LinkedIn's HTML Assessment Dump (Apr 2023)

LinkedIn's HTML Assessment is a set of 15 questions. Here are some sample questions that you can practice before attempting the actual Assessment.
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Tags: Web Development,Technology,

Books on SEO (Mar 2023)

Download Books

1.
The Art of SEO: Mastering Search Engine Optimization
Eric Enge, 2015

2.
Search Engine Optimization For Dummies
Peter Kent, 2004

3.
SEO 2022: Learn Search Engine Optimization with Smart Internet Marketing Strategies
Adam Clarke

4.
SEO Like I'm 5: The Ultimate Beginner's Guide to Search Engine Optimization
Matthew Capala, 2014

5.
SEO for Growth: The Ultimate Guide for Marketers, Web Designers & Entrepreneurs
John Jantsch, 2016

6.
SEO 2021 Learn Search Engine Optimization With Smart Internet Marketing Strategies: Learn SEO with Smart Internet Marketing Strategies
Adam Clarke

7.
Product-Led SEO: The Why Behind Building Your Organic Growth Strategy
Eli Schwartz, 2021

8.
How to Get to the Top of Google: The Plain English Guide to SEO
Tim Kitchen, 2013

9.
Search Engine Optimization All-in-One for Dummies
Bruce Clay, 2009

10.
3 Months to No. 1: The "no-nonsense" SEO Playbook for Getting Your Website Found on Google
Will Coombe, 2017

11.
SEO Workbook: Search Engine Optimization Success in Seven Steps
Jason McDonald, 2020

12.
Ultimate Guide to Link Building: How to Build Website Authority, Increase Traffic and Search Ranking with Backlinks
Garrett French, 2013

13.
SEO 2017: Learn Search Engine Optimization with Smart Internet Marketing Strategies
Adam Clarke

14.
The SEO Blueprint: How to Get More Organic Traffic Right NOW
David Krevitt, 2020

15.
Local SEO Secrets: 20 Local SEO Strategies You Should be Using NOW
Roger Bryan, 2021

16.
The Art of SEO
Eric Enge, 2009

17.
Optimize: How to Attract and Engage More Customers by Integrating SEO, Social Media, and Content Marketing
Lee Odden, 2012

18.
Entity SEO: Moving from Strings to Things
Dixon Jones, 2021

19.
Keywords for SEO: Actionable Knowledge Bombs to Help you Rank on Google
Itamar Blauer, 2021

20.
Everybody Writes: Your Go-To Guide to Creating Ridiculously Good Content
Ann Handley, 2014

21.
SEO 2019 Learn Search Engine Optimization With Smart Internet Marketing Strategies: Learn SEO with Smart Internet Marketing Strategies
Adam Clarke

22.
SEO - The Sassy Way of Ranking #1 in Google - when You Have NO CLUE! Beginner's Guide to Search Engine Optimization and Internet Marketing
Gundi Gabrielle, 2017

23.
SEO for Small Business Part 1: SEO and Keyword Research
Joseph Stevenson, 2020

24.
Search Engine Optimization: An Hour a Day
Gradiva Couzin, 2006

25.
Link Building Mastery: How to Rank Higher, Grow Your SEO Traffic and Build Authority with Backlinks
Julian Goldie, 2021

26.
Get into Bed with Google
Jon Smith, 2008

27.
Search Engine Optimization (SEO) Secrets
Danny Dover, 2011

28.
Ecommerce SEO: An Advanced Guide to On-Page Search Engine Optimization for Ecommerce
Traian Neacsu, 2015

29.
Social Media Marketing Workbook: How to Use Social Media for Business
Jason McDonald, 2015

30.
The Beginner's Guide to SEO: How to Optimize Your Website, Rank Higher on Google and Drive More Traffic
Jessica Ainsworth, 2021

31.
The Best Damn Website & ECommerce Marketing Optimization Guide, Period!
Stoney deGeyter, 2021

32.
SEO Fitness Workbook: The Seven Steps to Search Engine Optimization Success on Google (Teacher's Edition)
Jason McDonald, 2015

33.
Social Media Marketing for Beginners 2023 The #1 Guide To Conquer The Social Media World, Make Money Online and Learn The Latest Tips On Facebook, You
Jonathan Page, 2020

34.
Digital Marketing For Dummies
Ryan Deiss, 2016

35.
Search Engine Optimization Bible
Jerri L. Ledford, 2008

36.
SEO Mastery: Learn Advanced Search Engine Optimization Marketing Secrets, For Optimal Growth! Best Beginners Guide About SEO For Keeping your Business Ahead in The Modern Age!
Graham Fisher, 2019

37.
Landing Page Optimization
Tim Ash, 2008

38.
Faster, Smarter, Louder: Master Attention in a Noisy Digital Market
Aaron Agius, 2019

39.
SEO Made Easy: Everything You Need to Know about SEO and Nothing More
Evan Bailyn, 2013

40.
Seo 2021: Actionable, Hands-on SEO, Including a Full Site Audit
Dr Andy Williams, 2021

41.
Seo Step-By-Step: The Complete Beginner's Guide to Getting Traffic from Google
Caimin Jones, 2014

42.
Seo Secrets 2019: The Ultimate Guide on How to Mastering Search Engine Optimization Fast!
Phillip Rusell, 2018

43.
Inbound Marketing and SEO: Insights from the Moz Blog
Rand Fishkin, 2013

44.
The Truth About Search Engine Optimization
Rebecca Lieb, 2009

45.
SEO 2020 Learn Search Engine Optimization With Smart Internet Marketing Strategies: Learn SEO with Smart Internet Marketing Strategies
Adam Clarke

46.
ProBlogger: Secrets for Blogging Your Way to a Six-Figure Income
Darren Rowse, 2008

47.
The SEO Way: Beginners Guide to Search Engine Optimization
Tarek Riman, 2019

48.
Digital Marketing All-in-One For Dummies
Stephanie Diamond, 2019

49.
Google Ads (AdWords) Workbook: Advertising on Google Ads, YouTube, and the Display Network (Teacher's Edition)
Jason McDonald, 2019

50.
Etsy Business - Beginners Guide To Starting Your Own Etsy Business & Learn Etsy Marketing & SEO: Simple Steps To Maximize Profit Selling On Etsy
Eric Scott, 2020

The Little Book of Common Sense Investing (by John C Bogle, 10th Anniversary Edition, 2017)

The Little Book of Common Sense Investing (The only way to guarantee your fair share of stock market returns)
By: John C Bogle



About The Author



John Clifton "Jack" Bogle (May 8, 1929 – January 16, 2019) was an American investor, business magnate, and philanthropist. He was the founder and chief executive of The Vanguard Group, and is credited with creating the index fund. An avid investor and money manager himself, he preached investment over speculation, long-term patience over short-term action, and reducing broker fees as much as possible. The ideal investment vehicle for Bogle was a low-cost index fund held over a lifetime with dividends reinvested and purchased with dollar cost averaging.

His 1999 book ‘Common Sense on Mutual Funds: New Imperatives for the Intelligent Investor' became a bestseller and is considered a classic within the investment community.

