Showing posts with label Psychology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Psychology. Show all posts

Saturday, October 28, 2023

Buddhism Books (Oct 2023)

Download Books
1.
The Heart of the Buddha's Teaching
Thich Nhat Hanh, 1997

2.
What the Buddha Taught
Walpola Rahula Thero, 1959

3.
The Miracle of Mindfulness
Thich Nhat Hanh, 1975

4.
Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind
Shunryū Suzuki, 1970

5.
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance
Robert M. Pirsig, 1974

6.
Buddha's Teachings
The Buddha, 1995

7.
When Things Fall Apart
Pema Chödrön, 1996

8.
Why Buddhism Is True
Robert Wright, 2017

9.
Think Like a Monk: Train Your Mind for Peace and Purpose Every Day
Jay Shetty, 2020

10.
How to Be an Adult in Relationships: The Five Keys to Mindful Loving
David Richo, 2002

11.
Dhammapada
2018

12.
The Way of Zen
Alan Watts, 1957

13.
No Mud, No Lotus: The Art of Transforming Suffering
Thich Nhat Hanh, 2014

14.
Buddhism for Beginners
Thubten Chodron, 2001

15.
The Things You Can See Only When You Slow Down: How to Be Calm in a Busy World
Haemin Sunim, 2017

16.
Mindfulness in Plain English: 20th Anniversary Edition
Henepola Gunaratana, 2010

17.
Peace Is Every Step
Thich Nhat Hanh, 1990

18.
Fear: Essential Wisdom for Getting Through the Storm
Thich Nhat Hanh, 2012

19.
Buddhism Plain and Simple
Steve Hagen, 1997

20.
The Buddha and His Dhamma
Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, 1957

21.
Bardo Thodol
1927

22.
The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying
Sogyal Rinpoche, 1992

23.
No-Nonsense Buddhism for Beginners: Clear Answers to Burning Questions about Core Buddhist Teachings
Noah Rasheta, 2018

24.
Siddhartha
Hermann Hesse, 1922

25.
The Heart of the Buddha's Teaching: Transforming Suffering Into Peace, Joy, and Liberation
Thich Nhat Hanh, 2014

26.
You Are Here: Discovering the Magic of the Present Moment
Thich Nhat Hanh, 2009

27.
Cutting Through Spiritual Materialism
Chögyam Trungpa, 1973

28.
Big Panda and Tiny Dragon
James Norbury, 2020

29.
The Book of Joy
Desmond Tutu, 2016

30.
The Essence of Buddha: The Path to Enlightenment
Ryūhō Ōkawa, 2000

31.
The Words of My Perfect Teacher: A Complete Translation of a Classic Introduction to Tibetan Buddhism
Patrul Rinpoche, 1991

32.
Being Peace
Thich Nhat Hanh, 1987

33.
The Art of Happiness
14th Dalai Lama, 1998

34.
Living Buddha, Living Christ
Thich Nhat Hanh, 1995

35.
Radical Acceptance: Embracing Your Life with the Heart of a Buddha
Tara Brach, 2003

36.
Introducing Buddha: A Graphic Guide
Borin Van Loon, 1999

37.
In the Buddha's Words: An Anthology of Discourses from the Pali Canon
2005

38.
The Buddha In Daily Life: An Introduction to the Buddhism of Nichiren Daishonin
Richard Causton, 1995

39.
BUDDHA: Spirituality For Leadership & Success
Pranay, 2020

40.
The Wisdom of Insecurity
Alan Watts, 1951

41.
Buddhism Without Beliefs
Stephen Batchelor, 1997

42.
The Art of Living
Thich Nhat Hanh, 2017

43.
Introduction to the History of Indian Buddhism
Eugène Burnouf, 1844

44.
Why We Meditate: 7 Simple Practices for a Calmer Mind
Daniel Goleman, 2022

45.
Happy Money: The Japanese Art of Making Peace with Your Money
Ken Honda, 2019

46.
The Places That Scare You
Pema Chödrön, 2001

47.
Ashoka: Portrait of a Philosopher King
Patrick Olivelle, 2023

48.
Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks: Collected Papers on the Archaeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India
Gregory Schopen, 1997

49.
How We Live Is How We Die
Pema Chödrön, 2022

50.
Start Where You Are: A Guide to Compassionate Living
Pema Chödrön, 1994
Tags: List of Books,Emotional Intelligence,Psychology,

Wednesday, September 13, 2023

Summary of Maps of Meaning. Architecture of Belief (Part 1 of 2)

Book by Jordan B. Peterson

Broad Outline

The very high level and broad outline of the book is as follows:
The first chapter talks about the ideas of understanding the world as 'a place of things' and as a 'forum for action'. There it talks a bit about modeling the world around three questions:
1. What is?
2. What should be?
3. How should we therefore act?

Second chapter elaborates on the ideas of analyzing the world in terms of:
1. The unknown
2. The exploration
3. The known
Then the chapter looks at it from the lense of mythology and relates:
The unknown with The Great Mother
The known with The Great Father
And the explorer with The Archetypal Son

Third chapter talks about how new members (adults and children) are involved into a religion, under the umbrella of myths.

Preface

'A Place of Things' And 'A Forum for Action'

The world can be validly construed as a forum for action, as well as a place of things.

We describe the world as a place of things, using the formal methods of science. The techniques of narrative, however—myth, literature and drama—portray the world as a forum for action.

The two forms of representation have been unnecessarily set at odds, because we have not yet formed a clear picture of their respective domains.

The domain of the former view (A place of things) is the objective world—what is, from the perspective of intersubjective perception.

The domain of the latter view (a forum for action) is the world of value—what is and what should be, from the perspective of emotion and action.

A Forum For Action

The world as forum for action is composed, essentially, of three constituent elements, which tend to manifest themselves in typical patterns of metaphoric representation.

First is unexplored territory—the Great Mother, nature, creative and destructive, source and final resting place of all determinate things.

Second is explored territory—the Great Father, culture, protective and tyrannical, cumulative ancestral wisdom.

Third is the process that mediates between unexplored and explored territory—the Divine Son, the archetypal individual, the creative, the exploratory, and the vengeful adversary.

