Six banks to stop existing from 1 April 2020 as they merge with bigger government banks of India. These banks are: Allahabad Bank, Andhra Bank, Corporation Bank, Oriental Bank of Commerce, Syndicate Bank and United Bank of India.
In a similar move in 2017, four banks namely 'State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur', 'State Bank of Hyderabad', 'State Bank of Mysore' and 'State Bank of Travancore' were merged into their parent organization 'State Bank of India'.
Below is the list of 50 banks in India that are now defunct. The period extends from 1770 to 1 April 2020.
1. Allahabad Bank
Allahabad Bank is a nationalised bank with its headquarters in Kolkata, India. It is the oldest joint stock bank in India. On 24 April 2014, the bank entered into its 150th year of establishment. The bank was founded in Allahabad in 1865.
As of 31 March 2018, Allahabad Bank had over 3245 branches across India. The bank did a total business of INR 3.8 trillion during the FY 2017–18.
The bank's market capitalisation in June 2018 was US$573 million and it ranked #1,882 on the Forbes Global 2000 list. On 30 August 2019, the Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced merger of Allahabad Bank with Indian Bank.
Wikipedia Card:
Former type: Public sector undertaking
Traded as: BSE: 532480. NSE: ALBK
Industry: Banking, Financial services
Fate: Merged with Indian Bank
Successor: Indian Bank
Founded: 24 April 1865; 154 years ago in Allahabad, North-Western Provinces, British India
Defunct: 1 April 2020
Headquarters: Kolkata, West Bengal, India
Number of locations: 3,503 branches (Mar-2018)
Area served: India
Key people: S. S. Mallikarjuna Rao (MD & CEO)
Services:
Finance and insurance
Consumer banking
Corporate banking
Revenue: Increase ₹19,051 crore (US$2.7 billion)(2018)
Operating income: Decrease ₹3,438 crore (US$480 million)(2018)
Net income: Decrease₹-4,674 crore (US$−660 million)(2018)
Total assets: Increase ₹236,460.23 crore (US$33 billion) (2016)
Number of employees: 23,210 (2019)
Capital ratio: 8.69%
Website: allahabadbank.in
2. Alliance Bank of Simla
The Alliance Bank of Simla was a British-run though India-registered bank that commenced operations in Simla in 1874 under the management of James Lewis Walker. The bank was established to take over the business of the United Bank of India, established in 1866, which had operations in Simla and Umballa. Its board put the United Bank of India in voluntary liquidation on Saturday 21 March, and Alliance Bank commenced operations on Monday, 23 March. Alliance Bank failed on 27 April 1923 due to speculation by its management. At the time that it failed it had 36 branches, including ones in Lahore, Lucknow, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, and Rangoon.
3. Andhra Bank
Andhra Bank (BSE: 532418, NSE: ANDHRABANK) is a medium-sized public sector bank (PSB) of India, with a network of 2885 branches, 4 extension counters, 38 satellite offices and 3798 automated teller machines (ATMs) as of 31 March 2019. During 2011–12, the bank entered the states of Tripura and Himachal Pradesh. The bank now operates in 25 states and three Union Territories. Andhra Bank has its headquarters in Hyderabad, Telangana, India. Plans to merge it with Union Bank of India were disclosed by Minister of Finance (India) in August 2019.
The Government of India owns 90.85% of its share capital as on 31 March 2019. The state owned Life Insurance Corporation of India holds 7.80% of the shares. The bank has done a total business of ₹3,106 billion (US$44 billion) and has earned a net profit of ₹5.40 billion (US$76 million) for the Financial Year 2015–16. Board of directors of bank approved merger into union bank on 13.09.2019.
Wikipedia Card:
Former type: Public sector undertaking
Traded as: NSE: ANDHRABANK
BSE: 532418
Industry: Banking. Financial services.
Fate: Merged with Union Bank of India
Successor: Union Bank of India
Founded: 20 November 1923; 96 years ago
Founder: Bhogaraju Pattabhi Sitaramayya
Defunct: 1 April 2020
Headquarters: Hyderabad, Telangana, India
Areas served: India, Dubai, Malaysia, Jersey City (United States)
Key people: J. Packirisamy (MD & CEO)
Products: Consumer banking, Credit cards, corporate banking, finance and insurance, private banking, wealth management, Agricultural Loans
Revenue: Increase ₹18,027.42 crore (US$2.5 billion)(2016-17)
Operating income: Increase₹4,387.95 crore (US$620 million)(2016-17)
Net income: Decrease₹174.32 crore (US$24 million) (2016-17)
Total assets: Increase ₹222,126.13 crore (US$31 billion)(2016-17)
Number of employees: 20981 (2016-17)
Capital ratio: 12.38% (2016-17)
Website www.andhrabank.in
4. Arbuthnot & Co
Arbuthnot & Co was a mercantile bank, based in Madras, India. It was founded as Francis Latour & Co in the late 18th century, then became Arbuthnot De Monte & Co and failed spectacularly on 22 October 1906.
In the last quarter of 1906, Madras (now Chennai) was hit by the worst financial crisis the city was ever to suffer. Of the three best-known British commercial names in 19th century Madras, one crashed; a second had to be resurrected by a distress sale; and the third had to be bailed out by a benevolent benefactor. The agency house to close shop, Arbuthnot's, was considered the soundest of the three. Parry's (now EID Parry), may have been the earliest of them and Binny and Co.'s founders may have had the oldest associations with Madras, but it was Arbuthnot & Co., established in 1810, that was the city's strongest commercial organization in the 19th Century. When it fell, thousands lost their savings and the good name of British stability was severely rocked.
Arbuthnot & Co had two partners at the time of its failure, namely Sir George Gough Arbuthnot and J.M. Young, a salaried partner who seems to have had no voice in the running of the firm. The firm entered into an arrangement with Patrick Macfadyen who operated P Macfadyen & Co which was effectively Arbuthnot's London branch. Macfadyen engaged in speculation, in the process losing huge amounts of the firm's money. Prior to its collapse, Arbuthnots employed between 11,000 and 12,000 people, had 7,000 creditors and £1,000,000 in liabilities. It was ascertained that the liabilities of Macfadyen's were £400,000 and there were 1,000 creditors. It was agreed by the English trustee in bankruptcy and the official assignee in Madras that the assets of the two insolvent firms were to be treated as one and the same business, all creditors were to be entitled to share rateably in the pooled assets.
Macfadyen committed suicide by throwing himself under a train in 1906, and both firms had to close their doors. Both Macfadyen and Arbuthnot were consistently over-optimistic concerning their speculations. Arbuthnot was tried for the fraudulent activities the collapse revealed, and received a sentence of "18 months rigorous imprisonment".
A key figure in case was the Madras lawyer, V. Krishnaswamy Iyer, who went on to organize a group of Chettiars that founded "Indian Bank" in 1907.
5. Bank of Bombay
The Bank of Bombay was the second of the three presidency banks (others being the Bank of Calcutta and the Bank of Madras) of the Raj period. It was established, pursuant to a charter of the British East India Company, on 15 April 1840.
The bank's headquarters were in Bombay, now called Mumbai. The Bank of Madras undertook all the normal activities which a commercial bank was expected to undertake. The Bank of Bombay, in the absence of any central banking authority at that time, also conducted certain functions which are ordinarily a preserve of a central bank.
The Bank of Bombay and two other Presidency banks - the Bank of Calcutta and the Bank of Madras - were amalgamated and the reorganized banking entity was named the Imperial Bank of India on 27 January 1921. The Reserve Bank of India, which is the central banking organization of India, in the year 1955, acquired a controlling interest in the Imperial Bank of India and the Imperial Bank of India was renamed on 30 April 1955 to the State Bank of India.
Wikipedia Card:
Industry: Banking, Financial Services
Fate: Merged with Bank of Calcutta and Bank of Madras
Successor: Imperial Bank of India
Founded: 15 April 1840
Defunct: 27 January 1921
Headquarters: Bombay, Bombay Presidency, British India
Area served: British India
6. Bank of Chettinad
Bank of Chettinad is a defunct bank that originated in the Nattukottai Chettiar community.
1929: Two prominent Nattukottai Chettiar business family partnerships established the bank with its head office in Rangoon. They registered it as a private company in India and incorporated it under the Indian Companies Act of 1913. One of the families, from Kanadukathan, ran the firm. It was involved in many activities and was also closely associated with the Chettinad Corporation. In particular, it borrowed from Chartered Bank, Imperial Bank of India, First National City Bank, and Lloyds Bank for on-lending to Chettiar moneylenders.
1932: It opened an office in Colombo.
In 1942, the Japanese Military Authority created the Peoples Bank of Burma as a joint venture between it, the Burma Executive Authority (the Burmese puppet regime), and the Yokohama Specie Bank. Bank of Chettinad at the time was Burma's largest bank, the Peoples Bank of Burma took over Bank of Chettinad's 45 branches, and established its own head office in the former Burmese headquarters of Central Bank of India.
1946: The Supreme Court of Ceylon ruled that Bank of Chettinad was not a bank in that it primarily made loans on promissory notes and mortgages and did not take deposits.
1963: The Burmese government nationalized all foreign banks and essentially drove out the large population of people of Indian origin, among whom there were many Chettiars. Bank of Chettinad by then was no longer operating under that name and was not among the 24 foreign banks that the government nationalized.
1965: Bank of Chettinad was voluntarily wound up.
7. Bank of Hindostan
Bank of Hindostan (1770-1832), a now defunct bank, is considered as among the first modern banks in colonial India. It was established by the agency house of Alexander and Company. In India, the paper currency was first issued during British East India Company rule. The first paper notes were issued by the private banks such as Bank of Hindustan and the presidency banks during late 18th century. Via the Paper Currency Act of 1861, the British Government of India was conferred the monopoly to issue paper notes in India.
8. Bank of Madras
The Bank of Madras was one of the three Presidency Banks of British India, along with the Bank of Bengal and the Bank of Bombay. It was established on 1 July 1843 through the amalgamation of a number of existing regional banks and headquartered in Madras (now Chennai). It was merged with the other Presidency banks in 1921 to form the Imperial Bank of India, which later became the State Bank of India.
Wikipedia Card:
Industry: Banking, Financial Services
Fate: Merged with Bank of Calcutta and Bank of Bombay
Successor: Imperial Bank of India
Founded: 1 July 1843
Defunct: 27 January 1921
Headquarters: Madras, Madras Presidency, British India
Area served: British India
9. Bank of Madura
Bank of Madurai was a massive Tamil Nadu based bank established in 1943 by Karumuttu Thiagarajan Chettiar. It acquired Chettinad Mercantile Bank (est. 1933) and Illanji Bank (est. 1904) throughout the course of the 1960s. The Bank of Madura was a Chettiar bank with a large customer base of over 2 million customers and a network of more than 280 branches and 40+ ATM centres spread across around 100 cities in India. The bank merged with ICICI Bank Limited, under Section 44A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, under the leadership of Chairman K.M. Thiagarajan. The Bank had roughly 44 billion INR in assets at the time of the merger, not accounting for inflation. The Reserve Bank of India approved the merger effective 10 March 2001. It was headquartered at Madurai.
The merger was received well and benefitted the Bank of Madura, with their share price sharply rising, and finally closing at Rs 142 - over double what they hovered at only weeks ago. ICICI, however saw a sharp drop in their share price totally four rupees, it closing at Rs 164. The move was described as a positive strategic manoeuvre by the parties involved and news outlets alike. Bank of Madura Shareholders signed off on the deal on the 19th of January, 2001, agreeing to a 2:1 merger.
10. Bank of Rajasthan
The Bank of Rajasthan Ltd (Hindi: बैन्क ओफ राजस्थान) (BSE: / (500019 ) was a private sector bank of India which merged with ICICI Bank in 2010.
Wikipedia Card:
Former type: Private company (BSE),
Industry: Banking, Loan, Capital Markets and allied industries
Fate: Merged with ICICI Bank
Founded: 1943
Defunct: 2010
Headquarters: Clock Tower, Udaipur, India
Key people: G. Padmanabhan (MD & CEO)
Products: Loans, Savings, Investment vehicles, etc.
Revenue: ₹15,073.344 million (US$210 million) (year ended March 2009)
Net income: Increase ₹1,177.119 million (US$17 million) (March 2009)
Website: www.bankofrajasthan.com
11. Bengal Central Bank
Bengal Central Bank was a commercial bank based in Bengal. It was founded by J. C. Das in 1918 as the Bengal Central Loan Company. On 18 December 1950, it merged with Comilla Banking Corporation, Comilla Union Bank and Hooghly Bank to form the United Bank of India.
12. Bharat Overseas Bank
Bharat Overseas Bank (BOB) was a private bank based in Chennai, India. In 2007 it merged with Indian Overseas Bank, which took over all the bank's employees, assets, and deposits.
BOB was established in 1973 order to take over for the Bangkok branch of the Indian Overseas Bank. It was one of the few private banks that the Reserve Bank of India permitted to have a branch outside India, and was the only bank representing India in Thailand. It was owned by seven banks (initial ownership figures in parentheses): Indian Overseas Bank (30%), Bank of Rajasthan (16%), Vysya Bank (14.66%), Karur Vysya Bank (10%), Federal Bank (19.67%), South Indian Bank (10%), and Karnataka Bank (8.67%), but in 2007 Indian Overseas Bank fully acquired the bank.
13. Bharatiya Mahila Bank
Bharatiya Mahila Bank (BMB) was an Indian financial services banking company based in Mumbai, India. Former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh inaugurated the system on 19 November 2013 on the occasion of the 96th birth anniversary of former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. As part of the Modi government's banking reforms and to ensure greater banking outreach to women, the bank merged with State Bank of India on 1 April 2017.
While being run by women, and lending exclusively to women, the bank allowed deposits to flow from everyone. India was the third country, after Pakistan and Tanzania, to have a bank exclusively to benefit women.
Former type: State ownership
Industry: Banking, Financial services
Fate: Merged with State Bank of India
Founded: 2013
Defunct: 1 April 2017
Headquarters: Delhi, India
Key people: S M Swathi(ED)
Products: core banking, credit card, consumer banking, corporate banking, finance and insurance, investment banking, mortgage loans, private banking, private equity, wealth management
Owner: Government of India
Number of employees: 500
Website: www.bmb.co.in
14. Bank of Calcutta
Formerly: Bank of Calcutta
Industry: Banking, Financial Services
Fate: Merged with Bank of Bombay and Bank of Madras
Successor: Imperial Bank of India
Founded: 2 June 1806
Defunct: 27 January 1921
Headquarters: Calcutta, Bengal, British India
Area served: British India
The Bank of Calcutta (a precursor to the present State Bank of India) was founded on 2 June 1806, mainly to fund General Wellesley's wars against Tipu Sultan and the Marathas. It was the first bank of India and was renamed Bank of Bengal on 2 January 1809.
The bank opened branches at Rangoon (1861), Patna (1862), Mirzapur (1862), and Benares (1862). When it became known that the bank intended to open a branch at Dacca, negotiations began that resulted in Bank of Bengal in 1862 amalgamating Dacca Bank (est. 1846). A branch at Cawnpore followed.
The Bank of Calcutta, and the two other Presidency banks — the Bank of Bombay and the Bank of Madras — amalgamated on 27 January 1921 and the reorganized banking entity assumed the name Imperial Bank of India. The Reserve Bank of India, which is the central banking organization of India, in the year 1955, acquired a controlling interest in the Imperial Bank of India and the Imperial Bank of India was renamed on 30 April 1955 as the State Bank of India.
15. Centurion Bank of Punjab
Type: Public. BSE:532273. NSE:CENTBOP. Luxembourg Stock Exchange
Industry: Banking, Insurance, Capital Markets and allied industries
Founded: Panaji, 1994 (as Centurion bank)
Headquarters: Corporate Centre, 1201,Raheja Centre, Free Press Journal Marg, Nariman Point, Mumbai 400 021 India
Key people: Chairman: Mr. Rana Talwar
Products: Loans, Credit Cards, Savings, Investment vehicles, Life and General Insurance (Insurance) etc.
Website: www.centurionbop.co.in
The Centurion Bank of Punjab (formerly Centurion Bank) was an Indian private sector bank that provided retail and corporate banking services. It operated on a strong nationwide franchise of 403 branches and had over 5,000 employees. The bank listed its shares on the major Indian stock exchanges and on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. On 23 May 2008 HDFC Bank acquired Centurion Bank of Punjab.
16. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China
Industry: Banking
Fate: Merged with Standard Bank
Successor: Standard Chartered
Founded: 1853
Defunct: 1969
Headquarters: London
The Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China (informally The Chartered Bank) was a bank incorporated in London in 1853 by Scotsman James Wilson, under a Royal Charter from Queen Victoria.
Though lacking a truly strong domestic network in Britain, it was influential in the development of British colonial trade throughout the East of Suez.
In 1969 Chartered Bank merged with Standard Bank, which did business throughout Africa. The merged enterprise was incorporated in London under the name Standard Chartered.
17. Commercial Bank of India
Founded: Bombay, British India (1845)
Defunct: 1866
Number of locations: 10
Products: Banking
The Commercial Bank of India, also known as Exchange Bank was a bank which was established in Bombay Presidency (now Mumbai), in 1845 of the British Raj period. The bank failed in the crash of 1866, after successfully operating for 20 years. The bank had eight branches, exclusive of the head office at Bombay, viz: London, Calcutta, Hong Kong, Foochow (now Fuzhou), Shanghai, Hankow (now part of Wuhan), Yokohama and Singapore, with an agency for the purchase of bullion at San Francisco. Commercial Bank of India then was winded up as directed by the Master of the Rolls, under the corresponding section of the Companies Act of England, where the company was registered under the Indian law and was not registered in England, but was carrying on business in England.
18. Corporation Bank
Former type: Public sector undertaking
Traded as: BSE: 532179. NSE: CORPBANK
Industry: Banking, Financial services
Fate: Merged with Union Bank of India
Successor: Union Bank of India
Founded: 12 March 1906; 114 years ago
Founder: Khan Bahadur Haji Abdullah Haji Kasim Saheb Bahadur
Defunct: 1 April 2020
Headquarters: Mangalore, Karnataka, India
Area served: India
Key people: P. V. Bharathi (MD & CEO)
Products: e-banking, consumer banking, corporate banking, finance and insurance, investment banking, mortgage loans, private banking, private equity, savings, Securities, asset management, wealth management, Credit cards,
Revenue: Decrease ₹17,494.70 crore (US$2.5 billion)
Operating income: Decrease ₹3,894.46 crore (US$550 million) (2019)
Net income: Decrease ₹-6,332.98 crore (US$−890 million) (2019)
Total assets: Decrease₹221,891.31 crore (US$31 billion) (2019)
Owner: Government of India
Number of employees: 19,569 (2016)
Capital ratio: 12.30% (2019)
Website: www.corpbank.com
Corporation Bank is a public-sector banking company headquartered in Mangalore, India. The bank has a pan-Indian presence. Presently, the bank has a network of 2,432 fully automated CBS branches, 3,040 ATMs, and 4,724 branchless banking units across the country.
History ::
Corporation Bank was founded on 12 March 1906 in Udupi, with Rs. 5000 capital, Haji Abdulla Haji Khasim Saheb Bahadur as founding president, and guided by the principles of the Swadeshi movement of Bala Gangadhar Tilak.
On 14 November Corporation Bank said it raised an amount of Rs 500 crore of the Basel III compliant Tier-II Bonds (Series1) and the same has been allotted by the Securities Allotment Committee of the Board of the Bank.
On 2 December 2017, Corporation Bank launched its RuPay Select and RuPay Platinum credit cards. RuPay credit cards are accepted at all RuPay-enabled 1.5 million-plus PoS terminals and 80,000-plus e-commerce merchants in India and all ICS Partner acceptance points (POS, e-commerce merchants) globally.
On 30 August 2019, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced that Corporation Bank and Andhra Bank would be merged into Union Bank of India. The proposed merger would make Union Bank of India the fifth largest public sector bank in the country with assets of ₹14.59 lakh crore (US$200 billion) and 9,609 branches. The Board of Directors of Andhra Bank approved the merger on 13 September. The Union Cabinet approved the merger on 4 March, and it will be completed on 1 April 2020.
19. Dass Bank
Dass Bank (Bengali: দাশ ব্যাঙ্ক) was a commercial bank founded by Alamohan Das in 1939 in Calcutta that grew to have 60 branches all over Bengal. After the Partition of India, Dass Bank had to close because it had lost the majority of its branches when East Bengal became Pakistan.
20. Delhi and London Bank
The Delhi and London Bank was a bank that operated in British India. It was originally incorporated as the Delhi Banking Corporation in India in 1844 and under this better known name in London in 1865. The bank separated in 1916 with many of the Indian branches merging into the Alliance Bank of Simla (established in 1874) and the London branch was bought by the Boulton Brothers. The bank was liquidated in 1924 following failure.
21. Dena Bank
Formerly: Devkaran Nanjee Banking Company Ltd
Former type: Public sector undertaking
Traded as: BSE: 532121. NSE: DENABANK
ISIN: INE077A01010
Industry: Banking, Financial Services
Fate: Amalgamated with Bank of Baroda
Successor: Bank of Baroda
Founded: 26 May 1938
Founder: Devkaran Nanjee
Defunct: 1 April 2019
Headquarters: C-10, G Block, Bandra-Kurla Complex, Bandra (E), Mumbai, Maharashtra, India
Number of locations: 1,872 branches (2018)
Area served: India
Services: consumer banking, corporate banking, finance and insurance, investment banking, mortgage loans, private banking, private equity, savings, Securities, asset management, wealth management
Revenue: Decrease ₹8,932.2247 crore (US$1.3 billion) (2018)
Operating income: Decrease ₹-3,178.7532 crore (US$−450 million) (2018)
Net income: Decrease ₹-1,923.1532 crore (US$−270 million) (2018)
Total assets: Decrease ₹62.7257 crore (US$8.8 million) (2018)
Total equity: Decrease ₹6,943.7548 crore (US$970 million) (2018)
Owner: Government of India (80.74%)
Number of employees: 13,613 (2018)
Capital ratio: 11.09% (2018)
Website: www.denabank.com
Dena Bank Ltd was an Indian public sector bank. It was headquartered in Mumbai and had 1,874 branches. The bank was founded in 1938 and the Indian government nationalized it in 1969.
On 17 September 2018, the Government of India proposed the amalgamation of Dena Bank and Vijaya Bank with the Bank of Baroda, pending approval from the boards of the three banks. The Union Cabinet and the boards of the banks approved the merger on 2 January 2019. Under the terms of the amalgamation, Dena Bank and Vijaya Bank shareholders received 110 and 402 equity shares of the Bank of Baroda, respectively, of face value ₹2 for every 1,000 shares they held. The amalgamation became effective from 1 April 2019.
22. Exchange Bank of India & Africa
The Exchange Bank of India & Africa was an Indian bank with a number of overseas branches in East African countries that operated from 1942 until its failure in 1949. It expanded rapidly across the trade routes between India and Africa but suffered a crisis in 1949 which caused it to fail.
History
The bank was established in Bombay in 1942. It expanded rapidly and at its peak had branches in India at Ahmedabad, Amraoti, Amritsar, Bhavnagar, Bangalore, Calcutta, Cochin, Delhi, Karachi, Khamagaon, Kolhapur, Madras, Madura, Nagpur, Rajkot, Surendranagar, Tinnevelly, and Tuticorin. It also had overseas branches at Aden, Colombo, Dar-es-Salam, Jaffna, Jinga, Kampala, London, Mombasa, and Nairobi. The bank opened three East African branches in 1947, with the branch in Tanzania opening in late 1948.
A crisis developed in the bank from about mid-February 1949, resulting in a heavy run on the bank. The bank suspended payments in May and was liquidated in June 1949. The Managing Director of the bank at the time, Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney, was charged with and found guilty of criminal breach of trust for disposing of certain securities that a client had deposited with the bank.
23. Global Trust Bank (India)
Global Trust Bank (India) (GTB) was founded on 21 October 1994 and commenced operations at Secunderabad. Its founders included Ramesh Gelli (its first Chairman), Sridar Subasri, and Jayant Madhob, among others. The bank introduced a number of technology-based innovations and responsive service.
GTB was involved in the stock market scam of 2001, that the stockbroker Ketan Parekh ran. GTB lent heavily to individuals speculating in the stock market; when the market crashed the bank suffered extensive losses. One consequence was that merger talks with UTI Bank fell through. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) forced Gelli to resign. Gelli's successor resigned after six months, and Gelli's son joined the board of directors. In 2004, Gelli briefly returned to the bank in February 2004 before being again forced to resign.
