statistics.mean(l)

print(m)

While Loop

While loop is an entry controlled loop.

First thing we need is a variable to control our while loop.

Second thing a while loop requires is a condition (or conditional expression).

if True:

pass

And a condition requires: a variable and some test on it that would result in True or False.

Generally:

We let our variable to start with something like: i = 1

We let our condition be something like: i < 10

Printing first ten natural numbers

For 10 natural numbers

Let: i = 1

Condition: i <= 10

Third thing is modification of variable used in the condition above.

i += 1

Three steps described here are:

1. initialization

2. condition

3. change

Infinite Loop

You can create infinite loop by manipulating these three steps of a while loop:

1. initialization

2. condition

3. change

while (True):

# Do something infinite number of times

Break: breaks out of the normal flow of the code

Continue: it skips the current iteration on encountering this keyword and continues with the next iteration.


“pass” Statement

>>> x = 5

>>> print("less than 10") if x < 10 else print("greater than or equal to 10")

less than 10

>>> x = 15

>>> print("less than 10") if x < 10 else print("greater than or equal to 10")

greater than or equal to 10

>>> x = 5

>>> if(x < 10):

... x = x + 10

... else:

... pass

...

>>> x

15

>>>

‘pass’ with ‘if-else’

passing_marks = 33

student_marks = int(input("Enter student's marks:"))

grace_marks = 10

if student_marks < passing_marks:

student_marks += grace_marks

else:

pass

print("Final marks are:", student_marks)

‘pass’ with ‘for’ loop

# Print first 20 natural numbers leaving the multiples if 5 (inc. 5).

for i in range(1, 21):

if i % 5 == 0:

pass

else:

print(i)

‘pass’ with ‘try-except’

# A question worth 3 marks was wrong in the exam. So we have to give 3+ marks to each student.

try:

student_marks = int(input("Enter the student's marks: "))

if student_marks > 97:

print("Raising exception...")

raise Exception

student_marks += 3

except ValueError as e:

# invalid literal for int() with base 10: 'alpha beta gamma'

print(e)

except Exception as e:

pass

print("Final student marks: ", student_marks)

Defining an empty class

# Defining an empty class

class Person:

pass

Sunday, July 9, 2023

Rabeprazole (Salt)

Uses

Rabeprazole is used to treat ulcers (sores in the lining of the stomach or intestine) and is used in combination with other medications to eliminate H. pylori (a bacteria that causes ulcers) in adults. Rabeprazole is in a class of medications called proton-pump inhibitors.

Does rabeprazole relieve gas?

Results from these studies indicated that rabeprazole 10 or 20 mg once daily relieved heartburn within the first 1 or 2 days of treatment and also had significant positive effects on other GERD symptoms, including regurgitation, belching, bloating, satiety, and nausea.

How long can you safely take rabeprazole?

Depending on your condition, you may only take rabeprazole for a few weeks or months. Sometimes you might need to take it for longer, even many years. Some people do not need to take rabeprazole every day and take it only when they have symptoms.

Can I take rabeprazole 3 times a day?

Rabeprazole is to be taken as prescribed by your doctor, depending upon the severity of the disease. Usually, Rabeprazole is prescribed for once-daily administration, empty stomach in the morning. However, it can be prescribed for twice a day administration.

Brand

1. Nexorab-IT Manufacturer: NEXEUM PHARMACEUTICALS Contains: Rabeprazole(20.0 Mg) + Domperidone(30.0 Mg) Uses: GERD Therapy: ANTACID AND ANTI-EMETIC 2. Rablet IT Capsule PR Manufacturer: Lupin Ltd SALT COMPOSITION: Rabeprazole (20mg) + Itopride (150mg)

Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free

Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free

Manufacturer
Pfizer Ltd

SALT COMPOSITION
Oxetacaine (10mg/5ml) + Aluminium Hydroxide (0.291gm/5ml) + Milk Of Magnesia (98mg/5ml)

Storage
Store below 30°C

Product introduction
Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free is a prescription medicine that is used in the treatment of acidity, stomach ulcer, and heartburn. It helps in relieving the symptoms of acidity and ulcers such as stomach pain, heartburn, or irritation. It also neutralizes excessive acid in the stomach.

Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free is taken without food in a dose and duration as advised by the doctor. The dose you are given will depend on your condition and how you respond to the medicine. You should keep taking this medicine for as long as your doctor recommends. If you stop treatment too early your symptoms may come back and your condition may worsen. Let your healthcare team know about all other medications you are taking as some may affect, or be affected by this medicine. Do not take it for more than the recommended duration as long-term administration may have harmful effects on the health.

The most common side effects are diarrhea, constipation, and allergic reaction. Most of these are temporary and usually resolve with time. Contact your doctor straight away if you are at all concerned about any of these side effects. To overcome constipation, you should add fiber-rich foods to your diet and stay hydrated. Lifestyle modifications like having a fiber-rich diet, increase fluid intake and regular exercise can help you to get better results.

Before taking this medicine, you should tell your doctor if you are pregnant, planning pregnancy, or breastfeeding. You should also tell your doctor if you have any kidney or liver diseases so that your doctor can prescribe a suitable dose for you.