The Unknown, The Known and The Explorer

We are adapted to this world of divine characters, much as to the objective world.

The fact of this adaptation implies that the environment is in “reality” a forum for action, as well as a place of things.

Unprotected exposure to unexplored territory produces fear.

The individual is protected from such fear as a consequence of ritual imitation of the Great Father—as a consequence of the adoption of group identity, which restricts the meaning of things, and confers predictability on social interactions.

When identification with the group is made absolute, however—when everything has to be controlled, when the unknown is no longer allowed to exist—the creative exploratory process that updates the group can no longer manifest itself. This restriction of adaptive capacity dramatically increases the probability of social aggression.

Rejection of the unknown is tantamount to “identification with the devil,” the mythological counterpart and eternal adversary of the world-creating exploratory hero. Such rejection and identification is a consequence of Luciferian pride, which states: all that I know is all that is necessary to know. This pride is totalitarian assumption of omniscience—is adoption of God's place by “reason”—is something that inevitably generates a state of personal and social being indistinguishable from hell. This hell develops because creative exploration—impossible, without (humble) acknowledgment of the unknown—constitutes the process that constructs and maintains the protective adaptive structure that gives life much of its acceptable meaning.

Role of Personal Interest in Maintenance of The Group

“Identification with the devil” amplifies the dangers inherent in group identification, which tends of its own accord towards pathological stultification. Loyalty to personal interest-subjective meaning—can serve as an antidote to the overwhelming temptation constantly posed by the possibility of denying anomaly.

Personal interest—subjective meaning—reveals itself at the juncture of explored and unexplored territory, and is indicative of participation in the process that ensures continued healthy individual and societal adaptation.

Loyalty to personal interest is equivalent to identification with the archetypal hero—the “savior”—who upholds his association with the creative Word in the face of death, and despite group pressure to conform. Identification with the hero serves to decrease the unbearable motivational valence of the unknown; furthermore, provides the individual with a standpoint that simultaneously transcends and maintains the group.

Chapter 1: Maps of Experience

Object and Meaning

The world can be validly construed as forum for action, or as place of things.

The former manner of interpretation-more primordial, and less clearly understood-finds its expression in the arts or humanities, in ritual, drama, literature and mythology.

The world as forum for action is a place of value, a place where all things have meaning.

This meaning, which is shaped as a consequence of social interaction, is implication for action, or - at a higher level of analysis - implication for the configuration of the interpretive schema that produces or guides action.

A Place of Things

The latter manner of interpretation - the world as place of things - finds its formal expression in the methods and theories of science.

Science allows for increasingly precise determination of the consensually validatable properties of things, and for efficient utilization of precisely determined things as tools (once the direction such use is to take has been determined, through application of more fundamental narrative processes).

No complete world-picture can be generated without use of both modes (a forum for action and a place of things) of construal.

The fact that one mode is generally set at odds with the other means only that the nature of their respective domains remains insufficiently discriminated. Adherents of the mythological worldview tend to regard the statements of their creeds as indistinguishable from empirical “fact,” even though such statements were generally formulated long before the notion of objective reality emerged. Those who, by contrast, accept the scientific perspective—who assume that it is, or might become, complete-forget that an impassable gulf currently divides what is from what should be.

Four things we need to know

We need to know four things:

what there is,

what to do about what there is,

that there is a difference between knowing what there is, and knowing what to do about what there is

and what that difference is.

What there is

To explore something, to “discover what it is”—that means most importantly to discover its significance for motor output, within a particular social context, and only more particularly to determine its precise objective sensory or material nature. This is knowledge in the most basic of senses—and often constitutes sufficient knowledge.

What to do about what there is

Imagine that a baby girl, toddling around in the course of her initial tentative investigations, reaches up onto a countertop to touch a fragile and expensive glass sculpture. She observes its color, sees its shine, feels that it is smooth and cold and heavy to the touch. Suddenly her mother interferes, grasps her hand, tells her not to ever touch that object. The child has just learned a number of specifically consequential things about the sculpture—has identified its sensory properties, certainly. More importantly, however, she has determined that approached in the wrong manner, the sculpture is dangerous (at least in the presence of mother); has discovered as well that the sculpture is regarded more highly, in its present unaltered configuration, than the exploratory tendency—at least (once again) by mother. The baby girl has simultaneously encountered an object, from the empirical perspective, and its socioculturally determined status. The empirical object might be regarded as those sensory properties “intrinsic” to the object. The status of the object, by contrast, consists of its meaning—consists of its implication for behavior. Everything a child encounters has this dual nature, experienced by the child as part of a unified totality. Everything is something, and means something—and the distinction between essence and significance is not necessarily drawn.

Analysis of mythology

Proper analysis of mythology is not mere discussion of “historical” events enacted upon the world stage (as the traditionally religious might have it), and it is not mere investigation of primitive belief (as the traditionally scientific might presume). It is, instead, the examination, analysis and subsequent incorporation of an edifice of meaning, which contains within it hierarchical organization of experiential valence. The mythic imagination is concerned with the world in the manner of the phenomenologist, who seeks to discover the nature of subjective reality, instead of concerning himself with description of the objective world. Myth, and the drama that is part of myth, provide answers in image to the following question: “how can the current state of experience be conceptualized in abstraction, with regards to its meaning?” [which means its (subjective, biologically predicated, socially constructed) emotional relevance or motivational significance].

Meaning means implication for behavioral output; logically, therefore, myth presents information relevant to the most fundamental of moral problems: “what should be? (what should be done?)” The desirable future (the object of what should be) can be conceptualized only in relationship to the present, which serves at least as a necessary point of contrast and comparison. To get somewhere in the future presupposes being somewhere in the present; furthermore, the desirability of the place traveled to depends on the valence of the place vacated.

The Three Questions

The question of “what should be?” (what line should be traveled?) therefore has contained within it, so to speak, three subqueries, which might be formulated as follows:

1) What is? What is the nature (meaning, the significance) of the current state of experience?

2) What should be? To what (desirable, valuable) end should that state be moving?

3) How should we therefore act? What is the nature of the specific processes by which the present state might be transformed into that which is desired?

What should be?