RBI examined GTB's accounts for 2001-2 and found that GTB's net worth had turned negative, but did not close the bank. GTB did not address its problems. Instead, and despite its dire straits, GTB continued to grow. It had 87 branches in 2002–2003, and grew to 103 branches before the RBIC forced it to close. It also paid interest on deposits at a rate equal to or better than other banks in its area. GTB sought to recapitalize itself by bringing in new investors. In mid-2004 GTB was in close talks with Newbridge Capital. Newbridge was to invest US$200million, subject to RBI approval. However, RBI was reluctant to permit private investors to restructure GTB.
The RBC issued a Moratorium Order on 24 July 2004. Before GTB's winding up, Goldman Sachs owned 4% of the bank and the International Finance Corporation owned 5%. Oriental Bank of Commerce acquired GTB on 14 August 2004. Shareholders in GTB received nothing for their shares; depositors, however, suffered no loss. After acquiring GTB, OBC discovered that GTB's situation was even worse than it had appeared at the time of acquisition. OBC did gain an increased presence in the southern parts of India, where its presence had been weak and GTB's was extensive.
GTB had been leaner than OBC. OBC had ten times the staff and branches than GTB, but only four to five times as much in the form of deposits, investments, or advances.
24. Grindlays Bank
Headquarters: Grindlay & Co, 54 Parliament Street, Westminster on 22 August 1899
Industry: Banking
Fate: Taken over by Australia and New Zealand Banking Group in 1984
Founded: 1828 in London, United Kingdom
Founder: Robert Melville Grindlay
Headquarters: London, United Kingdom
Number of locations: 183 (1863 - 1963)
The historic overseas bank was established in London in 1828 as Leslie & Grindlay, agents and bankers to the British army and business community in India. Banking operations expanded to include the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East and elements of Africa and Southeast Asia. It was styled Grindlay, Christian & Matthews in 1839, Grindlay & Co from 1843, Grindlay & Co Ltd from 1924 and Grindlays Bank Ltd in 1947 until its merger with the National Bank of India.
The National Bank of India was formed in 1863 and became one of the larger London overseas banks operating not only in the Indian sub-continent but in communities around the Indian Ocean. In 1948 it purchased the smaller Grindlays Bank Ltd, renaming itself National and Grindlays Bank Ltd some ten years later. Following further acquisitions, its name was shortened to Grindlays Bank in 1974. Grindlays was taken over by Australia and New Zealand Banking Group in 1984 and renamed ANZ Grindlays Bank. Standard Chartered Bank acquired ANZ Grindlays in 2000, after which the Grindlays name fell out of use.
25. Imperial Bank of India
Type: Private (80%)
Industry: Banking, Financial Services
Fate: Nationalization into State Bank of India in 1955
Predecessor: Bank of Calcutta(1806-1921), Bank of Bombay(1840-1921), Bank of Madras(1843-1921)
Successor: State Bank of India
Founded: 27 January 1921
Founder: J. M. Keynes
Headquarters: Bombay, Bombay State, India
Area served: India
The Imperial Bank of India (IBI) was the oldest and the largest commercial bank of the Indian subcontinent, and was subsequently transformed into the State Bank of India in 1955. Initially, as per its royal charter, it acted as the central bank for British India prior to the formation of the Reserve Bank of India in 1935.
26. Lord Krishna Bank
Lord Krishna Bank was a private sector bank headquartered at Kodungallur, in Thrissur District of Kerala state in India. The bank was founded in 1940. The bank was founded by Sri. Narayana Prabhu at Kodungallur. In the 1960s, it acquired three commercial banks:
Kerala Union Bank (est. 22 September 1952):
Thiyya Bank, which was established in 1941, and merged on 16 November 1964;
Josna Bank, which was established on 12 June 1944 in Cochin by N. Govinda Pai and N. Lakshmana Pai, of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin community.
In 1961, Josna Bank acquired the assets and liabilities of the Tripunithura Union Bank (est. 23 July 1929). The merger between Josna Bank and Lord Krishna Bank was effective 13 October 1965. At the time Josna Bank had 14 branches.
Lord Krishna Bank became a scheduled commercial bank in 1971. In 2007, Lord Krishna Bank was merged with Centurion Bank of Punjab.
27. Madhavpura Mercantile Cooperative Bank
Former type: cooperative
Industry: Banking
Fate: Licence cancelled by RBI on 1 June 2012
Founded: Ahmedabad, Gujarat (10 October 1968)
Defunct: yes
Headquarters: Ahmedabad
Area served: Interstate
Key people: BKR Maruti(CEO), Ramesh Parikh (Chairman), Devendra Pandya (Managing Director)
Net income: – ₹1,147.13 crore (US$160 million)
Madhavpura Mercantile Cooperative Bank (MMCB) was a Gujarat-based interstate cooperative bank that became defunct and lost its licence after it was unable to pay back the money it owed public depositors. Reserve Bank of India cancelled its licence in June 2012 under section 22 of the Banking regulations Act, 1949.
Involvement with stock brokers and impact of the 2001 Sensex crash
In 1999–2000, when the bank had 50,000 public depositors, it started lending out large sums of money to stock brokers in gross violation of Reserve Bank of India (RBI) rules and regulations. The MMCB had issued pay orders worth ₹1,200 crore (US$170 million) to stock broker Ketan Parekh, which he discounted at Bank of India. The bank had also lent money to Mukesh Babu and Sirish Maniar of the brokerage firm Maniar Group. At the time banks in India were not allowed to lend more than ₹15 crore (US$2.1 million) to stock brokers. In early 2001 Parekh and other brokers made a large sum of money when the Bombay Stock Exchange's Sensex saw a bull run; however, when the dotcom bubble burst, the Sensex dropped down to 3,000 points, and Parekh and the bank started having problems. On 8 March 2001, the news broke out that the bank had given a huge guarantee to Parekh which he lost in the stock crash. As little remained in the bank's coffers, public depositors began withdrawing their money; only a few were successful.
Prior to the scam, the Madhavpura Mercantile Cooperative Bank was the largest urban cooperative bank in Gujarat. It had a deposit base of ₹1,200 crore (US$170 million) in March 2001, half of which was from other banks. Seeing the condition of the bank and fear of losing their money among the depositors the RBI restricted the bank's operations on 13 March 2001. The Central Registrar of Cooperative Societies superseded the bank's 12-member board.
28. Mercantile Bank of India, London and China
Industry: Financial Services
Fate:
Acquired by HSBC, 1959.
Acquired by Citibank, 1984.
Acquired by the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., 1987
Predecessor:
Mercantile Bank of Bombay (1853)
Mercantile Bank of India, London, and China (1857)
Mercantile Bank of India, Ltd (1893)
Founded: 1853
Headquarters:
Bombay (1853)
London (1858)
The Mercantile Bank of India, London and China (later, Mercantile Bank, Ltd) was an Anglo-Indian bank with business focus in the Far East. It was founded in Bombay in 1853 as the Mercantile Bank of Bombay; and later in 1857 was renamed to Mercantile Bank of India, London, and China with London as its headquarters.
By 1959, through a series of mergers and divisions, its name had been shortened to 'Mercantile Bank, Ltd', and was acquired by HSBC the same year. The bank was an issuer of Hong Kong bank notes until 1974.
29. Nath Bank
The Nath Bank (Bengali: নাথ ব্যাংক) was an Indian-owned bank founded by Kshetra Nath Dalal in 1926 in Noakhali, now in Bangladesh but then in undivided India. By 1947 when the Partition of India was imminent, Nath Bank had its head office and three branches in Noakhali district, as well as a branch in Comilla in Tipperah District. Noakhali and Tipperah districts were to become a part of Pakistan, so the bank shifted its head office to Kolkata. During this time the Indian banks were facing severe crisis. In 1949, the Nath Bank had to be bailed out by the Reserve Bank of India. Even that failed to resolve the crisis and the bank was finally liquidated in 1950. Economist Arun Ghosh attributes its collapse to its over-aggressive expansion of branch banking. The failure of the Nath Bank created a panic among investors.
30. Nedungadi Bank
Rao Bahadur T.M. (Thalakodi Madathil) Appu Nedungadi, who was famous as the first Malayalam novelist by writing the first Malayalam novel, titled Kundalatha, established Nedungadi Bank in 1899 at Calicut in Kerala. It was first private sector commercial bank to be set up in South India. The bank was incorporated in 1913. In 1964 it acquired the Cochin National Bank in Trichur, and then the year after Nedungadi took over selected assets and liabilities of the Coimbatore National Bank (est. 25 January 1933). Cochin National Bank had three offices and Coimbatore National Bank had only one.
Over time, Nedungadi established some 174 branches, including branches at all major metropolitan cities such as New Delhi, Calcutta, Chennai, Mumbai, Ahmedabad, etc.
In 2002 the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) probing a stock scam pointed out discrepancies in the conduct of business by Nedungadi Bank. In 2003 Punjab National Bank took it over. At the time of the merger with PNB, Nedungadi Bank's shares had zero value, with the result that its shareholders received no payment for their shares.
31. New Bank of India
New Bank of India was established in 1936, in Lahore by Mulk Raj Kohli, a professor of Economics turned banker. It moved its head office to Amritsar in 1947, and then to New Delhi in 1956. It acquired Didwana Industrial Bank in 1965, Chawla Bank in 1969, and Sahukara Bank in 1971. Earlier New Bank of India had acquired Punjab & Kashmir Bank.
Didwana Industrial Bank had been established in 1925 in Didwana.
Chawla Bank, which had been established in 1913, had its registered office in Bannu, North Western Frontier Province, and a branch office at Dehra Dun in the United Provinces. Ninety-five percent of its depositors and creditors migrated to India after Partition.
Sahukara Bank, est. 1912 in Ludhiana, had branches in Pakistan that it lost at Partition.
Lala Gokul Chand Suri founded Punjab & Kashmir Bank in 1912 in Delhi with operations in Rawalpindi.
The Government of India nationalized New Bank of India in 1980. Punjab National Bank acquired New Bank of India in 1993. The only other nationalized bank merged with another—except for State Bank of India with its associate banks—was the merger of Bharatiya Mahila Bank with State Bank of India in 2017.
32. North Malabar Gramin Bank
Former type: Public Sector Bank, sponsored by Syndicate Bank
Industry: Financial Commercial banks
Successor: Kerala Gramin Bank
Founded: Estd. under Regional Rural Banks Act 1976
Defunct: July 7, 2013
Headquarters: Kannur, Kerala, India
Website: www.nmgbank.com
North Malabar Gramin Bank (NMGB; Malayalam: നോർത്ത് മലബാർ ഗ്രാമീൺ ബാങ്ക്) was a Regional Rural Bank in Kerala, India. It was established in 1976 as a Scheduled Commercial Bank as per the Regional Rural Banks Act of 1976 to provide banking facilities in the North Malabar region. It operated in seven districts of Kerala with the headquarters at Kannur, and had 222 branches as of 14 June 2013. The bank distinguished itself as one of the few profit making RRBs in India before its amalgamation.
On 8 July 2013, per a Government of India notification, North Malabar Gramin Bank (sponsored by Syndicate Bank) and South Malabar Gramin Bank (sponsored by Canara Bank) were amalgamated into a single entity as the Kerala Gramin Bank, with its head office at Malappuram, and Canara Bank as the sponsor bank, after consulting NABARD, the concerned sponsor banks and the Government of Kerala.
33. Oriental Bank Corporation
Formerly: Bank of Western India
Former type: Private
Industry: Banking
Founded: Bombay, Bombay Presidency, British India (1842)
Defunct: 1892
Headquarters: London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland
Areas served: Asia, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, San Francisco
The Oriental Bank Corporation or "OBC" was a British imperial bank founded in India in 1842 which grew to be prominent throughout the Far East. As an Exchange bank, the OBC was primarily concerned with the finance of trade and exchanges of different currencies. It was the first bank in Hong Kong and the first bank to issue banknotes in Hong Kong.
34. Oriental Bank of Commerce
Former type: Public sector undertaking
Traded as:
BSE: 500315
NSE: ORIENTBANK
Industry: Banking, Financial services
Fate: Merged with Punjab National Bank
Successor: Punjab National Bank
Founded: 19 February 1943; 77 years ago
Founder: Rai Bahadur Sohan Lal
Defunct: 1 April 2020
Headquarters: Gurgaon, Haryana, India
Area served: India
Key people: Mukesh Kumar Jain (MD & CEO)
Products: Investment banking, Consumer banking, Commercial banking, Retail banking, Private banking, Asset management, Pensions, Mortgages, Credit cards
Revenue: Decrease ₹17,867.69 crore (US$2.5 billion)(2019)
Operating income: Increase ₹3,754 crore (US$530 million) (2019)
Net income: Increase ₹55.00 crore (US$7.7 million) (2019)
Total assets: Increase₹271,909.57 crore (US$38 billion) (2019)
Owner: Government of India
Number of employees: 21,729(2019)
Capital ratio: 12.73% (2019)
Website: www.obcindia.co.in
Oriental Bank of Commerce (BSE: 500315 NSE: ORIENTBANK) is an Indian public sector bank. Headquartered at Gurgaon, Haryana, has 2390 branches and 2625 ATMs across India.
35. Oudh Commercial Bank
Former type: Private company
Industry: Banking
Fate: Failed
Founded: 1881
Defunct: 1958
Headquarters: Faizabad, India
Oudh Commercial Bank or Awadh Commercial Bank was an Indian bank established in 1881 in Faizabad and operated until 1958 when it failed. It was the first commercial bank in India having limited liability and an entirely Indian board of directors. It was a small bank that had no branches and that served only local needs.
History ::
Before it failed it acquired the Bank of Rohilkund (or Bank of Rohilkhand), which Sir Yusef Ali Khan, Nawab of Rampur (1832–1887), had promoted over the objection of local moneylenders. Bank of Rohilkund was established in 1862, just after the acceptance of limited liability for banks. Bank of Rohilkund was the first promoted by a princely state; it too was a small bank.
36. Palai Central Bank
Palai Central Bank was a commercial bank headquartered in Kerala, South India that functioned during the middle of last century. Although it was started in a small remote city, the bank grew up to become not only the biggest bank but the biggest institution in Kerala, after the state government, and the 17th largest among the 94 scheduled banks in India. The Kerala High Court in 1960 ordered the liquidation of Palai Central Bank on a petition from the Reserve Bank of India.
From the time of its founding in 1927, Palai Central Bank had an eventful history. The bank's existence the period preceding and immediately following India's independence, when Kerala – a small State in the far south – could exert only very little influence in the nation's capital. It was also a period when the need for protecting the interests of different segments of society was not a major consideration when policy decisions were taken by the Central Government.
37. Pandyan Bank
Pandyan Bank was a private sector bank that S.N.K. Sundaram established at Madurai, Tamil Nadu, on 11 December 1946. In 1963 Canara Bank acquired Pandyan Bank.
The bank introduced innovations such as plastic pouches for savings bank pass-books. More importantly, it created an all-women's branch at Town Hall Road in Madurai in 1947, staffed by ten women, one of whom was Kamala Sundaram, S.N.K. Sundaram's daughter.
The merger with Canara Bank took effect on 2 December 1963. At the time of the acquisition, Pandyan Bank had 83 branches, and 800 staff.
38. South Malabar Gramin Bank
Former type: Public Sector Bank, sponsored by Canara Bank
Industry: Financial. Commercial banks
Successor: Kerala Gramin Bank
Founded: Estd. under Regional Rural Banks Act 1976
Defunct: July 7, 2013
Headquarters: Malappuram, Kerala, India
Website: www.smgbank.com
South Malabar Gramin Bank (now Kerala Gramin Bank) was a Regional Rural Bank in India, and had its headquarters at Malappuram in Kerala. Its area of operation was limited to 8 districts in Kerala, India. It had been financing farm & non-farm sectors and other employment generation programs through its 506 branches spread over these 8 districts.
As per Government of India notification dated 08.07.2013, amalgamation of South Malabar Gramin Bank and North Malabar Gramin Bank sponsored by Syndicate Bank had been effected into a single entity as Kerala Gramin Bank with its head office at Malappuram and sponsor bank as Canara Bank after consulting NABARD, concerned sponsor banks and State government of Kerala. Government of India notification is effective from 08.07.2013.
39. State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur
Former type: Public
Traded as:
BSE: 501061
NSE: SBBJ
Industry: Banking, Insurance, Capital Markets and allied industries
Fate: merged with State Bank of India on 31 March 2017
Founded: Jaipur, 1963
Defunct: 31 March 2017
Headquarters: Head Office, Tilak Marg, Jaipur 302 005 India
Key people: Arundhati Bhattacharya(Chairman), Dibakar Mohanty(Managing Director)
Products: Loans, Savings, Investment vehicles, etc.
Net income: Increase ₹ 850.60 Crore (March 2016)
Number of employees: 12,831
Parent: State Bank of India
Website www.sbbjbank.com
State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur (SBBJ) was a major Indian bank. It was a subsidiary of State Bank of India, with which it was merged on 31st March 2017. As of 2015, SBBJ had 1,360 branches, mostly located in the state of Rajasthan, India. Its branch network out of Rajasthan covered all the major business centers of India. In 1997, the bank entered the capital market with an Initial Public Offering of 1,360,000 shares at a premium of Rs. 440 per share. For the year 2015-16 the net profit of the company was Rs. 8.5 billion.
40. State Bank of Hyderabad
Former type: Public Sector
Industry: Banking, Insurance, Capital Markets and allied industries
Fate: Merged in State Bank of India in 2017
Founded: Nizam Mir Osman Ali Khan, Hyderabad State Bank Hyderabad, 8 August 1941
Defunct: 31 March 2017
Headquarters:
Gunfoundry, Abids
Hyderabad India
Area served: Pan-India.
Key people: Rajnish Kumar (banker) (Chairman), Mani Palvesan (Managing Director)
Products: Personal Banking Schemes, Corportate Banking, SME Banking Schemes, FOREX, Mobile Banking, Internet Banking, Credit Cards, Insurance
Net income: Rs. 1317 crores
Owner: Government of India
Number of employees: 17,000
Parent: State Bank of India (100% owned)
Website: www.sbhyd.com
State Bank of Hyderabad (SBH) was a nationalized bank in India, with headquarters at Gunfoundry, Abids, Hyderabad, Telangana. It was one of the five associate banks of State Bank of India (SBI) and was one of the scheduled banks in India. It was founded in 1941 as the Hyderabad State Bank. From 1956 until 31 March 2017, it had been an associate bank of the SBI, the largest such. The State Bank of Hyderabad was merged with SBI on 1 April 2017.
The Bank's head office was situated at Gunfoundry Area, Hyderabad, India. SBH had over 2,000 branches and about 18,000 employees. The Bank's business had crossed Rs. 2.4 trillion as on 31.12.2015 with a net profit of Rs. 8.12 billion.
The bank had performed well in the decades before merger, winning several awards for its banking practices. Mrs. Arundhati Bhattacharya was the Chairman and Shri Mani Palavesan the Managing Director at the time of merger.
It was the chief banker of Telangana State.
41. State Bank of Indore
State Bank of Indore (Indore Bank) was a government-owned Indian bank and the largest of State Bank of India's (SBI) six associate bank subsidiaries. In October 2009, the Government of India gave its in-principle approval to a merger between State Bank of India and State Bank of Indore. On 15 July 2010 the Cabinet cleared the merger. On 26 August 2010 State Bank of Indore officially merged into State Bank of India.
At the time of the merger the bank had over 470 branches in more than 300 cities and towns. In March 2009, the business turnover of State Bank of Indore exceeded Rs. 500 billion.
History
1920: The Bank of Indore was incorporated under a special charter from Maharaja Tukoji Rao Holkar III, who was the ruler from 1903 to 1927 of the former princely state of Indore. Indore State awarded the Bank a monopoly for 10 years, granted it certain concessions and subscribed to the Bank's share capital. Indore Bank's main branch and headquarters was in the city of Indore, located on the Malwa Plateau, just north of the Vindhya Range.
1960: The Bank of Indore became a subsidiary of State Bank of India w.e.f. 1 January 1960 under the name State Bank of Indore. Prior to the merger, SBI held a 98.05% stake in Indore Bank.
1962: State Bank of Indore acquired the Bank of Dewas, which had been established in 1936 and had been the first bank in Dewas district.
1965: State Bank of Indore acquired Dewas Senior Bank, which had been incorporated in 1941.
1971: State Bank of Indore was up-graded to class 'A' category bank.
2010: State Bank of Indore was merged into State Bank of India.
42. State Bank of Mysore
Former type: Public sector
Traded as:
BSE: 532200
NSE: MYSOREBANK
ISIN: INE651A01020
Industry: Banking, Insurance, Capital Markets and allied industries
Fate: Merged with State Bank of India
Predecessor: The Bank of Mysore Ltd.
Successor: State Bank of India
Founded: 2 October 1913; 106 years ago as The Bank of Mysore Ltd.
Founder: Sir M. Visvesvaraya
Defunct: 31 March 2017
Headquarters: Bengaluru
Number of locations: 1074 branches and 9 extension counters
Area served: India
Key people:
Chairman: Arundhati Bhattacharya
Managing Director: N.K.Chari
Products: Deposits, Personal Banking Schemes, C & I Banking Schemes, Agri Banking Schemes, SME Banking Schemes
Services: Loans, Deposits, Mobile Banking, ATM Services, NRI Services, Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) Transactions, National Electronic Fund Transfer (NEFT), Internet Banking, Debit Card
Net income: Increase₹276 Crores[citation needed]
Total equity: Increase3988 Crores as on 31 Mar 2014
Number of employees: 10,226 (31 December 2016)
3,600 supervisory staff
6,626 non-supervisory staff
Parent: State Bank of India (90.00% shares)
Website: bank.sbi
State Bank of Mysore was a Public Sector bank in India, with headquarters at Bengaluru. It was one of the five associate banks of State Bank of India, all of which were consolidated with the State Bank of India with effect from 1 April 2017.
State Bank of Mysore was established in the year 1913 as The Bank of Mysore Ltd. under the patronage of Maharaja Krishna Raja Wadiyar IV, at the instance of the banking committee headed by the great Engineer-Statesman, Bharat Ratna Sir M.Visvesvaraya. During 1953, "Mysore Bank" was appointed as an agent of Reserve Bank of India to undertake Government business and treasury operations, and in March 1960, it became a subsidiary of the State Bank of India under the State Bank of India (subsidiary Banks) Act 1959. Now the bank is an Associate Bank under State Bank Group and the State Bank of India holds 92.33% of shares. The Bank's shares are listed in Bengaluru, Chennai, and Mumbai stock exchanges.
This bank had 976 branches and 10627 employees (June 2014) and the Bank has 772 branches (79%) in Karnataka State. The bank had regional offices in Bengaluru, Mysuru, Mangaluru, Mandya, Hassan, Shivamogga, Davangere, Ballari, Tumakuru, Kolar, Chennai, Coimbatore, Hyderabad, Mumbai and New Delhi. The bank's turnover in the year 2013-2014 was around US$19 Billion and Profit about US$46 Million.
43. State Bank of Patiala
Former type: Public
Traded as:
BSE: 501061
NSE: SBP
Industry: Banking, Insurance, Capital Markets and allied industries
Fate: Merged in State Bank of India in 2017
Founded: Patiala, 1917
Defunct: 2017
Headquarters: Head Office, The Mall, Patiala 147 002 India
Key people: Sh. Rajnish kumar (Chairman), Shri. S. A. Ramesh Rangan(Managing Director)
Products: Loans, Savings, Investment vehicles, etc.
Revenue: Increase ₹173,000 crore (US$24 billion) (2013)
Net income: Increase ₹11,358.06 crore (US$1.6 billion) (2013)
Total assets: Increase ₹116,709.10 crore (US$16 billion) (2013)
Total equity: Increase ₹203,417.50 crore (US$29 billion) (2013)
Number of employees: 13178
Parent: State Bank of India
Website: www.sbp.co.in
State Bank of Patiala, founded in 1917, was an associate bank of the State Bank Group. At the time of its merger, State Bank of Patiala had a network of 1445 service outlets, including 1314 branches, in all major cities of India, but most of the branches were located in the Indian states of Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Jammu & Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat and Maharashtra. It merged with State Bank of India on 1 April 2017.
44. State Bank of Saurashtra
Headquarter: Bhavnagar
The State Bank of Saurashtra was a government-owned bank in India. It was one of the seven Associate Banks of the State Bank of India, with which it merged on 13 August 2008. At the time of the merger, the bank had a network of 423 branches spread over 15 states and the Union Territory of Daman and Diu.