Uses of Mucaine Oral Gel

Treatment of Acidity Treatment of Heartburn Treatment of Stomach ulcers

Benefits of Mucaine Oral Gel

In Treatment of Acidity Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free relieves excessive acidity in your stomach which prevents heartburn and indigestion. Usually, it is used along with other medicines for management of your condition. Continue taking it for as long as the doctor may advise you to. You need to take this medicine regularly to get the most out of it. Take a fiber-rich diet, avoid oily or spicy food and drink plenty of fluids while taking it to make sure you stay hydrated. In Treatment of Heartburn Heartburn is a burning feeling in your chest caused by stomach acids traveling back up towards your throat and mouth (acid reflux). Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free improves the movement of food in the stomach and helps prevent heartburn. You should take it exactly as it is prescribed or as it says on the label for it to be effective. Some simple lifestyle changes can help stop or reduce heartburn. Think about what foods trigger heartburn and try to avoid them; eat smaller, more frequent meals; try to lose weight if you are overweight, and try to find ways to relax. Do not eat within 3 to 4 hours of going to bed. In Treatment of Stomach ulcers Stomach ulcers are painful sores that develop in the inner lining of the stomach or gut (intestine). Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free reduces the amount of acid your stomach makes which prevents further damage to the ulcer as it heals naturally. You may be given other medicines along with this medicine depending on what caused the ulcer. You need to keep taking Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free as prescribed by the doctor for it to be effective, even if the symptoms seem to disappear. show more Side effects of Mucaine Oral Gel Most side effects do not require any medical attention and disappear as your body adjusts to the medicine. Consult your doctor if they persist or if you’re worried about them Common side effects of Mucaine Constipation Diarrhea Allergic reaction How to use Mucaine Oral Gel Take this medicine in the dose and duration as advised by your doctor. Check the label for directions before use. Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free is to be taken empty stomach. How Mucaine Oral Gel works Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free is a combination of three medicines: Oxetacaine, Aluminium Hydroxide, and Milk Of Magnesia. Oxetacaine is a local anesthetic that provides faster relief from pain due to ulcers or acidic injury in the stomach. Aluminium Hydroxide and Milk Of Magnesia are antacids that neutralize the excess acid in stomach. Safety advice warnings Alcohol CONSULT YOUR DOCTOR It is not known whether it is safe to consume alcohol with Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free. Please consult your doctor. warnings Pregnancy CONSULT YOUR DOCTOR Information regarding the use of Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free during pregnancy is not available. Please consult your doctor. warnings Breast feeding CONSULT YOUR DOCTOR Information regarding the use of Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free during breastfeeding is not available. Please consult your doctor. warnings Driving CONSULT YOUR DOCTOR It is not known whether Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free alters the ability to drive. Do not drive if you experience any symptoms that affect your ability to concentrate and react. warnings Kidney SAFE IF PRESCRIBED Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free is probably safe to use in patients with kidney disease. Limited data available suggests that dose adjustment of Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free may not be needed in these patients. Please consult your doctor. warnings Liver CONSULT YOUR DOCTOR There is limited information available on the use of Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free in patients with liver disease. Please consult your doctor. What if you forget to take Mucaine Oral Gel? If you miss a dose of Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free, take it as soon as possible. However, if it is almost time for your next dose, skip the missed dose and go back to your regular schedule. Do not double the dose. All substitutes For informational purposes only. Consult a doctor before taking any medicines. No substitutes found for this medicine

Quick tips

It is better to take it after food or as suggested by the doctor. Some healthy tips to prevent acidity from happening: Avoid taking hot tea, coffee, spicy food, and chocolate. Instead, have cold milk and cold coffee as these help neutralize the acid in the stomach. Avoid alcohol and smoking. Avoid eating late at night or before bedtime. Do not take Mucaine Gel Mint Sugar Free at least 2 hours before or after taking other medicines as it may interact with other medications. It may cause constipation. Drink plenty of water and eat more high-fiber foods. Inform your doctor if it becomes severe or does not go away. It may take 4-6 weeks or more for the ulcers to heal completely. Do not stop taking the medicine without talking to your doctor first.

Fact Box

Habit Forming: No Therapeutic Class: GASTRO INTESTINAL

Saturday, July 8, 2023

Questions to ask yourself while entering a conflict

When in a conflict ask five basic questions that are useful for ordinary conflicts of all sorts.

1) Interests:

What are my interests?

What are my adversary's interests?

2) Alternatives:

What are my alternatives to negotiation?

What are my adversary's alternatives?

This question highlights your choices away from the negotiating table. If you decide not to negotiate, what actions can you take unilaterally—without the cooperation of the other side? And how well do those actions serve your interests? One alternative might be to do nothing: walk away from the deal and ignore the conflict. Another alternative might be to find another partner.

There is also the use of coercive force. Every bigger child who snatches a toy from a smaller one understands the attractions of a self-help strategy.

However, legitimacy is an important consideration, especially when using force, so one must be ready to justify any coercive tactics. Where legal rights are involved, a lawsuit is a coercive alternative. In a labor- management conflict, strikes or lockouts are, for the most part, alternatives used to coerce concessions in bargaining. In the international arena, a naval blockade or an air strike may be an alternative to diplomatic negotiations.
Next, for each alternative, consider the full range of possible outcomes.
With regard to litigation, for example, it’s not enough to consider only the best possible outcome. What happens if you lose the case? What are theodds of winning or losing? Even if you win, are there any negative consequences?8
Once you have evaluated your alternatives, identify the best of the lot.
This is your Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, or “BATNA.” If you later decide to negotiate, this will be an important reference point for evaluating any deal that is on the table. You should never be willing to accept a negotiated deal that doesn’t serve your interests better than your BATNA.

3) Potential negotiated outcomes:

Is there a potential deal (or deals) that could satisfy both parties' interests better than our alternatives to negotiation?

4) Costs:

What will it cost me to negotiate? What do I expect to lose in terms of tangible resources: money and time? Will my reputation suffer? Will negotiating set a bad precedent?


The negotiation process itself imposes costs, which you will incur regardless of whether you reach a deal. These must be taken into account.

Transaction Costs: The negotiation process involves costs in terms of time, money, manpower, and other resources.10 For example, most department stores, restaurants, and museums do not negotiate on price. Why won’t Macy’s negotiate over the price of a suit? Because the store in Herald Square alone receives about thirty thousand visitors a day and negotiating with that many people would be inefficient.11 Consider the expense involved in training salespeople to negotiate with customers, the cost of devising complicated compensation schemes with incentives for “good negotiators,” the time that might be wasted on haggling, and the possible damage to reputation and branding. These costs outweigh the benefit of any extra sales that might be made with selective price adjustments.
The negotiation process may also impose costs arising from the disclosure of information. Parties usually have to disclose information in order to reach a deal. Certain disclosures are riskier than others, particularly if one is negotiating with an adversary capable of exploiting this information in the future. For a business, disclosing intelligence-gathering capabilities or trade secrets may be unacceptably risky. For an individual, disclosing personal desires or preferences may weaken her bargaining power in the future.

Spillover Costs: Negotiating with one party may adversely affect you in future dealings with other parties. One such cost may involve reputation. For example, a physician may prefer not to settle a malpractice claim, even if settlement would be cheaper than litigation, in order to avoid any implication that she was in any way at fault.

5) Implementation:

If we do reach a deal, is there a reasonable prospect that it will be carried out?

From Chapter 2: Bargaining and Its Alternatives: Costs, Benefits, and Beyond 
Tags: Book Summary,Negotiation,

Thursday, June 29, 2023

Vantaxa 5 (Vortioxetine) Tablet

Vantaxa 5mg Tablet

Prescription Required

Manufacturer/ Marketer: Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd

SALT COMPOSITION: Vortioxetine (5mg)

Storage: Store below 30°C

Vortioxetine Uses

Vortioxetine is used in the treatment of Depression.