Active apprehension of the goal of behavior, conceptualized in relationship to the interpreted present, serves to constrain or provide determinate framework for the evaluation of ongoing events, which emerge as a consequence of current behavior. The goal is an imaginary state, consisting of “a place” of desirable motivation or affect—a state that only exists in fantasy, as something (potentially) preferable to the present.

(Construction of the goal therefore means establishment of a theory about the ideal relative status of motivational states—about the good.) This imagined future constitutes a vision of perfection, so to speak, generated in the light of all current knowledge (at least under optimal conditions), to which specific and general aspects of ongoing experience are continually compared. This vision of perfection is the promised land, mythologically speaking—conceptualized as a spiritual domain (a psychological state), a political utopia (a state, literally speaking), or both, simultaneously.

Mythology comes to answer the questions for us...

We answer the question “what should be?” by formulating an image of the desired future.

We cannot conceive of that future, except in relationship to the (interpreted) present— and it is our interpretation of the emotional acceptability of the present that comprises our answer to the question “what is?” [“what is the nature (meaning, the significance) of the current state of experience?”].

We answer the question “how then should we act?” by determining the most efficient and self-consistent strategy, all things considered, for bringing the preferred future into being.

Our answers to these three fundamental questions—modified and constructed in the course of our social interactions—constitutes our knowledge, insofar as it has any behavioral relevance; constitutes our knowledge, from the mythological perspective.

The structure of the mythic known—what is, what should be, and how to get from one to the other—is presented in Figure 1:

Chapter 2: Maps of Meaning

Model of reality

You work in an office; you are climbing the corporate ladder. Your daily activity reflects this superordinate goal. You are constantly immersed in one activity or another designed to produce an elevation in your status from the perspective of the corporate hierarchy.

Today, you have to attend a meeting that may prove vitally important to your future. You have an image in your head, so to speak, about the nature of that meeting and the interactions that will characterize it. You imagine what you would like to accomplish. Your image of this potential future is a fantasy, but it is based, insofar as you are honest, on all the relevant information derived from past experience that you have at your disposal. You have attended many meetings. You know what is likely to happen, during any given meeting, within reasonable bounds; you know how you will behave, and what effect your behavior will have on others. Your model of the desired future is clearly predicated on what you currently know.

You also have a model of the present, constantly operative. You understand your (somewhat subordinate) position within the corporation, which is your importance relative to others above and below you in the hierarchy. You understand the significance of those experiences that occur regularly while you are during your job: you know who you can give orders to, who you have to listen to, who is doing a good job, who can safely be ignored, and so on. You are always comparing this present (unsatisfactory) condition to that of your ideal, which is you, increasingly respected, powerful, rich and happy, free of anxiety and suffering, climbing toward your ultimate success. You are unceasingly involved in attempts to transform the present, as you currently understand it, into the future, as you hope it will be. Your actions are designed to produce your ideal— designed to transform the present into something ever more closely resembling what you want. Your are confident in your model of reality, in your story; when you put it into action, you get results.

A story about the unknown

Let's talk about 'the' scheduled meeting you have at work.

You prepare yourself mentally for your meeting. You envision yourself playing a centrally important role—resolutely determining the direction the meeting will take, roducing a powerful impact on your co-workers. You are in your office, preparing to leave. The meeting is taking place in another building, several blocks away. You formulate provisional plans of behavior designed to get you there on time. You estimate travel time at fifteen minutes.

You leave your office on the twenty-seventh floor, and you wait by the elevator. The minutes tick by—more and more of them. The elevator fails to appear. You had not taken this possibility into account. The longer you wait, the more nervous you get. Your heart

rate starts increasing, as you prepare for action (action unspecified, as of yet). Your palms sweat. You flush. You berate yourself for failing to consider the potential impact of such a delay. Maybe you are not as smart as you think you are. You begin to revise your model of yourself. No time for that now: you put such ideas out of your head and concentrate on the task at hand.

The unexpected has just become manifest—in the form of the missing elevator. You planned to take it to get where you were going; it did not appear. Your original plan of action is not producing the effects desired. It was, by your own definition, a bad plan. You need another one—and quickly. Luckily you have an alternate strategy at your disposal.

The stairs! You dash to the rear of the building. You try the door to the stairwell. It is locked. You curse the maintenance staff. You are frustrated and anxious. The unknown has emerged once again. You try another exit. Success! The door opens. Hope springs forth from your breast. You still might make it on time. You rush down the stairs—all twenty-seven floors—and onto the street.

Effects the Unknown has on you

You are, by now, desperately late. As you hurry along, you monitor your surroundings: is progress toward your goal continuing? Anyone who gets in your way inconveniences you—elderly women, playful, happy children, lovers out for a stroll. You are a good person, under most circumstances—at least in your own estimation. Why, then, do these innocent people aggravate you so thoroughly? You near a busy intersection. The crosswalk light is off. You fume and mutter away stupidly on the sidewalk. Your blood pressure rises. The light finally changes. You smile and dash forward. Up a slight rise you run. You are not in great physical shape. Where did all this energy come from? You are approaching the target building. You glance at your watch.

Five minutes left: no problem. A feeling of relief and satisfaction floods you. You are there; in consequence, you are not an idiot. If you believed in God, you would thank Him.

Had you been early—had you planned appropriately—the other pedestrians and assorted obstacles would not have affected you at all. You might have even appreciated them—at least the good-looking ones—or may at least not have classified them as obstacles.

Maybe you would have even used the time to enjoy your surroundings (unlikely) or to think about other issues of real importance—like tomorrow's meeting.

You continue on your path. Suddenly, you hear a series of loud noises behind you— noises reminiscent of a large motorized vehicle hurtling over a small concrete barrier (much like a curb). You are safe on the sidewalk—or so you presumed a second ago. Your meeting fantasies vanish. The fact that you are late no longer seems relevant. You stop hurrying along, instantly, arrested in your path by the emergence of this new phenomenon. Your auditory system localizes the sounds in three dimensions. You involuntarily orient your trunk, neck, head and eyes toward the place in space from which the sounds apparently emanate. Your pupils dilate, and your eyes widen. Your heart rate speeds up, as your body prepares to take adaptive action—once the proper path of that action has been specified.