Prior to 1948, the region of Saurashtra, which at present forms a part of Gujarat State, comprised many small, medium and large princely states. Bhavnagar, Rajkot and Porbandar, which were among the larger states, and two smaller states, Palitana and Vadia, had established their own Darbar (meaning Palace) Banks, the oldest of which was Bhavnagar Darbar Bank, established in 1902. These banks mainly catered to the needs of the governments of their respective princely states, and acted as depositories for local savings. After the establishment of Saurashtra state in 1948, there was a parallel amalgamation of these banks. The Bhavnagar Darbar Bank became the State Bank of Saurashtra, under the Saurashtra State Bank (Amalgamation) Ordinance, 1950, and the four Darbar Banks - Rajkot State Bank, Porbandar State Bank, Palitana Darbar Bank and Vadia State Bank - were merged with it with effect from 1 July 1950 as its branches. At the close of 1950 the Bank had only 9 branches and deposits of Rs.7 crores.
In 1960, following the formation of a separate Gujarat State, the bank's main area of operation - Saurashtra - became a part of Gujarat. At the same time, the State Bank of India took over the State Bank of Saurashtra, along with the other major state-owned banks under the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959. By this time, the number of branches had increased to 24, with aggregate deposits of Rs.13.39 crores, total advances of Rs.7.93 crores, and an investment portfolio of Rs.8.04 crores. The paid up capital and reserves were Rs.1.51 crores. The bank also had 866 employees.
The bank's first chairman was Jagubhai S. Parikh, and he served until 1960. He was the Deputy Chief Minister of Bhavnagar State Cabinet and was the first Finance Minister in the post-Independence Saurashtra Cabinet.
45. State Bank of Travancore
Formerly: Travancore Bank Ltd
Former type: Public
Traded as:
NSE: SBT
BSE: 532191
Industry: Banking, Capital Markets and allied industries
Fate: Merged with State Bank of India on 31 March 2017
Successor: State Bank of India
Founded: Trivandrum, 12 September 1945 (as Travancore Bank Ltd)
Founder: Chithira Thirunal Balarama Varma
Defunct: 31 March 2017
Headquarters: Poojappura, Thiruvananthapuram, India
Number of locations: 1,157 Branches, 12 Extension counters and 1,602 ATM Counters
Area served: Kerala
Services: Investment Banking, Consumer Banking, Commercial Banking, Retail Banking, Private Banking, Asset Management, Pensions, Mortgages.
Number of employees: 14,069 (2015)
Parent: State Bank of India
Website: statebankoftravancore.com
State Bank of Travancore (SBT) was a major Indian bank headquartered in Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, and was a major associate of State Bank of India.
SBT was a subsidiary of the State Bank Group, but also had private share-holders. It was the premier bank of Kerala. Overall, as of 31 March 2015 SBT had a network of 1,157 branches and 1,602 ATMs, covering 18 states and three union territories.
On 15 February 2017, the Union Cabinet approved a proposal to merge SBT and four other associate banks with SBI. It finally merged with its parent bank on 31 March 2017.
46. Syndicate Bank
Former type: Public sector undertaking
Traded as:
BSE: 532276
NSE: SYNDIBANK
Industry: Banking, Financial services
Fate: Merged with Canara Bank
Successor: Canara Bank
Founded: 1925; 95 years ago (as Canara Industrial and Banking Syndicate Limited)
Founders: Upendra Ananth Pai, T. M. A. Pai, Vaman Kudva
Defunct: 1 April 2020
Headquarters: Manipal, Udupi, Karnataka
Areas served: India, United Kingdom, Oman
Key people: Ajay Vipin Nanavati (Chairman), Mrutyunjay Mahapatra (MD & CEO)
Products: Finance and insurance, Consumer Banking, Corporate Banking, Investment Banking, Investment Management, Private Equity, Mortgages, Credit Cards
Revenue: Decrease ₹6,913.09 crore (US$970 million)(2017)
Operating income: Increase ₹1,514 crore (US$210 million) (2017)
Net income: Increase ₹359 crore (US$50 million) (2017)
Total assets: Decrease ₹299,073.34 crore (US$42 billion) (2017)
Owner: Government of India
Number of employees: 35000 (March 2019)
Capital ratio: 12.03% (2017)
Website: www.syndicatebank.in
Syndicate Bank is one of the oldest and major commercial banks of India. It was founded by T M A Pai, Upendra Pai and Vaman Kudva. At the time of its establishment, the bank was known as Canara Industrial and Banking Syndicate Limited. The bank, along with 13 major commercial banks of India, was nationalised on 19 July 1969, by the Government of India. The Bank has headquarter in the university town of Manipal, India. On 30 August 2019, the Government of India announced the bank would be merged into Canara Bank.
47. United Bank of India
Former type: Public sector undertaking
Traded as:
NSE: UNITEDBNK
BSE: 533171
Industry: Banking, Financial services
Fate: Merged with Punjab National Bank
Predecessors: Comilla Banking Corporation, Bengal Central Bank, Comilla Union Bank, Hooghly Bank
Successor: Punjab National Bank
Founded: 1950; 70 years ago
Founder: Narendra Chandra Dutta
Defunct: 1 April 2020
Headquarters: Kolkata, West Bengal, India
Area served: India
Key people: Ashok Kumar Pradhan (MD & CEO)
Products: Finance and Insurance, Consumer Banking, Corporate Banking, Investment Banking, Investment Management, Private Equity, Mortgages
Revenue: Increase₹10,945.00 crore (US$1.5 billion) (2019)
Operating income: Increase ₹1,412.00 crore (US$200 million) (2019)
Net income: Decrease ₹-2,316.00 crore (US$−320 million) (2019)
Total assets: Increase ₹151,530.00 crore (US$21 billion) (2019)
Owner: Government of India
Number of employees: 15,191 (2018)
Capital ratio: 10.08% (2016)
Website: www.unitedbankofindia.com
United Bank of India (UBI) is an Indian government-owned bank headquartered in Kolkata, India. Presently the bank has a three-tier organisational setup consisting of its head office in Kolkata, 36 regional offices and 2054 branches spread all over India. However, its major presence is in Eastern India. The bank has three full-fledged overseas branches, one each at Kolkata, New Delhi and Mumbai. United Bank of India now aims to expand its international activities.
On 30 March 2009, the Indian government approved the restructuring of United Bank of India. The government proposed to invest 2.5 billion rupees in shares by 31 March and another 5.50 billion in the next fiscal year in Tier-I capital instruments. The move is part of the Indian government's program to improve the capital base of the state-owned banks. UBI gets SEBI approval for Rs 1,000 crore equity issue via QIP On 22 November 2017, United Bank of India (UBI) said it has received SEBI's approval for issue of equity shares worth Rs 1,000 crore by way of institutional placement.
On August 30, 2019, the Government of India announced the bank would be merged into Punjab National Bank of India. The merger is most likely come into effect at the beginning of the next fiscal year starting on April 2020.
48. United Industrial Bank
United Industrial Bank (UIB) was founded in Calcutta in 1940 by Jadunath Ray. In 1989 Allahabad Bank acquired it in a rescue.
In 1963 UIB acquired two banks. One was the Prabartak Bank, which the Prabartak Sangha movement had founded in Calcutta on 17 September 1929 as the Prabartak Bank and Insurance Company. At one point Prabartak Bank had a branch in Chittagong. The other was the Bank of Bankura, which had been established in Calcutta on 8 June 1936.
In 1964 United Industrial Bank acquired two more banks: Metropolitan Bank on 6 February, and Southern Bank on 24 August. Both Southern and Metropolitan Bank had been established in Calcutta, Southern on 10 October 1934, and Metropolitan on 16 October 1936.
In 1965 the Government of East Pakistan took over UIB's branch in East Pakistan.
At the time of its merger into Allahabad Bank, United Industrial had 145 branches.
49. United Western Bank
United Western Bank (UWB) was an Indian bank founded in 1936 that IDBI Bank acquired in 2006 in a rescue. The Reserve Bank of India placed UWB under a moratorium to protect the interest of public and depositors as growing losses eroded its capital.
Annasaheb Chirmule, a leader of the Swadeshi movement, founded Satara Swadeshi Commercial Bank in 1907, and some three decades later founded United Western Bank. The bank was incorporated in 1936, and commenced operations the next year. UWB's head office was in Satara, in Maharashtra State. It became a Scheduled Bank in 1951.
In 1956 UWB acquired Union Bank of Kolhapur, which had been incorporated on 5 July 1949.
In 1961 UWB acquired Satara Swadeshi Commercial Bank. Established on 20 August 1907, this was the first bank established at Satara.
At the time of the merger with IDBI, UWB had some 230 branches spread over 47 districts in 9 states, controlled by five Zonal Offices at Mumbai, Pune, Kolhapur, Jalgaon and Nagpur. By acquiring UWB, IDBI was able to increase its branch network from 195 to 425 branches.
50. Vijaya Bank
Former type: Public sector undertaking
Traded as:
BSE: 532401
NSE: VIJAYABANK
ISIN: INE705A01016
Industry: Banking, Financial services
Fate: Merged with Bank of Baroda
Successor: Bank of Baroda
Founded: 23 October 1931 (Mangalore, Madras Presidency, British India)
Founder: Attavar Balakrishna Shetty
Defunct: 1 April 2019
Headquarters: No. 41/2, M G Road, Bangalore, Karnataka, India
Number of locations: 2,136 branches, 2,155 ATMs (2018)
Area served: India
Services: Consumer banking, corporate banking, finance and insurance, investment banking, mortgage loans, private banking, wealth management
Revenue: Increase ₹14,190.45 crore (US$2.0 billion) (2018)
Operating income: Increase ₹3,098 crore (US$430 million) (2018)
Net income: Increase ₹727 crore (US$100 million) (2018)
Total assets: Increase₹177,632.04 crore (US$25 billion) (2018)
Total equity: Increase₹10,627.19 crore (US$1.5 billion) (2018)
Owner: Government of India (68.77%)
Number of employees: 16,079 (2018)
Capital ratio: 13.90% (2018)
Website: www.vijayabank.com
Vijaya Bank was a public sector bank with its corporate office in Bengaluru, Karnataka, India. It was one of the nationalised banks in India. The bank offered a wide range of financial products and services to customers through its various delivery channels. The bank had a network of 2031 branches (as of March 2017) throughout the country and over 4000 customer touch points including 2001 ATMs.
On 17 September 2018, the Government of India proposed the merger of Vijaya Bank and Dena Bank with the Bank of Baroda, pending approval from the boards of the three banks. The merger was approved by the Union Cabinet and the boards of the banks on 2 January 2019. Under the terms of the merger, Dena Bank and Vijaya Bank shareholders received 110 and 402 equity shares of the Bank of Baroda, respectively, of face value ₹2 for every 1,000 shares they held. The merger is effective from 1 April 2019.. Vijaya Bank that has merged with Bank of Baroda has built a museum that dedicates to its history.
References
Ref 1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Defunct_banks_of_India
Ref 2: Bank of Hindostan
Industry Scenario (Ref 1)
The Aviation sector in India currently contributes $72 bn to GDP.
India has 464 airports and airstrips, of which 125 airports are owned by Airport Authority of India (AAI). These 125 AAI airports manage close to 78% of domestic passenger traffic and 22% of international passenger traffic.
Passenger traffic in India stood at 316.51 mn during April 2018 - Feb 2019. Out of which domestic passenger traffic stood at 252.92 mn while international traffic stood at 63.59 mn. The aircraft movement, passenger traffic and freight traffic increased by 4.9%, 4.5% and 3.1% respectively in February 2019 viz-a-viz February 2018, across all Indian airports taken together.
However, the share of international cargo traffic is much higher at 68.5% in comparison with 31.5% of domestic cargo traffic.
Maintenance, Repair & Overhaul (MRO) industry is expected to grow to $1.2 bn by 2020 from $950 mn currently.
NUMBER OF AIRLINES CLOSED EVERY FIVE YEARS BETWEEN 1991-2020 (Ref 2)
2016-2020: 6
2011-2015: 9
2006-2010: 10
2001-2005: 1 [Gujarat Airways operated from 1995 till 2001.]
1996-2000: 11
1991-1995: 5
NUMBER OF AIRLINES CLOSED EVERY TEN YEARS BETWEEN 1929-1990
1981-1990: 1 [Pushpaka Airlines operated from 1979 till June 1983.]
1971-1980: 3
1961-1970: 4
1951-1960: 6
1941-1950: 5
1931-1940: 3
Indian State Air Service was started in 1929.
A total of 64 airlines closed in the lifetime of Indian Aviation from 1929 till April 2020.
Case Study "Jet Airways" (Ref 3)
Jet Airways (India) Ltd. is a bankrupt and grounded Indian international airline based in Mumbai, India which, on 17 April 2019, ceased all flight operations with its last revenue flight operated by a Jet Konnect Boeing 737 arriving into Mumbai on 17 April 2019. From the third quarter of 2010 onward, Jet Airways was the largest commercial passenger airline in India with a passenger market share of 22.6%. With its competitors, mainly SpiceJet and IndiGo, lowering ticket fares in the following years, it was forced to follow suit, hurting overall performance resulting in steep financial losses. It dropped to second place behind IndiGo in October 2017, with a passenger market share of 17.8%. The downward slide continued and resulted in bankruptcy.
BANKRUPTCY AND CESSATION OF SERVICES
As of November 2018, Jet Airways has been reported to have a negative financial outlook due to increasing losses. In March 2019 it was reported that nearly a fourth of Jet Airways' aircraft were grounded due to unpaid lease rates. On 25 March 2019, Mr. Naresh Goyal and his wife Anitha Goyal stepped down from the board of directors.
On 5 April, Indian Oil Corporation stopped supplying fuel to the airline, citing non-payment of dues as the emergency funds have still not been credited. On April 17, the airline suspended all flight operations, due to lenders rejecting Rs 4 billion of emergency funding and its membership in the International Air Transport Association (IATA) was suspended. On 17 June, after getting no acceptable offers from Etihad Airways and Hinduja Group, lenders to Jet Airways decided to refer the company to National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) for bankruptcy proceedings with debt of $1.2 billion.
As the group faces insolvency proceedings in Netherlands after failing to pay two debtors, NCLAT (National Company Law Appellate Tribunal) has allowed cross-border insolvency proceeding stating in an order that the "Dutch Trustee (Administrator) will work in cooperation with the 'Resolution Professional of India."
Case Study of latest entrant in the Scheduled Airlines: "Vistara" (Ref 4)
Tata SIA Airlines Limited, operating as Vistara, is an Indian full-service airline, based in Gurgaon, with its hub at Indira Gandhi International Airport. The carrier, a joint venture between Tata Sons and Singapore Airlines, commenced operations on 9 January 2015 with its inaugural flight between Delhi and Mumbai. The airline had carried more than two million passengers by June 2016 and as of May 2019, has a 4.7% share of the domestic carrier market, making it the 6th largest domestic airline. The airline serves 34 destinations with a fleet of Airbus A320, Boeing 787-9 and Boeing 737-800NG aircraft.
Case Study of latest entrant in the Regional Airlines: "TruStar" (Ref 5)
TruStar is an Indian low-cost airline promoted by Turbo Aviation Pvt Ltd based in Hyderabad. The airline plans to launch operations by the second quarter of 2020 with Dornier 228 aircraft.
In December 2019, Turbo Aviation announced that it had secured a £100-million ($133.64 million) investment from a Business Group based in the UK for the launch of commuter air services under the third place of the UDAN scheme. The airline plans to start operations with the routes they have secured under UDAN, with plans to connect passengers all over India and eventually overseas destinations in the future. The TruStar fleet will include 10 ATR-72s, 10 Airbus A320 and 4 Dornier 228 aircraft. In January 2019, under the third round of the Governments Regional Connectivity Scheme, also known as UDAN, TruStar had been awarded four routes in Uttar Pradesh, three routes across the States of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Goa, two routes between Hyderabad and Prakasham Barrage of Andhra Pradesh and between Chennai and Ramnad in Tamil Nadu and also routes connecting Raipur, Rourkela, Jharsuguda and Jagadalpur with Bhubaneswar, Visakhapatnam and Hyderabad. In Telangana, Turbo Aviation has been given permission to start services from Hyderabad to Nagarjuna Sagar, which will be a sea plane route.
TruStar will be the first private airline to introduce the Dornier 228NG built in India at Kanpur by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) into scheduled commercial services in India.
Functioning Airlines and Their Debts
1. Air India: INR 58,283 crore (Ref A)
2. Vistara: No debt. Posted a loss of INR 830.80 crore in 2019 (Ref C)
3. Air India Express: INR 23,286.50 crore (Ref A)
4. GoAir: INR 1,820 crore (INR 18.2 billion) (Ref D)
5. Indigo: INR 1,98,418 crore (Ref E)
6. SpiceJet: INR 974.57 (Ref F)
7. AirAsia: No debt. Posted a loss of INR 670.93 crore in 2019 (Ref C)
References
Ref 1: https://www.investindia.gov.in/sector/aviation
Ref 2: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_defunct_airlines_of_India
Ref 3: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jet_Airways
Ref 4: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vistara
Ref 5: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TruStar
Ref 6: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_airlines_of_India
Ref A: Air India sale: Debt burden on buyer to be Rs 23,286 crore
Ref B: Vistara pares losses as sales rise 54% in FY18
Ref C: How Vistara, AirAsia India fared
Ref D: India Ratings Affirms Go Airlines (India) at 'IND A-'; Outlook Stable
Ref E: Indigo posts net loss of Rs 1,062 crore
Ref F: SpiceJet Ltd. Balance Sheet
INTRODUCTION
Buffett has applied the traditional principles as chief executive officer of Berkshire Hathaway, a company with roots in a group of textile operations begun in the early 1800s. Buffett took the helm of Berkshire in 1964, when its book value per share was $19.46 and its intrinsic value per share far lower. Today, its book value per share is around $20,000 and its intrinsic value far higher. The growth rate in book value per share during that period is 23.8% compounded annually.
Berkshire is now a holding company engaged in a variety of businesses, not including textiles. Berkshire's most important business is insurance, carried on principally through its 100% owned subsidiary, GEICO Corporation, the seventh largest auto insurer in the United States. Berkshire publishes The Buffalo News and owns other businesses that manufacture or distribute products ranging from encyclopedias, home furnishings, and cleaning systems, to chocolate candies, ice cream, footwear, uniforms, and air compressors. Berkshire also owns substantial equity interests in major corporations, including American Express, Coca-Cola, Walt Disney, Freddie Mac, Gillette, McDonald's, The Washington Post, and Wells Fargo.
Buffett and Berkshire Vice Chairman Charlie Munger have built this $50 billion enterprise by investing in businesses with excellent economic characteristics and run by outstanding managers. While they prefer negotiated acquisitions of 100% of such a business at a fair price, they take a "double-barreled approach" of buying on the open market less than 100% of such businesses when they can do so at a pro-rata price well below what it would take to buy 100%.
The double-barreled approach has paid off handsomely. The value of marketable securities in Berkshire's portfolio, on a per share basis, increased from $4 in 1965 to over $22,000 in 1995, a 33.4% annual increase. Per share operating earnings increased in the same period from just over $4 to over $258, a 14.79% annual increase. These extraordinary results continue, in recent years increasing at similar rates. According to Buffett, these results follow not from any master plan but from focused investing-allocating capital by concentrating on businesses with outstanding economic characteristics and run by first-rate managers.
...
This introduction to the major themes encapsulates the basics and locates them in the context of current thinking. The essays follow.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
For Buffett, managers are stewards of shareholder capital. The best managers think like owners in making business decisions. They have shareholder interests at heart. But even first-rate managers will sometimes have interests that conflict with those of shareholders. How to ease those conflicts and to nurture managerial stewardship have been constant objectives of Buffett's fortyyear career and a prominent theme of his essays. The essays address some of the most important governance problems.
Besides the owner-orientation reflected in Buffett's disclosure practice and the owner-related business principles summarized above, the next management lesson is to dispense with formulas of managerial structure. Contrary to textbook rules on organizational behavior, mapping an abstract chain of command on to a particular business situation, according to Buffett, does little good. What matters is selecting people who are able, honest, and hard-working. Having first-rate people on the team is more important than designing hierarchies and clarifying who reports to whom about what and at what times.
Three major difference between CEOs and other employees
Special attention must be paid to selecting a CEO because of three major differences Buffett identifies between CEOs and other employees. First, standards for measuring a CEO's performance are inadequate or easy to manipulate, so a CEO's performance is harder to measure than that of most workers. Second, no one is senior to the CEO, so no senior person's performance can be measured either. Third, a board of directors cannot serve that senior role since relations between CEOs and boards are conventionally congenial.
~ ~ ~
Major reforms are often directed toward aligning management and shareholder interests or enhancing board oversight of CEO performance. Stock options for management were touted as one method; greater emphasis on board processes was another. Separating the identities and functions of the Chairman of the Board and the CEO or appointment of standing audit, nominating and compensation committees were also heralded as promising reforms. None of these innovations has solved governance problems, however, and some have exacerbated them.
The best solution, Buffett instructs, is to take great care in identifying CEOs who will perform capably regardless of weak structural restraints. Outstanding CEOs do not need a lot of coaching from owners, although they can benefit from having a similarly outstanding board. Directors therefore must be chosen for their business savvy, their interest, and their owner-orientation.
According to Buffett, one of the greatest problems among boards in corporate America is that members are selected for other reasons, such as adding diversity or prominence to a board.
Most reforms are painted with a broad brush, without noting the major differences among types of board situations that Buffett identifies. For example, director power is weakest in the case where there is a controlling shareholder who is also the manager.
When disagreements arise between the directors and management, there is little a director can do other than to object and, in serious circumstances, resign. Director power is strongest at the other extreme, where there is a controlling shareholder who does not participate in management. The directors can take matters directly to the controlling shareholder when disagreement arises.
The most common situation, however, is a corporation without a controlling shareholder. This is where management problems are most acute, Buffett says. It would be helpful if directors could supply necessary discipline, but board congeniality usually prevents that. To maximize board effectiveness in this situation, Buffett believes the board should be small in size and composed mostly of outside directors. The strongest weapon a director can wield in these situations remains his or her threat to resign.
All these situations do share a common characteristic: the terrible manager is a lot easier to confront or remove than the mediocre manager. A chief problem in all governance structures, Buffett emphasizes, is that in corporate America evaluation of chief executive officers is never conducted in regular meetings in the absence of that chief executive. Holding regular meetings without the chief executive to review his or her performance would be a marked improvement in corporate governance.
Evaluating CEO performance is even harder than it may seem. Both short-term results and potential long-term results must be assessed. If only short-term results mattered, many managerial decisions would be much easier, particularly those relating to businesses whose economic characteristics have eroded.
Corporate Philanthropy
Sometimes management interests conflict with shareholder interests in subtle or easily disguised ways. Take corporate philanthropy, for example. At most major corporations, management allocates a portion of corporate profit to charitable concerns. The charities are chosen by management, for reasons often unrelated either to corporate interests or shareholder interests. Most state laws permit management to make these decisions, so long as aggregate annual donations are reasonable in amount, usually not greater than 10% of annual net profits.
Berkshire does things differently. Shareholders designate charities to which the corporation donates. Nearly all shareholders participate in allocating millions of dollars per year to charitable organizations of their choice. This is an imaginative practical response to a tension that is at the core of the management-shareholder relationship. It is surprising that other American corporations do not follow this model of corporate charitable giving. Part of the reason may be the lack of long-term ownership orientation that characterizes the shareholder profiles of many American corporations. If so, this demonstrates a cost of the shortterm mentality of America's investment community.
Stock Options for employees
The plan to align management and shareholder interests by awarding executives stock options not only was oversold, but also subtly disguised a deeper division between those interests that the options created. Many corporations pay their managers stock options whose value increases simply by retention of earnings, rather than by superior deployment of capitaL As Buffett explains, however, simply by retaining and reinvesting earnings, managers can report annual earnings increases without so much as lifting a finger to improve real returns on capital Stock options thus often rob shareholders of wealth and allocate the booty to executives. Moreover, once granted, stock options are often irrevocable, unconditional, and benefit managers without regard to individual performance.
It is possible to use stock options to instill a managerial culture that encourages owner-like thinking, Buffett agrees. But the alignment will not be perfect. Shareholders are exposed to the downside risks of sub-optimal capital deployment in a way that an option holder is not. Buffett therefore cautions shareholders who are reading proxy statements about approving option plans to be aware of the asymmetry in this kind of alignment. Many shareholders rationally ignore proxy statements, but this subject should really be on the front-burner of shareholders, particularly shareholder institutions that periodically engage in promoting corporate governance improvements.