Benefits of Vantaxa Tablet

In Depression Vantaxa 5mg Tablet works by increasing the level of a chemical called serotonin in the brain. This improves your mood, relieves anxiety, tension, and helps you sleep better. It has fewer side effects than older antidepressants. It usually takes 4-6 weeks for this medicine to work so you need to keep taking it even if you feel it is not working. Do not stop taking it, even if you feel better unless your doctor advises you to.

How Vortioxetine works

Vortioxetine is a serotonin modulator and stimulator (SMS). It works by acting on multiple brain chemicals including serotonin, noradrenaline, dopamine, histamine, and acetylcholine which are thought to be involved in controlling mood and related mental processes. Common side effects of Vortioxetine Constipation, Nausea, Vomiting, Abnormal dreams, Dizziness, Diarrhea, Dryness in mouth, Itching

Fact Box

Chemical Class: Piperazine Derivative Habit Forming: No Therapeutic Class: NEURO CNS Action Class: Serotonin modulator and stimulator Ref: https://www.1mg.com/drugs/vantaxa-5mg-tablet-758073?wpsrc=Google+Organic+Search

Sizodon MD 0.5 Tablet

Manufacturer/ Marketer: Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd

SALT COMPOSITION: Risperidone (0.5mg)

Storage: Store below 30°C

Product Description

Sizodon MD 0.5 Tablet is used in the treatment of schizophrenia (a mental disorder that can result in hallucinations or delusions and also adversely affects a person’s ability to think and behave) and mania. Sizodon MD 0.5 Tablet is taken with or without food, preferably at night. However, it is advised to take it at the same time each day as this helps to maintain a consistent level of medicine in the body. Take this in the dose and duration as advised by your doctor and if you have missed a dose, take it as soon as you remember. It is important that this medication is not stopped suddenly without talking to your doctor as it may worsen your symptoms. However, discontinue this medicine immediately if you experience Neuroleptic malignant syndrome (NMS), characterized by fever, muscle rigidity, and altered consciousness or seizures. Some common side effects of this medicine include insomnia, sedation, somnolence, parkinsonism, and headache. Initially, this medicine may cause a sudden drop in blood pressure when you change positions, so it is better to rise slowly if you have been sitting or lying down. It also causes dizziness and sleepiness, so do not drive or do anything that requires mental focus until you know how this medicine affects you. This medicine may increase your weight but, modifying your lifestyle by having a healthy diet and exercising regularly can reduce this side effect. You should be cautious while using this medicine as it may increase the risk of developing diabetes, so it is better to monitor glucose regularly. Inform your doctor if you develop any unusual changes in mood or behavior, new or worsening depression, or suicidal thoughts while taking this medicine.

Uses of Sizodon Disintegrating Strip

Treatment of Schizophrenia Treatment of Mania

Benefits of Sizodon Disintegrating Strip

In Treatment of Schizophrenia Schizophrenia is a mental disorder in which a person’s thinking ability, feelings and behavior become abnormal. Sizodon MD 0.5 Tablet helps restore the chemical imbalances in the brain that are responsible for such changes. It improves thoughts, behavior and enhances the quality of life. In Treatment of Mania Mania means extremely excited or elevated mood. Sizodon MD 0.5 Tablet helps calm the mood and relax the nerves. This stabilises the mood and prevents the symptoms of mania from recurring again. Taking Sizodon MD 0.5 Tablet will ensure that you have a better social life and are able to do daily activities more comfortably.

How Sizodon Disintegrating Strip works

Sizodon MD 0.5 Tablet is an atypical antipsychotic. It works by affecting the levels of chemical messengers (dopamine and serotonin) to improve mood, thoughts and behavior.

Fact Box

Chemical Class: Benzisoxazole Derivative Habit Forming: No Therapeutic Class: NEURO CNS Action Class: Atypical Antipsychotics

Interaction with drugs

Taking Sizodon with any of the following medicines can modify the effect of either of them and cause some undesirable side effects Clotrimazole Brand(s): Clowil, Odis, Kamestin Life-threatening Use of Risperidone and Clotrimazole should be avoided at the same time. Clotrimazole is expected to increase Risperidone levels, which may result in potential life-threatening abnormal heart rate. Fluconazole Brand(s): Fungis, EF Z, Rocflu Life-threatening Itraconazole Brand(s): Itraspan, Canzit, Itoz Life-threatening Miconazole Brand(s): Canticid Life-threatening

Nexorab IT Capsules (GERD)

Rabeprazole + Itopride

Rabeprazole + Itopride Uses

Rabeprazole+Itopride is used in the treatment of gastroesophageal reflux disease (acid reflux) and Peptic ulcer disease.

How Rabeprazole + Itopride works

Rabeprazole + Itopride is a combination of two medicines: Rabeprazole and Itopride. Rabeprazole is a proton pump inhibitor (PPI). It works by reducing the amount of acid in the stomach which helps in the relief of acid-related indigestion and heartburn. Itopride is a prokinetic which works on the region in the brain that controls vomiting. It also acts on the upper digestive tract to increase the movement of the stomach and intestines, allowing food to move more easily through the stomach. Itopride (INN; brand name Ganaton) is a prokinetic benzamide derivative. These drugs inhibit dopamine and acetylcholine esterase enzyme and have a gastrokinetic effect. Itopride is indicated for the treatment of functional dyspepsia and other gastrointestinal conditions.

Common side effects of Rabeprazole + Itopride

Diarrhea, Headache, Dizziness, Flatulence, Weakness, Nausea, Vomiting, Abdominal pain

Brand

Nexorab - IT Capsules

Sunday, June 25, 2023

Avoiding Common Traps While Thinking to Negotiate (Chapter 1)

Consider a business dispute based on real events that could happen to any one of us. Characters Evelyn: sister Fred: brother-in-law You are the founder of a small, privately owned research and development company in Silicon Valley. You recently learned that your joint venture partner, the giant Bikuta Corporation of Japan, has secretly developed a competing product which it is now selling under its own name in the Chinese market. This “new” product is essentially a knockoff of the design you licensed to Bikuta (along with essential know-how) two years ago. There is no doubt in your mind that Bikuta has violated your contract, which provides that Bikuta will manufacture and distribute only your product “worldwide” for five years—and pay you a license fee of 15 percent of sales. When you confront Bikuta's president, he is unremorseful. He says your original design does not “fit” the Chinese market and that Bikuta owes you nothing for Chinese sales. He also wants to renegotiate your 15 percent royalty rate, which he suddenly claims is too high. You feel stunned and betrayed. Bikuta thinks nothing of stealing your know-how, ignoring its contractual obligations, and trying to bully you into accepting less than you are due. You are also angry with yourself for being so trusting. Any businessperson can identify with this case. The gut says “Do battle!” and “It would be unworthy to negotiate.” But what's the wise thing to do— financially, morally, rationally? In the face of a bully, do you fight or negotiate? The tension between conflicting moral and pragmatic demands is central to this dilemma. By the time you finish reading it, I hope my framework will give you a new and useful way to think not only about Bikuta, but about all those situations in which you will have to decide whether to bargain with the Devil.