What is an Index Fund?

"SUCCESSFUL INVESTING IS ALL about common sense. As the Oracle has said, it is simple, but it is not easy. Simple arithmetic suggests, and history confirms, that the winning strategy is to own all of the nation's publicly held businesses at very low cost. By doing so you are guaranteed to capture almost the entire return that they generate. The best way to implement this strategy is indeed simple: Buying a fund that holds this market portfolio, and holding it forever. Such a fund is called an index fund."

What is an Index Fund? (More Technically)

Index funds are mutual funds that are designed to track the performance of a particular index. For example, "ICICI Prudential Nifty 50 Index Fund" tracks the index Nifty 50.



Index funds eliminate the risks of individual stocks, market sectors, and manager selection. Only stock market risk remains.

Power of Compounding

Please don't underestimate the power of compounding the generous returns earned by our businesses. Over the past century, our corporations have earned a return on their capital of 9.5 percent per year. Compounded at that rate over a decade, each $1 initially invested grows to $2.48; over two decades, $6.14; over three decades, $15.22; over four decades, $37.72, and over five decades, $93.48.
More than doubling every decade.

SIP (Systematic Investment Plan) In An Index Fund

Data Dated: Friday, May 17, 2019
What if we invest Rs 1000 every month instead of a one time investment at the inception of the fund?
If we were to invest Rs 1000 each month in Nifty50, we would be having a current value of our investment to be Rs 1,691,507.
The figure 'Gain per day' would stand at: Rs 182.
This is a very slowly changing number:



But if we look at its growth over time, it mimics the original Nifty50 curve but while the range of "Gain per day" is 0 to 185, the range of Nifty50 is 1000 to 12000.
Here is a look at the two curves, On the left "Gain per day", and on the right "Nifty50":

Gain Per Day



Nifty50



The Man in The Middle

But the costs of playing the investment game both reduce the gains of the winners and increases the losses of the losers. So who wins? You know who wins. The man in the middle (actually, the men and women in the middle, the brokers, the investment bankers, the money managers, the marketers, the lawyers, the accountants, the operations departments of our financial system) is the only sure winner in the game of investing. Our financial croupiers always win. 
In the casino, the house always wins. In horse racing, the track always wins. In the Powerball lottery, the state always wins. Investing is no different. After the deduction of the costs of investing, beating the stock market is a loser's game.

This book will tell you why you should stop contributing to the croupiers of the financial markets, who rake in something like $400 billion each year from you and your fellow investors. It will also tell you how easy it is to do just that: simply buy the entire stock market. Then, once you have bought your stocks, get out of the casino and stay out. Just hold the market portfolio forever. And that's what the index fund does.

Once upon a Time...

A wealthy family named the Gotrocks, grown over the generations to include thousands of brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, and cousins, owned 100 percent of every stock in the United States. Each year, they reaped the rewards of investing: all the earnings growth that those thousands of corporations generated and all the dividends that they distributed.
 
Each family member grew wealthier at the same pace, and all was harmonious. Their investment had compounded over the decades, creating enormous wealth, because the Gotrocks family was playing a winner's game.
 
But after a while, a few fast-talking Helpers arrive on the scene, and they persuade some "smart" Gotrocks cousins that they can earn a larger share than the other relatives. These Helpers convince the cousins to sell some of their shares in the companies to other family members and to buy some shares of others from them in return. The Helpers handle the transactions, and as brokers, they receive commissions for their services. The ownership is thus rearranged among the family members. To their surprise, however, the family wealth begins to grow at a slower pace. Why? Because some of the return is now consumed by the Helpers, and the family's share of the generous pie that U.S. industry bakes each year 100 percent at the outset, starts to decline, simply because some of the return is now consumed by the Helpers.
 
The smart cousins quickly realize that their plan has actually diminished the rate of growth in the family's wealth. They recognize that their foray into stock-picking has been a failure and conclude that they need professional assistance, the better to pick the right stocks for themselves. So they hire stock-picking experts - more Helpers! - to gain an advantage. These money managers charge a fee for their services. So when the family appraises its wealth a year later, it finds that its share of the pie has diminished even further.

Alarmed at last, the family sits down together and takes stock of the events that have transpired since some of them began to try to outsmart the others. "How is it," they ask, "that our original 100 percent share of the pie -  made up each year of all those dividends and earnings -  has dwindled to just 60 percent?" Their wisest member, a sage old uncle, softly responds: "All that money you've paid to those Helpers and all those unnecessary extra taxes you're paying come directly out of our family's total earnings and dividends. Go back to square one, and do so immediately. Get rid of all your brokers. Get rid of all your money managers. Get rid of all your consultants. Then our family will again reap 100 percent of however large a pie that corporate America bakes for us, year after year."
They followed the old uncle's wise advice, returning to their original passive but productive strategy, holding all the stocks of corporate America, and standing pat. That is exactly what an index fund does.
... and the Gotrocks Family Lived Happily Ever After

Cost of financial intermediation and taxes

The way to wealth for those in the business of investment is to persuade their clients, "Don't just stand there. Do something." 
    
But the way to wealth for their clients in the aggregate is to follow the opposite maxim: "Don't do something. Just stand there."

Matter of Fact

The higher the level of their investment activity, the greater the cost of financial intermediation and taxes, the less the net return that shareholders - as a group, the owners of our businesses - receive.

For every 20K INR of investment in ICICI Prudential Nifty 50 Index Fund – Growth:

You get units of worth: 19,999 INR
And a stamp duty of 1 INR is charged from you.

The Investor Emotions

We can measure the emotions of the investors by the price/earnings (P/E) ratio, which measures the number of dollars investors are willing to pay for each dollar of earnings. As investor confidence waxes and wanes, P/E multiples rise and fall. When greed holds sway, we see very high P/Es. 
When hope prevails, P/Es are moderate. When fear is in the saddle, P/Es are very low. Back and forth, over and over again, swings in the emotions of investors momentarily derail the steady long-range upward trend in the economics of investing.

Regression toward the mean

In statistics, regression toward the mean (also called reversion to the mean, and reversion to mediocrity) is the phenomenon where if one sample of a random variable is extreme, the next sampling of the same random variable is likely to be closer to its mean. Furthermore, when many random variables are sampled and the most extreme results are intentionally picked out, it refers to the fact that (in many cases) a second sampling of these picked-out variables will result in "less extreme" results, closer to the initial mean of all of the variables.

Mathematically, the strength of this "regression" effect is dependent on whether or not all of the random variables are drawn from the same distribution, or if there are genuine differences in the underlying distributions for each random variable. In the first case, the "regression" effect is statistically likely to occur, but in the second case, it may occur less strongly or not at all.

Regression toward the mean is thus a useful concept to consider when designing any scientific experiment, data analysis, or test, which intentionally selects the "most extreme" events - it indicates that follow-up checks may be useful in order to avoid jumping to false conclusions about these events; they may be "genuine" extreme events, a completely meaningless selection due to statistical noise, or a mix of the two cases.