Buffett emphasizes that performance should be the basis for executive pay decisions. Executive performance should be measured by profitability, after profits are reduced by a charge for the capital employed in the relevant business or earnings retained by it. If stock options are used, they should be related to individual performance, rather than corporate performance, and priced based on business value. Better yet, as at Berkshire, stock options should simply not be part of an executive's compensation. After all, exceptional managers who earn cash bonuses based on the performance of their own business can simply buy stock if they want to; if they do, they "truly walk in the shoes of owners," Buffett says.
CORPORATE FINANCE AND INVESTING
The most revolutionary investing ideas of the past thirty years were those called modern finance theory. This is an elaborate set of ideas that boil down to one simple and misleading practical implication: it is a waste of time to study individual investment opportunities in public securities. According to this view, you will do better by randomly selecting a group of stocks for a portfolio by throwing darts at the stock tables than by thinking about whether individual investment opportunities make sense.
One of modern finance theory's main tenets is modern portfolio theory. It says that you can eliminate the peculiar risk of any security by holding a diversified portfolio-that is, it formalizes the folk slogan "don't put all your eggs in one basket." The risk that is left over is the only risk for which investors will be compensated, the story goes.
This leftover risk can be measured by a simple mathematical term - called beta - that shows how volatile the security is compared to the market. Beta measures this volatility risk well for securities that trade on efficient markets, where information about publicly traded securities is swiftly and accurately incorporated into prices. In the modern finance story, efficient markets rule. Reverence for these ideas was not limited to ivory tower academics, in colleges, universities, business schools, and law schools, but became·standard dogma throughout financial America in the past thirty years, from Wall Street to Main Street. Many professionals still believe that stock market prices always accurately reflect fundamental values, that the only risk that matters is the volatility of prices, and that the best way to manage that risk is to invest in a diversified group of stocks.
Buffett points out the absurdity of beta by observing that "a stock that has dropped very sharply compared to the market ... becomes 'riskier' at the lower price than it was at the higher price"-that is how beta measures risk. Equally unhelpful, beta cannot distinguish the risk inherent in "a single-product toy company selling pet rocks or hula hoops from another toy company whose sole product is Monopoly or Barbie." But ordinary investors can make those distinctions by thinking about consumer behavior and the way consumer products companies compete, and can also figure out when a huge stock-price drop signals a buying opportunity.
Contrary to modern finance theory, Buffett's investment knitting does not prescribe diversification. It may even call for concentration, if not of one's portfolio, then at least of its owner's mind. As to concentration of the portfolio, Buffett reminds us that Keynes, who was not only a brilliant economist but also a brilliant investor, believed that an investor should put fairly large sums into two or three businesses he knows something about and whose management is trustworthy. On that view, risk rises when investments and investment thinking are spread too thin. A strategy of financial and mental concentration may reduce risk by raising both the intensity of an investor's thinking about a business and the comfort level he must have with its fundamental characteristics before buying it.
The fashion of beta, according to Buffett, suffers from inattention to "a fundamental principle: It is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong." Long-term investment success depends not on studying betas and maintaining a diversified portfolio, but on recognizing that as an investor, one is the owner of a business. Reconfiguring a portfolio by buying and selling stocks to accommodate the desired beta-risk profile defeats long-term investment success. Such "flitting from flower to flower" imposes huge transaction costs in the forms of spreads, fees and commissions, not to mention taxes. Buffett jokes that calling someone who trades actively in the market an investor "is like calling someone who repeatedly engages in one-night stands a romantic." Investment knitting turns modern finance theory's folk wisdom on its head: instead of "don't put all your eggs in one basket," we get Mark Twain's advice from Pudd'nhead Wilson: "Put all your eggs in one basket-and watch that basket."
Price and Value
In a number of classic works, including The Intelligent Investor, Graham introduced some of the most profound investment wisdom in history. It rejects a prevalent but mistaken mind-set that equates price with value. On the contrary, Graham held that price is what you pay and value is what you get. These two things are rarely identical, but most people rarely notice any difference.
One of Graham's most profound contributions is a character who lives on Wall Street, Mr. Market. He is your hypothetical business partner who is daily willing to buy your interest in a business or sell you his at prevailing market prices. Mr. Market is moody, prone to manic swings from joy to despair. Sometimes he offers prices way higher than value; sometimes he offers prices way lower than value. The more manic-depressive he is, the greater the spread between price and value, and therefore the greater the investment opportunities he offers. Buffett reintroduces Mr. Market, emphasizing how valuable Graham's allegory of the overall market is for disciplined investment knitting-even though Mr. Market would be unrecognizable to modern finance theorists.
Another leading prudential legacy from Graham is his marginof-safety principle. This principle holds that one should not make an investment in a security unless there is a sufficient basis for believing that the price being paid is substantially lower than the value being delivered. Buffett follows the principle devotedly, noting that Graham had said that if forced to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, they would be: margin of safety. Over forty years after first reading that, Buffett still thinks those are the right words. While modern finance theory enthusiasts cite market efficiency to deny there is a difference between price (what you pay) and value (what you get), Buffett and Graham regard it as all the difference in the world.
That difference also shows that the term "value investing" is a redundancy. All true investing must be based on an assessment of the relationship between price and value. Strategies that do not employ this comparison of price and value do not amount to investing at all, but to speculation-the hope that price will rise, rather than the conviction that the price being paid is lower than the value being obtained. Many professionals make another common mistake, Buffett notes, by distinguishing between "growth investing" and "value investing." Growth and value, Buffett says, are not distinct. They are integrally linked since growth must be treated as a component of value.
COMMON STOCK
Buffett notes Phil Fisher's suggestion that a company is like a restaurant, offering a menu that attracts people with particular tastes. Berkshire's long-term menu emphasizes that the costs of trading activity can impair long-term results. Indeed, Buffett estimates that the transaction costs of actively traded stocks-broker commissions and market-maker spreads-often amount to 10% or more of earnings. Avoiding or minimizing such costs is necessary for long-term investment success, and Berkshire's listing on the New York Stock Exchange helped contain those costs.
Apart from reflecting the long-term menu and minimization of transaction costs, Berkshire's dividend policy also reflects Buffett's conviction that a company's earnings payout versus retention decision should be based on a single test: each dollar of earnings should be retained if retention will increase market value by at least a like amount; otherwise it should be paid out. Earnings retention is justified only when "capital retained produces incremental earnings equal to, or above, those generally available to investors.
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Berkshire's acquisition policy is the double-barreled approach: buying portions or all of businesses with excellent economic characteristics and run by managers Buffett and Munger like, trust, and admire.
Berkshire has additional advantages in acquisitions: a high quality stock to pay with and a substantial amount of managerial autonomy to offer once a deal is done-both rare in an acquiring company, Buffett says. Buffett also puts his money where his mouth is, reminding prospective sellers that Berkshire has acquired many of its businesses from family or other closely-held groups, and inviting them to check with every previous seller about Berkshire's initial promises measured against its later actions.
ACCOUNTING AND TAXATION
The most basic point to understand about accounting is that it is a form. As a form, it can be manipulated.
Buffett emphasizes that useful financial statements must enable a user to answer three basic questions about a business: approximately how much a company is worth, its likely ability to meet its future obligations, and how good a job its managers are doing in operating the business.
It is common on Wall Street to value businesses using a calculation of cash flows equal to (a) operating earnings plus (b) depreciation expense and other non-cash charges. Buffett regards that calculation as incomplete. After taking (a) operating earnings and adding back (b) non-cash charges, Buffett argues that you must then subtract something else: (c) required reinvestment in the business. Buffett defines (c) as "the average amount of capitalized expenditures for plant and equipment, etc., that the business requires to fully maintain its long-term competitive position and its unit volume." Buffett calls the result of (a) + (b) - (c) "owner earnings." When (b) and (c) differ, cash flow analysis and owner earnings analysis differ too. For most businesses, (c) usually exceeds (b), so cash flow analysis usually overstates economic reality.
PROLOGUE
Phil Fisher, a respected investor and author, once likened the policies of the corporation in attracting shareholders to those of a restaurant attracting potential customers. A restaurant could seek a given clientele-patrons of fast foods, elegant dining, Oriental food, etc.-and eventually obtain an appropriate group of devotees. If the job were expertly done, that clientele, pleased with the service, menu, and price level offered, would return consistently.
But the restaurant could not change its character constantly and end up with a happy and stable clientele. If the business vacillated between French cuisine and take-out chicken, the result would be a revolving door of confused and dissatisfied customers.
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE A. Owner-Related Business Principles
1. Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.
Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners. (Because of the size of our shareholdings we are also, for better or worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itselfas the ultimate owner ofour business assets but instead view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets.
2. In line with Berkshire's owner-orientation, most of our directors have a major portion of their net worth invested in the company. We eat our own cooking.
3. Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize Berkshire's average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future-a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation.
4. Our preference would be to reach our goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases ofmarketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year's capital allocation.
5. Because of our two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of conventional accounting, consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we control, numbers we consider ofgreat importance. These figures, along with
other information we will supply about the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about them.
6. Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses (whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double the pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.
7. We use debt sparingly and, when we do borrow, we attempt to structure our loans on a long-term fixed-rate basis. We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet.
This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations to policyholders, lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to our care.
(As one of the Indianapolis "500" winners said: "To finish first, you must first finish.")
8. A managerial "wish list" will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do with your money what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.
9. We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 ofmarket value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.
10. We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give. This rule applies to all forms of issuance-not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock-fordebt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as well. We will not sell small portions of your company-and that is what the issuance ofshares amounts to-on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.
11. You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance: Regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns. We are also very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling and the advocates sincere, but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in that kind of behavior.
12. We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less. Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: The CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private.
13. Despite our policy of candor we will discuss our activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas are. Therefore we normally will not talk about our investment ideas.
This ban extends even to securities we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say "no comment" on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation.
AN ADDED PRINCIPLE: To the extent possible, we would like each Berkshire shareholder to record a gain or loss in market value during his period of ownership that is proportional to the gain or loss in per-share intrinsic value recorded by the company during that holding period. For this to come about, the relationship between the intrinsic value and the market price of a Berkshire share would need to remain constant, and by our preferences at 1-to-1. As that implies, we would rather see Berkshire's stock price at a fair level than a high level.
B. Boards and Managers
[The performance of CEOs of investee companies], which we have observed at close range, contrasts vividly with that of many CEOs, which we have fortunately observed from a safe distance. Sometimes these CEOs clearly do not belong in their jobs; their positions, nevertheless, are usually secure. The supreme irony of business management in that it is far easier for an inadequate CEO to keep his job than it is for an inadequate subordinate.
If a secretary, say, is hired for a job that requires typing ability of at least 80 words a minute and turns out to be capable of only 50 words a minute, she will lose her job in no time. There is a logical standard for this job; performance is easily measured; and if you can't make the grade, you're out. Similarly, if new sales people fail to generate sufficient business quickly enough, they will be let go. Excuses will not be accepted as a substitute for orders.
However, a CEO who doesn't perform is frequently carried indefinitely. One reason is that performance standards for his job seldom exist. When they do, they are often fuzzy or they may be waived or explained away, even when the performance shortfalls are major and repeated. At too many companies, the boss shoots the arrow of managerial performance and then hastily paints the bullseye around the spot where it lands.
Another important, but seldom recognized, distinction between the boss and the foot soldier is that the CEO has no immediate superior whose performance is itself getting measured. The sales manager who retains a bunch of lemons in his sales force will soon be in hot water himself. It is in his immediate self-interest to promptly weed out his hiring mistakes. Otherwise, he himself may be weeded out. An office manager who has hired inept secretaries faces the same imperative.
But the CEO's boss is a Board of Directors that seldom measures itself and is infrequently held to account for substandard corporate performance. If the Board makes a mistake in hiring, and perpetuates that mistake, so what? Even if the company is taken over because of the mistake, the deal will probably bestow substantial benefits on the outgoing Board members. (The bigger they are, the softer they fall.)
Finally, relations between the Board and the CEO are expected to be congenial. At board meetings, criticism of the CEO's performance is often viewed as the social equivalent of belching. No such inhibitions restrain the office manager from critically evaluating the substandard typist.
These points should not be interpreted as a blanket condemnation of CEOs or Boards of Directors: Most are able and hardworking, and a number are truly outstanding. But the management failings that Charlie and I have seen make us thankful that we are linked with the managers of our three permanent holdings. They love their businesses, they think like owners, and they exude integrity and ability.
~ ~ ~
Commentators on corporate governance seldom make any distinction among three fundamentally different manager/owner situations that exist in publicly-held companies.
Attention usually falls on the first case, because it prevails on the corporate scene. Since Berkshire falls into the second category, however, and will someday fall into the third, we will discuss all three variations.
The first, and by far most common, board situation is one in which a corporation has no controlling shareholder. In that case, I believe directors should behave as if there is a single absentee owner, whose long-term interest they should try to further in all proper ways. Unfortunately, "long-term" gives directors a lot of wiggle room. If they lack either integrity or the ability to think independently, directors can do great violence to shareholders while still claiming to be acting in their long-term interest. But assume the board is functioning well and must deal with a management that is mediocre or worse. Directors then have the responsibility for changing that management, just as an intelligent owner would do if he were present. And if able but greedy managers over-reach and try to dip too deeply into the shareholders' pockets, directors must slap their hands.
In this plain-vanilla case, a director who sees something he doesn't like should attempt to persuade the other directors of his view. If he is successful, the board will have the muscle to make the appropriate change. Suppose, though, that the unhappy director can't get other directors to agree with him. He should then feel free to make his views known to the absentee owners. Directors seldom do that, of course. The temperament of many directors would in fact be incompatible with critical behavior of that sort.
But I see nothing improper in such actions, assuming the issues are serious. Naturally, the complaining director can expect a vigorous rebuttal from the unpersuaded directors, a prospect that should discourage the dissenter from pursuing trivial or non-rational causes.
For the boards just discussed, I believe the directors ought to be relatively few in number-say, ten or less-and ought to come mostly from the outside. The outside board members should establish standards for the CEO's performance and should also periodically meet, without his being present, to evaluate his performance against those standards.
The requisites for board membership should be business savvy, interest in the job, and owner-orientation. Too often, directors are selected simply because they are prominent or add diversity to the board. That practice is a mistake. Furthermore, mistakes in selecting directors are particularly serious because appointments are so hard to undo: The pleasant but vacuous director need never worry about job security.
The second case is that existing at Berkshire, where the controlling owner is also the manager. At some companies, this arrangement is facilitated by the existence of two classes of stock endowed with disproportionate voting power. In these situations, it's obvious that the board does not act as an agent between owners and management and that the directors cannot effect change except through persuasion. Therefore, if the owner/manager is mediocre or worse-or is over-reaching-there is little a director can do about it except object. If the directors having no connections to the owner/manager make a unified argument, it may well have some effect. More likely it will not.
If change does not come, and the matter is sufficiently serious, the outside directors should resign. Their resignation will signal their doubts about management, and it will emphasize that no outsider is in a position to correct the owner/manager's shortcomings.
The third governance case occurs when there is a controlling owner who is not involved in management. This case, examples of which are Hershey Foods and Dow Jones, puts the outside directors in a potentially useful position. If they become unhappy with either the competence or integrity of the manager, they can go directly to the owner (who may also be on the board) and report their dissatisfaction. This situation is ideal for an outside director, since he need make his case only to a single, presumably interested owner, who can forthwith effect change if the argument is persuasive. Even so, the dissatisfied director has only that single course of action. If he remains unsatisfied about a critical matter, he has no choice but to resign.
Logically, the third case should be the most effective in insuring first-class management. In the second case the owner is not going to fire himself, and in the first case, directors often find it very difficult to deal with mediocrity or mild over-reaching. Unless the unhappy directors can win over a majority of the board-an awkward social and logistical task, particularly if management's behavior is merely odious, not egregious-their hands are effectively tied. In practice, directors trapped in situations of this kind usually convince themselves that by staying around they can do at least some good. Meanwhile, management proceeds unfettered.
In the third case, the owner is neither judging himself nor burdened with the problem of garnering a majority. He can also insure that outside directors are selected who will bring useful qualities to the board. These directors, in turn, will know that the good advice they give will reach the right ears, rather than being stifled by a recalcitrant management. If the controlling owner is intelligent and self-confident, he will make decisions in respect to management that are meritocratic and pro-shareholder. Moreover-and this is critically important-he can readily correct any mistake he makes.
At Berkshire we operate in the second mode now and will for as long as I remain functional. My health, let me add, is excellent.
For better or worse, you are likely to have me as an owner/manager for some time.
After my death, all of my stock will go to my wife, Susie, should she survive me, or to a foundation if she dies before I do. In neither case will taxes and bequests require the sale of consequential amounts of stock.
When my stock is transferred to either my wife or the foundation, Berkshire will enter the third governance mode, going forward with a vitally interested, but non-management, owner and with a management that must perform for that owner. In preparation for that time, Susie was elected to the board a few years ago, and in 1993 our son, Howard, joined the board. These family members will not be managers of the company in the future, but they will represent the controlling interest should anything happen to me. Most of our other directors are also significant owners of Berkshire stock, and each has a strong owner-orientation. All in all, we're prepared for "the truck."
C. The Anxieties of Plant Closings
For an understanding of how the to-invest-or-not-to-invest dilemma plays out in a commodity business, it is instructive to look at Burlington Industries, by far the largest U.S. textile company both 21 years ago and now. In 1964 Burlington had sales of $1.2 billion against our $50 million. It had strengths in both distribution and production that we could never hope to match and also, of course, had an earnings record far superior to ours. Its stock sold at 60 at the end of 1964; ours was 13.
Burlington made a decision to stick to the textile business, and in 1985 had sales of about $2.8 billion. During the 1964-85 period, the company made capital expenditures of about $3 billion, far more than any other U.S. textile company and more than $200-pershare on that $60 stock. A very large part of the expenditures, I am sure, was devoted to cost improvement and expansion. Given Burlington's basic commitment to stay in textiles, I would also surmise that the company's capital decisions were quite rational.
Nevertheless, Burlington has lost sales volume in real dollars and has far lower returns on sales and equity now than 20 years ago. Split 2-for-1 in 1965, the stock now sells at 34-on an adjusted basis, just a little over its $60 price in 1964. Meanwhile, the CPI has more than tripled. Therefore, each share commands about one-third the purchasing power it did at the end of 1964. Regular dividends have been paid but they, too, have shrunk significantly in purchasing power.
This devastating outcome for the shareholders indicates what can happen when much brain power and energy are applied to a faulty premise. The situation is suggestive of Samuel Johnson's horse: "A horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse-not a remarkable mathematician." Likewise, a textile company that allocates capital brilliantly within its industry is a remarkable textile company-but not a remarkable business.
My conclusion from my own experiences and from much observation of other businesses is that a good managerial record (measured by economic returns) is far more a function of what business boat you get into than it is of how effectively you row (though intelligence and effort help considerably, of course, in any business, good or bad). Some years ago I wrote: "When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact." Nothing has since changed my point of view on that matter. Should you find yourself in a chronically leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.
D. An Owner-Based Approach to Corporate Charity
A recent survey reported that about 50% of major American companies match charitable contributions made by directors (sometimes by a factor of three to one).
When A takes money from B to give to C and A is a legislator, the process is called taxation. But when A is an officer or director of a corporation, it is called philanthropy.
In a widely-held corporation the executives ordinarily arrange all charitable donations, with no input at all from shareholders, in two main categories: (1) Donations considered to benefit the corporation directly in an amount roughly commensurate with the cost of the donation; and (2) Donations considered to benefit the corporation indirectly through hard-to-measure, long-delayed feedback effects of various kinds.
Below is a list showing the largest categories to which our shareholders have steered their contributions.
(a) 347 churches and synagogues received 569 gifts
(b) 238 colleges and universities received 670 gifts
(c) 244 K-12 schools (about two-thirds secular, one-third religious) received 525 gifts
(d) 288 institutions dedicated to art, culture or the humanities received 447 gifts
(e) 180 religious social-service organizations (split about equally between Christian and Jewish) received 411 gifts
(f) 445 secular social-service organizations (about 40% youthrelated) received 759 gifts
(g) 153 hospitals received 261 gifts
(h) 186 health-related organizations (American Heart Association, American Cancer Society, etc.) received 320 gifts
Three things about this list seem particularly interesting to me.
First, to some degree it indicates what people choose to give money to when they are acting of their own accord, free of pressure from solicitors or emotional appeals from charities. Second, the contributions programs of publicly-held companies almost never allow gifts to churches and synagogues, yet clearly these institutions are what many shareholders would like to support. Third, the gifts made by our shareholders display conflicting philosophies: 130 gifts were directed to organizations that believe in making abortions readily available for women and 30 gifts were directed to organizations (other than churches) that discourage or are opposed to abortion.
E. A Principled Approach to Executive Pay
Despite their shortcomings, options can be appropriate under some circumstances. My criticism relates to their indiscriminate use and, in that connection, I would like to emphasize three points: First, stock options are inevitably tied to the overall performance of a corporation. Logically, therefore, they should be awarded only to those managers with overall responsibility. Managers with limited areas of responsibility should have incentives that payoff in relation to results under their control. The .350 hitter expects, and also deserves, a big payoff for his performanceeven if he plays for a cellar-dwelling team. And the .150 hitter should get no reward-even if he plays for a pennant winner. Only those with overall responsibility for the team should have their rewards tied to its results.
Second, options should be structured carefully. Absent special factors, they should have built into them a retained-earnings or carrying-cost factor. Equally important, they should be priced realistically. When managers are faced with offers for their companies, they unfailingly point out how unrealistic market prices can be as an index of real value. But why, then, should these same depressed prices be the valuations at which managers sell portions of their businesses to themselves? (They may go further: officers and directors sometimes consult the Tax Code to determine the lowest prices at which they can, in effect, sell part of the business to insiders. While they're at it, they often elect plans that produce the worst tax result for the company.) Except in highly unusual cases, owners are not well served by the sale of part of their business at a bargain price-whether the sale is to outsiders or to insiders. The obvious conclusion: options should be priced at true business value.
Third, I want to emphasize that some managers whom I admire enormously-and whose operating records are far better than mine-disagree with me regarding fixed-price options. They have built corporate cultures that work, and fixed-price options have been a tool that helped them. By their leadership and example, and by the use of options as incentives, these managers have taught their colleagues to think like owners. Such a culture is rare and when it exists should perhaps be left intact-despite inefficiencies and inequities that may infest the option program. "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" is preferable to "purity at any price".
# Managers eager to bet heavily on their abilities usually have plenty of ability to bet on.
II. CORPORATE FINANCE AND INVESTING A. Mr. Market
Ben Graham, my friend and teacher, long ago described the mental attitude toward market fluctuations that I believe to be most conducive to investment success. He said that you should imagine market quotations as coming from a remarkably accommodating fellow named Mr. Market who is your partner in a private business. Without fail, Mr. Market appears daily and names a price at which he will either buy your interest or sell you his.
Even though the business that the two of you own may have economic characteristics that are stable, Mr. Market's quotations will be anything but. For, sad to say, the poor fellow has incurable emotional problems. At times he feels euphoric and can see only the favorable factors affecting the business. When in that mood, he names a very high buy-sell price because he fears that you will snap up his interest and rob him of imminent gains. At other times he is depressed and can see nothing but trouble ahead for both the business and the world. On these occasions he will name a very low price, since he is terrified that you will unload your interest on him.
Mr. Market has another endearing characteristic: He doesn't mind being ignored. If his quotation is uninteresting to you today, he will be back with a new one tomorrow. Transactions are strictly at your option. Under these conditions, the more manic-depressive his behavior, the better for you.
But, like Cinderella at the ball, you must heed one warning or everything will turn into pumpkins and mice: Mr. Market is there to serve you, not to guide you. It is his pocketbook, not his wisdom, that you will find useful. If he shows up some day in a particularly foolish mood, you are free to either ignore him or to take advantage of him, but it will be disastrous if you fall under his influence. Indeed, if you aren't certain that you understand and can value your business far better than Mr. Market you don't belong in the game. As they say in poker, "If you've been in the game 30 minutes and you don't know who the patsy is, you're the patsy."
~ ~ ~
Our attitude (a determination to have and to hold) fits our personalities and the way we want to live our lives. Churchill once said, "You shape your houses and then they shape you." We know the manner in which we wish to be shaped. For that reason, we would rather achieve a return of X while associating with people whom we strongly like and admire than realize 110% of X by exchanging these relationships for uninteresting or unpleasant ones.
B. Arbitrage
In recent years, most arbitrage operations have involved takeovers, friendly and unfriendly. With acquisition fever rampant, with anti-trust challenges almost non-existent, and with bids often ratcheting upward, arbitrageurs have prospered mightily. They have not needed special talents to do well; the trick, Peter Sellers in the movie, has simply been "Being There." In Wall Street the old proverb has been reworded: "Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach him how to arbitrage and you feed him forever." (If, however, he studied at the Ivan Boesky School of Arbitrage, it may be a state institution that supplies his meals.)