Avoiding Common Traps

Here we want to say why intuitive judgments are not always wise. Fred's perspective reflects a number of traps, or cognitive distortions, that commonly lead us to refuse to negotiate when we probably should. These “negative” traps are in the left-hand column below, and they are by far the more common response when we are in conflict with an enemy. But a second set of traps, listed in the right-hand column, can have the opposite effect, causing us to negotiate when maybe we shouldn't. Evelyn's perspective reflects some of these “positive” traps.
# Negative Traps Promoting Refusal Positive Traps Promoting Negotiation
a Tribalism Universalism
b Demonization Contextual rationalization and forgiveness
c Dehumanization Rehabilitation and redemption
d Moralism/Self-righteousness Shared fault and responsibility
e Zero-sum fallacy Win-win
f Fight/Flight Appeasement
g Call to battle Call for peace/Pacifism
a) Tribalism involves an appeal to a group identity, where you see your own side—the in-group—as familiar and reliable, while the other side is an out-group that should be distrusted and disfavored. The group identity rests on shared characteristics such as family or kinship structures, language, religion, race, ethnicity, or a common history. In our example, Fred perceives Bikuta as a member of a foreign tribe— the Japanese—who are different, don't think the way “we” Americans do, and who are not to be trusted. At the opposite extreme is the trap of universalism. This presumes that people are all essentially the same and underestimates the importance of differences created by culture, history, and group identity. In Evelyn's words, “People are people. Any businessman wants to make money for his company.” b) Demonization is the tendency to view the other side as “evil”: not just guilty of bad acts, but fundamentally bad to the core. Fred sees Bikuta's actions—secretly opening a factory in China, manufacturing a competing stent, and asking for a reduction in the license fee—as revealing his underlying character. Evelyn's perspective reflects the opposite extreme: contextual rationalization. She suggests that Bikuta's behavior is best understood as the product of external pressures and thus can be easily forgiven. c) Dehumanization involves seeing the enemy as being outside the moral order, less than human. Said to be a central process in prejudice, racism, and discrimination, this trap justifies treating the “other” as an “object.” Fred's characterizations of the Japanese lean in this direction. More extreme examples can easily be found. In 2008, Imam Yousif al-Zahar of Hamas characterized Jews as “the brothers of apes and pigs” before calling them a people “who cannot be trusted” and “have been traitors to all agreements.” The opposite trap might involve a belief that all people are capable of change and deserve an opportunity for rehabilitation and redemption. In Evelyn's words, “Give Mr. Bikuta a chance to do the right thing.” d) Moralism and self-righteousness create a tendency to see the other side as entirely at fault while you are innocent and worthy. Fred feels Bikuta is completely to blame, has purposely and flagrantly violated the joint venture agreement, and deserves moral condemnation. The opposite trap is the tendency to assume that in every conflict there is fault on all sides and that the burden of responsibility should be shared. Evelyn suggests that while Bikuta may be at fault, you are partially responsible as well for not being more attentive to Bikuta's desire to enter the Chinese market. e) The zero-sum trap involves seeing the world in terms of a competition: what one side wins, the other side must lose. Conflict is seen as purely distributive: anything that benefits your enemy is necessarily bad for you. Reducing the license fee, according to Fred, can only help Bikuta and hurt you. One sees this trap everywhere. In divorce disputes, for example, spouses often argue over the allocation of money, or timespent with the children, as if more for one spouse can't possibly be good for the other. The opposite trap is the naïve assumption that win- win is always possible, that the pie can always be expanded so that both sides are better off. Evelyn suggests that if joint venture sales will be expanded by reason of lower license fees, both you and Bikuta could be better off economically. She may (or may not) be right. f) The fight/flight trap involves seemingly opposite behaviors, but both are automatic reactions and relate to “hot cognition.” In the face of intense conflict, you may: (1) unthinkingly charge into battle or, (2) at the other extreme, flee, conceding what is important to you in the hope of avoiding a fight. Fred obviously wants to fight. Evelyn wants neither to fight nor to flee, but she is perhaps inclined toward appeasement. Better to negotiate with Bikuta and make concessions, she argues, than fight a possibly losing legal battle. g) The final trap, the call to battle, involves a political figure, business executive, or family member mobilizing his or her “troops” for a fight in a righteous mission against evil. This call uses the language of war and will often rhetorically draw upon demonization, tribalism, dehumanization, and moralism. While the leader inevitably claims his motivation is only to do what is best for the group as a whole, the call to battle often serves the leader's own political interests as well. Far less common is the opposite extreme, a call for peace, based on the premise that almost any conflict can be avoided or ended through sensible peace-seeking initia-tives. The call for peace may invoke notions of universalism, forgiveness, redemption, and shared responsibility.
Tags: Negotiation,Book Summary,

Friday, June 23, 2023

Story of Natan Sharansky (From the book 'Bargaining with the devil')

Anatoli (Natan) Sharansky was twenty-nine years old when he was seized by the Russian secret police, the KGB, taken to Lefortovo prison, stripped naked and searched, and told that he was being charged with treason, a capital offense. He was accused of passing state secrets to the CIA. The charges were bogus. His real offense was that he had become a public spokesman for the Soviet Zionist movement. He had regularly provided the major American and European television and newspaper correspondents in the Soviet Union with interviews and information about “refuseniks”—
Soviet Jews who had been refused permission to emigrate to Israel.
The KGB wanted to make a deal with Sharansky, and they used a combination of carrots and sticks in their efforts to induce his cooperation.

In exchange for a confession and a condemnation of the refusenik movement, they offered Sharansky a short prison sentence, after which he would be free to leave the Soviet Union and join his wife in Israel. Implicit in the deal was the understanding that once Sharansky had left the Soviet Union, he could repudiate his confession as coerced. The stick included subjecting Sharansky to a merciless campaign of psychological torture, social isolation, continuing threats of extreme punishment, and harsh conditions.