Reversion to Mean

Curiously, without exception, every decade of significantly negative speculative return was immediately followed by a decade in which it turned positive by a correlative amount - the quiet 1910s and then the roaring 1920s, the dispiriting 1940s and then the booming 1950s, the discouraging 1970s and then the soaring 1980s - reversion to the mean (RTM) writ large.

(Reversion to the mean can be thought of as the tendency for stock returns to return to their long-term norms over time - periods of exceptional returns tend to be followed by periods of below average performance, and vice versa.)

Ref: Chapter 2: Rational Exuberance (Shareholder Gains Must Match Business Gains.)

Regression toward the mean

Alternative definition in financial usage:

Jeremy Siegel uses the term "return to the mean" to describe a financial time series in which "returns can be very unstable in the short run but very stable in the long run." 

More quantitatively, it is one in which the standard deviation of average annual returns declines faster than the inverse of the holding period, implying that the process is not a random walk, but that periods of lower returns are systematically followed by compensating periods of higher returns, as is the case in many seasonal businesses, for example.

Reference: 
Siegel, Jeremy (November 27, 2007). Stocks for the Long Run (4th ed.). McGraw–Hill. pp. 13, 28–29. ISBN 978-0071494700.

Regression toward the mean



After the Covid-19 Pandemic



Index Fund vs. Managed Fund



Noise of the Emotions

My advice to investors is to ignore the short-term noise of the emotions reflected in our financial markets and focus on the productive long-term economics of our corporate businesses. Shakespeare could have been describing the inexplicable hourly and daily - sometimes even yearly or longer - fluctuations in the stock market when he wrote, "[It is] like a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." The way to investment success is to get out of the expectations market of stock prices and cast your lot with the real market of business.

Don't Take My Word for It

Simply heed the timeless distinction made by Benjamin Graham, legendary investor, author of The Intelligent Investor, and mentor to Warren Buffett. He was right on the money when he put his finger on the essential reality of investing: 

"In the short run the stock market is a voting machine... in the long run it is a weighing machine."
In the short run, stock market fluctuates with the whims of an investor. In the long run, stock market tells you about the growth of size of the businesses.

Using his wonderful metaphor of "Mr. Market," Ben Graham says, "Imagine that in some private business you own a small share which cost you $1,000. One of your partners, named Mr. Market, is very obliging indeed. Every day he tells you what he thinks your interest is worth and furthermore offers either to buy you out or to sell you an additional interest on that basis. Sometimes his idea of value appears plausible and justified by business developments and prospects as you know them.
Often, on the other hand, Mr. Market lets his enthusiasm or his fears run away with him, and the value he proposes seems little short of silly.
"If you are a prudent investor... will you let Mr. Market's daily communication determine your view as the value of your $1,000 interest in the enterprise? Only in case you agree with him, or in case you want to trade with him.... But the rest of the time you will be wiser to form your own ideas of the value of your holdings.... The true investor... will do better if he forgets about the stock market and pays attention to his dividend returns and to the operating results of his companies...."
The investor with a portfolio of sound stocks should expect their prices to fluctuate and should neither be concerned by sizable declines nor become excited by sizable advances. He should always remember that market quotations are there for his convenience, either to be taken advantage of or to be ignored."

From the chapter: "How Most Investors Turn a Winner's Game into a Loser's Game"

All investors as a group must necessarily earn precisely the market return, but only before the costs of investing are deducted.

There are, then, these two certainties: 
(1) Beating the market before costs is a zero-sum game; 
(2) Beating the market after costs is a loser's game.

Ch 4: How Most Investors Turn a Winner's Game into a Loser's Game

"The Relentless Rules of Humble Arithmetic"
"Costs matter"

A few years ago when I was rereading Other People's Money, by Louis D. Brandeis (first published in 1914), I came across a wonderful passage that illustrates this simple lesson. Brandeis, later to become one of the most influential jurists in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court, railed against the oligarchs who a century ago controlled investment America and corporate America alike.
Brandeis described their self-serving financial management and their interlocking interests as "trampling with impunity on laws human and divine, obsessed with the delusion that two plus two make five." He predicted (accurately, as it turned out) that the widespread speculation of that era would collapse, "a victim of the relentless rules of humble arithmetic." He then added this unattributed warning (I'm guessing it's from Sophocles): "Remember, O Stranger, arithmetic is the first of the sciences, and the mother of safety."

Brandeis's words hit me like the proverbial ton of bricks. Why? Because the relentless rules of the arithmetic of investing are so obvious. (It's been said by my detractors that all I have going for me is "the uncanny ability to recognize the obvious.") The curious fact is that most investors seem to have difficulty recognizing what lies in plain sight, right before their eyes. Or, perhaps even more pervasively, they refuse to recognize the reality because it flies in the face of their deep-seated beliefs, biases, overconfidence, and uncritical acceptance of the way that financial markets have worked, seemingly forever.
What's more, it is hardly in the interest of our financial intermediaries to encourage their investor/clients to recognize the obvious reality. Indeed, the self-interest of the leaders of our financial system almost compels them to ignore these relentless rules.

Paraphrasing Upton Sinclair: It's amazing how difficult it is for a man to understand something if he's paid a small fortune not to understand it. 

Our system of financial intermediation has created enormous fortunes for those who manage other people's money. Their self-interest will not soon change. But as an investor, you must look after yourr self-interest. Only by facing the obvious realities of investing can an intelligent investor succeed.

Ch 5: Focus on the Lowest-Cost Funds

The More the Managers Take, the Less the Investors Make.

If the managers take nothing, the investors receive everything: the market's return.

About What is a Good Time to See Returns From an Index Fund

Don't Take My Word for It 

The wise Warren Buffett shares my view. Consider what I call his four E's. 
"The greatest Enemies of the Equity investor are Expenses and Emotions." 

So does Andrew Lo, MIT professor and author of Adaptive Markets (2017), who personally "invests by buying and holding index funds."

*** 
Perhaps even more surprisingly, the founder and chief executive of the largest mutual fund supermarket - while vigorously promoting stock trading and actively managed funds - favors the classic index fund for himself. When asked why people invest in managed funds, Charles Schwab answered: "It's fun to play around . . . it's human nature to try to select the right horse...
[But] for the average person, I'm more of an indexer.... The predictability is so high.... For 10, 15, 20 years you'll be in the 85th percentile of performance. Why would you screw it up?" (Most of Mr. Schwab's personal portfolio is invested in index funds.) 

***
Mark Hulbert, editor of the highly regarded Hulbert Financial Digest, concurs. "Assuming that the future is like the past, you can outperform 80 percent of your fellow investors over the next several decades by investing in an index fund - and doing nothing else. . . . [A]cquire the discipline to do something even better [than trying to beat the market]: become a long-term index fund investor."
His New York Times article was headlined: "Buy and Hold? Sure, but Don't Forget the ‘Hold.'"