To evaluate arbitrage situations you must answer four questions:
(1) How likely is it that the promised event will indeed occur?
(2) How long will your money be tied up?
(3) What chance is there that something still better will transpire-a competing takeover bid, for example? and
(4) What will happen if the event does not take place because of anti-trust action, financing glitches, etc.?
We told you last year that we expected to do little in arbitrage during 1989, and that's the way it turned out. Arbitrage positions are a substitute for short-term cash equivalents, and during part of the year we held relatively low levels of cash. In the rest of the year we had a fairly good-sized cash position and even so chose not to engage in arbitrage. The main reason was corporate transactions that made no economic sense to us; arbitraging such deals comes too close to playing the greater-fool game. (As Wall Streeter Ray DeVoe says: "Fools rush in where angels fear to trade.") We will engage in arbitrage from time to time-sometimes on a large scale-but only when we like the odds.
C. Debunking Standard Dogma
[W]e continue to think that it is usually foolish to part with an interest in a business that is both understandable and durably wonderful. Business interests of that kind are simply too hard to replace.
Interestingly, corporate managers have no trouble understanding that point when they are focusing on a business they operate: A parent company that owns a subsidiary with superb long-term economics is not likely to sell that entity regardless of price. "Why," the CEO would ask, "should I part with my crown jewel?" Yet that same CEO, when it comes to running his personal investment portfolio, will offhandedly-and even impetuously-move from business to business when presented with no more than superficial arguments by his broker for doing so. The worst of these is perhaps, "You can't go broke taking a profit." Can you imagine a CEO using this line to urge his board to sell a star subsidiary? In our view, what makes sense in business also makes sense in stocks: An investor should ordinarily hold a small piece of an outstanding business with the same tenacity that an owner would exhibit if he owned all of that business.
Earlier I mentioned the financial results that could have been achieved by investing $40 in The Coca-Cola Co. in 1919. In 1938, more than 50 years after the introduction of Coke, and long after the drink was firmly established as an American icon, Fortune did an excellent story on the company. In the second paragraph the writer reported: "Several times every year a weighty and serious investor looks long and with profound respect at Coca-Cola's record, but comes regretfully to the conclusion that he is looking too late. The specters of saturation and competition rise before him."
Yes, competition there was in 1938 and in 1993 as well. But it's worth noting that in 1938 The Coca-Cola Co. sold 207 million cases of soft drinks (if its gallonage then is converted into the 192- ounce cases used for measurement today) and in 1993 it sold about 10.7 billion cases, a 50-fold increase in physical volume from a company that in 1938 was already dominant in its very major industry.
Nor was the party over in 1938 for an investor: Though the $40 invested in 1919 in one share had (with dividends reinvested) turned into $3,277 by the end of 1938, a fresh $40 then invested in Coca-Cola stock would have grown to $25,000 by yearend 1993. I can't resist one more quote from that 1938 Fortune story: "It would be hard to name any company comparable in size to CocaCola and selling, as Coca-Cola does, an unchanged product that can point to a ten-year record anything like Coca-Cola's." In the 55 years that have since passed, Coke's product line has broadened somewhat, but it's remarkable how well that description still fits.
[ A separate paragraph from this 1993 letter provided as follows:
Let me add a lesson from history: Coke went public in 1919 at $40 per share. By the end of 1920 the market, coldly reevaluating Coke's future prospects, had battered the stock down by more than 50%, to $19.50. At yearend 1993, that single share, with dividends reinvested, was worth more than $2.1 million. As Ben Graham said: "In the short-run, the market is a voting machine-reflecting a voter-registration test that requires only money, not intelligence or emotional stability-but in the long-run, the market is a weighing machine." ]
Charlie and I decided long ago that in an investment lifetime it's too hard to make hundreds of smart decisions. That judgment became ever more compelling as Berkshire's capital mushroomed and the universe of investments that could significantly affect our results shrank dramatically. Therefore, we adopted a strategy that required our being smart-and not too smart at that-only a very few times. Indeed, we'll now settle for one good idea a year. (Charlie says it's my turn.)
The strategy we've adopted precludes our following standard diversification dogma. Many pundits would therefore say the strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it. In stating this opinion, we define risk, using dictionary terms, as "the possibility of loss or injury."
Academics, however, like to define investment "risk" differently, averring that it is the relative volatility of a stock or portfolio of stocks-that is, their volatility as compared to that of a large universe of stocks. Employing data bases and statistical skills, these academics compute with precision the "beta" of a stock-its relative volatility in the past-and then build arcane investment and capital-allocation theories around this calculation. In their hunger for a single statistic to measure risk, however, they forget a fundamental principle: It is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong.
For owners of a business-and that's the way we think of shareholders-the academics' definition of risk is far off the mark, so much so that it produces absurdities. For example, under betabased theory, a stock that has dropped very sharply compared to the market-as had Washington Post when we bought it in 1973-becomes "riskier" at the lower price than it was at the higher price.
Would that description have then made any sense to someone who was offered the entire company at a vastly-reduced price? In fact, the true investor welcomes volatility. Ben Graham explained why in Chapter 8 of The Intelligent Investor. There he introduced "Mr. Market," an obliging fellow who shows up every day to either buy from you or sell to you, whichever you wish. The more manic-depressive this chap is, the greater the opportunities available to the investor. That's true because a wildly fluctuating market means that irrationally low prices will periodically be attached to solid businesses. It is impossible to see how the availability of such prices can be thought of as increasing the hazards for an investor who is totally free to either ignore the market or exploit its folly.
In assessing risk, a beta purist will disdain examining what a company produces, what its competitors are doing, or how much borrowed money the business employs. He may even prefer not to know the company's name. What he treasures is the price history of its stock. In contrast, we'll happily forgo knowing the price history and instead will seek whatever information will further our understanding of the company's business. After we buy a stock, consequently, we would not be disturbed if markets closed for a year or two. We don't need a daily quote on our 100% position in See's or H.H. Brown to validate our well-being. Why, then, should we need a quote on our 7% interest in Coke? In our opinion, the real risk an investor must assess is whether his aggregate after-tax receipts from an investment (including those he receives on sale) will, over his prospective holding period, give him at least as much purchasing power as he had to begin with, plus a modest rate of interest on that initial stake. Though this risk cannot be calculated with engineering precision, it can in some cases be judged with a degree of accuracy that is useful. The primary factors bearing upon this evaluation are:
1) The certainty with which the long-term economic characteristics of the business can be evaluated;
2) The certainty with which management can be evaluated, both as to its ability to realize the full potential of the business and to wisely employ its cash flows;
3) The certainty with which management can be counted on to channel the reward from the business to the shareholders rather than to itself;
4) The purchase price of the business;
5) The levels of taxation and inflation that will be experienced and that will determine the degree by which an investor's purchasing-power return is reduced from his gross return.
These factors will probably strike many analysts as unbearably fuzzy since they cannot be extracted from a data base of any kind.
But the difficulty of precisely quantifying these matters does not negate their importance nor is it insuperable. Just as Justice Stewart found it impossible to formulate a test for obscenity but nevertheless asserted, "I know it when I see it," so also can investors-in an inexact but useful way-"see" the risks inherent in certain investments without reference to complex equations or price histories.
Is it really so difficult to conclude that Coca-Cola and Gillette possess far less business risk over the long term than, say, any computer company or retailer? Worldwide, Coke sells about 44% of all soft drinks, and Gillette has more than a 60% share (in value) of the blade market. Leaving aside chewing gum, in which Wrigley is dominant, I know of no other significant businesses in which the leading company has long enjoyed such global power.
Moreover, both Coke and Gillette have actually increased their worldwide shares of market in recent years. The might of their brand names, the attributes of their products, and the strength of their distribution systems give them an enormous competitive advantage, setting up a protective moat around their economic castles. The average company, in contrast, does battle daily without any such means of protection. As Peter Lynch says, stocks of companies selling commodity-like products should come with a warning label: "Competition may prove hazardous to human wealth."
The competitive strengths of a Coke or Gillette are obvious to even the casual observer of business. Yet the beta of their stocks is similar to that of a great many run-of-the-mill companies who possess little or no competitive advantage. Should we conclude from this similarity that the competitive strength of Coke and Gillette gains them nothing when business risk is being measured? Or should we conclude that the risk in owning a piece of a companyits stock-is somehow divorced from the long-term risk inherent in its business operations? We believe neither conclusion makes sense and that equating beta with investment risk makes no sense.
The theoretician bred on beta has no mechanism for differentiating the risk inherent in, say, a single-product toy company selling pet rocks or hula hoops from that of another toy company whose sole product is Monopoly or Barbie. But it's quite possible for ordinary investors to make such distinctions if they have a reasonable understanding of consumer behavior and the factors that create long-term competitive strength or weakness. Obviously, every investor will make mistakes. But by confining himself to a relatively few, easy-to-understand cases, a reasonably intelligent, informed and diligent person can judge investment risks with a useful degree of accuracy.
In many industries, of course, Charlie and I can't determine whether we are dealing with a "pet rock" or a "Barbie." We couldn't solve this problem, moreover, even if we were to spend years intensely studying those industries. Sometimes our own intellectual shortcomings would stand in the way of understanding, and in other cases the nature of the industry would be the roadblock. For example, a business that must deal with fast-moving technology is not going to lend itself to reliable evaluations of its long-term economics. Did we foresee thirty years ago what would transpire in the television-manufacturing or computer industries?
Of course not. (Nor did most of the investors and corporate managers who enthusiastically entered those industries.) Why, then, should Charlie and I now think we can predict the future of other rapidly-evolving businesses? We'll stick instead with the easy cases. Why search for a needle buried in a haystack when one is sitting in plain sight?
Of course, some investment strategies-for instance, our efforts in arbitrage over the years-require wide diversification. If significant risk exists in a single transaction, overall risk should be reduced by making that purchase one of many mutually-independent commitments. Thus, you may consciously purchase a risky investment-one that indeed has a significant possibility of causing loss or injury-if you believe that your gain, weighted for probabilities, considerably exceeds your loss, comparably weighted, and if you can commit to a number of similar, but unrelated opportunities. Most venture capitalists employ this strategy.
Should you choose to pursue this course, you should adopt the outlook of the casino that owns a roulette wheel, which will want to see lots of action because it is favored by probabilities; but will refuse to accept a single, huge bet.
Another situation requiring wide diversification occurs when an investor who does not understand the economics of specific businesses nevertheless believes it in his interest to be a long-term owner of American industry. That investor should both own a large number of equities and space out his purchases. By periodically investing in an index fund, for example, the know-nothing investor can actually out-perform most investment professionals.
Paradoxically, when "dumb" money acknowledges its limitations, it ceases to be dumb.
On the other hand, if you are a know-something investor, able to understand business economics and to find five to ten sensibly priced companies that possess important long-term competitive advantages, conventional diversification makes no sense for you. It is apt simply to hurt your results and increase your risk. I cannot understand why an investor of that sort elects to put money into a business that is his 20th favorite rather than simply adding that money to his top choices-the businesses he understands best and that present the least risk, along with the greatest profit potential. In the words of the prophet Mae West: "Too much of a good thing can be wonderful."
D. "Value" Investing: A Redundancy
We really don't see many fundamental differences between the purchase of a controlled business and the purchase of marketable holdings . . .. In each case we try to buy into businesses with favorable long-term economics. Our goal is to find an outstanding business at a sensible price, not a mediocre business at a bargain price. Charlie and I have found that making silk purses out of silk is the best that we can do; with sow's ears, we fail.
I would say that the controlled company offers two main advantages. First, when we control a company we get to allocate capital, whereas we are likely to have little or nothing to say about this process with marketable holdings. This point can be important because the heads of many companies are not skilled in capital allocation. Their inadequacy is not surprising. Most bosses rise to the top because they have excelled in an area such as marketing, production, engineering, administration-or, sometimes, institutional politics.
Once they become CEOs, they face new responsibilities. They now must make capital allocation decisions, a critical job that they may have never tackled and that is not easily mastered. To stretch the point, it's as if the final step for a highly-talented musician was not to perform at Carnegie Hall but, instead, to be named Chairman of the Federal Reserve.
The lack of skill that many CEOs have at capital allocation is no small matter: After ten years on the job, a CEO whose company annually retains earnings equal to 10% of net worth will have been responsible for the deployment of more than 60% of all the capital at work in the business.
CEOs who recognize their lack of capital-allocation skills (which not all do) will often try to compensate by turning to their staffs, management consultants, or investment bankers. Charlie and I have frequently observed the consequences of such "help."
On balance, we feel it is more likely to accentuate the capital-allocation problem than to solve it.
In the end, plenty of unintelligent capital allocation takes place in corporate America. (That's why you hear so much about "restructuring.") Berkshire, however, has been fortunate. At the companies that are our major non-controlled holdings, capital has generally been well-deployed and, in some cases, brilliantly so.
The second advantage of a controlled company over a marketable security has to do with taxes. Berkshire, as a corporate holder, absorbs some significant tax costs through the ownership of partial positions that we do not when our ownership is 80% or greater. Such tax disadvantages have long been with us, but changes in the tax code caused them to increase significantly during [1986]. As a consequence, a given business result can now deliver Berkshire financial results that are as much as 50% better if they come from an 80%-or-greater holding rather than from a lesser holding.
Our equity-investing strategy remains little changed from what it was ... when we said in the 1977 annual report: "We select our marketable equity securities in much the way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want the business to be one
(a) that we can understand;
(b) with favorable long-term prospects;
(c) operated by honest and competent people; and
(d) available at a very attractive price."
We have seen cause to make only one change in this creed: Because of both market conditions and our size, we now substitute "an attractive price" for "a very attractive price."
But how, you will ask, does one decide what's "attractive"? In answering this question, most analysts feel they must choose between two approaches customarily thought to be in opposition: "value" and "growth." Indeed, many investment professionals see any mixing of the two terms as a form of intellectual cross-dressing.
We view that as fuzzy thinking (in which, it must be confessed, I myself engaged some years ago). In our opinion, the two approaches are joined at the hip: Growth is always a component in the calculation of value, constituting a variable whose importance can range from negligible to enormous and whose impact can be negative as well as positive.
In addition, we think the very term "value investing" is redundant. What is "investing" if it is not the act of seeking value at least sufficient to justify the amount paid? Consciously paying more for a stock than its calculated value-in the hope that it can soon be sold for a still-higher price-should be labeled speculation (which is neither illegal, immoral nor-in our view-financially fattening).
Whether appropriate or not, the term "value investing" is widely used. Typically, it connotes the purchase of stocks having attributes such as a low ratio of price to book value, a low priceearnings ratio, or a high dividend yield. Unfortunately, such characteristics, even if they appear in combination, are far from determinative as to whether an investor is indeed buying something for what it is worth and is therefore truly operating on the principle of obtaining value in his investments. Correspondingly, opposite characteristics-a high ratio of price to book value, a high priceearnings ratio, and a low dividend yield-are in no way inconsistent with a "value" purchase.
Similarly, business growth, per se, tells us little about value.
It's true that growth often has a positive impact on value, sometimes one of spectacular proportions. But such an effect is far from certain. For example, investors have regularly poured money into the domestic airline business to finance profitless (or worse) growth. For these investors, it would have been far better if Orville had failed to get off the ground at Kitty Hawk: The more the industry has grown, the worse the disaster for owners.
~ ~ ~
In The Theory of Investment Value, written over 50 years ago, John Burr Williams set forth the equation for value, which we condense here: The value of any stock, bond or business today is determined by the cash inflows and outflows-discounted at an appropriate interest rate-that can be expected to occur during the remaining life of the asset. Note that the formula is the same for stocks as for bonds. Even so, there is an important, and difficult to deal with, difference between the two: A bond has a coupon and maturity date that define future cash flows; but in the case of equities, the investment analyst must himself estimate the future "coupons." Furthermore, the quality of management affects the bond coupon only rarely-chiefly when management is so inept or dishonest that payment of interest is suspended. In contrast, the ability of management can dramatically affect the equity "coupons."
Leaving the question of price aside, the best business to own is one that over an extended period can employ large amounts of incremental capital at very high rates of return. The worst business to own is one that must, or will, do the opposite-that is, consistently employ ever-greater amounts of capital at very low rates of return. Unfortunately, the first type of business is very hard to find: Most high-return businesses need relatively little capital.
Shareholders of such a business usually will benefit if it pays out most of its earnings in dividends or makes significant stock repurchases.
Though the mathematical calculations required to evaluate equities are not difficult, an analyst-even one who is experienced and intelligent-can easily go wrong in estimating future "coupons." At Berkshire, we attempt to deal with this problem in two ways. First, we try to stick to businesses we believe we understand.
That means they must be relatively simple and stable in character.
If a business is complex or subject to constant change, we're not smart enough to predict future cash flows. Incidentally, that shortcoming doesn't bother us. What counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but rather how realistically they define what they don't know. An investor needs to do very few things right as long as he or she avoids big mistakes.
Second, and equally important, we insist on a margin of safety in our purchase price. If we calculate the value of a common stock to be only slightly higher than its price, we're not interested in buying. We believe this margin-of-safety principle, so strongly emphasized by Ben Graham, to be the cornerstone of investment success.
~ ~ ~
The human side is just as important. We don't want managers we like and admire-and who have welcomed a major financial commitment by us-to ever lose any sleep wondering whether surprises might occur because of our large ownership. I have told them there will be no surprises, and these agreements put Berkshire's signature where my mouth is. That signature also means the managers have a corporate commitment and therefore need not worry if my personal participation in Berkshire's affairs ends prematurely (a term I define as any age short of three digits).
E. Intelligent Investing
Inactivity strikes us as intelligent behavior. Neither we nor most business managers would dream of feverishly trading highlyprofitable subsidiaries because a small move in the Federal Reserve's discount rate was predicted or because some Wall Street pundit had reversed his views on the market. Why, then, should we behave differently with our minority positions in wonderful businesses? The art of investing in public companies successfully is little different from the art of successfully acquiring subsidiaries. In each case you simply want to acquire, at a sensible price, a business with excellent economics and able, honest management. Thereafter, you need only monitor whether these qualities are being preserved.
~ ~ ~
Let me add a few thoughts about your own investments. Most investors, both institutional and individual, will find that the best way to own common stocks is through an index fund that charges minimal fees. Those following this path are sure to beat the net results (after fees and expenses) delivered by the great majority of investment professionals.
Should you choose, however, to construct your own portfolio, there are a few thoughts worth remembering. Intelligent investing is not complex, though that is far from saying that it is easy. What an investor needs is the ability to correctly evaluate selected businesses. Note that word "selected": You don't have to be an expert on every company, or even many. You only have to be able to evaluate companies within your circle of competence. The size of that circle is not very important; knowing its boundaries, however, is vital.
To invest successfully, you need not understand beta, efficient markets, modern portfolio theory, option pricing, or emerging markets. You may, in fact, be better off knowing nothing of these.
That, of course, is not the prevailing view at most business schools, whose finance curriculum tends to be dominated by such subjects.
In our view, though, investment students need only two well-taught courses-How to Value a Business, and How to Think About Market Prices.
Your goal as an investor should simply be to purchase, at a rational price, a part interest in an easily-understandable business whose earnings are virtually certain to be materially higher five, ten and twenty years from now. Over time, you will find only a few companies that meet these standards-so when you see one that qualifies, you should buy a meaningful amount of stock. You must also resist the temptation to stray from your guidelines: If you aren't willing to own a stock for ten years, don't even think about owning it for ten minutes. Put together a portfolio of companies whose aggregate earnings march upward over the years, and so also will the portfolio's market value.
Though it's seldom recognized, this is the exact approach that has produced gains for Berkshire shareholders: Our look-through earnings have grown at a good clip over the years, and our stock price has risen correspondingly. Had those gains in earnings not materialized, there would have been little increase in Berkshire's value.
F. Cigar Butts and the Institutional Imperative
To quote Robert Benchley, "Having a dog teaches a boy fidelity, perseverance, and to turn around three times before lying down." Such are the shortcomings of experience. Nevertheless, it's a good idea to review past mistakes before committing new ones. So let's take a quick look at the last 25 years.
• My first mistake, of course, was in buying control of Berkshire. Though I knew its business-textile manufacturing-to be unpromising, I was enticed to buy because the price looked cheap. Stock purchases of that kind had proved reasonably rewarding in my early years, though by the time Berkshire came along in 1965 I was becoming aware that the strategy was not ideal. If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price, there will usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives you a chance to unload at a decent profit, even though the long-term performance of the business may be terrible. I call this the "cigar butt" approach to investing. A cigar butt found on the street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke, but the "bargain purchase" will make that puff all profit.
Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish. First, the original "bargain" price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces-never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen. Second, any initial advantage you secure will be quickly eroded by the low return that the business earns. For example, if you buy a business for $8 million that can be sold or liquidated for $10 million and promptly take either course, you can realize a high return. But the investment will disappoint if the business is sold for $10 million in ten years and in the interim has annually earned and distributed only a few percent on cost. Time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre.
You might think this principle is obvious, but I had to learn it the hard way-in fact, I had to learn it several times over. Shortly after purchasing Berkshire, I acquired a Baltimore department store, Hochschild, Kohn, buying through a company called Diversified Retailing that later merged with Berkshire. I bought at a substantial discount from book value, the people were first-class, and the deal included some extras-unrecorded real estate values and a significant LIFO inventory cushion. How could I miss? So-o-othree years later I was lucky to sell the business for about what I had paid. After ending our corporate marriage to Hochschild, Kohn, I had memories like those of the husband in the country song, "My Wife Ran Away With My Best Friend and I Still Miss Him a Lot."
I could give you other personal examples of "bargainpurchase" folly but I'm sure you get the picture: It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price. Charlie understood this early; I was a slow learner. But now, when buying companies or common stocks, we look for first-class businesses accompanied by first-class managements.
• That leads right into a related lesson: Good jockeys will do well on good horses, but not on broken-down nags. Both Berkshire's textile business and Hochschild, Kohn had able and honest people running them. The same managers employed in a business with good economic characteristics would have achieved fine records. But they were never going to make any progress while running in quicksand.
I've said many times that when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact. I just wish I hadn't been so energetic in creating examples. My behavior has matched that admitted by Mae West: "I was Snow White, but I drifted."
• A further related lesson: Easy does it. After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid them. To the extent we have been successful, it is because we concentrated on identifying one-foot hurdles that we could step over rather than because we acquired any ability to clear seven-footers.
The finding may seem unfair, but in both business and investments it is usually far more profitable to simply stick with the easy and obvious than it is to resolve the difficult. On occasion, tough problems must be tackled as was the case when we started our Sunday paper in Buffalo. In other instances, a great investment opportunity occurs when a marvelous business encounters a one-time huge, but solvable, problem as was the case many years back at both American Express and GEICO. Overall, however, we've done better by avoiding dragons than by slaying them.
• My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call "the institutional imperative." In business school, I was given no hint of the imperative's existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent, intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn't so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play.
For example:
(1) As if governed by Newton's First Law of Motion, an institution will resist any change in its current direction;
(2) Just as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds;
(3) Any business craving of the leader, however foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate-of-return and strategic studies prepared by his troops; And
(4) The behavior of peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting executive compensation or whatever, will be mindlessly imitated.
Institutional dynamics, not venality or stupidity, set businesses on these courses, which are too often misguided. After making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the power of the imperative, I have tried to organize and manage Berkshire in ways that minimize its influence. Furthermore, Charlie and I have attempted to concentrate our investments in companies that appear alert to the problem.
• After some other mistakes, I learned to go into business only with people whom I like, trust, and admire. As I noted before, this policy of itself will not ensure success: A second-class textile or department-store company won't prosper simply because its managers are men that you would be pleased to see your daughter marry.
However, an owner-or investor-can accomplish wonders if he manages to associate himself with such people in businesses that possess decent economic characteristics. Conversely, we do not wish to join with managers who lack admirable qualities, no matter how attractive the prospects of their business. We've never succeeded in making a good deal with a bad person.
• Some of my worst mistakes were not publicly visible. These were stock and business purchases whose virtues I understood and yet didn't make. It's no sin to miss a great opportunity outside one's area of competence. But I have passed on a couple of really big purchases that were served up to me on a platter and that I was fully capable of understanding. For Berkshire's shareholders, myself included, the cost of this thumb-sucking has been huge.
