Showing posts with label Business Standard. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Business Standard. Show all posts

Thursday, August 13, 2026

RBI Holds Repo Rate at 5.25%: What the Pause Means for Home Loan Borrowers

See All Articles

RBI Holds Repo Rate at 5.25%: What the Pause Means for Home Loan Borrowers

If you were hoping for another cut in your home loan EMI, the Reserve Bank of India has asked you to wait a little longer. In its latest Monetary Policy Committee meeting, the RBI kept the repo rate unchanged at 5.25%, citing domestic economic conditions, inflation trends, and global uncertainties. The decision is a pause, not a surprise, but it leaves millions of borrowers asking the same question: what now?

A Pause, Not a Surprise

The RBI's decision to hold the repo rate at 5.25% reflects a central bank that is choosing stability over further stimulus. According to the RBI's latest MPC statement, the pause comes after assessing a mix of domestic inflation pressures and an uncertain global environment. Industry experts quoted by Business Standard note that the central bank now appears focused on ensuring that past rate cuts are fully passed on by banks rather than rushing into another reduction.

That focus on transmission is important. The RBI has already delivered significant relief over the past year, and the current hold signals that the central bank wants to consolidate those gains before considering further easing. For anyone expecting a quick follow-up cut, the message is clear: the emergency phase of aggressive loosening is over.

What the Hold Means for Your Home Loan

For most borrowers, the immediate answer is not much. Since a large share of home loans in India are linked to benchmarks such as the repo rate, your EMI is likely to remain unchanged for now. Banks are expected to keep lending rates broadly stable unless liquidity conditions change significantly. For those with fixed-rate home loans, there is no immediate impact either.

But that does not mean borrowers are stuck. If your existing loan carries a much higher interest rate than the current market range, you could consider refinancing or making part prepayments to reduce your overall interest burden over time. A stable rate environment is actually a good moment to renegotiate or restructure, because the base rate is unlikely to move sharply in the near term.

The Context: 125 Basis Points of Relief Since Early 2025

While there is no fresh relief this time, borrowers have already benefited significantly. Since early 2025, the RBI has cut the repo rate by a cumulative 125 basis points, according to data reported by Business Standard. That has reduced borrowing costs for many floating-rate home loans. Home loan rates are still hovering around 7% to 7.25% for many eligible borrowers, making borrowing cheaper than it was a few years ago.

This context matters. A pause after such a substantial easing cycle is not unusual. Central banks often take a wait-and-see approach after a series of cuts to gauge the impact on credit growth, consumption, and inflation. The RBI's current stance suggests that it believes the cumulative cuts are sufficient for now, and that the bigger challenge is ensuring those cuts actually reach borrowers through lower lending rates.

Should Homebuyers Be Worried? Not Immediately

A stable interest rate environment gives borrowers greater certainty while planning long-term finances. For prospective homebuyers, the current rate environment remains relatively favourable. If you already have a floating-rate home loan, your EMI is likely to stay where it is, which means no sudden upward shock. That predictability is valuable in a volatile global economy.

The RBI's decision to hold rates also suggests that the central bank is not seeing an urgent need to tighten, which would have been a far more worrying signal for the housing market. The absence of a hike is itself a form of support, even if it does not feel like fresh relief.

The Road Ahead: Inflation and Global Risks

For now, the outlook remains stable, but there are risks on the horizon. Global uncertainty, higher fuel prices, and rising input costs are keeping inflation under pressure. The RBI has now raised its inflation forecast for FY27 to 5%, according to the latest MPC statement. That upward revision is a clear signal that the central bank is not comfortable with the price trajectory.

What does this mean for borrowers? No fresh relief, but no fresh burden either. The lower rates delivered over the past year are likely to stay in place for some time, giving households a window of stability. The next move, whenever it comes, will depend on how quickly inflation cools and whether global headwinds ease.

Facts

- Repo rate held at 5.25% in the latest RBI Monetary Policy Committee meeting.

- Cumulative repo rate cuts since early 2025: 125 basis points.

- Typical home loan rate for eligible borrowers: 7% to 7.25%.

- RBI's inflation forecast for FY27 raised to 5%.

- Most home loans in India are linked to benchmarks such as the repo rate.

- Fixed-rate home loans see no immediate impact from the current hold.