A Four or Five Year Time Period is Good Enough Time to Get Returns From an Index Fund


    

        

            
4-Years
            
Open
            
Close
            
Change
        
    
    

        

            
1994
            
1000.00
            
1079.40
            
79.40
        
        

            
1998
            
1078.95
            
1059.05
            
-19.90
        
        

            
2002
            
1058.85
            
2836.55
            
1777.70
        
        

            
2006
            
2836.80
            
5201.05
            
2364.25
        
        

            
2010
            
5200.90
            
6304.00
            
1103.10
        
        

            
2014
            
6323.80
            
10530.70
            
4206.90
        
        

            
2018
            
10531.70
            
11748.15
            
1216.45
        
    


~ ~ ~


    

        

            
5-Years
            
Open
            
Close
            
Change
        
    
    

        

            
1994
            
1000.00
            
884.25
            
-115.75
        
        

            
1999
            
886.75
            
1879.75
            
993.00
        
        

            
2004
            
1880.35
            
2959.15
            
1078.80
        
        

            
2009
            
2963.30
            
6304.00
            
3340.70
        
        

            
2014
            
6323.80
            
10862.55
            
4538.75
        
        

            
2019
            
10881.70
            
11748.15
            
866.45
        
    


Ch 8: Taxes Are Costs, Too
Don't Pay Uncle Sam Any More Than You Should.

A word about Indian Income Tax Rules:

Mutual fund tax benefits under Section 80C:

Investments in Equity Linked Savings Schemes or ELSS mutual funds qualify for deduction from your taxable income under Section 80C of the Income Tax Act 1961. The maximum investment amount eligible for tax deduction under Section 80C, is Rs 1.5 lakhs.

Index funds such as "ICICI Prudential Nifty 50 Index Fund" do not fall under 80C.
For tax saving purpose, you can go for funds like: "ICICI Prudential Long Term Equity Fund (Tax Saving)"

A Word About "Long Term Capital Gain" Tax

The LTCG of up to Rs. 1 lakh is tax-free, whereas gains over Rs. 1 Lakh is subject to LTCG tax of 10% (plus 4% cess) without any indexation benefit. Equity-Linked Saving Scheme (ELSS funds) is another equity scheme that is the most efficient tax saving scheme under Section 80C.

Ch 9: When the Good Times No Longer Roll

It's Wise to Plan on Lower Future Returns in the Stock and Bond Markets.

Here we can talk about holding a job or a more regular source of income. And then doing an SIP from this source of income.

FAQ: What all factors should we consider while selecting an index fund from any bank?

1. Stamp duty (For ICICI Prudential Nifty 50 Index Fund, 1 Rs for every Rs 20K of investment)
2. Lock-in period (NA for ICICI Prudential Nifty 50 Index Fund)
3. Exit charges (NA for ICICI Prudential Nifty 50 Index Fund)
4. Fund manager fees (NA for ICICI Prudential Nifty 50 Index Fund)
5. Tax exemption (Income from ICICI Prudential Nifty 50 Index Fund is taxable)

Tags: Investment,Book Summary,

JavaScript Books (Mar 2023)

Download Books

1.
JavaScript: The Good Parts
Douglas Crockford, 2008

2.
A Smarter Way to Learn JavaScript
Mark Myers, 2014

3.
JavaScript and JQuery: Interactive Front-End Web Development
Jon Duckett, 2013

4.
Effective JavaScript: 68 Specific Ways to Harness the Power of JavaScript
David Herman, 2012

5.
You Don't Know JS: Scope & Closures
Kyle Simpson, 2014

6.
Eloquent JavaScript, 3rd Edition: A Modern Introduction to Programming
Marijn Haverbeke, 2018

7.
Head First JavaScript Programming: A Brain-Friendly Guide
Elisabeth Robson, 2014

8.
Eloquent JavaScript: A Modern Introduction to Programming
Marijn Haverbeke, 2011

9.
Secrets of the JavaScript Ninja
John Resig, 2008

10.
Learn JavaScript Visually: With Interactive Exercises
Ivelin Demirov, 2014

11.
The Principles of Object-Oriented JavaScript
Nicholas C. Zakas, 2014

12.
JavaScript: The Definitive Guide: Master the World's Most-Used Programming Language
David Flanagan, 2002

13.
Javascript: The Definitive Guide, 5th edition
David Flanagan, 2006

14.
Beginning JavaScript
Paul Wilton, 2000

15.
Professional JavaScript for Web Developers
Nicholas C. Zakas, 2005

16.
Programming JavaScript Applications: Robust Web Architecture with Node, HTML5, and Modern JS Libraries
Eric Elliott, 2014

17.
Speaking JavaScript: An In-Depth Guide for Programmers
Axel Rauschmayer, 2014

18.
JavaScript Patterns
Stoyan Stefanov, 2010

19.
You Don't Know JS Yet: Get Started
Kyle Simpson, 2020

20.
JavaScript for Kids: A Playful Introduction to Programming
Nick Morgan, 2014

21.
Learning JavaScript Design Patterns
Addy Osmani, 2012

22.
JavaScript: The Definitive Guide
David Flanagan, 1996

23.
You Don't Know JS: ES6 & Beyond
Kyle Simpson, 2015

24.
JavaScript Enlightenment
Cody Lindley, 2012

25.
Eloquent Javascript: A Modern Introduction to Programming
Marijn Haverbeke, 2011

26.
JavaScript from Beginner to Professional: Learn JavaScript Quickly by Building Fun, Interactive, and Dynamic Web Apps, Games, and Pages
Rob Percival, 2021

27.
Node.js in Action
Marc Harter, 2011

28.
Coding with JavaScript For Dummies
Eva Holland, 2015

29.
JavaScript Cookbook
Shelley Powers, 2010

30.
Professional JavaScript for Web Developers
Matt Frisbie, 2019

31.
Learn JavaScript Quickly: A Complete Beginner's Guide to Learning JavaScript, Even If You're New to Programming
Code Quickly, 2020

32.
Understanding ECMAScript 6: The Definitive Guide for JavaScript Developers
Nicholas C. Zakas, 2016

33.
JavaScript: The Missing Manual
David Sawyer McFarland, 2008

34.
Maintainable JavaScript
Nicholas C. Zakas, 2012

35.
High Performance JavaScript
Nicholas C. Zakas, 2010

36.
Pro JavaScript Design Patterns
Ross Harmes, 2007

37.
JavaScript For Kids For Dummies
Eva Holland, 2015

38.
JavaScript for Impatient Programmers
Axel Rauschmayer, 2019

39.
Up & Going
Kyle Simpson, 2015

40.
Node.js Design Patterns - Third Edition: Design and Implement Production-grade Node.js Applications Using Proven Patterns and Techniques
Mario Casciaro, 2020

41.
You Don't Know JS: Types & Grammar
Kyle Simpson, 2015

42.
jQuery in Action
Bear Bibeault, 2008

43.
Javascript: This Book Includes : Javascript Basics For Beginners + Javascript Front End Programming + Javascript Back End Programming
Andy Vickler, 2021