• Our consistently-conservative financial policies may appear to have been a mistake, but in my view were not. In retrospect, it is clear that significantly higher, though still conventional, leverage ratios at Berkshire would have produced considerably better returns on equity than the 23.8% we have actually averaged. Even in 1965, perhaps we could have judged there to be a 99% probability that higher leverage would lead to nothing but good. Correspondingly, we might have seen only a 1% chance that some shock factor, external or internal, would cause a conventional debt ratio to produce a result falling somewhere between temporary anguish and default.
We wouldn't have liked those 99:1 odds-and never will. A small chance of distress or disgrace cannot, in our view, be offset by a large chance of extra returns. If your actions are sensible, you are certain to get good results; in most such cases, leverage just moves things along faster. Charlie and I have never been in a big hurry: We enjoy the process far more than the proceeds-though we have learned to live with those also.
G. Junk Bonds junk bond: noun: a high-yield, high-risk security, typically issued by a company seeking to raise capital quickly in order to finance a takeover.
With Wells Fargo, we think we have obtained the best managers in the business, Carl Reichardt and Paul Hazen. In many ways the combination of Carl and Paul reminds me of another-Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Capital Cities/ABC. First, each pair is stronger than the sum of its parts because each partner understands, trusts and admires the other. Second, both managerial teams payable people well, but abhor having a bigger head count than is needed. Third, both attack costs as vigorously when profits are at record levels as when they are under pressure. Finally, both stick with what they understand and let their abilities, not their egos, determine what they attempt. (Thomas J. Watson Sr. of IBM followed the same rule: "I'm no genius," he said. "I'm smart in spots-but I stay around those spots.")
~ ~ ~
The most common cause of low prices is pessimism-sometimes pervasive, sometimes specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such an environment, not because we like pessimism but because we like the prices it produces. It's optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer.
None of this means, however, that a business or stock is an intelligent purchase simply because it is unpopular; a contrarian approach is just as foolish as a follow-the-crowd strategy. What's required is thinking rather than polling. Unfortunately, Bertrand Russell's observation about life in general applies with unusual force in the financial world: "Most men would rather die than think. Many do."
~ ~ ~
Just as buying into the banking business is unusual for us, so is the purchase of below-investment-grade bonds. But opportunities that interest us and that are also large enough to have a worthwhile impact on Berkshire's results are rare. Therefore, we will look at any category of investment, so long as we understand the business we're buying into and believe that price and value may differ significantly. (Woody Allen, in another context, pointed out the advantage of open-mindedness: "I can't understand why more people aren't bi-sexual because it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night.")
In the past we have bought a few below-investment-grade bonds with success, though these were all old-fashioned "fallen angels"-bonds that were initially of investment grade but that were downgraded when the issuers fell on bad times. . . .
A kind of bastardized fallen angel burst onto the investment scene in the 1980s-"junk bonds" that were far below investmentgrade when issued. As the decade progressed, new offerings of manufactured junk became ever junkier and ultimately the predictable outcome occurred: Junk bonds lived up to their name. In 1990-even before the recession dealt its blows-the financial sky became dark with the bodies of failing corporations.
The disciples of debt assured us that this collapse wouldn't happen: Huge debt, we were told, would cause operating managers to focus their efforts as never before, much as a dagger mounted on the steering wheel of a car could be expected to make its driver proceed with intensified care. We'll acknowledge that such an attention-getter would produce a very alert driver. But another certain consequence would be a deadly-and unnecessary-accident if the car hit even the tiniest pothole or sliver of ice. The roads of business are riddled with potholes; a plan that requires dodging them all is a plan for disaster.
In the final chapter of The Intelligent Investor Ben Graham forcefully rejected the dagger thesis: "Confronted with a challenge to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we venture the motto, Margin of Safety." Forty-two years after reading that, I still think those are the right three words. The failure of investors to heed this simple message caused them staggering losses as the 1990s began.
At the height of the debt mania, capital structures were concocted that guaranteed failure: In some cases, so much debt was issued that even highly favorable business results could not produce the funds to service it. One particularly egregious "kill-'emat-birth" case a few years back involved the purchase of a mature television station in Tampa, bought with so much debt that the interest on it exceeded the station's gross revenues. Even if you assume that all labor, programs and services were donated rather than purchased, this capital structure required revenues to explode-or else the station was doomed to go broke. (Many of the bonds that financed the purchase were sold to now-failed savings and loan associations; as a taxpayer, you are picking up the tab for this folly.) All of this seems impossible now. When these misdeeds were done, however, dagger-selling investment bankers pointed to the "scholarly" research of academics, which reported that over the years the higher interest rates received from low-grade bonds had more than compensated for their higher rate of default. Thus, said the friendly salesmen, a diversified portfolio of junk bonds would produce greater net returns than would a portfolio of high~grade bonds. (Beware of past-performance "proofs" in finance: If history books were the key to riches, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.) There was a flaw in the salesmen's logic-one that a first-year student in statistics is taught to recognize. An assumption was being made that the universe of newly-minted junk bonds was identical to the universe of low-grade fallen angels and that, therefore, the default experience of the latter group was meaningful in predicting the default experience of the new issues. (That was an error similar to checking the historical death rate from Kool-Aid before drinking the version served at Jonestown.)
The universes were of course dissimilar in several vital respects. For openers, the manager of a fallen angel almost invariably yearned to regain investment-grade status and worked toward that goal. The junk-bond operator was usually an entirely different breed. Behaving much as a heroin user might, he devoted his energies not to finding a cure for his debt-ridden condition, but rather to finding another fix. Additionally, the fiduciary sensitivities of the executives managing the typical fallen angel were often, though not always, more finely developed than were those of the junkbond-issuing financiopath.
Wall Street cared little for such distinctions. As usual, the Street's enthusiasm for an idea was proportional not to its merit, but rather to the revenue it would produce. Mountains of junk bonds were sold by those who didn't care to those who didn't think-and there was no shortage of either.
Junk bonds remain a mine field, even at prices that today are often a small fraction of issue price. As we said last year, we have never bought a new issue of a junk bond. (The only time to buy these is on a day with no "y" in it.) We are, however, willing to look at the field, now that it is in disarray.
H. Zero-Coupon Bonds
Most bonds, of course, require regular payments of interest, usually semi-annually. A zero-coupon bond, conversely, requires no current interest payments; instead, the investor receives his yield by purchasing the security at a significant discount from maturity value. The effective interest rate is determined by the original issue price, the maturity value, and the amount of time between issuance and maturity.
~ ~ ~
If you're my age you bought your first zero-coupon bonds during World War II, by purchasing the famous Series E U.S. Savings Bond, the most widely-sold bond issue in history. (After the war, these bonds were held by one out of two U.S. households.) Nobody, of course, called the Series E a zero-coupon bond, a term in fact that I doubt had been invented. But that's precisely what the Series E was. These bonds came in denominations as small as $18.75. That amount purchased a $25 obligation of the United States government due in 10 years, terms that gave the buyer a compounded annual return of 2.9%. At the time, this was an attractive offer: the 2.9% rate was higher than that generally available on Government bonds and the holder faced no market-fluctuation risk, since he could at any time cash in his bonds with only a minor reduction in interest.
~ ~ ~
Some time ago Ken Galbraith, in his witty and insightful The Great Crash, coined a new economic term: "the bezzle," defined as the current amount of undiscovered embezzlement. This financial creature has a magical quality: The embezzlers are richer by the amount of the bezzle, while the embezzlers do not yet feel poorer.
Professor Galbraith astutely pointed out that this sum should be added to the National Wealth so that we might know the Psychic National Wealth. Logically, a society that wanted to feel enormously prosperous would both encourage its citizens to embezzle and try not to detect the crime. By this means, "wealth" would balloon though not an erg of productive work had been done.
The satirical nonsense of the bezzle is dwarfed by the realworld nonsense of the zero-coupon bond. With zeros, one party to a contract can experience "income" without his opposite experiencing the pain of expenditure. As long as major investors willingly don their Peter Pan wings and repeatedly say "I believe," there is no limit to how much "income" can be created by the zero-coupon bond.
I. Preferred Stock preferred stock: noun; NORTH AMERICAN: stock that entitles the holder to a fixed dividend, whose payment takes priority over that of common-stock dividends.
We only want to link up with people whom we like, admire, and trust. John Gutfreund at Salomon, Colman Mockler, Jr. at Gillette, Ed Colodny at USAir, and Andy Sigler at Champion meet this test in spades. They are trusting us to be intelligent owners, thinking about tomorrow instead of today, just as we are trusting them to be intelligent managers, thinking about tomorrow as well as today.
~ ~ ~
Seth Schofield, [then] CEO of USAir, has worked diligently to correct the company's historical cost problems but, to date, has not managed to do so. In part, this is because he has had to deal with a moving target, the result of certain major carriers having obtained labor concessions and other carriers having benefitted from "freshstart" costs that came out of bankruptcy proceedings. (As Herb Kelleher, CEO of Southwest Airlines, has said: "Bankruptcy court for airlines has become a health spa.") Additionally, it should be no surprise to anyone that those airline employees who contractually receive above-market salaries will resist any reduction in these as long as their checks continue to clear.
Despite this difficult situation, USAir may yet achieve the cost reductions it needs to maintain its viability long-term. But it is far from sure that will happen.
When Richard Branson, the wealthy owner of Virgin Atlantic Airways, was asked how to become a millionaire, he had a quick answer: "There's really nothing to it. Start as a billionaire and then buy an airline." Unwilling to accept Branson's proposition on faith, your Chairman decided in 1989 to test it by investing $358 million in a 91/4% preferred stock of USAir.
I liked and admired Ed Colodny, the company's then-CEO, and I still do. But my analysis of USAir's business was both superficial and wrong. I was so beguiled by the company's long history of profitable operations, and by the protection that ownership of a senior security seemingly offered me, that I overlooked the crucial point: USAir's revenues would increasingly feel the effects of an unregulated, fiercely competitive market whereas its cost structure was a holdover from the days when regulation protected profits. These costs, if left unchecked, portended disaster, however reassuring the airline's past record might be. ([Again, if] history supplied all of the answers, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.)
To rationalize its costs, however, USAir needed major improvements in its labor contracts-and that's something most airlines have found it extraordinarily difficult to get, short of credibly threatening, or actually entering, bankruptcy. USAir was to be no exception. Immediately after we purchased our preferred stock, the imbalance between the company's costs and revenues began to grow explosively. In the 1990-1994 period, USAir lost an aggregate of $2.4 billion, a performance that totally wiped out the book equity of its common stock.
In another context, a friend once asked me: "If you're so rich, why aren't you smart?" After reviewing my sorry performance with USAir, you may conclude he had a point.
III. COMMON STOCK common stock: noun; NORTH AMERICAN: shares entitling their holder to dividends that vary in amount and may even be missed, depending on the fortunes of the company.
Occasional outbreaks of those two super-contagious diseases, fear and greed, will forever occur in the investment community. The timing of these epidemics will be unpredictable. And the market aberrations produced by them will be equally unpredictable, both as to duration and degree. Therefore, we never try to anticipate the arrival or departure of either disease. Our goal is more modest: we simply attempt to be fearful when others are greedy and to be greedy only when others are fearful.
A. The Bane of Trading: Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are very heavy for active stocks, often mounting to 10% or more of the earnings of a public company. In effect, these costs act as a hefty tax on owners, albeit one based on individual decisions to "change chairs" and one that is paid to the financial community rather than to Washington. Our policies and your investment attitude have reduced this "tax" on Berkshire owners to what we believe is the lowest level among large public companies. A NYSE listing should further reduce this cost for Berkshire's owners by narrowing the market-maker's spread.
B. Attracting the Right Sort of Investor
In two respects our goals probably differ somewhat from those of most listed companies. First, we do not want to maximize the price at which Berkshire shares trade. We wish instead for them to trade in a narrow range centered at intrinsic business value (which we hope increases at a reasonable-or, better yet, unreasonablerate). Charlie and I are bothered as much by significant overvaluation as significant undervaluation. Both extremes will inevitably produce results for many shareholders that will differ sharply from Berkshire's business results. If our stock price instead consistently mirrors business value, each of our shareholders will receive an investment result that roughly parallels the business results of Berkshire during his holding period.
Second, we wish for very little trading activity. If we ran a private business with a few passive partners, we would be disappointed if those partners, and their replacements, frequently wanted to leave the partnership. Running a public company, we feel the same way.
Our goal is to attract long-term owners who, at the time of purchase, have no timetable or price target for sale but plan instead to stay with us indefinitely. We don't understand the CEO who wants lots of stock activity, for that can be achieved only if many of his owners are constantly exiting. At what other organization-school, club, church, etc.-do leaders cheer when members leave? (However if there were a broker whose livelihood depended upon the membership turnover in such organizations, you could be sure that there would be at least one proponent of activity, as in: "There hasn't been much going on in Christianity for a while; maybe we should switch to Buddhism next week.")
Of course, some Berkshire owners will need or want to sell from time to time, and we wish for good replacements who will pay them a fair price. Therefore we try, through our policies, performance, and communications, to attract new shareholders who understand our operations, share our time horizons, and measure us as we measure ourselves. If we can continue to attract this sort of shareholder-and, just as important, can continue to be uninteresting to those with short-term or unrealistic expectations-Berkshire shares should consistently sell at prices reasonably related to business value.
C. Dividend Policy
Dividend policy is often reported to shareholders, but seldom explained. A company will say something like, "Our goal is to pay out 40% to 50% of earnings and to increase dividends at a rate at least equal to the rise in the CPI". And that's it-no analysis will be supplied as to why that particular policy is best for the owners of the business. Yet, allocation of capital is crucial to business and investment management. Because it is, we believe managers and owners should think hard about the circumstances under which earnings should be retained and under which they should be distributed.
The first point to understand is that all earnings are not created equal. In many businesses-particularly those that have high asset/profit ratios-inflation causes some or all of the reported earnings to become ersatz. The ersatz portion-let's call these earnings "restricted"-cannot, if the business is to retain its economic position, be distributed as dividends. Were these earnings to be paid out, the business would lose ground in one or more of the following areas: its ability to maintain its unit volume of sales, its long-term competitive position, its financial strength. No matter how conservative its payout ratio, a company that consistently distributes restricted earnings is destined for oblivion unless equity capital is otherwise infused.
Restricted earnings are seldom valueless to owners, but they often must be discounted heavily. In effect, they are conscripted by the business, no matter how poor its economic potential. (This retention-no-matter-how-unattractive-the-return situation was communicated unwittingly in a marvelously ironic way by Consolidated Edison a decade ago. At the time, a punitive regulatory policy was a major factor causing the company's stock to sell as low as onefourth of book value: i.e., every time a dollar of earnings was retained for reinvestment in the business, that dollar was transformed into only 25¢ of market value. But, despite this gold-intolead process, most earnings were reinvested in the business rather than paid to owners. Meanwhile, at construction and maintenance sites throughout New York, signs proudly proclaimed the corporate slogan, "Dig We Must".) Restricted earnings need not concern us further in this dividend discussion. Let's turn to the much-more-valued unrestricted variety. These earnings may, with equal feasibility, be retained or distributed. In our opinion, management should choose whichever course makes greater sense for the owners of the business.
This principle is not universally accepted. For a number of reasons managers like to withhold unrestricted, readily distributable earnings from shareholders-to expand the corporate empire over which the managers rule, to operate from a position of exceptional financial comfort, etc. But we believe there is only one valid reason for retention. Unrestricted earnings should be retained only when there is a reasonable prospect-backed preferably by historical evidence or, when appropriate, by a thoughtful analysis of the future-that for every dollar retained by the corporation, at least one dollar ofmarket value will be created for owners. This will happen only if the capital retained produces incremental earnings equal to, or above, those generally available to investors.
To illustrate, let's assume that an investor owns a risk-free 10% perpetual bond with one very unusual feature. Each year the investor can elect either to take his 10% coupon in cash, or to reinvest the coupon in more 10% bonds with identical terms: i.e., a perpetual life and coupons offering the same cash-or-reinvest options. If, in any given year, the prevailing interest rate on longterm, risk-free bonds is 5%, it would be foolish for the investor to take his coupon in cash since the 10% bonds he could instead choose would be worth considerably more than 100¢ on the dollar.
Under these circumstances, the investor wanting to get his hands on cash should take his coupon in additional bonds and then immediately sell them. By doing that, he would realize more cash than if he had taken his coupon directly in cash. Assuming all bonds were held by rational investors, no one would opt for cash in an era of 5% interest, not even those bondholders needing cash for living purposes.
If, however, interest rates were 15%, no rational investor would want his money invested for him at 10%. Instead, the investor would choose to take his coupon in cash, even if his personal cash needs were nil. The opposite course-reinvestment of the coupon-would give an investor additional bonds with market value far less than the cash he could have elected. If he should want 10% bonds, he can simply take the cash received and buy them in the market, where they will be available at a large discount.
An analysis similar to that made by our hypothetical bondholder is appropriate for owners in thinking about whether a company's unrestricted earnings should be retained or paid out. Of course, the analysis is much more difficult and subject to error because the rate earned on reinvested earnings is not a contractual figure, as in our bond case, but rather a fluctuating figure. Owners must guess as to what the rate will average over the intermediate future. However, once an informed guess is made, the rest of the analysis is simple: you should wish your earnings to be reinvested if they can be expected to earn high returns, and you should wish them paid to you if low returns are the likely outcome of reinvestment.
Many corporate managers reason very much along these lines in determining whether subsidiaries should distribute earnings to their parent company. At that level, the managers have no trouble thinking like intelligent owners. But payout decisions at the parent company level often are a different story. Here managers frequently have trouble putting themselves in the shoes of their shareholder-owners.
With this schizoid approach, the CEO of a multi-divisional company will instruct Subsidiary A, whose earnings on incremental capital may be expected to average 5%, to distribute all available earnings in order that they may be invested in Subsidiary B, whose earnings on incremental capital are expected to be 15%. The CEO's business school oath will allow no lesser behavior. But if his own long-term record with incremental capital is 5%-and market rates are lO%-he is likely to impose a dividend policy on shareholders of the parent company that merely follows some historical or industry-wide payout pattern. Furthermore, he will expect managers of subsidiaries to give him a full account as to why it makes sense for earnings to be retained in their operations rather than distributed to the parent-owner. But seldom will he supply his owners with a similar analysis pertaining to the whole company.
In judging whether managers should retain earnings, shareholders should not simply compare total incremental earnings in recent years to total incremental capital because that relationship may be distorted by what is going on in a core business. During an inflationary period, companies with a core business characterized by extraordinary economics can use small amounts of incremental capital in that business at very high rates of return (as was discussed in last year's section on Goodwill). But, unless they are experiencing tremendous unit growth, outstanding businesses by definition generate large amounts of excess cash. If a company sinks most of this money in other businesses that earn low returns, the company's overall return on retained capital may nevertheless appear excellent because of the extraordinary returns being earned by the portion of earnings incremental invested in the core business. The situation is analogous to a Pro-Am golf event: even if all of the amateurs are hopeless duffers, the team's best-ball score will be respectable because of the dominating skills of the professional.
Many corporations that consistently show good returns both on equity and on overall incremental capital have, indeed, employed a large portion of their retained earnings on an economically unattractive, even disastrous, basis. Their marvelous core businesses, however, whose earnings grow year after year, camouflage repeated failures in capital allocation elsewhere (usually involving high-priced acquisition of businesses that have inherently mediocre economics). The managers at fault periodically report on the lesson they have learned from the latest disappointment. They then usually seek out future lessons. (Failure seems to go to their heads.) In such cases, shareholders would be far better off if earnings were retained only to expand the high-return business, with the balance paid in dividends or used to repurchase stock (an action that increases the owners' interest in the exceptional business while sparing them participation in subpar businesses). Managers of high-return businesses who consistently employ much of the cash thrown off by those businesses in other ventures with low returns should be held to account for those allocation decisions, regardless of how profitable the overall enterprise is.
Nothing in this discussion is intended to argue for dividends that bounce around from quarter to quarter with each wiggle in earnings or in investment opportunities. Shareholders of public corporations understandably prefer that dividends be consistent and predictable. Payments, therefore, should reflect long-term expectations for both earnings and returns on incremental capital.
Since the long-term corporate outlook changes only infrequently, dividend patterns should change no more often. But over time distributable earnings that have been withheld by managers should earn their keep. If earnings have been unwisely retained, it is likely that managers, too, have been unwisely retained.
D. Stock Splits and Trading Activity
We often are asked why Berkshire does not split its stock. The assumption behind this question usually appears to be that a split would be a pro-shareholder action. We disagree. Let me tell you why.
One of our goals is to have Berkshire Hathaway stock sell at a price rationally related to its intrinsic business value. (But note "rationally related," not "identical": if well-regarded companies are generally selling in the market at large discounts from value, Berkshire might well be priced similarly.) The key to a rational stock price is rational shareholders, both current and prospective.
If the holders of a company's stock and/or the prospective buyers attracted to it are prone to make irrational or emotionbased decisions, some pretty silly stock prices are going to appear periodically. Manic-depressive personalities produce manic-depressive valuations. Such aberrations may help us in buying and selling the stocks of other companies. But we think it is in both your interest and ours to minimize their occurrence in the market for Berkshire.
To obtain only high quality shareholders is no cinch. Mrs. Astor could select her 400, but anyone can buy any stock. Entering members of a shareholder "club" cannot be screened for intellectual capacity, emotional stability, moral sensitivity or acceptable dress. Shareholder eugenics, therefore, might appear to be a hopeless undertaking.
In large part, however, we feel that high quality ownership can be attracted and maintained if we consistently communicate our business and ownership philosophy-along with no other conflicting messages-and then let self selection follow its course. For example, self selection will draw a far different crowd to a musical event advertised as an opera than one advertised as a rock concert-even though anyone can buy a ticket to either.
Through our policies and communications-our "advertisements"-we try to attract investors who will understand our operations, attitudes and expectations. (And, fully as important, we try to dissuade those who won't.) We want those who think of themselves as business owners and invest in companies with the intention of staying a long time. And, we want those who keep their eyes focused on business results, not market prices.
Investors possessing those characteristics are in a small minority, but we have an exceptional collection of them. I believe well over 90%-probably over 95%-of our shares are held by those who were shareholders of Berkshire or Blue Chip five years ago.
And I would guess that over 95% of our shares are held by investors for whom the holding is at least double the size of their next largest. Among companies with at least several thousand public shareholders and more than $1 billion of market value, we are almost certainly the leader in the degree to which our shareholders think and act like owners. Upgrading a shareholder group that possesses these characteristics is not easy.
Were we to split the stock or take other actions focusing on stock price rather than business value, we would attract an entering class of buyers inferior to the exiting class of sellers. At $1300, there are very few investors who can't afford a Berkshire share.
Would a potential one-share purchaser be better off if we split 100 for 1 so he could buy 100 shares? Those who think so and who would buy the stock because of the split or in anticipation of one would definitely downgrade the quality of our present shareholder group. (Could we really improve our shareholder group by trading some of our present dear-thinking members for impressionable new ones who, preferring paper to value, feel wealthier with nine $10 bills than with one $100 bill?) People who buy for non-value reasons are likely to sell for non-value reasons. Their presence in the picture will accentuate erratic price swings unrelated to underlying business developments.
We will try to avoid policies that attract buyers with a shortterm focus on our stock price and try to allow policies that attract informed long-term investors focusing on business values. Just as you purchased your Berkshire shares in a market populated by rational informed investors, you deserve a chance to sell-should you ever want to-in the same kind of market. We will work to keep it in existence.
One of the ironies of the stock market is the emphasis on activity. Brokers, using terms such as "marketability" and "liquidity", sing the praises of companies with high share turnover (those who cannot fill your pocket will confidently fill your ear). But investors should understand that what is good for the croupier is not good for the customer. A hyperactive stock market is the pickpocket of enterprise.
For example, consider a typical company earning, say, 12% on equity. Assume a very high turnover rate in its shares of 100% per year. If a purchase and sale of the stock trades at book value, the owners of our hypothetical company will pay, in aggregate, 2% of the company's net worth annually for the privilege of transferring ownership. This activity does nothing for the earnings of the business, and means that 1/6 of them are lost to the owners through the "frictional" cost of transfer. (And this calculation does not count option trading, which would increase frictional costs still further.)
All that makes for a rather expensive game of musical chairs.
Can you imagine the agonized cry that would arise if a governmental unit were to impose a new 16 2/3% tax on earnings of corporations or investors? By market activity, investors can impose upon themselves the equivalent of such a tax.
Days when the market trades 100 million shares (and that kind of volume, when over-the-counter trading is included, is today abnormally low) are a curse for owners, not a blessing-for they mean that owners are paying twice as much to change chairs as they are on a SO-million-share day. If 100-million-share days persist for a year and the average cost on each purchase and sale is 18¢ a share, the chair-changing tax for investors in aggregate would total about $7.5 billion-an amount roughly equal to the combined 1982 profits of Exxon, General Motors, Mobil and Texaco, the four largest companies in the Fortune 500.