You actively explore the unexpected occurrence, once you have oriented yourself toward it, with all the sensory and cognitive resources you can muster. You are generating hypotheses about the potential cause of the noise even before you turn. Has a van jumped the curb? The image flashes through your mind. Has something heavy fallen from a building? Has the wind overturned a billboard or street sign? Your eyes actively scan the relevant area. You see a truck loaded with bridge parts heading down the street, just past a pothole in the road. The mystery is solved. You have determined the specific motivational significance of what just seconds ago was the dangerous and threatening unknown, and it is zero. A loaded truck hit a bump. Big deal! Your heart slows down. Thoughts of the impending meeting re-enter the theater of your mind. Your original journey continues as if nothing has happened.

What is going on? Why are you frightened and frustrated by the absence of the expected elevator, the presence of the old woman with the cane, the carefree lovers, the loud machinery? Why are you so emotionally and behaviorally variable?

Another Story About The Unknown

Let us presume that you return from your meeting. You made it on time and, as far as you could tell, everything proceeded according to plan.

You noticed that your colleagues appeared a little irritated and confused by your behavior as you attempted to control the situation, but you put this down to jealousy on their part—to their inability to comprehend the majesty of your conceptualizations. You are satisfied, in consequence—satisfied temporarily—so you start thinking about tomorrow, as you walk back to work. You return to your office. There is a message on your answering machine. The boss wants to see you. You did not expect this. Your heart rate speeds up a little: good or bad, this news demands preparation for action.

What does she want? Fantasies of potential future spring up. Maybe she heard about your behavior at the meeting and wants to congratulate you on your excellent work. You walk to her office, apprehensive but hopeful.

You knock and stroll in jauntily. The boss looks at you and glances away somewhat unhappily. Your sense of apprehension increases. She motions for you to sit, so you do. What is going on? She says, “I have some bad news for you.” This is not good. This is not what you wanted. Your heart rate is rising unpleasantly. You focus all of your attention on your boss. “Look,” she says, “I have received a number of very unfavorable reports regarding your behavior at meetings. All of your colleagues seem to regard you as a rigid and overbearing negotiator. Furthermore, it has become increasingly evident that you are unable to respond positively to feedback about your shortcomings. Finally, you do not appear to properly understand the purpose of your job or the function of this corporation.”

First Encounter With 'The Revolutionary' Situation

You are shocked beyond belief, paralyzed into immobility. Your vision of the future with this company vanishes, replaced by apprehensions of unemployment, social disgrace and failure. You find it difficult to breathe. You flush and perspire profusely; your face is a mask of barely suppressed horror. You cannot believe that your boss is such a bitch.

“You have been with us for five years,” she continues, “and it is obvious that your performance is not likely to improve. You are definitely not suited for this sort of career, and you are interfering with the progress of the many competent others around you. In consequence, we have decided to terminate your contract with us, effective immediately. If I were you, I would take a good look at myself.”

You have just received unexpected information, but of a different order of magnitude than the petty anomalies, irritations, threats and frustrations that disturbed your equilibrium in the morning. You have just been presented with incontrovertible evidence that your characterizations of the present and of the ideal future are seriously, perhaps irreparably, flawed. Your presumptions about the nature of the world are in error. The world you know has just crumbled around you. Nothing is what it seemed; everything is unexpected and new again. You leave the office in shock. In the hallway, other employees avert their gaze from you, in embarrassment. Why did you not see this coming? How could you have been so mistaken in your judgment?

Maybe everyone is out to get you.

Better not think that.

Need for re-evaluation of the present

You stumble home, in a daze, and collapse on the couch. You can't move. You are hurt and terrified. You feel like you might go insane. Now what? How will you face people? The comfortable, predictable, rewarding present has vanished. The future has opened up in front of you like a pit, and you have fallen in. For the next month, you find yourself unable to act. Your spirit has been extinguished. You sleep and wake at odd hours; your appetite is disturbed. You are anxious, hopeless and aggressive, at unpredictable intervals. You snap at your family and torture yourself. Suicidal thoughts

enter the theater of your imagination. You do not know what to think or what to do: you are the victim of an internal war of emotion.

Your encounter with the terrible unknown has shaken the foundations of your worldview. You have been exposed, involuntarily, to the unexpected and revolutionary.

Chaos has eaten your soul. This means that your long-term goals have to be reconstructed, and the motivational significance of events in your current environment re-evaluated—literally revalued.

This capacity for complete revaluation, in the light of new information, is even more particularly human than the aforementioned capability for exploration of the unknown and generation of new information. Sometimes, in the course of our actions, we elicit phenomena whose very existence is impossible, according to our standard methods of construal (which are at base a mode of attributing motivational significance to events). Exploration of these new phenomena, and integration of our findings into our knowledge, occasionally means reconceptualization of that knowledge (and consequent re-exposure to the unknown, no longer inhibited by our mode of classification). This means that simple movement from present to future is occasionally interrupted by a complete breakdown and reformulation, a reconstitution of what the present is and what the future should be. The ascent of the individual, so to speak, is punctuated by periods of dissolution and rebirth. The more general model of human adaptation—conceptualized most simply as steady state, breach, crisis, redress—therefore ends up looking like Figure 4: Revolutionary Adaptation.

A man reborn

A month after you were fired, a new idea finds its way into your head. Although you never let yourself admit it, you didn't really like your job. You only took it because you felt that it was expected of you. You never put your full effort into it, because you really wanted to do something else—something other people thought was risky or foolish. You made a bad decision, a long time ago. Maybe you needed this blow, to put you back on the path. You start imagining a new future—one where you are not so “secure,” maybe, but where you are doing what you actually want to do. The possibility of undisturbed sleep returns, and you start eating properly again. You are quieter, less arrogant, more accepting—except in your weaker moments. Others make remarks, some admiring, some envious, about the change they perceive in you. You are a man recovering from a long illness—a man reborn.

Indeed, our very cultures are erected upon the foundation of a single great story:

Paradise, encounter with chaos, fall and redemption.