44.
Structure and Interpretation of Computer Programs
Gerald Jay Sussman, 1985

45.
Learning Web Design
Jennifer Niederst Robbins, 2012

46.
Object-Oriented JavaScript
Kumar Chetan Sharma, 2013

47.
Beginning JavaScript and CSS Development with JQuery
Richard York, 2009

48.
Test-Driven JavaScript Development
Christian Johansen, 2011

49.
Effective TypeScript: 62 Specific Ways to Improve Your TypeScript
Dan Vanderkam, 2019

50.
The Road to Learn React: Your Journey to Master Plain Yet Pragmatic React. Js
Robin Wieruch, 2017

51.
React Key Concepts: Consolidate Your Knowledge of React's Core Features
Maximilian Schwarzmuller, 2022

52.
Data Structures and Algorithms with JavaScript
Michael McMillan
O'Reilly Media (2014)

53.
Knockout.js (Building Dynamic Client-Side Web Applications)
Jamie Munro
O'Reilly Media (2014)

54.
JavaScript for Dummies
Emily A. Vander Veer
Wiley Pub (2005)

Tags: Technology,List of Books,JavaScript,

3-D Negotiation. Harvard Business School Press (James K. Sebenius & David A. Lax, 2008)

Part One: 3-D Negotiation in a Nutshell

CH 1: Negotiate in Three Dimensions



CH 2: Do a 3-D Audit of Barriers to Agreement

1. With a provisional agreement in mind, do a 3-D barriers audit.

1.1. What prevents you from reaching the potential of the deal you want?

1.2. Wrong parties? Wrong interests? Wrong no-deal options? Wrong sequence? Wrong basic process choices? Wrong deal design? Adverse tactics or interpersonal approach?

2. Assess setup barriers.

2.1. Have you mapped all the parties, their interests, and best no-deal options?

2.2. Have you assessed the full set of actually and potentially involved parties?

2.3. Have you probed the full set of interests at stake, yours and theirs, going behind bargaining positions?

2.4. Have you assessed each side’s best no-deal option, which sets the bar for any acceptable deal and influences negotiating “power”?

2.5. Have you checked the sequence and basic process choices?

3. Assess deal-design barriers.

3.1. Does the proposed agreement create the maximum possible value?

3.2. Does it meet the requirements and objectives of the parties?

4. Assess tactical and interpersonal barriers.

4.1. Do you face hardball or other difficult tactics?

4.2. Are there communication, trust, personality, style, or cross-cultural issues?

5. Watch for cross-cutting barriers.

5.1. An adverse deal/no-deal balance?

5.2. Missing or blurry information?

CH 3: Craft a 3-D Strategy to Overcome the Barriers

1. A 3-D strategy is an aligned combination of setup, deal design, and tactical moves to overcome barriers to agreement. It enables you to “let them have your way in 3-D.” Following a barriers audit, it requires that you:

1.1. Set up the right negotiation.

1.2. Get the parties right. Get the interests right. Get no-deal options and the deal/no-deal balance right. Get the sequence of approach right. Get basic process choices right.

1.3. Design value-creating deals.

1.4. Stress problem-solving tactics.

2. Remember that a barrier encountered in one dimension can often push you into other dimensions for a solution.

3. While we present the elements of 3-D strategies as separate classes of moves “away from the table,” “on the drawing board,” and “at the table,” they tend to happen more concurrently in practice.

Part Two: Set Up the Right Negotiation
“Away from the Table”

CH4: Get All the Parties Right

1. A vital part of getting the setup right is getting the parties right.

2. Think expansively to get the right all-party map.

3. To get the right all-party map, take a disciplined look beyond the usual suspects to figure out who might really matter: potential and actual parties, internal and external players, principals and agents, decision makers and influencers, allies and blockers, and high- and low-value parties, as well those who must approve and implement the deal.

4. Map the relationships among those on your all-party map by assessing the informal as well as the formal decision and governance processes.

CH 5: Get All the Interests Right

1. To get the setup right, get the interests right.

1.1. Whatever each party cares about that is at stake is an interest.

1.2. Make mapping interests—yours and theirs—a central priority, well before the formal negotiations begin and throughout the process.

1.3. Avoid the Reverse Midas Touch; don’t let price bulldoze a potentially richer set of interests including perceived fairness, self-image, reputation, relationships, the social contract, the negotiation process itself, and ethics.

2. Don’t mistake bargaining positions for the richer set of underlying interests.

3. Don’t forget to ask your counterparts directly and indirectly about interests, actively listen to the responses, and probe what you hear.

4. Use standard public sources to map interests.

5. Tap internal sources as well as others who have negotiated with your prospective counterparts.

6. Tap knowledgeable advisers appropriately.

7. Be aware of unconsciously skewed perceptions: the mythical fixed pie, self-serving role biases, and partisan perceptions.

8. Take deliberate steps to counteract the psychological mechanisms that can powerfully but unconsciously skew interest perceptions.

CH 6: Get the No-Deal Options Right

1. Use your best no-deal options, and those of the other negotiating parties, to determine whether and, if so, where a zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) exists. (Don’t neglect “internal” no-deal options in your assessment!)

2. Make sure the other side sees you as ultimately able and willing to walk away. When your counterpart(s) perceives a credible increase in your willingness to walk away—especially in the direction of an attractive no-deal option — your at-the-table outcomes often improve. Therefore, take steps to improve your best no-deal option and consider actions to worsen that of your counterpart.

3. Take care to protect—and do not inadvertently weaken—your no-deal options.

4. Consider worsening your own no-deal option, in certain very carefully selected circumstances.

5. When diagnosing a potential negotiation, use your understanding of no-deal options to distinguish between those situations in which negotiation can play a major role and those in which it must play a lesser role.

CH 7: Get the Sequence and Basic Process Choices Right

1. To sequence effectively:

1.1. Scan widely to map the range of potential parties as well as the relationships among them, including the costs and benefits of gaining each party’s agreement.

1.2. Map backward from the key players who are critical to the deal. With respect to a target player, ask which prior agreements among which of the other players might help persuade the target to say “yes.” Do the same for the penultimate player. Keep working backward in this fashion until you have found the most promising path through the cloud of possibilities.

1.3. Ask whether the parties should mainly meet together or separately at each stage of the process. Similarly, decide whether it would be more productive for the stages of the negotiation to be public or private.

1.4. Manage the flow of information carefully and think through how to frame each stage.

2. Beyond setup moves, negotiators should make basic process choices, including:

2.1. Classic process choices include whether to involve mediation, arbitration, other various alternative dispute resolution devices, and special procedures such as “Texas shootouts.”

2.2. Though a wide range of options is available, two polar sets of basic process choices can be captured in very different overall approaches to the negotiation process: a contractually oriented decide/announce/defend (DAD) method, and a stakeholder-relationship-focused full consensus (FC) option.

2.3. A useful checklist of basic process characteristics includes the auspices of the process, its mandate, participation rules, decision and procedural expectations, agenda considerations, staging, external communication norms, process support (from technical advice to third parties such as mediators or facilitators), and postdeal arrangements.

2.4. When considering the process elements on this checklist, think hard about whether it is better to deal with them explicitly, or leave them on a more ad hoc and implicit basis. You should also decide whether these elements should be put up for negotiation, or whether you should try to stipulate, or even impose, your basic process preferences.