These companies had a combined net worth of $75 billion at yearend 1982 and accounted for over 12% of both net worth and net income of the entire Fortune 500 list. Under our assumption investors, in aggregate, every year forfeit all earnings from this staggering sum of capital merely to satisfy their penchant for "financial flip-flopping". In addition, investment management fees of over $2 billion annually-sums paid for chair-changing advice-require the forfeiture by investors of all earnings of the five largest banking organizations (Citicorp, Bank America, Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover and J.P. Morgan). These expensive activities may decide who eats the pie, but they don't enlarge it.
Meanwhile, true turnover in Berkshire stock (excluding interdealer transactions, gifts and bequests) probably runs 3% per year.
Thus our owners, in aggregate, are paying perhaps 6/100 of 1% of Berkshire's market value annually for transfer privileges. By this very rough estimate, that's $900,000-not a small cost, but far less than average. Splitting the stock would increase that cost, downgrade the quality of our shareholder population, and encourage a market price less consistently related to intrinsic business value.
We see no offsetting advantages.
E. Shareholder Strategies
Late last year Berkshire's stock price crossed $10,000. Several shareholders have mentioned to me that the high price causes them problems: They like to give shares away each year and find themselves impeded by the tax rule that draws a distinction between annual gifts of $10,000 or under to a single individual and those above $10,000. That is, those gifts no greater than $10,000 are completely tax-free; those above $10,000 require the donor to use up a portion of his or her lifetime exemption from gift and estate taxes, or, if that exemption has been exhausted, to pay gift taxes.
I can suggest three ways to address this problem. The first would be useful to a married shareholder, who can give up to $20,000 annually to a single recipient, as long as the donor files a gift tax return containing his or her spouse's written consent to gifts made during the year.
Secondly, a shareholder, married or not, can make a bargain sale. Imagine, for example, that Berkshire is selling for $12,000 and that one wishes to make only a $10,000 gift. In that case, sell the stock to the giftee for $2,000. (Caution: You will be taxed on the amount, if any, by which the sales price to your giftee exceeds your tax basis.) Finally, you can establish a partnership with people to whom you are making gifts, fund it with Berkshire shares, and simply give percentage interests in the partnership away each year. These interests can be for any value that you select. If the value is $10,000 or less, the gift will be tax-free.
We issue the customary warning: Consult with your own tax advisor before taking action on any of the more esoteric methods of gift-making.
We hold to the view about stock splits that we set forth in the 1983 Annual Report.35 Overall, we believe our owner-related policies-including the no-split policy-have helped us assemble a body of shareholders that is the best associated with any widelyheld American corporation. Our shareholders think and behave like rational long-term owners and view the business much as Charlie and I do. Consequently, our stock consistently trades in a price range that is sensibly related to intrinsic value.
Additionally, we believe that our shares turn over far less actively than do the shares of any other widely-held company. The frictional costs of trading-which act as a major "tax" on the owners of many companies-are virtually non-existent at Berkshire.
(The market-making skills of Jim Maguire, our New York Stock Exchange specialist, definitely help to keep these costs low.) Obviously a split would not change this situation dramatically. Nonetheless, there is no way that our shareholder group would be upgraded by the new shareholders enticed by a split. Instead we believe that modest degradation would occur.
F. Berkshire's Recapitalization
Among other points, here Buffett discusses an idea on how to keep "Berkshire clones" unmerchandisable.
IV. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Of all our activities at Berkshire, the most exhilarating for Charlie and me is the acquisition of a business with excellent economic characteristics and a management that we like, trust and admire. Such acquisitions are not easy to make but we look for them constantly. In the search, we adopt the same attitude one might find appropriate in looking for a spouse: It pays to be active, interested, and open-minded, but it does not pay to be in a hurry.
In the past, I've observed that many acquisition-hungry managers were apparently mesmerized by their childhood reading of the story about the frog-kissing princess. Remembering her success, they pay dearly for the right to kiss corporate toads, expecting wondrous transfigurations. Initially, disappointing results only deepen their desire to round up new toads. ("Fanaticism," said [Santayana], "consists of redoubling your effort when you've forgotten your aim.") Ultimately, even the most optimistic manager must face reality. Standing knee-deep in unresponsive toads, he then announces an enormous "restructuring" charge. In this corporate equivalent of a Head Start program, the CEO receives the education but the stockholders pay the tuition.
In my early days as a manager I, too, dated a few toads. They were cheap dates-I've never been much of a sport-but my results matched those of acquirers who courted higher-priced toads.
I kissed and they croaked.
After several failures of this type, I finally remembered some useful advice I once got from a golf pro (who, like all pros who have had anything to do with my game, wishes to remain anonymous). Said the pro: "Practice doesn't make perfect; practice makes permanent." And thereafter I revised my strategy and tried to buy good businesses at fair prices rather than fair businesses at good prices.
A. Bad Motives and High Prices
As our history indicates, we are comfortable both with total ownership of businesses and with marketable securities representing small portions of businesses. We continually look for ways to employ large sums in each area. (But we try to avoid small commitments-"If something's not worth doing at all, it's not worth doing well".) Indeed, the liquidity requirements of our insurance and trading stamp businesses mandate major investments in marketable securities.
Our acquisition decisions will be aimed at maximizing real economic benefits, not at maximizing either managerial domain or reported numbers for accounting purposes. (In the long run, managements stressing accounting appearance over economic substance usually achieve little of either.) Regardless of the impact upon immediately reportable earnings, we would rather buy 10% of Wonderful Business T at X per share than 100% of Tat 2X per share. Most corporate managers prefer just the reverse, and have no shortage of stated rationales for their behavior.
However, we suspect three motivations-usually unspokento be, singly or in combination, the important ones in most highpremium takeovers:
(1) Leaders, business or otherwise, seldom are deficient in animal spirits and often relish increased activity and challenge. At Berkshire, the corporate pulse never beats faster than when an acquisition is in prospect.
(2) Most organizations, business or otherwise, measure themselves, are measured by others, and compensate their managers far more by the yardstick of size than by any other yardstick. (Ask a Fortune 500 manager where his corporation stands on that famous list and, invariably, the number responded will be from the list ranked by size of sales; he may well not even know where his corporation places on the list Fortune just as faithfully compiles ranking the same 500 corporations by profitability.) (3) Many managements apparently were overexposed in impressionable childhood years to the story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad's body by a kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss will do wonders for the profitability of Company T(arget).
Such optimism is essentiaL Absent that rosy view, why else should the shareholders of Company A(cquisitor) want to own an interest in T at the 2X takeover cost rather than at the X market price they would pay if they made direct purchases on their own?
In other words, investors can always buy toads at the going price for toads. If investors instead bankroll princesses who wish to pay double for the right to kiss the toad, those kisses had better pack some real dynamite. We've observed many kisses but very few miracles. Nevertheless, many managerial princesses remain serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses-even after their corporate backyards are knee-deep in unresponsive toads.
In fairness, we should acknowledge that some acquisition records have been dazzling. Two major categories stand out.
The first involves companies that, through design or accident, have purchased only businesses that are particularly well adapted to an inflationary environment. Such favored business must have two characteristics:
(1) an ability to increase prices rather easily (even when product demand is flat and capacity is not fully utilized) without fear of significant loss of either market share or unit volume, and
(2) an ability to accommodate large dollar volume increases in business (often produced more by inflation than by real growth) with only minor additional investment of capital. Managers of ordinary ability, focusing solely on acquisition possibilities meeting these tests, have achieved excellent results in recent decades. However, very few enterprises possess both characteristics, and competition to buy those that do has now become fierce to the point of being self-defeating.
The second category involves the managerial superstars-men who can recognize that rare prince who is disguised as a toad, and who have managerial abilities that enable them to peel away the disguise. We salute such managers as Ben Heineman at Northwest Industries, Henry Singleton at Teledyne, Erwin Zaban at National Service Industries, and especially Tom Murphy at Capital Cities Communications (a real managerial "twofer", whose acquisition efforts have been properly focused in Category 1 and whose operating talents also make him a leader of Category 2). From both direct and vicarious experience, we recognize the difficulty and rarity of these executives' achievements. (So do they; these champs have made very few deals in recent years, and often have found repurchase of their own shares to be the most sensible employment of corporate capital.)
Your Chairman, unfortunately, does not qualify for Category 2. And, despite a reasonably good understanding of the economic factors compelling concentration in Category 1, our actual acquisition activity in that category has been sporadic and inadequate.
Our preaching was better than our performance. (We neglected the Noah principle: predicting rain doesn't count, building arks does.) We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that have been chronicled in past reports. Clearly our kisses fell flat. We have done well with a couple of princes-but they were princes when purchased. At least our kisses didn't turn them into toads. And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes at toad-like prices.
~ ~ ~
A few favorite rationalizations employed by stock-issuing managements follow:
(a) "The company we're buying is going to be worth a lot more in the future." (Presumably so is the interest in the old business that is being traded away; future prospects are implicit in the business valuation process. If 2X is issued for X, the imbalance still exists when both parts double in business value.)
(b) "We have to grow." (Who, it might be asked, is the "we"?
For present shareholders, the reality is that all existing businesses shrink when shares are issued. Were Berkshire to issue shares tomorrow for an acquisition, Berkshire would own everything that it now owns plus the new business, but your interest in such hard-to-match businesses as See's Candy Shops, National Indemnity, etc. would automatically be reduced. If (1) your family owns a 120-acre farm and (2) you invite a neighbor with 60 acres of comparable land to merge his farm into an equal partnershipwith you to be managing partner, then (3) your managerial domain will have grown to 180 acres but you will have permanently shrunk by 25% your family's ownership interest in both acreage and crops. Managers who want to expand their domain at the expense of owners might better consider a career in government.)
(c) "Our stock is undervalued and we've minimized its use in this deal-but we need to give the selling shareholder 51 % in stock and 49% in cash so that certain of those shareholders can get the tax-free exchange they want." (This argument acknowledges that it is beneficial to the acquirer to hold down the issuance of shares, and we like that. But if it hurts old owners to utilize shares on a 100% basis, it very likely hurts on a 51 % basis. After all, a man is not charmed if a spaniel defaces his lawn, just because it's a spaniel and not a St. Bernard. And the wishes of sellers can't be the determinant of the best interests of the buyer-what would happen if, heaven forbid, the seller insisted that as a condition of merger the CEO of the acquirer be replaced?) There are three ways to avoid destruction of value for old owners when shares are issued for acquisitions. One is to have a true business-value-for-business-value merger, such as the Berkshire-Blue Chip combination is intended to be. Such a merger attempts to be fair to shareholders of both parties, with each receiving just as much as it gives in terms of intrinsic business value. The Dart Industries-Kraft and Nabisco-Standard Brands mergers appeared to be of this type, but they are the exceptions.
It's not that acquirers wish to avoid such deals; it's just that they are very hard to do.
The second route presents itself when the acquirer's stock sells at or above its intrinsic business value. In that situation, the use of stock as currency actually may enhance the wealth of the acquiring company's owners. Many mergers were accomplished on this basis in the 1965-69 period. The results were the converse of most of the activity since 1970: the shareholders of the acquired company received very inflated currency (frequently pumped up by dubious accounting and promotional techniques) and were the losers of wealth through such transactions.
During recent years the second solution has been available to very few large companies. The exceptions have primarily been those companies in glamorous or promotional businesses to which the market temporarily attaches valuations at or above intrinsic business valuation.
The third solution is for the acquirer to go ahead with the acquisition, but then subsequently repurchase a quantity of shares equal to the number issued in the merger. In this manner, what originally was a stock-for-stock merger can be converted, effectively, into a cash-for-stock acquisition. Repurchases of this kind are damage-repair moves. Regular readers will correctly guess that we much prefer repurchases that directly enhance the wealth of owners instead of repurchases that merely repair previous damage.
Scoring touchdowns is more exhilarating than recovering one's fumbles. But, when a fumble has occurred, recovery is important and we heartily recommend damage-repair repurchases that turn a bad stock deal into a fair cash deal.
~ ~ ~
The language utilized in mergers tends to confuse the issues and encourage irrational actions by managers. For example, "dilution" is usually carefully calculated on a pro forma basis for both book value and current earnings per share. Particular emphasis is given to the latter item. When that calculation is negative (dilutive) from the acquiring company's standpoint, a justifying explanation will be made (internally, if not elsewhere) that the lines will cross favorably at some point in the future. (While deals often fail in practice, they never fail in projections-if the CEO is visibly panting over a prospective acquisition, subordinates and consultants will supply the requisite projections to rationalize any price.) Should the calculation produce numbers that are immediately positive-that is, anti-dilutive-for the acquirer, no comment is thought to be necessary.
The attention given this form of dilution is overdone: current earnings per share (or even earnings per share of the next few years) are an important variable in most business valuations, but far from all-powerful.
There have been plenty of mergers, non-dilutive in this limited sense, that were instantly value-destroying for the acquirer. And some mergers that have diluted current and near-term earnings per share have in fact been value-enhancing. What really counts is whether a merger is dilutive or anti-dilutive in terms of intrinsic business value (a judgment involving consideration of many variables). We believe calculation of dilution from this viewpoint to be all-important (and too seldom made).
A second language problem relates to the equation of exchange. If Company A announces that it will issue shares to merge with Company B, the process is customarily described as "Company A to Acquire Company B", or "B Sells to A". Clearer thinking about the matter would result if a more awkward but more accurate description were used: "Part of A sold to acquire B", or "Owners of B to receive part of A in exchange for their properties". In a trade, what you are giving is just as important as what you are getting. This remains true even when the final tally on what is being given is delayed. Subsequent sales of common stock or convertible issues, either to complete the financing for a deal or to restore balance sheet strength, must be fully counted in evaluating the fundamental mathematics of the original acquisition. (If corporate pregnancy is going to be the consequence of corporate mating, the time to face that fact is before the moment of ecstasy.) Managers and directors might sharpen their thinking by asking themselves if they would sell 100% of their business on the same basis they are being asked to sell part of it. And if it isn't smart to sell all on such a basis, they should ask themselves why it is smart to sell a portion. A cumulation of small managerial stupidities will produce a major stupidity-not a major triumph. (Las Vegas has been built upon the wealth transfers that occur when people engage in seemingly-small disadvantageous capital transactions.)
~ ~ ~
In contemplating business mergers and acquisitions, many managers tend to focus on whether the transaction is immediately dilutive or anti-dilutive to earnings per share (or, at financial institutions, to per-share book value). An emphasis of this sort carries great dangers. ... Imagine that a 25-year-old first-year MBA student is considering merging his future economic interests with those of a 25-year-old day laborer. The MBA student, a nonearner, would find that a "share-for-share" merger of his equity interest in himself with that of the day laborer would enhance his near-term earnings (in a big way!). But what could be sillier for the student than a deal of this kind?
In corporate transactions, it's equally silly for the would-be purchaser to focus on current earnings when the prospective acquiree has either different prospects, a different mix of operating and non-operating assets, or a different capital structure. At Berkshire, we have rejected many merger and purchase opportunities that would have boosted current and near-term earnings but that would have reduced per-share intrinsic value. Our approach, rather, has been to follow Wayne Gretzky's advice: "Go to where the puck is going to be, not to where it is." As a result, our shareholders are now many billions of dollars richer than they would have been if we had used the standard catechism.
The sad fact is that most major acquisitions display an egregious imbalance: They are a bonanza for the shareholders of the acquiree; they increase the income and status of the acquirer's management; and they are a honey pot for the investment bankers and other professionals on both sides. But, alas, they usually reduce the wealth of the acquirer's shareholders, often to a substantial extent. That happens because the acquirer typically gives up more intrinsic value than it receives. Do that enough, says John Medlin, the retired head of Wachovia Corp., and "you are running a chain letter in reverse."
Over time, the skill with which a company's managers allocate capital has an enormous impact on the enterprise's value. Almost by definition, a really good business generates far more money (at least after its early years) than it can use internally. The company could, of course, distribute the money to shareholders by way of dividends or share repurchases. But often the CEO asks a strategic planning staff, consultants or investment bankers whether an acquisition or two might make sense. That's like asking your interior decorator whether you need a $50,000 rug.
The acquisition problem is often compounded by a biological bias: Many CEO's attain their positions in part because they possess an abundance of animal spirits and ego. If an executive is heavily endowed with these qualities-which, it should be acknowledged, sometimes have their advantages-they won't disappear when he reaches the top. When such a CEO is encouraged by his advisors to make deals, he responds much as would a teenage boy who is encouraged by his father to have a normal sex life. It's not a push he needs.
Some years back, a CEO friend of mine-in jest, it must be said-unintentionally described the pathology of many big deals.
This friend, who ran a property-casualty insurer, was explaining to his directors why he wanted to acquire a certain life insurance company. After droning rather unpersuasively through the economics and strategic rationale for the acquisition, he abruptly abandoned the script. With an impish look, he simply said: "Aw, fellas, all the other kids have one."
At Berkshire, our managers will continue to earn extraordinary returns from what appear to be ordinary businesses. As a first step, these managers will look for ways to deploy their earnings advantageously in their businesses. What's left, they will send to Charlie and me. We then will try to use those funds in ways that build per-share intrinsic value. Our goal will be to acquire either part or all of businesses that we believe we understand, that have good, sustainable underlying economics, and that are run by managers whom we like, admire and trust.
B. Sensible Stock Repurchases Versus Greenmail greenmail: noun; STOCK MARKET: the practice of buying enough shares in a company to threaten a takeover, forcing the owners to buy them back at a higher price in order to retain control.
The companies in which we have our largest investments have all engaged in significant stock repurchases at times when wide discrepancies existed between price and value. As shareholders, we find this encouraging and rewarding for two important reasonsone that is obvious, and one that is subtle and not always understood. The obvious point involves basic arithmetic: major repurchases at prices well below per-share intrinsic business value immediately increase, in a highly significant way, that value. When companies purchase their own stock, they often find it easy to get $2 of present value for $1. Corporate acquisition programs almost never do as well and, in a discouragingly large number of cases, fail to get anything close to $1 of value for each $1 expended.
The other benefit of repurchases is less subject to precise measurement but can be fully as important over time. By making repurchases when a company's market value is well below its business value, management clearly demonstrates that it is given to actions that enhance the wealth of shareholders, rather than to actions that expand management's domain but that do nothing for (or even harm) shareholders. Seeing this, shareholders and potential shareholders increase their estimates of future returns from the business. This upward revision, in turn, produces market prices more in line with intrinsic business value. These prices are entirely rational. Investors should pay more for a business that is lodged in the hands of a manager with demonstrated pro-shareholder leanings than for one in the hands of a self-interested manager marching to a different drummer. (To make the point extreme, how much would you pay to be a minority shareholder of a company controlled by Robert Vesco?) The key word is "demonstrated". A manager who consistently turns his back on repurchases, when these clearly are in the interests of owners, reveals more than he knows of his motivations. No matter how often or how eloquently he mouths some public relations-inspired phrase such as "maximizing shareholder wealth" (this season's favorite), the market correctly discounts assets lodged with him. His heart is not listening to his mouth-and, after a while, neither will the market.
C. Leveraged Buyouts leveraged buyout: noun: the purchase of a controlling share in a company by its management using outside capital.
If successful corporate business acquisition is so hard, how does one explain the widespread recent success of most of the leveraged-buy-out ("LBO") operators who have purchased corporations? A huge part of the answer comes from income-tax effects and other simple effects. When, in a typical LBO, the typical mostly equity corporate capitalization was replaced by 90% debt plus a new lO%-of-capitalization common stock position:
(1) the combined market value of all the new common stock plus all the new debt became much higher than the previous market value of all the older common stock, because the existing stream of pre-tax earnings was no longer shared with corporate income tax collectors who, in many cases, had previously received more cash each year than shareholders; and
(2) even after the value-enhancing effect of the corporate tax reduction was shared with former shareholders by paying them extra-high prices to leave, a retained residue of value-enhancing tax effect made the new common stock (which now became much like a speculative warrant with good terms) worth considerably more than cost as the ink dried on acquisition papers; and
(3) the new "owners" then resorted to strategies, difficult neither to conceive nor implement, including the following:
(a) they eliminated many of the easily removable costs (largely personnel costs) and sub-par segments which in some mix (i) bedevil successful corporations (including ours) with sloth and folly and (ii) create their humane grace and, through present sacrifice, good long-term prospects, justifying sacrifice endured; and
(b) they sold off a few operations at super-high prices, sometimes exercising the easiest microeconomic insight by selling to a direct competitor and sometimes selling to a surprisingly easy-to-find non-competitive corporate buyer, not owned by its managers, willing to pay almost as high a price as a competitor would; and
(4) the new "owners" then profited, in due course, not only from the tax effect and other simple reshuffling activities described above, but also from the wonderful upside effects of extreme financial leverage during a long business boom accompanied by a rising stock market.
Whether the country wants a large number (or even any) of its large corporations to have extremely leveraged capitalizations, except through occasional adversity, presents interesting social questions. Is one social function of corporations to be financially strong so that they act as shock absorbers, protecting dependent employees, suppliers and customers from part of the volatility implicit in capitalism? Was Ben Franklin right when he included the following folk wisdom in Poor Richard's Almanac: "It is hard for an empty sack to stand upright." Is a weak corporation, borrowed to the hilt, the social equivalent of a bridge with an inadequate reserve of structural strength? Granting that leveraged buyouts have some favorable effects (as well as unfavorable effects) on long term efficiency, how many thousands of able people do we wish to attract into promotional corporate recapitalization activity which (1) reduces corporate income taxes, (2) often tests the limits of antitrust law, and (3) focuses business attention on short-term cash generation to pay down oppressive levels of debt? Finally, as Columbia Law School's Professor Lou Lowenstein puts it (more or less): "Do we really want entire corporate businesses, as important social institutions, continuously traded like pork belly contracts?"
However the social questions are answered, three aspects of the present situation are clear. First, the corporate tax effect is so large in LBO transactions that easy success in such transactions does not imply that success is easy in ordinary corporate acquisitions. Second, the hordes of leveraged-buy-out operators now with us raise the general level of acquisition prices to the detriment of other would-be acquirers, including Wesco, which are not willing to maximize tax benefits through maximized borrowing. And, third, the LBO operator will not go away so long as present permissive laws last. The operators have a real advantage under such laws, not just a fig leaf aiding promotion. Even though failure and disgrace will reduce their number, and prices paid in leveraged-buyout transactions will fall, the capitalized value of reducing the corporate income tax will remain. Therefore, plenty of rational incentive will remain for transactions. The LBO genie will encounter reverses, but he is not going back in the bottle unless ordered to do so by new laws.
It should also be noted that the LBO operators' incentives to bid high do not end with real advantages derived from tax law and willingness to reshuffle businesses with much speed and few scruples. Additional incentives for high bids come from typical structures in which general partners of LBO partnerships risk little of their own money (often less than none after fees are taken into account), yet share significantly in gains. Such arrangements are similar to the system of the race track tout. And who has ever seen a tout who didn't want his backer to make a lot of bets? To Wesco, as a non-LBO operator, the good-corporate-acquisition game was always tough. And that game in each recent year has become more like fishing for muskies at Leech Lake, in Minnesota, where the writer's earliest business partner, Ed Hoskins, had the following conversation with his Indian guide:
"Are any muskies caught in this lake?"
"More muskies are caught in this lake than in any other lake in Minnesota. This lake is famous for muskies."
"How long have you been fishing here?"
"19 years."
"And how many muskies have you caught?"
"None."
When a management has our point of view, infrequency of business acquisition may safely be predicted. Whether this happens, as we like to believe, because the game is hard for almost everyone, or merely because the game is hard for us, the result for Wesco shareholders is the same: less worthwhile activity than we all would like. But there may be one consolation: A series of big, incorrectable acquisition troubles, with no meaningful salvage, is seldom caused by people who think the acquisition game is like fishing for muskies at Leech Lake.
D. Sound Acquisition Policies
It may seem strange that we exult over a year in which we made three acquisitions, given that we have regularly used these pages to question the acquisition activities of most managers. Rest assured, Charlie and I haven't lost our skepticism: We believe most deals do damage to the shareholders of the acquiring company.
Too often, the words from HMS Pinafore apply: "Things are seldom what they seem, skim milk masquerades as cream." Specifically, sellers and their representatives invariably present financial projections having more entertainment value than educational value. In the production of rosy scenarios, Wall Street can hold its own against Washington.