The Valence of Things

The existential psychotherapist Viktor Frankl tells a story from his experiences as a Nazi death camp inmate that makes this point most strikingly:

Take as an example something that happened on our journey from Auschwitz to the camp affiliated with Dachau. We became more and more tense as we approached a certain bridge over the Danube which the train would have to cross to reach Mauthausen, according to the statement of experienced traveling companions. Those who have never seen anything similar cannot possibly imagine the dance of joy performed in the carriage by the prisoners when they saw that our transport was not crossing the bridge and was instead heading “only” for Dachau.

And again, what happened on our arrival in that camp, after a journey lasting two days and three nights? There had not been enough room for everybody to crouch on the floor of the carriage at the same time. The majority of us had to stand all the way, while a few took turns at squatting on the scanty straw which was soaked with human urine.

No chimney in this camp...

When we arrived the first important news that we heard from older prisoners was that this comparatively small camp (its population was 2,500) had no “oven,” no crematorium, no gas! That meant that a person who had become a “Moslem” [no longer fit for work] could not be taken straight to the gas chamber, but would have to wait until a so-called “sick convoy” had been arranged to return to Auschwitz. This joyful surprise put us all in a good mood. The wish of the senior warden of our hut in Auschwitz had come true: we had come, as quickly as possible, to a camp which did not have a “chimney”—unlike Auschwitz. We laughed and cracked jokes in spite of, and during, all we had to go through in the next few hours.

When we new arrivals were counted, one of us was missing. So we had to wait outside in the rain and cold wind until the missing man was found. He was at last discovered in a hut, where he had fallen asleep from exhaustion. Then the roll call was turned into a punishment parade. All through the night and late into the next morning, we had to stand outside, frozen and soaked to the skin after the strain of our long journey. And yet we were all very pleased! There was no chimney in this camp and Auschwitz was a long way off.

Nature of Valence

Valence can be positive or negative, as the early behaviorists noted. Positive and negative are not opposite ends of a continuum, however—not in any straightforward way. The two “states” appear orthogonal, although (perhaps) mutually inhibitory.

Furthermore, positive and negative are not simple: each can be subdivided, in a more or less satisfactory manner, at least once.

Positively Valued Things

Positively valued things, for example, can be satisfying or promising (can serve as consummatory or incentive rewards, respectively).

Many satisfying things are consumable, in the literal sense, as outlined previously. Food, for example, is a consummatory reward to the hungry—which means that it is valued under such circumstances as a satisfaction. Likewise, water satisfies the individual deprived of liquid. Sexual contact is rewarding to the lustful, and warmth is desirable to those without shelter. Sometimes more complex stimuli are satisfying or rewarding as well. It all depends on what is presently desired, and how that desire plays itself out. A mild verbal reprimand might well foster feelings of relief in the individual who expects a severe physical beating—which is to say, technically, that the absence of an expected punishment can serve quite effectively as a reward (it is in fact the form of reward that the tyrant prefers). Regardless of their form, attained satisfactions produce satiation, calm and somnolent pleasure, and (temporary) cessation of the behaviors directed to that particular end—although behaviors that culminate in a satisfactory conclusion are more likely to be manifested, in the future, when “instinctive” or “voluntary” desire re-emerges.

Promises

Promises, which are also positive, might be regarded as more abstractly meaningful than satisfactions, as they indicate potential rather than actuality. Promises—cues of consummatory rewards or satisfactions—indicate the imminent attainment of something desired or potentially desirable. Their more abstract quality does not make them secondary or necessarily learned, however, as was once thought; our response to

potential satisfaction is often as basic or primary as our response to satisfaction itself. Promises (cues of satisfaction) have been regarded, technically, as incentive rewards, because they induce forward locomotion— which is merely movement toward the place that the cue indicates satisfaction will occur.

Curiosity, hope and excited pleasure tend to accompany exposure to cues of reward (and are associated with subsequent forward locomotion). Behaviors that produce promises—like those that result in satisfactions—also increase in frequency, over time.

Negatively valued things

Negatively valued things—which have a structure that mirrors that of their positive counterparts—can either be punishing or threatening. Punishments—a diverse group of stimuli or contexts, as defined immediately below—all appear to share one feature (at least from the perspective of the theory outlined in this manuscript): they indicate the temporary or final impossibility of implementing one or more means or attaining one or more ends. Some stimuli are almost universally experienced as punishing, because their appearance indicates reduced likelihood of carrying through virtually any imaginable plan—of obtaining almost every satisfaction, or potential desirable future. Most things or situations that produce bodily injury fall into this category. More generally, punishments might be conceived of as involuntary states of deprivation (of food, water, optimal temperature, or social contact); as disappointments or frustrations (which are absences of expected rewards), and as stimuli sufficiently intense to produce damage to the systems encountering them. Punishments stop action, or induce retreat or escape (backward locomotion), and engender the emotional state commonly known as pain or hurt. Behaviors, which culminate in punishment and subsequent hurt, tend to

extinguish—to decrease in frequency, over time.

Threats

Threats, which are also negative, indicate potential, like promises—but potential for punishment, for hurt, for pain. Threats—cues of punishment—are stimuli that indicate enhanced likelihood of punishment and hurt. Threats are abstract, like promises; however, like promises, they are not necessarily secondary or learned. Unexpected phenomena, for example—which constitute innately recognizable threats—stop us in our tracks, and make us feel anxiety. So, arguably, do certain innate fear stimuli—like snakes. Behaviors that culminate in the production of cues of punishment—that create situations characterized by anxiety—tend to decrease in frequency over time (much like those that produce immediate punishment).

Satisfactions and their cues are good, simply put; punishments and threats are bad. We tend to move forward (to feel hope, curiosity, joy) and then to consume (to make love, to eat, to drink) in the presence of good things; and to pause (and feel anxious), then withdraw, move backwards (and feel pain, disappointment, frustration, loneliness) when faced by things we do not like. In the most basic of situations—when we know what we are doing, when we are engaged with the familiar—these fundamental tendencies suffice.

A kitchen knife, for example...

A kitchen knife, for example: is it something to cut up vegetables, at dinner? 
Something to draw, for a still life? A toy, for mumblety-peg? A screwdriver, to fix a shelf? An implement of murder? 
In the first four cases, it “possesses” a positive valence. 
In the last case, it is negative—unless you are experiencing a frenzy of rage.
  