Part Three: Design Value-Creating Deals
“On the Drawing Board”

CH 8: Move “Northeast”



1. Many people see the zone of possible agreement as a Battle Line, in which one side’s gain necessarily implies another side’s loss.

2. Negotiation also involves “northeasterly,” value-creating moves that simultaneously benefit all sides, at no cost to anyone. Such moves are fundamentally different than mutually acceptable compromises along a Battle Line.

3. While common ground and shared interests are important, value is often created by dovetailing differences of interest or priority.

4. Relentlessly probe for different interests that are relatively easy for one side to give—yet highly valuable for the other side to get. Such differences can be profitably unbundled or form the basis for mutually beneficial trades. Search for high benefit–low cost moves.

5. Thinking creatively and perhaps well beyond this specific deal, ask what could the two sides possibly do jointly to create the most value together? What specific steps could be taken to maximize the net value of the total pie?

6. If you encounter skepticism—or feel skeptical yourself—remember that there are good psychological reasons why people think that value-creation can’t be for real. At the same time, remember that these psychological blind spots sometimes prevent negotiators from spotting immense cooperative potential.

7. Don’t forget that creating value is only half the story; it must also be claimed. This tends to happen concurrently, rather than sequentially. The real challenge in negotiation is to productively manage the Negotiator’s Dilemma: the tension between the cooperative moves that are necessary to create value and the competitive moves needed to claim it.

CH 9: Dovetail Differences

1. A deal-design approach complements an interpersonal process view of negotiation with an understanding of the principles behind value creation. Knowing what you are looking for can counteract powerful psychological biases toward seeing the world in “fixed-pie” terms.

2. Rather than looking mainly for common ground and shared interests, deal designers probe for differences of many kinds to create value.

3. The basic “differences” principle counsels a search for high-benefit, low-cost items, or those that are relatively cheap for one side to give, but that the other side finds relatively valuable to get.

4. Develop a differences inventory, with clear knowledge of how characteristic deal designs can unlock joint gains from distinct classes of differences:

4.1. Differences of interest or priority can lead to mutually beneficial trades orcreative solutions that unbundle underlying interests.

4.2. Differences in cost and revenue structure suggest crafting arrangements of highest net value.

4.3. Complementary differences in capability can be profitably combined.

4.4. Differences in beliefs about the future can lead to joint gains from carefully crafted contingent agreements, paying careful attention to incentives and the informational underpinning of the difference.

4.5. Differences in attitudes toward risk—assessing, bearing, or influencing it—can lead to mutually preferable mechanisms. Differences in attitudes toward time, whether simple discount rate differences or more complex manifestations—can suggest collectively shifting benefits and costs to match differing time preferences.

4.6. Many other differences—in tax status, accounting or regulatory treatment, sensitivity to constituencies, etc.—can profitably be arbitraged, singly or in combination, by sophisticated deal designers to create value on a sustainable basis.

5. By looking beyond the immediately involved parties and issues, a differences orientation can often suggest moves to profitably change the setup for all sides—by adding or subtracting parties and issues that manifest complementary differences.

CH 10: Make Lasting Deals

1. Many of the moves described in earlier chapters do more than create a positive process, build good working relationships, and set the stage for good outcomes. They can also enhance the sustainability of agreements in the face of very significant change, whether internal or external.

2. While many negotiated agreements are clearly time- and task-limited, it may be a mistake to treat social and economic contracts as fixed and static. In many cases, the likelihood of new challenges and opportunities calls for the expectation of change—which calls, in turn, for deals designed for profitable evolution.

3. Think through the likely future evolution of agreements and accompanying attitudes. Design economic agreements and negotiate expectations that productively anticipate foreseeable changes in circumstances.

4. If possible, avoid simplexed negotiations and agreements, because they tend to be fragile.
Consider multiplexing both parties and issues of a potentially vulnerable agreement to broaden and deepen its supporting coalition, and to weave an interest web that is harder to dislodge.

5. After the deal is done, keep an eye out for likely adverse shifts in the continuing deal/no-deal balance.

6. In particular, beware of potentially insecure contracts—agreements in which, when one party makes an irrevocable or costly-to-reverse move,the other side has an incentive to defect from the deal.

7. To make insecure contracts more secure, consider: 

7.1. Setup moves to render the situation more sustainable 

7.2. Deal-design moves aimed at prevention; for example, contingent or more flexible contracts, performance bonds, linkages and multiplexing, and various compliance mechanisms 

8. In some cases, the best prevention is to stay out of the deal altogether.

CH 11: Negotiate the Spirit of the Deal

Auditing Perceptions of the Underlying Social Contract 

To negotiate truly compatible views, consider an explicit and periodic “audit” of all sides’ perceptions. Here’s a sample checklist: 

Real nature and purpose. Do you envision a discrete transaction or partnership? A merger of equals or something different? Building an institution for the long term or making a financial investment? Do you see the driving culture as, for example, operational? Research-oriented? Marketing? Engineering? and so on.

Scope and duration. Are you focused on a discrete task in the short term or is it more open-ended? Is it a likely prelude to a larger or different arrangement? Of what actions, even outside the formal bounds of the deal, do each of us expect to be informed and over which do we expect some say? and so on.

Part Four: Stress Problem-Solving Tactics 
“At the Table”

Chapter Twelve: Shape Perceptions to Claim Value 

Thomas Edison's Universal Stock Ticker

Thomas Edison invented the “Universal” stock ticker, a device used for many years by brokerage houses. When Edison first offered this device for sale, he added up the time and effort he had put into inventing it and concluded he was entitled to $5,000 for it. That’s what he decided to ask for it.
Ultimately, though, he figured he would accept $3,000. When General Lefferts, the president of the Gold & Stock Telegraph Company, came to negotiate, Edison was going to name his price. But he couldn’t,
Edison said, because he “hadn’t the nerve toname such a large sum.” Instead Edison asked General Lefferts to make him an offer.
Lefferts offered $40,000. Edison said he thought that was “fair.” Edison would have lost $35,000 just by making the first offer.

Edison’s experience notwithstanding, we’d like to offer some contrarian advice here: In cases when you are not hopelessly uninformed, seriously consider going first.

1. Remember the Twin Tasks of haggling: learn about the true zone of possible agreement (ZOPA), and favorably shape perceptions of it.

2. Learn about the ZOPA by using prior research, analyzing your best no-deal option as well as the other side’s, and continuously mining the other side’s moves for real ZOPA-related information. Update your ZOPA assessment frequently.

3. Focus on the opportunity, rather than the downside; as part of your preparation consider writing a short paragraph on what you hope to accomplish, not what you want to avoid.

4. Set a fairly aggressive target.

5. Shape perceptions of the ZOPA by: 

5.1. Meta-anchoring—implicitly shaping the definition of the problem the negotiation will solve. Brainstorm possible meta- anchors, assess their implications, and take the initiative to meta-anchor the negotiation favorably and head off unfavorable meta-anchors.

5.2. Anchoring directly with favorable offers, numbers or data, and “non-offer offers” and “extreme but flexible offers.” Don’t forget to justify your proposals.

6. Strongly consider making the first offer—an extreme but flexible or non-offer offer—to gain the benefits of anchoring.