In any case, why potential buyers even look at projections prepared by sellers baffles me. Charlie and I never give them a glance, but instead keep in mind the story of the man with an ailing horse.
Visiting the vet, he said: "Can you help me? Sometimes my horse walks just fine and sometimes he limps." The vet's reply was pointed: "No problem-when he's walking fine, sell him." In the world of mergers and acquisitions, that horse would be peddled as Secretariat.
At Berkshire, we have all the difficulties in perceiving the future that other acquisition-minded companies do. Like they [sic] also, we face the inherent problem that the seller of a business practically always knows far more about it than the buyer and also picks the time of sale-a time when the business is likely to be walking "just fine."
Even so, we do have a few advantages, perhaps the greatest being that we don't have a strategic plan. Thus we feel no need to proceed in an ordained direction (a course leading almost invariably to silly purchase prices) but can instead simply decide what makes sense for our owners. In doing that, we always mentally compare any move we are contemplating with dozens of other opportunities open to us, including the purchase of small pieces of the best businesses in the world via the stock market. Our practice of making this comparison-acquisitions against passive investments-is a discipline that managers focused simply on expansion seldom use.
Talking to Time Magazine a few years back, Peter Drucker got to the heart of things: "I will tell you a secret: Dealmaking beats working. Dealmaking is exciting and fun, and working is grubby.
Running anything is primarily an enormous amount of grubby detail work ... dealmaking is romantic, sexy. That's why you have deals that make no sense."
In making acquisitions, we have a further advantage: As payment, we can offer sellers a stock backed by an extraordinary collection of outstanding businesses. An individual or a family wishing to dispose of a single fine business, but also wishing to defer personal taxes indefinitely, is apt to find Berkshire stock a particularly comfortable holding. I believe, in fact, that this calculus played an important part in the two acquisitions for which we paid shares in 1995.
Beyond that, sellers sometimes care about placing their companies in a corporate home that will both endure and provide pleasant, productive working conditions for their managers. Here again, Berkshire offers something special. Our managers operate with extraordinary autonomy. Additionally, our ownership structure enables sellers to know that when I say we are buying to keep, the promise means something. For our part, we like dealing with owners who care what happens to their companies and people. A buyer is likely to find fewer unpleasant surprises dealing with that type of seller than with one simply auctioning off his business.
In addition to the foregoing being an explanation of our acquisition style, it is, of course, a not-so-subtle sales pitch. If you own or represent a business earning $25 million or more before tax, and it fits the criteria [set forth below], just give me a call. Our discussion will be confidential. And if you aren't interested now, file our proposition in the back of your mind: We are never going to lose our appetite for buying companies with good economics and excellent management.
Concluding this little dissertation on acquisitions, I can't resist repeating a tale told me last year by a corporate executive. The business he grew up in was a fine one, with a long-time record of leadership in its industry. Its main product, however, was distressingly glamorless. So several decades ago, the company hired a management consultant who-naturally-advised diversification, the then-current fad. ("Focus" was not yet in style.) Before long, the company acquired a number of businesses, each after the consulting firm had gone through a long-and expensive-acquisition study. And the outcome? Said the executive sadly, "When we started, we were getting 100% of our earnings from the original business. After ten years, we were getting 150%."
It's discouraging to note that though we have on four occasions made major purchases of companies whose sellers were represented by prominent investment banks, we were in only one of these instances contacted by the investment bank. In the other three cases, I myself or a friend initiated the transaction at some point after the investment bank had solicited its own list of prospects. We would love to see an intermediary earn its fee by thinking of us-and therefore repeat here what we're looking for:
(1) Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),
(2) Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are "turnaround" situations),
(3) Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
(4) Management in place (we can't supply it),
(5) Simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we won't understand it),
(6) An offering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer-customarily within five minutes-as to whether we're interested. (With [H.H.] Brown, we didn't even need to take five.) We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.
Our favorite form of purchase is one [in which] the company's owner-managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives, and we invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auctionlike sales: "When the phone don't ring, you'll know it's me." Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir, Champion, and American Express. We are not interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stockmarket.
E. On Selling One's Business
Most business owners spend the better part of their lifetimes building their businesses. By experience built upon endless repetition, they sharpen their skills in merchandising, purchasing, personnel selection, etc. It's a learning process, and mistakes made in one year often contribute to competence and success in succeeding years.
In contrast, owner-managers sell their business only oncefrequently in an emotionally-charged atmosphere with a multitude of pressures coming from different directions. Often, much of the pressure comes from brokers whose compensation is contingent upon consummation of a sale, regardless of its consequences for both buyer and seller. The fact that the decision is so important, both financially and personally, to the owner can make the process more, rather than less, prone to error. And, mistakes made in the once-in-a-lifetime sale of a business are not reversible.
Price is very important, but often is not the most critical aspect of the sale. You and your family have an extraordinary businessone of a kind in your field-and any buyer is going to recognize that. It's also a business that is going to get more valuable as the years go by. So if you decide not to sell now, you are very likely to realize more money later on. With that knowledge you can deal from strength and take the time required to select the buyer you want.
If you should decide to sell, I think Berkshire Hathaway offers some advantages that most other buyers do not. Practically all of these buyers will fall into one of two categories:
(1) A company located elsewhere but operating in your business or in a business somewhat akin to yours. Such a buyer-no matter what promises are made-will usually have managers who feel they know how to run your business operations and, sooner or later, will want to apply some hands-on "help." If the acquiring company is much larger, it often will have squads of managers, recruited over the years in part by promises that they will get to run future acquisitions. They will have their own way of doing things and, even though your business record undoubtedly will be far better than theirs, human nature will at some point cause them to believe that their methods of operating are superior. You and your family probably have friends who have sold their businesses to larger companies, and I suspect that their experiences will confirm the tendency of parent companies to take over the running of their subsidiaries, particularly when the parent knows the industry, or thinks it does.
(2) A financial maneuverer, invariably operating with large amounts of borrowed money, who plans to resell either to the public or to another corporation as soon as the time is favorable. Frequently, this buyer's major contribution will be to change accounting methods so that earnings can be presented in the most favorable light just prior to his bailing out. . .. This sort of transaction . . . is becoming much more frequent because of a rising stock market and the great supply of funds available for such transactions.
If the sole motive of the present owners is to cash their chips and put the business behind them-and plenty of sellers fall in this category-either type of buyer that I've just described is satisfactory. But if the sellers' business represents the creative work of a lifetime and forms an integral part of their personality and sense of being, buyers of either type have serious flaws.
Berkshire is another kind of buyer-a rather unusual one. We buy to keep, but we don't have, and don't expect to have, operating people in our parent organization. All of the businesses we own are run autonomously to an extraordinary degree. In most cases, the managers of important businesses we have owned for many years have not been to Omaha or even met each other. When we buy a business, the sellers go on running it just as they did before the sale; we adapt to their methods rather than vice versa.
We have no one-family, recently recruited MBAs, etc.-to whom we have promised a chance to run businesses we have bought from owner-managers. And we won't have.
You know of some of our past purchases. I'm enclosing a list of everyone from whom we have ever bought a business, and I invite you to check with them as to our performance versus our promises. You should be particularly interested in checking with the few whose businesses did not do well in order to ascertain how we behaved under difficult conditions.
Any buyer will tell you that he needs you personally-and if he has any brains, he most certainly does need you. But a great many buyers, for the reasons mentioned above, don't match their subsequent actions to their earlier words. We will behave exactly as promised, both because we have so promised, and because we need to in order to achieve the best business results.
This need explains why we would want the operating members of your family to retain a 20% interest in the business. We need 80% to consolidate earnings for tax purposes, which is a step important to us. It is equally important to us that the family members who run the business remain as owners. Very simply, we would not want to buy unless we felt key members of present management would stay on as our partners. Contracts cannot guarantee your continued interest; we would simply rely on your word.
The areas I get involved in are capital allocation and selection and compensation of the top man. Other personnel decisions, operating strategies, etc. are his bailiwick. Some Berkshire managers talk over some of their decisions with me; some don't. It depends upon their personalities and, to an extent, upon their own personal relationship with me.
If you should decide to do business with Berkshire, we would pay in cash. Your business would not be used as collateral for any loan by Berkshire. There would be no brokers involved.
Furthermore, there would be no chance that a deal would be announced and that the buyer would then back off or start suggesting adjustments (with apologies, of course, and with an explanation that banks, lawyers, boards of directors, etc. were to be blamed). And finally, you would know exactly with whom you are dealing. You would not have one executive negotiate the deal only to have someone else in charge a few years later, or have the president regretfully tell you that his board of directors required this change or that (or possibly required sale of your business to finance some new interest of the parent's).
It's only fair to tell you that you would be no richer after the sale than now. The ownership of your business already makes you wealthy and soundly invested. A sale would change the form of your wealth, but it wouldn't change its amount. If you sell, you will have exchanged a 100%-owned valuable asset that you understand for another valuable asset-cash-that will probably be invested in small pieces (stocks) of other businesses that you understand less well. There is often a sound reason to sell but, if the transaction is a fair one, the reason is not so that the seller can become wealthier.
I will not pester you; if you have any possible interest in selling, I would appreciate your call. I would be extraordinarily proud to have Berkshire, along with the key members of your family, own ____; I believe we would do very well financially; and I believe you would have just as much fun running the business over the next 20 years as you have had during the past 20.
Sincerely,
Warren E. Buffett
V. ACCOUNTING AND TAXATION
To those of you who are uninterested in accounting, I apologize for this dissertation. I realize that many of you do not pore over our figures, but instead hold Berkshire primarily because you know that: (1) Charlie and I have the bulk of our money in Berkshire; (2) we intend to run things so that your gains or losses are in direct proportion to ours; (3) the record has so far been satisfactory. There is nothing necessarily wrong with this kind of "faith" approach to investing. Other shareholders, however, prefer an "analysis" approach and we want to supply the information they need. In our own investing, we search for situations in which both approaches give us the same answer.
A. A Satire on Accounting Shenanigans B. Look-Through Earnings When one company owns part of another company, appropriate accounting procedures pertaining to that ownership interest must be selected from one of three major categories. The percentage of voting stock that is owned, in large part, determines which category of accounting principles should be utilized.
Generally accepted accounting principles require (subject to exceptions, naturally . . . ) full consolidation of sales, expenses, taxes, and earnings of business holdings more than 50% owned.
Blue Chip Stamps, 60% owned by Berkshire Hathaway Inc., falls into this category. Therefore, all Blue Chip income and expense items are included in full in Berkshire's Consolidated Statement of Earnings, with the 40% ownership interest of others in Blue Chip's net earnings reflected in the Statement as a deduction for "minority interest". C. Economic Goodwill Versus Accounting Goodwill Goodwill: noun: the established reputation of a business regarded as a quantifiable asset and calculated as part of its value when it is sold.
Our first lesson: businesses logically are worth far more than net tangible assets when they can be expected to produce earnings on such assets considerably in excess of market rates of return. The capitalized value of this excess return is economic Goodwill.
~ ~ ~
Before leaving this subject, we should issue an important warning: Investors are often led astray by CEOs and Wall Street analysts who equate depreciation charges with the amortization charges we have just discussed. In no way are the two the same: With rare exceptions, depreciation is an economic cost every bit as real as wages, materials, or taxes. Certainly that is true at Berkshire and at virtually all the other businesses we have studied. Furthermore, we do not think so-called EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) is a meaningful measure of performance. Managements that dismiss the importance of depreciation-and emphasize "cash flow" or EBITDA are apt to make faulty decisions, and you should keep that in mind as you make your own investment decisions. D. Owner Earnings and the Cash Flow Fallacy ...After all, what are we paying the accountants for if it is not to deliver us the "truth" about our business. But the accountants' job is to record, not to evaluate. The evaluation job falls to investors and managers.
Accounting numbers of course, are the language of business and as such are of enormous help to anyone evaluating the worth of a business and tracking its progress. Charlie and I would be lost without these numbers: they invariably are the starting point for us in evaluating our own businesses and those of others. Managers and owners need to remember, however, that accounting is but an aid to business thinking, never a substitute for it.E. Intrinsic Value, Book Value, and Market Price
[Intrinsic value is] an all-important concept that offers the only logical approach to evaluating the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses. Intrinsic value can be defined simply: It is the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life.
The calculation of intrinsic value, though, is not so simple. As our definition suggests, intrinsic value is an estimate rather than a precise figure, and it is additionally an estimate that must be changed if interest rates move or forecasts of future cash flows are revised. Two people looking at the same set of facts, moreoverand this would apply even to Charlie and me-will almost inevitably come up with at least slightly different intrinsic value figures.
That is one reason we never give you our estimates of intrinsic value. What our annual reports do supply, though, are the facts that we ourselves use to calculate this value.
Meanwhile, we regularly report our per-share book value, an easily calculable number, though one of limited use. The limitations do not arise from our holdings of marketable securities, which are carried on our books at their current prices. Rather the inadequacies of book value have to do with the companies we control, whose values as stated on our books may be far different from their intrinsic values.
You can gain some insight into the differences between book value and intrinsic value by looking at one form of investment, a college education. Think of the education's cost as its "book value." If this cost is to be accurate, it should include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he chose college rather than a job.
For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic value.
First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education.
Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever paid for the education didn't get his money's worth. In other cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.
~ ~ ~
Over the long term there has been a more consistent relationship between Berkshire's market value and business value than has existed for any other publicly-traded equity with which I am familiar. This is a tribute to you. Because you have been rational, interested, and investment-oriented, the market price for Berkshire stock has almost always been sensible. This unusual result has been achieved by a shareholder group with unusual demographics: virtually all of our shareholders are individuals, not institutions.
No other public company our size can claim the same.
~ ~ ~
Ben Graham told a story 40 years ago that illustrates why investment professionals behave as they do: An oil prospector, moving to his heavenly reward, was met by St. Peter with bad news.
"You're qualified for residence", said St. Peter, "but, as you can see, the compound reserved for oil men is packed. There's no way to squeeze you in." After thinking a moment, the prospector asked if he might say just four words to the present occupants. That seemed harmless to St. Peter, so the prospector cupped his hands and yelled, "Oil discovered in hell." Immediately the gate to the compound opened and all of the oil men marched out to head for the nether regions. Impressed, St. Peter invited the prospector to move in and make himself comfortable. The prospector paused.
"No," he said, "I think I'll go along with the rest of the boys. There might be some truth to that rumor after all."
F. Segment Data and Consolidation G. Deferred Taxes H. Retiree Benefits and Stock Options Managers thinking about accounting issues should never forget one of Abraham Lincoln's favorite riddles: "How many legs does a dog have if you call his tail a leg?" The answer: "Four, because calling a tail a leg does not make it a leg." It behooves managers to remember that Abe's right even if an auditor is willing to certify that the tail is a leg. I. Distribution of the Corporate Tax Burden
Discussion on how the Tax Reform Act of 1986 affects Berkshire.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 affects our various businesses in important and divergent ways. Although we find much to praise in the Act, the net financial effect for Berkshire is negative: our rate of increase in business value is likely to be at least moderately slower under the new law than under the old. The net effect for our shareholders is even more negative: every dollar of increase in per-share business value, assuming the increase is accompanied by an equivalent dollar gain in the market value of Berkshire stock, will produce 72¢ of after-tax gain for our shareholders rather than the 80¢ produced under the old law. This result, of course, reflects the rise in the maximum tax rate on personal capital gains from 20% to 28%. J. Taxation and Investment Philosophy
Through my favorite comic strip, Li'l Abner, I got a chance during my youth to see the benefits of delayed taxes, though I missed the lesson at the time. Making his readers feel superior, Li'l Abner bungled happily, but moronically, through life in Dogpatch.
At one point he became infatuated with a New York temptress, Appassionatta Van Climax, but despaired of marrying her because he had only a single silver dollar and she was interested solely in millionaires. Dejected, Abner took his problem to Old Man Mose, the font of all knowledge in Dogpatch. Said the sage: Double your money 20 times and Appassionatta will be yours (1, 2, 4, 8 .... 1,048,576).
My last memory of the strip is Abner entering a roadhouse, dropping his dollar into a slot machine, and hitting a jackpot that spilled money all over the floor. Meticulously following Mose's advice, Abner picked up two dollars and went off to find his next double. Whereupon I dumped Abner and began reading Ben Graham.
Mose clearly was overrated as a guru: Besides failing to anticipate Abner's slavish obedience to instructions, he also forgot about taxes. Had Abner been subject, say, to the 35% federal tax rate that Berkshire pays, and had he managed one double annually, he would after 20 years only have accumulated $22,370. Indeed, had he kept on both getting his annual doubles and paying a 35% tax on each, he would have needed 7 ½ years more to reach the $1 million required to win Appassionatta.
But what if Abner had instead put his dollar in a single investment and held it until it doubled the same 27.5 times? In that case, he would have realized about $200 million pre-tax or, after paying a $70 million tax in the final year, about $130 million after-tax. For that, Appassionatta would have crawled to Dogpatch. Of course, with 27.5 years having passed, how Appassionatta would have looked to a fellow sitting on $130 million is another question.
What this little tale tells us is that tax-paying investors will realize a far, far greater sum from a single investment that compounds internally at a given rate than from a succession of investments compounding at the same rate. But I suspect many Berkshire shareholders figured that out long ago.
EPILOGUE
We will keep most of our major holdings, regardless of how they are priced relative to intrinsic business value. This 'til-deathdo-us-part attitude, combined with the full prices these holdings command, means that they cannot be expected to push up Berkshire's value in the future as sharply as in the past. In other words, our performance to date has benefited from a double-dip:
(1) the exceptional gains in intrinsic value that our portfolio companies have achieved;
(2) the additional bonus we realized as the market appropriately "corrected" the prices of these companies, raising their valuations in relation to those of the average business.
We will continue to benefit from good gains in business value that we feel confident our portfolio companies will make. But our "catchup" rewards have been realized, which means we'll have to settle for a single-dip in the future.
We face another obstacle: In a finite world, high growth rates must self-destruct. If the base from which the growth is taking place is tiny, this law may not operate for a time. But when the base balloons, the party ends: A high growth rate eventually forges its own anchor.
Carl Sagan has entertainingly described this phenomenon, musing about the destiny of bacteria that reproduce by dividing into two every 15 minutes. Says Sagan: "That means four doublings an hour, and 96 doublings a day. Although a bacterium weighs only about a trillionth of a gram, its descendants, after a day of wild asexual abandon, will collectively weigh as much as a mountain [ ... ] in two days, more than the sun-and before very long, everything in the universe will be made of bacteria." Not to worry, says Sagan: Some obstacle always impedes this kind of exponential growth. "The bugs run out of food, or they poison each other, or they are shy about reproducing in public."
Even on bad days, Charlie Munger (Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner) and I do not think of Berkshire as a bacterium. Nor, to our unending sorrow, have we found a way to double its net worth every 15 minutes. Furthermore, we are not the least bit shy about reproducing-financially-in public. Nevertheless, Sagan's observations apply.
A fat wallet ... is the enemy of superior investment results.
And Berkshire now has a net worth of $11.9 billion compared to about $22 million when Charlie and I began to manage the company. Though there are as many good businesses as ever, it is useless for us to make purchases that are inconsequential in relation to Berkshire's capital. (As Charlie regularly reminds me, "If something is not worth doing at all, it's not worth doing welL") We now consider a security for purchase only if we believe we can deploy at least $100 million in it. Given that minimum, Berkshire's investment universe has shrunk dramatically.
Nevertheless, we will stick with the approach that got us here and try not to relax our standards. Ted Williams, in The Story of My Life, explains why: "My argument is, to be a good hitter, you've got to get a good ball to hit. It's the first rule in the book.
If I have to bite at stuff that is out of my happy zone, I'm not a .344 hitter. I might only be a .250 hitter." Charlie and I agree and will try to wait for opportunities that are well within our own "happy zone."
We will continue to ignore political and economic forecasts, which are an expensive distraction for many investors and businessmen. Thirty years ago, no one could have foreseen the huge expansion of the Vietnam War, wage and price controls, two oil shocks, the resignation of a president, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a one-day drop in the Dow of 508 points, or treasury bill yields fluctuating between 2.8% and 17.4%.
But, surprise-none of these blockbuster events made the slightest dent in Ben Graham's investment principles. Nor did they render unsound the negotiated purchases of fine businesses at sensible prices. Imagine the cost to us, then, if we had let a fear of unknowns cause us to defer or alter the deployment of capital. Indeed, we have usually made our best purchases when apprehensions about some macro event were at a peak. Fear is the foe of the faddist, but the friend of the fundamentalist.
A different set of major shocks is sure to occur in the next 30 years. We will neither try to predict these nor to profit from them.
If we can identify businesses similar to those we have purchased in the past, external surprises will have little effect on our long-term results.
What we promise you-along with more modest gains-is that during your ownership of Berkshire, you will fare just as Charlie and I do. If you suffer, we will suffer; if we prosper, so will you.
And we will not break this bond by introducing compensation arrangements that give us a greater participation in the upside than the downside.
We further promise you that our personal fortunes will remain overwhelmingly concentrated in Berkshire shares: We will not ask you to invest with us and then put our own money elsewhere. In addition, Berkshire dominates both the investment portfolios of most members of our families and of a great many friends who belonged to partnerships that Charlie and I ran in the 1960's. We could not be more motivated to do our best.....
We achieved our gains through the efforts of a superb corps of operating managers who get extraordinary results from some ordinary-appearing businesses. Casey Stengel described managing a baseball team as "getting paid for home runs other fellows hit."
That's my formula at Berkshire, also.....
It's far better to own a significant portion of the Hope diamond than 100% of a rhinestone, and the companies just mentioned easily qualify as rare gems. Best of all, we aren't limited to simply a few of this breed, but instead possess a growing collection.
Stock prices will continue to fluctuate-sometimes sharplyand the economy will have its ups and downs. Over time, however, we believe it is highly probable that the sort of businesses we own will continue to increase in value at a satisfactory rate.
I think it's appropriate that I conclude with a discussion of Berkshire's management, today and in the future. As our first owner-related principle tells you, Charlie and I are the managing partners of Berkshire. But we subcontract all of the heavy lifting in this business to the managers of our subsidiaries. In fact, we delegate almost to the point of abdication: Though Berkshire has about 33,000 employees, only 12 of these are at headquarters.
Charlie and I mainly attend to capital allocation and the care and feeding of our key managers. Most of these managers are happiest when they are left alone to run their businesses, and that is customarily just how we leave them. That puts them in charge of all operating decisions and of dispatching the excess cash they generate to headquarters. By sending it to us, they don't get diverted by the various enticements that would come their way were they responsible for deploying the cash their businesses throw off. Furthermore, Charlie and I are exposed to a much wider range of possibilities for investing these funds than any of our managers could find in his or her own industry.
Most of our managers are independently wealthy, and it's therefore up to us to create a climate that encourages them to choose working with Berkshire over golfing or fishing. This leaves us needing to treat them fairly and in the manner that we would wish to be treated if our positions were reversed.
As for the allocation of capital, that's an activity both Charlie and I enjoy and in which we have acquired some useful experience.
In a general sense, grey hair doesn't hurt on this playing field: You don't need good hand-eye coordination or well-toned muscles to push money around (thank heavens). As long as our minds continue to function effectively, Charlie and I can keep on doing our jobs pretty much as we have in the past.
On my death, Berkshire's ownership picture will change but not in a disruptive way: First, only about 1% of my stock will have to be sold to take care of bequests and taxes; second, the balance of my stock will go to my wife, Susan, if she survives me, or to a family foundation if she doesn't. In either event, Berkshire will possess a controlling shareholder guided by the same philosophy and objectives that now set our course.
At that juncture, the Buffett family will not be involved in managing the business, only in picking and overseeing the managers who do. Just who those managers will be, of course, depends on the date of my death. But I can anticipate what the management structure will be: Essentially my job will be split into two parts, with one executive becoming responsible for investments and another for operations. If the acquisition of new businesses is in prospect, the two will cooperate in making the decisions needed.
Both executives will report to a board of directors that will be responsive to the controlling shareholder, whose interests will in turn be aligned with yours.
Were we to need the management structure I have just described on an immediate basis, my family and a few key individuals know who I would pick to fill both posts. Both currently work for Berkshire and are people in whom I have total confidence.
I will continue to keep my family posted on the succession issue. Since Berkshire stock will make up virtually my entire estate and will account for a similar portion of the assets of either my wife or the foundation for a considerable period after my death, you can be sure that I have thought through the succession question carefully. You can be equally sure that the principles we have employed to date in running Berkshire will continue to guide the managers who succeed me.
Lest we end on a morbid note, I also want to assure you that I have never felt better. I love running Berkshire, and if enjoying life promotes longevity, Methuselah's record is in jeopardy.