Criticisms

- The RBI's pause prioritizes inflation optics over borrower relief, leaving millions of homeowners with EMIs that could have fallen further if transmission had been faster.

- By raising its inflation forecast to 5% while holding rates, the central bank signals a tolerance for sustained price pressure that contradicts its own mandate of price stability.

- Citing global uncertainty without offering a clear timeline for future cuts leaves borrowers in a state of limbo, unable to plan long-term finances with confidence.

- The RBI's focus on ensuring past rate cuts are passed on shifts responsibility to banks, but the central bank itself holds the primary lever for meaningful additional relief and has chosen not to use it.

Monday, August 3, 2026

The French Fine That Rekindled a Firestorm: Infosys, Labour Compliance, and the Shadow of the 70-Hour Workweek

See All Articles

The French Fine That Rekindled a Firestorm: Infosys, Labour Compliance, and the Shadow of the 70-Hour Workweek

Nearly three years after Infosys founder N.R. Narayana Murthy urged India’s youth to work 70 hours a week, the IT giant has again found itself in the crosshairs of a labour debate. This time, however, the controversy didn’t erupt in a Bangalore boardroom or on social media. It arrived quietly, in the form of a €175,000 fine from French regulators. The reason? A time recording system that fell short of France’s exacting labour laws. The incident has forced a conversation many Indian tech firms would rather avoid: are we compliant not just with the spirit of global work rules, but with the letter of the law?

What Exactly Happened in France?

In a regulatory order that attracted little fanfare in India initially, France’s regional labour authority fined Infosys around ₹2 crore for shortcomings in its employee time recording system. Crucially, the infraction had nothing to do with overworking staff. The French inspectors pointed to gaps in reliability, auditability, and monitoring—particularly for certain unspecified categories of employees. As Business Standard reported, the system simply did not meet the mandated standards for tracking working hours, overtime, and rest periods.

Infosys, for its part, has downplayed the fine’s impact, stating it will not materially affect financials or operations. The company has not disclosed which employee segments were involved or whether it must overhaul its systems. But the damage to its image as a global compliance-first player has already been done.

France’s 35-Hour Fortress

To understand the severity of the fine—modest as the sum might seem for a billion-dollar company—one must look at France’s labour regime. The country’s 35-hour statutory workweek, introduced in 2000, is among Europe’s most protective. Employers must keep “precise, reliable, and auditable” records of every employee’s daily and weekly hours, breaks, and overtime. The law isn’t just about capping work; it’s about making working time transparent and contestable. As French labour code articles L3171-1 to L3171-4 mandate, these records must be accessible to labour inspectors at any moment.

In this context, a deficient monitoring tool isn’t a minor administrative lapse. It’s a structural failure that undermines the very enforcement mechanism of working hour limits. Infosys, with a significant presence in France serving European clients, should have been acutely aware of these obligations.

The 70-Hour Echo

Why did a relatively small fine reignite a dormant culture war? The answer lies in the remarks that still haunt the Infosys founder. In 2023, Murthy famously invoked China’s 9-9-6 culture (9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days a week) and argued that India’s youth must embrace a 70-hour routine to compete globally. The comments sparked a furious nationwide debate about burnout, productivity, and worker dignity.

So when news broke that Infosys had been penalised for flimsy time recording, it became a symbolic moment. Critics saw it as proof that the IT industry’s high-intensity work rhetoric often masks a reluctance to respect worker protections. Others, more fairly, note that the two issues are distinct: the French fine is about compliance mechanics, not about forcing overtime. Yet the overlap in public consciousness is telling. Any labour-related slip by Infosys now carries the weight of Murthy’s words.

A Compliance Wake-Up Call for Indian IT

The episode is less an indictment of a single company and more a mirror to the Indian IT sector’s patchy approach to overseas labour compliance. Indian firms have long thrived on flexibility and cost arbitrage, but as they expand deeper into regulated European markets, the old habits of ad-hoc time reporting or managerial discretion on logging hours become liabilities.

French regulators are not known for leniency. In 2022, a Japanese company in France was fined €50,000 for similar record-keeping lapses. The Infosys fine, though larger, is still a drop in the ocean. Yet reputational costs could be far higher. Clients in banking and insurance, where Infosys derives a huge chunk of revenue, are extremely sensitive to compliance risks. A single overlooked audit trail can jeopardise contracts.