7. Use the midpoint rule to respond to their offer; counteroffer so the midpoint between the two offers is your target.

8. Avoid being anchored by an extreme offer—clearly communicate that the offer is unacceptable, and shift the metric to unfreeze the anchor and drop your own more favorable counter-anchoring.

9. Use patterns of concession converging to a supposed limit, and be aware that your counterpart may use this tactic.

10. Use and be alert for the norm of reciprocity—your concession may induce one from them, and vice versa.

11. Use the contrast principle—the offer that follows an extreme offer may look more generous than it would have if it didn’t follow the extreme offer.

12. Be wary of splitting the difference and consider it only when when last offers are close and both acceptable.

13. Persuade your counterparts that saying yes to your price is better than their alternatives, that accepting a price that you like is a good (and fair) choice for them, and that the constraints upon you make it hard for you to move.

13.1. Prepare fairness arguments and prepare to respond to fairness arguments.
13.2. Avoid unsupported commitments. Consider making supported commitments.
13.3. Treat unsupported commitments as aspirations. When they support their attempted commitments with a clear rationale that certain interests would be damaged if they moved, undo their commitments by finding other ways to meet those interests.

Chapter Thirteen: Solve Joint Problems to Create and Claim Value

1. Effective tactics must productively manage the tension between the cooperative moves necessary to create value jointly and the competitive moves to claim it individually. This means eliciting enough information to generate good options while managing your vulnerability.

2. Ask, listen, and learn: 

2.1. Listen actively.
2.2. Ask open-ended questions rather than yes/no questions: “What if? Why? Why not? How would that work for you?”
2.3. Bring a designated listener.

3. Divulge information strategically:

3.1. Begin with the end: at the beginning, jointly envision the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, perhaps by writing a press release in advance on the hoped- for outcome that meets everyone’s core interests.

3.2. Use the norm of reciprocity to build trust and share/gain information: start by offering low-risk information and ratchet up.

3.3. Present multiple equivalent offers.

3.4. Sequence issues carefully and negotiate in packages.

4. Foster an appealing, productive negotiation process by establishing a positive atmosphere: 

4.1. Psychologically place the parties side by side against the problem rather than face-to-face against each other.
4.2. Focus on advancing interests rather than arguing positions.
4.3. Focus on the future instead of the past and on problem solving instead of blaming.
4.4. Focus on disaggregated fact-based communications rather than high-level assertions.

5. Adopt a persuasive style.
5.1. Be open to persuasion.
5.2. Be both empathetic and assertive.
5.3. Tell stories as well as using facts and logic.
5.4. Inoculate against potentially disadvantageous arguments.
5.5. Match your appeal to where your counterparts are and how they process information.
5.6. Make your appeal work through their cultural filters.

6. For the deal that “lets them have your way,” write your counterparts’ victory speech, showing their key audiences why accepting your proposal was a wise decision.

Part Five: 3-D Strategies in Practice 
“Let Them Have Your Way”

Chapter Fourteen: Map Backward to Craft a 3-D Strategy

Back to 1912: The Roosevelt Campaign and Moffett Studios

In 1912, Theodore Roosevelt was nearing the end of a 2 hard-fought presidential election campaign. Critical to his success was a final whistle-stop journey through the American heartland. At each stop, Roosevelt planned to inspire his audiences with his powerful oratorical skills, and give everyone in attendance a small pamphlet, some three million of which had been printed and packed away in boxcars. On the cover of the pamphlet was a stern, “presidential” portrait; inside was the transcript of a stirring speech called “Confession of Faith.” With luck, this strategy would clinch the critical votes.

The barnstorming campaign was about to begin when a campaign worker discovered a small line on each photograph that read, “Moffett Studios, Chicago.” Since Moffett held the copyright, the unauthorized use of each photo could each cost the campaign one dollar. The potential $3 million cost of distributing all the pamphlets would greatly exceed the campaign’s available resources.

The campaign workers were near panic. What should they do? What could they do? All the options looked bad. Not using the pamphlets might sink Roosevelt’s chances at the polls. But if the campaign used the pamphlets without Moffett’s permission and got caught, all kinds of bad things might result: they could be sued for copyright infringement, a scandal might break out very close to the election, andthe campaign might be liable for an unaffordable amount.

Quickly, the campaign workers reached a consensus: they would have to negotiate something with Moffett. At the same time, they realized that they had no idea how to approach this negotiation. Research by their Chicago operatives turned up discouraging news. While Moffett had been a photographer for years, with both artistic and commercial aspirations, he had achieved little critical success, and virtually no financial success. He was now approaching retirement, reportedly bitter and cynical, with a single-minded focus on money.

It’s not hard to put yourself in the shoes of those campaign workers as they tried to plot their negotiating strategy, or to imagine the queasy feelings in their stomachs. It must have seemed a hopelessly weak position: approaching a photographic studio whose owner had a keen interest in money, facing a pressing time deadline, thinking of three million pamphlets already packed in boxcars with no time to redo them, contemplating a potential $3 million price tag—or possibly worse, in the case of a lawsuit—and having nothing like the resources that they appeared to need.

If we were to translate their predicament into the language we’ve been developing in the preceding chapters, the campaign workers assessed their no-deal options in negotiations with Moffett as exceedingly weak.

As they saw the situation, if Moffett were to say “no” to any affordable price proposal, the campaign would either (1) face an unaffordably large financial exposure if it went ahead and used the photos, or (2) risk losing any shot at the presidency if it did not use the pictures. By contrast, Moffett seemed to enjoy a commanding option in the event of no deal. Given this assessment, the only deals that might induce a “yes” from Moffett would involve impossibly large payments. In brief, thecampaign faced a potent barrier: an exceedingly adverse deal/no-deal balance. Again: what on earth could they do, and should they do? Dispirited, the campaign workers approached George Perkins, noted financier, partner of J. P. Morgan,

California railroad builder, and Roosevelt’s campaign manager. Perkins lost no time summoning his stenographer to dispatch the following cable to Moffett Studios in Chicago: “We are planning to distribute millions of pamphlets with Roosevelt’s picture on the cover. It will be great publicity for the studio whose photograph we use. How much will you pay us to use yours? Respond immediately.” Virtually by return telegraph, he received the following reply from Moffett: “We’ve never done this before, but under the circumstances we’d be pleased to offer you $250.”
Reportedly, Perkins accepted the offer—without trying to get even more from Moffett.

# An effective 3-D strategy is an aligned and mutually reinforcing combination of setup, deal-design, and tactical moves chosen to overcome barriers to agreement.

# To help organize the elements of your strategy, map backward from your target deal to the deal/no-deal balance that will most likely induce them to make this choice, and then make your way back to the current situation. This enables you to determine the actions you must now take to face them with the right deal/no-deal balance.