Unexplored Territory

Unexpected or unpredictable things—novel things, more exactly (the class of novel things, most particularly)—have a potentially infinite, unbounded range of significance.

What does something that might be anything mean? In the extremes, it means, the worst that could be (or, at least, the worst you can imagine) and, conversely, the best that could be (or the best you can conceive of). Something new might present the possibility for unbearable suffering, followed by meaningless death—a threat virtually unbounded in significance. That new and apparently minor but nonetheless strange and worrisome ache you noticed this morning, for example, while you were exercising, might just signify the onset of the cancer that will slowly and painfully kill you. Alternatively, something unexpected might signify inconceivable opportunity for expansion of general competence and well-being. Your old, boring but secure job unexpectedly disappears. A year later, you are doing what you really want to do, and your life is incomparably better.

An unexpected thing or situation appearing in the course of goal-directed behavior constitutes a stimulus that is intrinsically problematic: novel occurrences are, simultaneously, cues for punishment (threats) and cues for satisfaction (promises).

Normal Novelty

Something “normally” novel constitutes an occurrence which leaves the current departure point and goal intact, but indicates that the means of achieving that goal have to be modified. Let us say, for example, that you are in your office. You are accustomed to walking down an unobstructed hallway to get to the elevator. You are so used to performing this activity that you can do it “automatically”—so you often read while walking. One day, while reading, you stumble over a chair someone left in the middle of the hallway. This is normal novelty. You don't have to alter your current goal, except in a temporary and trivial manner; you are not likely to get too upset by the unexpected obstacle. Getting to the elevator is still a real possibility, even within the desired time frame; all you have to do is walk around the chair (or move it somewhere else, if you are feeling particularly altruistic).

Revolutionary novelty

Revolutionary novelty is something altogether different.

Here is an example: I am sitting alone in my office, in a high-rise building, alone at night. I suddenly fantasize: “I am going to take the elevator down three floors and get something to eat” (more accurately, hunger suddenly grips my imagination, and uses it for its own purposes). This fantasy constitutes a spatially and temporally bounded image of the ideal future—an “actual” possible future, carved out as a discriminable (and thus usable) object, from the infinite domain of potential possible futures. I use this definite image to evaluate the events and processes that constitute the interpreted present, as it unfolds around me, as I walk toward the elevator (on my way to the cafeteria). I want to make reality match my fantasy—to subdue my motivation (to please the gods, so to speak). If the unexpected occurs—say, the elevator is not operating—the mismatch temporarily stops me. I replace my current plan with an alternative behavioral strategy, designed to obtain the same end. This means that I do not reconfigure the temporally and spatially bounded map that I am using to evaluate my circumstances—that I am using to regulate my emotions. All I have to do is change strategy.

I decide to take the stairs to the cafeteria. If the stairs are blocked by construction, I am in more serious trouble. My original fantasy—“go down to the cafeteria and eat”—was predicated on an implicit presumption: I can get downstairs. This presumption, which I wasn't really even aware of (which might be regarded as axiomatic, for the purposes of the current operation), has been violated. The story “go downstairs to eat” retained its function only in an environment characterized by valid means of between-floor transportation.

Story about the revolutionary novelty

The existence of these means constituted a given—I had used the elevator or the stairs so often that their very presence took on the aspect of a justifiably ignored constant. Once I had mastered the stairs or the elevator—once I had learned their location, position and mechanisms—I could take them for granted and presume their irrelevance. Predictable phenomena (read “thoroughly explored, and therefore adapted to”) do not attract attention; they do not require “consciousness.” No new behavioral strategies or frameworks of reference must be generated, in their presence.

Anyway: the elevators are broken; the stairs are blocked. The map I was using to evaluate my environment has been invalidated: my ends are no longer tenable. In consequence, necessarily, the means to those ends (my plans to go to the cafeteria) have been rendered utterly irrelevant. I no longer know what to do. This means, in a nontrivial sense, that I no longer know where I am. I presumed I was in a place I was familiar with—indeed, many familiar things (the fact of the floor, for example) have not changed.

Nonetheless, something fundamental has been altered—and I don't know how fundamental. I am now in a place I cannot easily leave. I am faced with a number of new problems, in addition to my unresolved hunger—at least in potential (Will I get home tonight? Do I have to get someone to “rescue” me? Who could rescue me? Who do I telephone to ask for help? What if there was a fire?). My old plan, my old “story” (“I am going downstairs to get something to eat”) has vanished, and I do not know how to evaluate my current circumstances. My emotions, previously constrained by the existence of a temporarily valid plan, re-emerge in a confused jumble. I am anxious (“what will I do? What if there was a fire?”), frustrated (“I'm certainly not going to get any more work done tonight, under these conditions!”) angry (“who could have been stupid enough to block all the exits?”), and curious (“just what the hell is going on around here, anyway?”). Something unknown has occurred and blown all my plans. An emissary of chaos, to speak metaphorically, has disrupted my emotional stability.

The unknown – An Environmental Constant

What is known and what unknown is always relative because what is unexpected depends entirely upon what we expect (desire)—on what we had previously planned and presumed. The unexpected constantly occurs because it is impossible, in the absence of omniscience, to formulate an entirely accurate model of what actually is happening or of what should happen; it is impossible to determine what results ongoing behavior will finally produce.

Errors in representation of the unbearable present and the ideal, desired future are inevitable, in consequence, as are errors in implementation and representation of the means by which the former can be transformed into the latter. The infinite human capacity for error means that encounter with the unknown is inevitable, in the course of human experience; means that the likelihood of such encounter is as certain, regardless of place and time of individual existence, as death and taxation. The (variable) existence of the unknown, paradoxically enough, can therefore be regarded as an environmental constant.

“The domain of the unknown surrounds us like an ocean surrounds an island. We can increase the area of the island, but we never take away much from the sea.”