The case also highlights a blind spot: the assumption that digital time recording automatically equates to compliance. Software without proper configuration, audit trails, or integration into managerial workflows is worse than a paper register—it creates an illusion of control. French inspectors are trained to probe exactly that illusion.

Facts

  • France’s labour authority fined Infosys €175,000 (~₹2 crore) for a time recording system that did not meet French standards of reliability and auditability.
  • The fine is not for employee overwork but for systemic shortcomings in tracking hours, overtime, and rest breaks.
  • France enforces a statutory 35-hour workweek with strict record-keeping duties under labour code articles L3171-1 to L3171-4.
  • Infosys maintains the penalty will have no material impact on its finances or operations.
  • Narayana Murthy’s 2023 call for a 70-hour workweek had earlier triggered a polarised debate on work culture in India.

Criticisms

  • Infosys’s failure to implement a robust time recording system in a highly regulated market shows a cavalier attitude toward local labour laws, despite decades of European operations.
  • By not disclosing which employee groups were affected, the company has avoided transparency, leaving workers and investors guessing about the depth of the compliance gap.
  • Narayana Murthy’s glorification of a 70-hour workweek distracts from the real, enforceable rights of employees—such as accurate time records that prevent wage theft and burnout.
  • The IT industry’s tendency to frame labour compliance as a bureaucratic nuisance rather than a fundamental duty perpetuates a culture where shortcuts are normalised, even in nations with strong worker protections.
  • French regulators, too, must ensure that fines are not merely symbolic; a €175,000 penalty for a firm with over $18 billion in revenue risks being dismissed as a cost of doing business, rather than prompting systemic change.

Wednesday, July 15, 2026

How does India calculate GDP? #gdp #indianeconomy #businessnews

See All Articles

Every quarter, the GDP growth figure lands with a thud on newsroom desks across India. An 8.2% here, a 5.4% there — each number triggers a frenzy of political chest-thumping or opposition hand-wringing. Stock markets twitch. Columnists sharpen their pens. Yet behind this single percentage point sits one of the most ambitious statistical undertakings on the planet. How exactly does a country of 1.4 billion people, with its sprawling informal economy, its millions of unregistered enterprises, and its chaotic marketplace energy, condense all economic life into one tidy number?

The answer is neither simple nor wholly satisfying.

The Architects of the Number

The institution charged with this impossible task is the National Statistical Office, or NSO. It falls under the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation and represents the statistical backbone of the Indian state. The NSO does not — because it cannot — track every rupee that changes hands. What it does instead is arguably more interesting: it constructs a giant, carefully weighted mosaic from thousands of disparate data fragments, each one a proxy for some slice of economic reality.

The Data Mosaic

Consider the sheer variety of sources the NSO draws upon. It collects production volumes from registered factories under the Annual Survey of Industries. It gathers crop output estimates from agricultural departments across states. It taps into the Index of Industrial Production, bank credit and deposit figures, telecom subscriber data, GST collections, vehicle registrations, cargo handled at ports, passenger traffic across railways and airlines — each dataset a thread in a larger tapestry. Tax records offer one lens. Corporate balance sheets offer another. Government expenditure accounts provide a third.

Economists then weave these threads together using a framework called the System of National Accounts — an internationally standardized methodology endorsed by the United Nations. The goal is to estimate the total value of goods and services produced within India's borders during a given period. That figure, Gross Domestic Product, becomes the headline.

But here is where the story gets murkier.

The Art of Estimation

What many outside the policy world fail to grasp is that the first GDP numbers released each quarter are precisely that — first estimates. They are not carved in stone. They are constructed from whatever partial data is available in the weeks following the quarter's end. Some datasets lag by months. The informal sector, which by some estimates still accounts for nearly half of India's economic output and an even larger share of employment, remains stubbornly opaque. Small businesses, street vendors, household enterprises — much of this activity leaves no formal paper trail.

So the NSO models. It extrapolates. It plugs gaps with benchmark indicators and past trends. As the Central Statistics Office itself has noted in its methodological documents, these early estimates rely heavily on "available data" and "trend extrapolation" for sectors where hard numbers are scarce. Months later, as more complete information streams in — full-year corporate returns, final tax filings, detailed agricultural surveys — the GDP figure gets revised. Sometimes the revisions are marginal. Occasionally they are significant enough to alter the entire growth narrative. A celebrated 7% quarter can quietly become 6.2% a year later, long after the headlines have faded.