Instead of cooperating, Sharansky adopted a stance of absolute refusal to make any deal with the KGB. He faced down a succession of high-level KGB interrogators, refusing to confess to anything or to provide any information that would implicate his friends and colleagues. He pleaded not guilty to the criminal charges, dismissed the state-assigned lawyer (whowas a Communist Party member), and insisted on the right to defend himself during the trial. He then used the trial as a forum to denounce the charges as a sham and vilify the Soviet regime. He was convicted on the bogus espionage charge and condemned to a thirteen-year sentence: three years in prison, with the remainder in a forced labor camp.
For the next nine years, Sharansky endured harsh physical conditions in Soviet prisons and labor camps. “During the long months of interrogation and isolation before my trial, and for all the years that followed, my captors were determined to break me, to make me con-fess to crimes I had never committed,” he later wrote in his memoir.4 He steadfastly refused all forms of cooperation, and even went on a nearly fatal hunger strike as a protest against the authorities.
Finally, in 1986, the Soviets released Sharansky in a prisoner exchange with the United States. Sharansky was released in Berlin and the United States released a captured Soviet spy.

To the very end, Sharansky refused to bargain with the Devil. On February 10, 1986, Sharansky was flown to East Berlin, accompanied by a KGB agent. A car was waiting to take him to the border. As they stepped off the plane, the KGB agent instructed Sharansky, “You see that car … Go straight to it and don't make any turns. Is it agreed?” Sharansky replied,
“Since when have I started making agreements with the KGB? You know that I never agree with the KGB about anything. If you tell me to go straight, I'll go crooked.” He then defiantly zigzagged his way to the car.
The next day he walked across the Glienicke Bridge to his freedom.

~ ~ ~

Sharansky's decision provides a rich context for exploring the issues raised earlier in this chapter. Sharansky himself has provided a wealth of information in his memoir and subsequent interviews.5 How did he make this decision—and continue to uphold it during the long years of his imprisonment? Was it based on analysis or intuition? Was it a pragmatic decision or a moral one? Above all, was it wise? 