Chapter Fifteen: Think Strategically, Act Opportunistically

AOL, Microsoft, and Netscape: Negotiating the Browser Wars Sometimes, you are simply outclassed on the central competitive aspects of a deal. For example, the customers of America Online (AOL) in 1996 were clamoring for an Internet browser. Despite its huge commercial success, AOL was developing an image as the “Internet for dummies.” Top management was concerned that this perception would spread, damage its franchise, and blunt future growth prospects. In short, AOL had a pressing need for a cutting-edge browser to improve its image and to allow its customers easy access to the Web that lay beyond AOL’s proprietary confines.

In a brutally competitive process, Netscape and Microsoft negotiated with AOL over which browser it 1 would adopt. Netscape’s technically superior Navigator, with a 75 to 85 percent market share, contended with Microsoft’s much buggier Explorer, then stuck at 3 to 4 percent and struggling for a market foothold, but a critical strategic priority for Bill Gates.
A confident, even arrogant, Netscape held out for a high per-copy fee from AOL, in effect defining a technically based “browser-for-dollars” deal. From the perspective of Steve Case, AOL’s CEO, “They [Netscape] were very aggressive about selling the browser, but they wanted a very high per-copy fee. The attitude was, ‘We’re 2 so hot, we’ll license to everyone, so you better take it.’”
And Netscape was playing a very strong hand vis-à-vis both its direct negotiating counterpart (AOL) and competitor (Microsoft). As AOL’s senior vice president Jean Villanueva later observed, “The deal was Netscape’s to lose. They were dominant. We needed to get what themarket wanted. Most importantly, we saw ourselves as 3 smaller companies fighting the same foe—Microsoft.”
So how did Microsoft prevail in this negotiation and, ultimately, win the browser wars? What kind of choice would lead AOL chief Steve Case to opt for Microsoft? In part, the answer can be found in the deal terms. When the deal was done, Microsoft’s Explorer would be provided to AOL for free, in contrast with the fee-based Navigator arrangement, with Microsoft also promising AOL a series of technical adaptations in a multiyear context.
Most remarkably to outside observers, Microsoft agreed that AOL client software would be bundled with the new Windows operating system. Even as a direct competitor to AOL, Microsoft would position the AOL icon on the Windows desktop right next to the icon for the Microsoft Network (MSN)—the online service created in direct response to AOL’s success. This positioning on “the most valuable desktop real estate in the world” would permit AOL to reach an additional 50 million people per year at effectively zero cost, compared to the $40 to $80 per-customer acquisition cost it currently incurred by “carpet bombing” the country with AOL disks. The value to AOL of having its icon on the Windows desktop was immense for marketing, distribution, and competitive reasons, in effect, blunting the threat posed by MSN. In effect, Bill Gates sacrificed the medium-term position of MSN to his larger goal of winning the browser wars.
Microsoft’s technically inferior browser meant that its prospects of winning on that battleground were poor regardless of its negotiating skills and tactics at the table.
Yet while Netscape was confidently playing a waiting game to bring AOL around, Microsoft undertook a 3-D effort to favorably shift the negotiating ground from Netscape’s technical “browser-for-dollars” deal towardwider business issues that keenly interested AOL and on which Microsoft held a decisive edge. Moreover, rather than focus on the technologists, Microsoft concentrated on AOL’s more business-oriented executives. As AOL’s lead negotiator and business development head David Colburn stated, “The willingness of Microsoft to bundle AOL... with the Windows operating system was a critically important competitive factor that was impossible for Netscape to match.” Rather than trying to play a poor tech hand well, Microsoft changed the negotiating setup to a business arena in which it had the edge.

This episode has important game-changing lessons: Are you in a weak position on issues A and B? Can you change the setup to emphasize issues D and E, on which you are strong? Moreover, are you dealing with person X, whose interests do not match your strengths? In tandem with your revised issues focus, can you shift the emphasis to person Y, who will be more receptive? Microsoft did not simply prevail by changing the issue setup. Perhaps unexpectedly, given the heavy-handed reputation Microsoft has in many quarters, Netscape’s arrogant actions at the table put it at a major disadvantage. As Alex Edelstein, Netscape senior product manager, put it, “We were too arrogant . . . Netscape thought its stuff was so good, it was enough to just put it out there.” On the receiving end, AOL CEO Steve Case observed, “[Netscape had] no desire to treat us as a partner; they only wanted to treat us like a customer.” In contrast, Microsoft deployed its massive resources toward meeting a much richer set of AOL’s interests than Netscape even appeared to acknowledge with its stubborn “browsers-for-dollars” hardball price proposal.
This reminds us that tactics—in tandem with the setup 5 and deal design—can carry, or lose, the day.Realistically, though, how could Netscape (David) have had a prayer against (Microsoft) Goliath? Wasn’t Microsoft’s victory inevitable, given its vast resources and powerful strategic interest in winning the browser wars? In our view, Netscape could indeed have carried the day. In January 1996, three months before the finale,
AOL chief Steve Case flew out to California to have dinner at Jim Barksdale’s home while discussing potential AOL links to Netscape. Case proposed that Netscape produce a special Navigator version for AOL that would serve as the principal browser for AOL’s 5 million subscribers. He also proposed that AOL run Netscape’s extremely popular but woefully underexploited Web site, which was receiving millions of hits daily. AOL certainly had the capacity to leverage the commercial potential of such massive traffic (it may also have wanted to control a potential competitor to its own site). Finally, Case suggested that Netscape and AOL actively cross-promote each other and that Netscape include an AOL seat on its board in order to cement the partnership. All Netscape had to do to shut out Microsoft was be more flexible on its price demands and “say yes!” to Case (while asking for a bulletproof exclusive).
Barksdale discussed this proposal with managers and engineers at Netscape. They opposed the move, citing the effort that would be required to create an AOL-specific Navigator, one that would be “componentized” to fit with AOL’s look and feel. Blocked by the failure of his internal negotiations, Barksdale ended up telling Case that the partnership proposal was a nonstarter. He countered by saying that AOL would be a “good distribution channel for Navigator” at a cost to AOL of $10 per downloaded copy.

Incredibly, Netscape failed to do the deal not once, but twice. Four months after the Microsoft-AOL agreement, the door to an AOL-Netscape deal reopened. Ram Shriram, then a vice president of Netscape, recounted what happened next: “AOL came to us again. AOL’s stock was tanking and it was getting sued by the attorneys general of various states. They were keen to come back to the table and forge a relationship with us.” Barksdale and Shriram met with AOL’s Steve Case, but Netscape’s engineering team rejected the proposed deal, saying, as Shriram put it, “‘Look, we’re all busy. We’re not really interested. Our focus is not consumers.’ We lost out another opportunity to take charge of another 10 to 12 million browsers.” Thus Netscape lost another opportunity to make a deal that would keep its control of the browser market.

Given these facts, it’s hard to see Microsoft’s victory as a foregone conclusion. Had Netscape acted on a clearer analysis of the full set of parties (internal as well as external), their interests (beyond the technical aspects of a browser and price), and no-deal options (for itself,
AOL, and Microsoft)—and had it looked for ways to create as well as try to arrogantly claim value with AOL— the outcome of these negotiations could have been far more favorable. But Netscape did not, and its failure to do so gave Microsoft the opening to reset the table, design a value-creating deal behind which to put its massive resources, and ultimately win the browser wars.

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