A Moving Target

And then there is the base. Every few years, the entire statistical architecture gets recalibrated. India recently updated its GDP base year to 2022-23, shifting from the earlier 2011-12 benchmark. Why does this matter? Because an economy's structure changes over time. In 2011-12, smartphones were a luxury item and digital payments a novelty. By 2022-23, the consumption basket, the industrial composition, and the very nature of economic transactions had fundamentally shifted. A base-year revision updates the weights assigned to different sectors, incorporates newer and more accurate data sources — including, increasingly, administrative and digital records — and brings previously undercounted or miscounted activities into sharper focus. The MCA-21 database of corporate filings, for instance, now plays a much larger role in the estimation process than it did during the earlier base-year regime.

Beyond the Calculator

Understanding all this reframes what GDP actually represents. It is not — and has never been — a giant national calculator tallying every paisa in real time. It is a massive, iterative, and deeply human statistical exercise. It relies on judgment calls, methodological choices, and the perpetual struggle to capture an economy that refuses to sit still for its portrait. The number that sparks so much political drama is, at its core, an educated approximation — sophisticated, constantly improving, but an approximation nonetheless.

This is not an argument for dismissing GDP. It remains an indispensable tool for policy-making, for international comparison, and for understanding the broad trajectory of material life. But its authority deserves a healthy dose of skepticism, especially when wielded as a blunt instrument in partisan debate. The next time a politician declares victory based on a quarterly growth print, the informed citizen might ask: which estimate, based on what data, and with what confidence interval?

Facts

  • The National Statistical Office (NSO), under the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, is responsible for compiling India's GDP figures.
  • India's GDP is estimated using the System of National Accounts framework, an internationally standardized methodology endorsed by the United Nations.
  • The first quarterly GDP figures are preliminary estimates that undergo multiple rounds of revision as more complete data becomes available.
  • India recently updated its GDP base year to 2022-23 from the previous 2011-12 benchmark.
  • Data sources for GDP estimation include factory production surveys, agricultural output reports, GST collections, corporate filings via the MCA-21 database, bank credit figures, telecom data, vehicle registrations, port cargo statistics, and government expenditure accounts.
  • Base-year revisions update sectoral weights and incorporate newer data sources to reflect structural changes in the economy.

Criticisms

  • The government and the NSO have consistently failed to adequately address the massive undercounting of India's informal economy, which still employs a majority of the workforce and generates nearly half of economic output.
  • Political leaders across parties routinely weaponize preliminary GDP estimates as definitive proof of economic success or failure, deliberately ignoring the provisional nature of early numbers.
  • The NSO has not been transparent enough about the uncertainty ranges attached to its GDP estimates, giving the public a false sense of precision.
  • Successive governments have delayed base-year revisions when politically inconvenient, undermining the statistical credibility of the GDP series.
  • News media outlets report quarterly GDP figures as finished facts rather than provisional estimates, feeding a cycle of misinformation and shallow analysis.
  • The reliance on formal-sector proxies like GST and corporate filings systematically underrepresents economic distress in the unorganized sector, making GDP growth an increasingly poor measure of broad-based economic well-being.

Tuesday, July 14, 2026

Freebies Are Not India’s Fiscal Villain — The Real Problem Is How States Pay for Them

See All Articles

Freebies Are Not India’s Fiscal Villain — The Real Problem Is How States Pay for Them

Every election season, a familiar script plays out. Political parties dangle cash transfers, free electricity, and subsidized services before voters, while commentators sound the alarm: India’s states are hurtling toward a debt crisis, driven by populist freebies. But the widely accepted narrative masks a more complex reality. When you look beyond the political noise and examine the data, India’s state finances tell a story that is both reassuring and deeply troubling — not because of the freebies themselves, but because of the way they are being financed.

The Fiscal Deficit Mirage

For years, the combined fiscal deficit of all states has hovered around the 3% of GDP mark, excluding the pandemic shock. That’s well within the borrowing limits set by fiscal responsibility laws. If you stop there, the alarm bells seem false. States, as a whole, appear disciplined. But focusing on the headline deficit is misleading. To understand the real fiscal health, you have to dig into how the borrowing is being used.