Exploration... And Fear

Exploratory activity culminates normally in restriction, expansion, or transformation of the behavioral repertoire. In exceptional, non-normal circumstances—that is, when a major error has been committed—such activity culminates in revolution, in modification of the entire story guiding affective evaluation and behavioral programming. Such revolutionary modification means update of modeled reality, past, present and future, through incorporation of information generated during exploratory behavior. Successful exploration transforms the unknown into the expected, desired and predictable; establishes appropriate behavioral measures (and expectations of those measures) for next contact. Unsuccessful exploration, by contrast—avoidance or escape—leaves the novel object firmly entrenched in its initial, “natural,” anxiety-provoking category. This observation sets the stage for a fundamental realization: human beings do not learn to fear new objects or situations, or even really “learn” to fear something that previously appeared safe, when it manifests a dangerous property. Fear is the a priori position, the natural response to everything for which no structure of behavioral adaptation has been designed and inculcated. Fear is the innate reaction to everything that has not been rendered predictable, as a consequence of successful, creative exploratory behavior undertaken in its presence, at some time in the past. LeDoux states:

Mental Conditioning

It is well established that emotionally neutral stimuli can acquire the capacity to evoke striking emotional reaction following temporal pairing with an aversive event. Conditioning does not create new emotional responses but instead simply allows new stimuli to serve as triggers capable of activating existing, often hard-wired, species-specific emotional reactions. In the rat, for example, a pure tone previously paired with footshock evokes a conditioned fear reaction consisting of freezing behavior accompanied by a host of autonomic adjustments, including increases in arterial pressure and heart rate. Similar responses are expressed when laboratory rats are exposed to a cat for the first time, but following amygdala lesions such responses are no longer present, suggesting that the responses are genetically specified (since they appear when the rat sees a cat, a natural predator, for the first time) and involve the amygdala. The fact that electrical stimulation of the amygdala is capable of eliciting the similar response patterns further supports the notion that the responses are hard-wired.

'Exploration' and Education

The urbanity characterizing ourselves, the civilized, amiable, and admirable part of mankind, well brought up and not constantly in a state of fear…depends as much on our successfully avoiding disturbing stimulation as on a lowered sensitivity [to fear-producing stimuli]…. [T]he capacity for emotional breakdown may [well] be self-concealing, leading [animals and human beings] to find or create an environment in which the stimuli to excessive emotional response are at a minimum. So effective is our society in this regard that its members—especially the well-to-do and educated ones—may not even guess at some of their own potentialities.

One usually thinks of education, in the broad sense, as producing a resourceful, emotionally stable adult, without respect to the environment in which these traits are to appear.

To some extent this may be true.

But education can be seen as being also the means of establishing a protective social environment in which emotional stability is possible. Perhaps it strengthens the individual against unreasonable fears and rages, but it certainly produces a uniformity of appearance and behavior which reduces the frequency with which the individual member of the society encounters the causes of such emotion. On this view, the susceptibility to emotional disturbance may not be decreased. It may in fact be increased. The protective cocoon of uniformity, in personal appearance, manners, and social activity generally, will make small deviations from custom appear increasingly strange and thus (if the general thesis is sound) increasingly intolerable. The inevitable small deviations from custom will bulk increasingly large, and the members of the society, finding themselves tolerating trivial deviations well, will continue to think of themselves as socially adaptable.

Explored Territory

When we explore, we transform the indeterminate status and meaning of the unknown thing that we are exploring into something determinate—in the worst case, rendering it nonthreatening, nonpunishing; in the best, manipulating and/or categorizing it so that it is useful. Animals perform this transformation in the course of actual action, which is to say that they construct their worlds by shifting their positions and changing their actions in the face of the unknown, and by mapping the consequences of those shifts and changes in terms of their affective or motivational valence. When an animal encounters an unexpected situation, such as a new object placed in its cage, it first freezes, watching the object. If nothing terrible happens while it is immobile, it moves, slowly and at a distance, monitoring the thing for its reactions to these cautious exploratory activities. Perhaps the animal sniffs at the thing, or scratches at it—trying to determine what it might be good (or bad) for. It maps the utility and valence of the object, conceived in relationship to its ongoing activity (and, perhaps, to possible patterns of activity in the future). The animal builds its world of significances from the information generated in the course of—as a consequence of—ongoing exploratory behavior. The application of experimental search programs, drawn primarily from the reservoir of learned (imitated) and instinctual behavior, or manifested as trial and error, involves behavioral alteration (exploration, play) and subsequent transformation of sensory and affective input. When an animal actively explores something new, it changes the sensory quality and motivational significance of that aspect of its experience as a consequence of its exploratory strategy. This means that the animal exhibits a variety of behaviors in a given mysterious situation and monitors the results. It is the organized interpretation of these results and the behaviors that produce them that constitute the world, past, present and future, of the animal (in conjunction with the unknown, of course—which constantly supersedes the capacity for representation).

The Motor Homunculus

The body is specifically represented in the neocortex. This representation is often given schematic form as the homunculus, or “little man.” The homunculus was

“discovered” by Wilder Penfield, who mapped the surface of the cortices of his neurosurgical patients by stimulating them electrically, painstakingly, point after point. He did this to find out what different sections of the brain were doing, so that he could do the least damage possible when attempting to surgically treat epilepsy or cancer or other forms of brain abnormality. He would probe the surface of the brain of one of his (awake) patients with an electrode (patients undergoing neurosurgery are frequently awake, as the brain feels no pain) and monitor the results, either directly or by asking the patient what he or she experienced. Sometimes such stimulation would produce visions, sometimes elicit memories; other times, it produced movements or sensations. Penfield determined, in this manner, how the body was mapped onto the central nervous system—how it was incarnated, so to speak, in intrapsychic representation. He established, for example, that homunculi come in two forms, motor and sensory—the former associated with the primary zone of the motor unit, the latter associated with the primary zone of the sensory area of the sensory unit. The motor form—represented schematically in Figure 10: The Motor Homunculus—is of most interest to us, because our discussion centers on motor output. The motor homunculus is a very odd little “creature.” Its face (particularly mouth and tongue) and hands (particularly thumbs) are grossly disproportionate to the rest of its “body.” This is because comparatively large areas of the motor cortex are given over to control of the face and hands, which are capable of an immense number of complex and sophisticated operations. The motor homunculus is an interesting figure. It might be regarded as the body, insofar as the body has anything to do with the brain. It is useful to consider the structure of the homunculus, because it is in some profound way representative of our essential nature, as it finds expression in emotion and behavior.