Background

Sharansky was born in 1948 in Stalino, a city in the Ukraine. While ethnically Jewish, his family, like most Jews during the Soviet period, was not religiously observant. From an early age, Sharansky was taught that Jews were often persecuted and that expressing any form of dissent was dangerous. He was five years old when Stalin died in 1953, and he remembers the day vividly. His father told him that Stalin had been a “terrible butcher” who had killed “many innocent people,” that shortly before his death Stalin had again begun persecuting Jews,6 and that another pogrom might soon be in the offing. Moreover, “Papa warned us not to repeat these comments to anyone. This is when I first learned that in order to survive in Soviet society you had to function on two levels at once: what you really thought and what you allowed yourself to tell other people. I lived with this dual reality until 1973.” Sharansky grew up “unaware of the religion, language, culture and history of my people.” As a youth he had little interest in a religion that could only be practiced in secret. “Because Jews of my generation had no desire to live a double life, or to be handicapped by a Jewish affiliation that meant little to us, we constantly looked for a means of escape.” Sharansky's means were his brains—he was a chess prodigy who excelled at math and had a passion for learning English. Because of his mathematical gifts, and despite being a Jew, Sharansky was accepted to the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, a prestigious, highly competitive school that liked to compare itself to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). While a student there, inspired by Andrei Sakharov and his Committee for Human Rights, Sharansky became interested both in human rights and the Soviet Zionist movement, a dissident group that sought to pressure the Soviet regime to grant Jews the right to leave the USSR for Israel and thus “make aliyah.” Through this movement he developed a strong Jewish identity and the courage to speak out: “[F]or the first time in my life, I was no longer afraid to say what I really believed—about my fellow citizens, the country I lived in, and the values I adhered to. At the age of twenty-five I finally learned what a joy it was to be free.” In October 1973, through his work with the Soviet Zionist movement, Sharansky met Natasha (later Avital) Stieglitz, who quickly became the love of his life. They soon moved in together. Later that year, Sharansky followed Natasha's example and applied for permission to leave the Soviet Union for Israel. In doing so, he knew it was only a matter of time before he was fired from his job as a computer specialist at the Institute for Oil and Gas. Natasha's exit visa came through in mid-1974. The couple struggled with the question of whether she should leave without him, and if so, whether they should marry before her departure. They decided they should marry and that she should not put her exit visa at risk through a delay. They married on July 4, 1974, in a Jewish ceremony. The next day she left the Soviet Union for Israel, where she took the name Avital. Sharansky, hoping that his own exit visa would come through quickly, assured her that he'd be there within six months at the latest. In fact, they were not to be reunited for twelve years. Sharansky increasingly devoted his energy and time to the Soviet Zionist movement, especially after he lost his job in 1975. Because of his excellent English, he became an important spokesman for the Jewish dissidents with the Western press. He developed close relationships with the Moscow correspondents of the major media from America and Europe, and frequently granted interviews and provided information about the plight of Soviet Jews in general and refuseniks in particular. After several years, the Soviet authorities decided to crack down on the movement. On March 4, 1977, the newspaper Izvestia published a full-page article denouncing Sharansky and several other Jewish activists, accusing them of passing state secrets to the CIA. Soon thereafter, Sharansky was arrested. After his arrest, Sharansky ended up spending nine years in prison and labor camps, including more than four hundred days in unheated, damp, four-by- six-foot “punishment cells,” with half rations. He also spent about two hundred days on hunger strikes. He chose this course instead of joining his wife in Israel. Based on what he knew at the time, was this a rational decision? It certainly looked as though he was analyzing the situation rationally. He was a chess master. He had studied game theory and was well grounded inmathematics. He saw himself as locked in a strategic contest with the KGB, and he relished formulating and refining his tactics. Even before his arrest, he had been interrogated by the KGB on several occasions and had framed these dealings as akin to a chess game. He took comfort in thinking through in advance what the KGB's moves might be, and how he might respond and defend. I had trained myself not to pay attention to the threats of the KGB interrogators I occasionally met with. Instead of answering their questions, I told them only what I wanted them to hear. In their presence I felt like a chess player facing a much weaker opponent. They did exactly what they were supposed to, and I knew all their moves in advance: their threats and warnings, their attempts at blackmail, their flattery and their promises. During the key period between his arrest and trial, he had sixteen months to refine his game. He also drew upon the memory of a computer program he had written as part of his graduate thesis, titled “Simulating the Decision-Making Process in Conflict Situations Based on the Chess Endgame.” He remembered that “an important element in my program was a hierarchical list, a 'tree' of goals and conditions for attaining them. And now, as I stared at the chessboard in my cell, it occurred to me that I could take a similar approach in the game that I was about to play against the KGB.” Now let's pay close attention to Sharansky's description of his thought process. What are the goals of this game? I asked myself. Clearly it was impossible to establish a goal of “minimizing the possible punishment,” for that would mean submitting to the will of the KGB. After some thought, I decided upon three goals, and I sketched them out on a scrap of toilet paper, part of the daily ration of rough tissue paper the guard had given me at breakfast: Obstruct → Study → Expose. (Emphasis added.)Upon further thought, he changed the first goal slightly. “Unfortunately, it wasn't in my power to obstruct, so I neatly crossed out that word and replaced it with a more modest goal: 'Not to cooperate.' ” Next he had to decide what it meant “not to cooperate”—what he would disclose, what he would not disclose. He spent a considerable amount of time diagramming the ends and means with each goal, dividing each into “more elementary parts” until it looked like a tree. Analysts often construct decision trees to analyze rational decision- making under conditions of uncertainty. But on closer inspection, Sharansky's tree looks suspiciously bare—in fact, it's missing a couple of branches. If Spock had been at Sharansky's side during this harrowing period, he wouldn't have let Sharansky get away with this. Spock would have begun by observing that Sharansky appeared to have three obvious interests. First, to minimize punishment and avoid execution. Second, to join Avital in Israel. Third, to promote the Soviet Zionist movement. On hearing a statement like the quoted passage above, Spock would immediately protest that Sharansky makes no mention of any interest in saving his own life, regaining his freedom, or joining his wife in Israel. In fact, Sharansky has already cut those branches right off the tree. He appears to have jumped ahead a few steps and presumed that it would be impossible to negotiate a deal that would serve these interests at an acceptable cost—that any negotiated deal that even remotely served these interests would mean “submitting to the will of the KGB.” Spock would have said, “Not so fast. This sounds rather like zero-sum thinking, with strong overtones of demonization and moralism.” At the very least, Spock would have insisted that Sharansky consider all his alternatives and weigh the pros and cons systematically. We will come back to this issue later. Now let's return to Sharansky's thought process. If he made no deal with the KGB, what were his alternatives? There was really only one alternative: to defy the KGB and insist that his case be tried. Sharansky was very clearheaded about the possible outcomes if he went to trial. He understood that there was no chance that he would be acquitted. Given the reality of the Soviet system, his conviction was preordained once he was arrested and charged. The only question was the penalty. Under the Soviet statute underwhich he was charged, the penalty was either death or fifteen years in prison. To most utilitarian analysts, that would qualify as a terrible BATNA. What were the odds that Sharansky would be executed? He had no way of knowing. On the one hand, the KGB clearly intended to make an example of him. Many refusenik dissidents had been arrested before, but they had been charged with the lesser crime of participating in “anti-Soviet” activities, which ordinarily carried only a five-year sentence. Sharansky was the first refusenik to be charged with a capital crime, and the KGB never let him forget it. Indeed, the KGB tried to give him the impression that the risk of execution was very great if he didn't cooperate. Interrogators repeatedly used the word rasstrel: death by gunfire. However, Sharansky also knew that his captors had an incentive to exaggerate this risk in order to make him confess. Sharansky's own perception of the risk of execution fluctuated wildly during the sixteen months of his pretrial imprisonment and interrogation. Initially, he thought a death sentence was extremely unlikely—little more than a theoretical possibility—for two reasons. First, the Soviet regime of the 1970s was imposing capital punishment far less often than in the Stalinist period, when many dissidents had been summarily executed. Second, Sharansky was well-known in the West and knew that Avital would do everything possible to ensure that his case received continuing publicity. He reasoned that the KGB could not afford to kill him or keep him completely hidden from the outside world because they would have to provide some proof to the media that he was alive. For the same reason, he believed that they would likely not kill his parents and brother, who remained in the Soviet Union. But later Sharansky came to feel that the threat of execution was real. At a critical time shortly before the trial, when the KGB tried hardest to coerce him, they applied a variety of psychological pressures to make him believe that rasstrel was a substantial possibility. His cellmate, a likely KGB collaborator, continually made sardonic jokes about how the executioner would soon smear Sharansky's head with iodine (to mark the target for the bullet) if he kept up his stubborn refusal to deal with the authorities. The KGB reinforced these “jokes” with their own comments. One of the more sophisticated interrogators, named Volodin, made statements such as:We tolerated you for a long time. We warned you and your friends. But even our patience has its limits. You ought to know our Soviet history. In every case where somebody was charged with crimes such as yours and did not confess and repent, he was executed. Well, not every case. There were times where there was no death penalty, and the accused received twenty-five years. We're not threatening you. I'm merely explaining your situation, which is my duty as an investigator. Assuming he escaped the firing squad, however, Sharansky knew he could count on a long prison sentence. This, too, carried great risk and uncertainty. Because of the harsh conditions in Soviet prisons and work camps, he might not survive. Even if he stayed alive, he might not survive psychologically; he feared that at some point in his incarceration, the KGB would finally break him and extract a confession. In his calmer moments, he thought the KGB would eventually let him go, perhaps in a prisoner swap with the West or out of sheer pressure from world opinion. But he had no idea whether this would happen in five, thirteen, or thirty years. Did Sharansky have a realistic sense of what kind of negotiated deal might be possible? The answer is yes. For the sixteen months between his arrest and his trial, Sharansky was continuously subjected to KGB interrogation. Reasonably early in the process he got the first hint of the kind of deal the KGB might offer if he were prepared to negotiate. [The interrogator's] tactic was to tell me about two other prisoners he had recently dealt with who had decided to cooperate with their investigators. They were both foreigners, a