Revenue vs. Capital: The Crucial Divide

Borrowing to build a road, a hospital, or an irrigation project is fundamentally different from borrowing to pay salaries, pensions, or welfare bills. The first creates assets that can spur future growth and generate returns. The second simply finances today’s consumption. This is where the concept of the revenue deficit comes in — the gap between a state’s current income and its current spending. A state that runs a revenue deficit is effectively taking on debt to cover its day-to-day expenses. A state with a revenue surplus, even if it has a high fiscal deficit, is borrowing primarily for capital formation.

The good news is that, taken together, Indian states have kept their combined revenue deficit below 1% of GDP for most of the past fifteen years, and they even ran a revenue surplus for three of those years. This aggregate picture suggests that much of the borrowing has been channelled into productive assets. But national aggregates are dangerous things; they hide glaring state-level fissures.

The Stark Divides Between States

A handful of states — Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, West Bengal, Kerala, and Rajasthan — stand out. Their debt levels are well above the comfort zone, and most of them are also running sizable revenue deficits. That means a significant portion of their borrowing is being consumed by salaries, pensions, and interest payments, leaving very little room for capital spending. It is in these states that the warning about freebies begins to find real traction, because welfare promises are increasingly being met through borrowed money rather than through tax buoyancy or expenditure rationalisation.

Contrast that with Odisha. On the surface, Odisha projects a relatively high fiscal deficit, yet it has consistently maintained a revenue surplus for years. It funds its welfare schemes largely from its own revenues. The fiscal deficit, in Odisha’s case, is a sign of investment, not profligacy. Maharashtra presents yet another picture: its total debt is still within manageable limits, but its revenue deficit has been swelling, partly due to welfare spending. It’s a warning sign that even a relatively comfortable state can drift into precarious territory if it loses sight of the revenue-capital distinction.

The lesson here is blunt: freebies alone do not determine a state’s fiscal health. What matters is the quality of the financing behind them.

The Rapid Rise of Unconditional Cash Transfers

This distinction has become urgent because of the breakneck expansion of unconditional cash transfer schemes. Their combined cost has skyrocketed from just 0.01% of GDP in FY21 to a projected 0.57% in FY26. The number of states offering such schemes has grown from one to twelve in the same period. Every new promise widens the scrutiny on state finances, because the fiscal room to accommodate these doles must come from somewhere. If they are paid for out of buoyant revenues, they remain sustainable. If they are added to an already strained revenue account, they accelerate the drift toward a debt trap.

The Real Debate

Political discourse habitually frames freebies as the villain. But that framing is lazy. The real fracture line is not between welfare and no welfare, but between states that have the revenue capacity to fund their promises and those that resort to borrowing for consumption. As long as the public debate remains stuck on the morality or electoral appeal of freebies, it misses the more urgent structural question: how can India’s federal fiscal architecture penalise revenue-deficit financing and reward states that maintain a clean revenue account? Until then, the aggregate numbers will keep lulling us into complacency while individual states silently steer toward a cliff. The real freebie, it turns out, is the lack of honesty about the quality of public finances.

Facts

  • The combined fiscal deficit of Indian states has remained around 3% of GDP for over a decade, except during the pandemic.
  • States have kept their combined revenue deficit below 1% of GDP for most of the last fifteen years, and even ran a revenue surplus for three years.
  • Highly indebted states like Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, West Bengal, Kerala, and Rajasthan are running sizable revenue deficits.
  • Odisha has projected a high fiscal deficit but has consistently maintained a revenue surplus.
  • Maharashtra’s debt is still manageable, but its revenue deficit has been rising.
  • The cost of unconditional cash transfers by states rose from 0.01% of GDP in FY21 to 0.57% in FY26; the number of states offering such schemes increased from 1 to 12.

Criticisms

  • You, the political class, weaponise freebies as a vote-buying mechanism without coupling them with the revenue reforms needed to foot the bill sustainably.
  • State governments whose finances are frayed hide behind the comfortable all-states average, dodging accountability for their revenue deficits.
  • Mainstream commentary and media coverage routinely equate all welfare spending with fiscal irresponsibility, ignoring the fundamental difference between capital investment and revenue consumption.
  • The current fiscal responsibility framework fails to penalise revenue-deficit financing strongly enough, creating a moral hazard that rewards short-term populism.
  • No central agency or institution provides a clear, standardised public metric that separates states borrowing for assets from states borrowing for salaries — a gap that lets fiscal decay fester in plain sight.