Dutchman and a Frenchman, and were arrested for passing out dissident literature. As I could see from the protocols of their interrogation [which the KGB shared with him], each had loudly insisted on his rights, but soon recanted. Then, after returning home, both men had repudiated their confessions, and the Dutchman had even written a book about his imprisonment. [The interrogator's] message was obvious: recant, and you, too, will be released. Then you can say whatever you like.Later the KGB was even more explicit: Our only goal is to defend state interests. You're young, and your wife is waiting for you in Israel. If you help us suppress the anti- government activity of the Zionists and the so-called dissidents, you'll receive a very short sentence—maybe two or three years. Perhaps you can even be freed right after the trial. We can make a deal about everything. We are not judges, of course, but we do have some influence in the courtroom. The precise terms of a negotiated deal were not spelled out. Exactly how short a sentence would he be offered? Would his parents and his brother be allowed to emigrate as well? Would a confession and general renunciation of the Soviet Zionist movement be enough? Or would the KGB also require that Sharansky reveal information that might jeopardize specific Soviet Zionists who had been his colleagues? Sharansky believed that once he made any concessions, the KGB would “own him,” that he would be forced down a slippery slope and would need to make further and further concessions. Obviously, the scope of Sharansky's required cooperation would rationally affect his assessment of whether to make a deal. But without entering into negotiations, there would be no way to explore the KGB's “bottom line.” Suppose an acceptable deal could be made that required Sharansky to do no more than confess and generally renounce the Soviet Zionist movement. Could the KGB be trusted to uphold its end of the bargain? Sharansky said the answer was yes. Although this may be a surprising conclusion to some, he reached it logically—by thinking about the KGB's interests. He knew his enemy well. The KGB was a “repeat player” that needed to negotiate with other refuseniks. Therefore, Sharansky reasoned, the KGB had a strong interest in maintaining its reputation within the refusenik community for honoring such deals. Sharansky reports that his assessment was based on precedent: the KGB's previous dealings with refuseniks who had cooperated. Sharansky also considered the costs of negotiating.Sitting in my cell, I asked myself the obvious question: why not recant and then repudiate it after I was released? But I already knew the answer. First, any confession I made would mean betraying my friends. When [dissidents] Yakir and Krasin decided to cooperate with the authorities, it was enormously demoralizing for the dissident community. I had no desire to undermine the movements I believed in, or to do anything that would leave my fellow refuseniks and dissidents with an even greater feeling of hopelessness, or of the KGB's own impotence. Second, I knew that the only reason that the world paid any attention to a small group of Soviet dissidents and Jewish activ-ists was our strong moral position. While collaborating with the KGB might be understandable, it would severely compromise that stance. The moral righteousness of our struggle was our greatest asset, perhaps our only asset. To cooperate with the KGB would mean letting down our growing number of supporters in the free world and undermining their continued determination to help us. Finally, on a more practical level, I knew that every time the KGB made a political arrest, it required permission from the political leadership. If I recanted, it would only make it easier for the KGB to receive permission to initiate new repressions and another round of arrests. If you accept that Sharansky's only interest was promoting the dis-sident movement, he did an impressive job of cost-benefit analysis. As to that interest, Sharansky found the costs of negotiating unacceptable. He believed that any sign of cooperation—even if subsequently recanted—would undermine the movement. He feared that any statement he made to the KGB might be twisted and used to implicate his compatriots in some fabricated crime. He also feared that the movement might lose Western support if its leaders were exposed as collaborators. He concluded that he would better serve the movement by resisting the KGB, and even becoming a martyr if necessary. Spock would not quickly dismiss this conclusion as irrational. He might question some of Sharansky's predictions and assessments, and he mighteven caution Sharansky against grandiosity. (How could Sharansky be so sure that the movement would be better served if resistance led to his death and martyrdom?) But if we accept that Sharansky's primary interest was the Zionist movement, Spock would have to agree that noncooperation met that interest better than negotiation. Indeed, it strengthened the movement by showing the world that Jewish dissident leaders could not be corrupted by the Soviet regime. But something remains a puzzle. Why did Sharansky so completely ignore his other interests in this calculus? Why didn't they even count enough to be mentioned? Given how much Sharansky detested the Soviet regime, surely he had some desire to get out of prison and join Avital in Israel, where he could raise a family, speak freely, and further promote the movement. Rationally, it doesn't make sense. And Sharansky would agree. In April 2004, he gave an interview at the University of California, Berkeley, that shed new light on his decision-making process.7 When asked how he decided what course of action to follow when imprisoned by the KGB, his answer had nothing to do with chess games or rational analysis. The source of his resistance, he said, was a “feeling that as long as you continue saying no, you're a free person. … The moment you say to them 'yes,' you will go back again to that slavery of the loyal Soviet citizen.” Sharansky added that this “intuitive, automatic feeling”—this desire “to continue being free” and “to enjoy [his] inner freedom in prison”—was “the basis of [his] resistance” (emphasis added). In fact, the basis of his decision was “irrational.” But reason and logic also played an important role in implementing his goal. [I]t is very dangerous to rely only on intuition, on non-rational things. As a religious, rational person, I was relying on my instincts, but as a scientist I had to rationalize these instincts. I had to explain to myself, rationally, why I should not cooperate with them. I had to make sure that I was controlling my behavior during interrogations, in spite of the fear, which they could insert in me, threatening to sentenceme to death. That's why I developed the whole system of rationalization, of what are my aims and means. He makes a similar point about the decision tree he created in prison. In looking back at that tree now, he says in his memoir, [It] seems like pseudo-science, a pathetic attempt to impose order on my racing and chaotic mind. But at the time it was tremendously important, as the familiar terminology from my scientific training helped me adjust to my new reality. After hours of scattered thoughts, I was finally able to organize my impulses under the rubric of a logical plan. This alone was comforting, and gave me a sense of control. In other words, he is admitting that he rigged the analysis. His desire to survive, which favored negotiation, was so powerful that he was afraid he would sacrifice his principles. So he simply removed that “interest” from the equation. He was very much caught in the Faustian tension I described earlier: a conflict between pragmatism and conscience. And he is telling us, with remarkable frankness, how he managed that tension. He used the intuitive, feeling part of his brain to decide what his goal should be, and then went back and manipulated the analysis so it would lead him to the “right” conclusion.8 The “feelings” that were so decisive here relate to self-respect, moral purpose, and identity. Spock's analysis cannot easily capture these factors, but they are very powerful motivators in human life. Indeed, a constant theme in the memoir was the importance Sharansky attached to maintaining his self-respect and not allowing the KGB or the system to humiliate him. “When I was stripped and searched, I decided it was best to treat my captors like the weather. A storm can cause you problems, and sometimes those problems can be humiliating. But the storm itself doesn't humiliate you. Once I understood this, I realized that nothing they did could humiliate me. I could only humiliate myself—by doing something I might later be ashamed of.” He turned this thought into a kind of mantra: “[N]othing they do can humiliate me, I alone can humiliate myself.”As for the traps we mentioned earlier, they too played an impor-tant role. It appears that Sharansky used the negative traps as a survival tactic. Take demonization, for example. Sharansky consciously repressed any impulse to empathize with his interrogators, or even to think they might in any way have any of his interests at heart. When Sharansky overheard his interrogators chitchatting among themselves about their families and children, he told himself that he must resist the natural impulse to realize that outside the prison the KGB personnel might be normal people. What worried me most about my isolation was that if it continued I would inevitably, perhaps even unconsciously, start adapting myself to the world of my interrogators. And once that process began, helped along by my fear of being killed and by [his cellmate's] constant chatter about the possibility of reaching an agreement with the KGB, I would gradually abandon my own world and my own values. The next step was all too clear: I would begin to “understand” my captors, and would try to reach an accord with them. Unless I stopped this process, it was only a matter of time before I succumbed. To counteract that impulse, Sharansky demonized the Soviet regime in sweeping and absolute terms. He viewed the regime as evil and soulless, oppressing not only him but his community—the Soviet Jews—and more broadly, the entire Soviet population. Sharansky also appears to have used the zero-sum trap to strengthen his resolve. He viewed every interaction with the KGB in purely competitive terms. In a chess game, there cannot be two winners. If your opponent wins, by definition you lose. And vice versa. He genuinely loved to do battle. He saw himself as supremely intelligent, and he relished the feeling that he could outsmart and defeat his captors. Sharansky did not want to see the “evil” regime win on anything, no matter how trivial. He refused to negotiate with the KGB even about receiving care packages in prison, or about receiving fewer days in a punishment cell in return for simply conversing with an interrogator. Finally, his extreme moralism and self-righteousness, mixed with apparent narcissism, appear to have helped him fight the fear and lonelinessof life in the Gulag. Sharansky told himself that when even one individual cannot be co-opted, the entire Soviet regime is undermined. He saw himself as waging a moral battle in which he alone held the key to victory. If he did not cooperate, he won and the KGB lost. It was as if he believed that if he gave up, his whole purpose in life—his struggle against the Soviets for Jewish liberation—would be shattered. He had little use for fellow dissidents who could not maintain this standard. In the Gulag, he confronted a former colleague, another Jewish dissident, Mark Morozov, who was negotiating with the KGB. Morozov wanted desperately to get out of captivity, and he justified his cooperation with the KGB by arguing that he would be more valuable to the Zionist movement on the outside than in prison. Sharansky felt both pity and contempt for him. His encounter with Morozov reaffirmed his intuition that “without firm moral principles it was impossible to withstand the pressure of the KGB. If you're a captive of your own fear, you'll not only believe any nonsense, but you'll even invent nonsense of your own in order to justify your behavior.” After his trial, as he left the detention prison where the KGB had tormented him for sixteen months, Sharansky saw that prison as “the place where I had emerged victorious, defended my freedom, retained my spiritual independence against the kingdom of lies, and reinforced my connection with Israel and with [my wife].” On his way to serving a thirteen-year sentence, he felt joy in having exercised his freedom by speaking the truth at the trial. In the ensuing years of imprisonment, Sharansky continued to demonstrate extraordinary discipline and courage. With the benefit of hindsight, there can be no doubt that his refusal to cooperate accomplished exactly what he hoped: to increase worldwide pressure on the Soviet regime.
Tags: Negotiation,Book Summary,

Wednesday, June 7, 2023

Books For Flask (Web Development Using Python)

Download Books
1. 
Flask Web Development: Developing Web Applications with Python
Miguel Grinberg, 2014

2. 
Mastering Flask
Jack Stouffer, 2015

3. 
Mastering Flask Web Development: Build Enterprise-grade, Scalable Python Web Applications, 2nd Edition
Jack Stouffer, 2018

4.
The New And Improved Flask Mega-Tutorial
Miguel Grinberg, 2017

5.
Flask Framework Cookbook
Shalabh Aggarwal, 2014

6.
Python API Development Fundamentals: Develop a Full-stack Web Application with Python and Flask
Ray Chung, 2019

7.
Building Web Apps with Python and Flask: Learn to Develop and Deploy Responsive RESTful Web Applications Using Flask Framework
Malhar Lathkar, 2021

8.
Flask Framework Cookbook: Over 80 Proven Recipes and Techniques for Python Web Development with Flask, 2nd Edition
Shalabh Aggarwal, 2019

9.
The Powder Flask Book: Treating of the History and Use of the Flask as a Principal Accessory to the Firearm, from Its Inception, Through the Ages, Until the Popular Acceptance of the Metallic Cartridge; and Giving Emphasis to the Powder Flasks of the Nineteenth Century, Noting Their Significance and Values for Shooters and Collectors of Antique Arms and Flasks
Ray Riling, 1953

10.
Flask By Example
Gareth Dwyer, 2016

11.
Building REST APIs with Flask: Create Python Web Services with MySQL
Kunal Relan, 2019

12.
Building Web Applications with Flask
Italo Maia, 2015

13.
Mad Science: Einstein's Fridge, Dewar's Flask, Mach's Speed, and 362 Other Inventions and Discoveries That Made Our World
2012

14.
Instant Flask Web Development
Ron DuPlain, 2013

Tags: Technology,List of Books,Python,

Propyphenazone

Introduction

Propyphenazone (known as isopropylantipyrine in Japan) is a derivative of phenazone with similar analgesic and antipyretic effects. Originally patented in 1931, propyphenazone is marketed as a combination formulation with paracetamol and caffeine for treatment of primary headache disorder. Serious adverse events Case reports have described acute inferior-wall myocardial infarctions characterized by low atrial rhythms[vague] (Kounis syndrome) secondary to propyphenazone use. Excerpt from WHO comments Propyphenazone, a pyrazolone derivative with anti-inflammatory, analgesic and antipyretic activity, was introduced in 1951 for the treatment of rheumatic disorders. As it is structurally related to aminophenazone it has been associated with severe blood dyscrasias. However, it cannot be transformed into potentially carcinogenic nitrosamines and has therefore been widely used as a replacement drug for aminophenazone. In certain countries, products containing propyphenazone have now been restricted in their indications, whereas in others they are still available, sometimes as over-the-counter preparations. Ref: wikipedia

More Details

Therapeutic Classification : Analgesic (of a drug: acting to relieve pain) And Antipyretic (of a drug: used to prevent or reduce fever) Agent Trade Names/Brand Names of Propyphenazone: Dart Overview of Propyphenazone • Propyphenazone is an analgesic and antipyretic, with some anti-inflammatory activity. • It is used to reduce fever and pain in conditions like headache and toothache. What is the dosage of Propyphenazone? • The recommended dose of the drug is 75 to 150 mg tablet orally. • It is usually available as a combination with other drugs like caffeine and paracetamol. How should Propyphenazone be taken? • Propyphenazone should be taken up to a maximum of four times a day. Ref: medindia.net
Tags: Medicine,