The most outstanding characteristic of the motor homunculus, for example—the hand, with its opposable thumb—is the defining feature of the human being. The ability to manipulate and explore characteristics of objects large and small—restricted as a general capacity to the highest primates—sets the stage for elicitation of an increased range of their properties, for their utilization as tools (for more comprehensive transformation of their infinite potential into definable actuality). The hand, used additionally to duplicate the action and function of objects, also allows first for imitation (and pointing), and then for full-blown linguistic representation. Used for written language, the hand additionally enables long-distance (temporal and spatial) transfer of its ability to another (and for the elaboration and extension of exploration, during the process of writing, which is hand-mediated thinking). Even development of spoken language, the ultimate analytic motor skill, might reasonably be considered an abstract extension of the human ability to take things apart and reassemble them, in an original manner. Interplay between hand and brain has literally enabled the individual to change the structure of the world. Consideration of the structure and function of the brain must take this primary fact into account. A dolphin or whale has a large, complex brain—a highly developed nervous system—but it cannot shape its world. It is trapped, so to speak, in its streamlined test-tube-like form, specialized for oceanic life. It cannot directly alter the shape of its material environment in any complex manner. Its brain, therefore, is not likely prepared to perform any traditionally “creative” function (indeed, as one would suspect, lacks the sophisticated structuring characteristic of primate brains).

The Twin Cerebral Hemispheres and Their Functions

Two Types of Memory

Knowing-how information, described alternatively as procedural, habitual, dispositional, or skilled, and knowing-what information, described alternatively as declarative, episodic, factual, autobiographical, or representational, appear physiologically distinct in their material basis, and separable in course of phylo- and ontogenetic development. Procedural knowledge develops long before declarative knowledge, in evolution and individual development, and appears represented in “unconscious” form, expressible purely in performance. Declarative knowledge, by contrast—knowledge of what—simultaneously constitutes consciously accessible and communicable episodic imagination (the world in fantasy) and subsumes even more recently developed semantic (linguistically mediated) knowledge, whose operations, in large part, allow for abstract representation and communication of the contents of the imagination. Squire and Zola-Morgan have represented the relationship between these memory forms according to the schematic of Figure 12: The Multiple Structure of Memory. The neuroanatomical basis of knowing how remains relatively unspecified. Skill generation appears in part as the domain of the cortical pre/motor unit; “storage” appears to involve the cerebellum. Knowing what, by contrast, appears dependent for its existence on the intact function of the cortical sensory unit, in interplay with the hippocampal system. Much of our knowing what, however—our description of the world—is about knowing how, which is behavioral knowledge, wisdom. Much of our descriptive knowledge—representational knowledge—is representation of what constitutes wisdom (without being that wisdom, itself). We have gained our description of wisdom by watching how we act, in our culturally governed social interactions, and by representing those actions.

We know how, which means how to act to transform the mysterious and ever-threatening world of the present into what we desire, long before we know how we know how, or why we know how. This is to say, for example, that a child learns to act appropriately (assuming it does) long before it can provide abstracted explanations for or descriptions of its behavior. A child can be “good” without being a moral philosopher.

Mythologically Speaking...

The Unknown is represented by The Great Mother

The Known >>> The Great Father

The Explorer >>> The Archetypal Son

The Great Mother

The Great Mother—the unknown, as it manifests itself in experience—is the feminine deity who gives birth to and devours all. She is the unpredictable as it is encountered, and is therefore characterized, simultaneously, by extreme positive and extreme negative valence.

The Great Father

The Great Father is order, placed against chaos; civilization erected against nature, with nature's aid. He is the benevolent force that protects individuals from catastrophic encounter with what is not yet understood; is the walls that surrounded the maturing Buddha and that encapsulated the Hebrew Eden. Conversely, however, the Great Father is the tyrant who forbids the emergence (or even the hypothetical existence) of anything new.

The Archetypal Son

The Archetypal Son is the child of order and chaos—culture and nature—and is therefore clearly their product. Paradoxically, however, as the deity who separates the earth (mother) from the sky (father), he is also the process that gives rise to his parents. This paradoxical situation arises because the existence of defined order and the unexplored territory defined in opposition to that order can come into being only in the

light of consciousness, which is the faculty that knows (and does not know). The Archetypal Son, like his parents, has a positive aspect and a negative aspect. The positive aspect continually reconstructs defined territory as a consequence of the “assimilation” of the unknown [as a consequence of “incestuous” (that is, “sexual”—read creative) union with the Great Mother]. The negative aspect rejects or destroys anything it does not or will not understand.

Chapter 3: Apprenticeship and Enculturation

Apprenticeship: Adoption of a Shared Map

Subjugation to lawful authority might more reasonably be considered in light of the metaphor of the apprenticeship.

Childhood dependency must be replaced by group membership, prior to the development of full maturity.

Such membership provides society with another individual to utilize as a “tool,” and provides the maturing but still vulnerable individual with necessary protection (with a group-fostered “identity”). The capacity to abide by social rules, regardless of the specifics of the discipline, can therefore be regarded as a necessary transitional stage in the movement from childhood to adulthood.

Discipline should therefore be regarded as a skill that may be developed through adherence to strict ritual, or by immersion within a strict belief system or hierarchy of values. Once such discipline has been attained, it may escape the bounds of its developmental precursor. It is in this manner that true freedom is attained. It is at this level of analysis that all genuine religious and cultural traditions and dogmas are equivalent, regardless of content: they are all masters whose service may culminate in the development of self-mastery, and consequent transcendence of tradition and dogma.

Apprenticeship is necessary, but should not on that account be glamorized. Dogmatic systems make harsh and unreasonable masters. Systems of belief and moral action—and those people who are identified with them—are concerned above all with self-maintenance and preservation of predictability and order. The (necessarily) conservative tendencies of great systems makes them tyrannical, and more than willing to crush the spirit of those they “serve.”

Apprenticeship is a precursor to freedom, however, and nothing necessary and worthwhile is without danger.

Adoption of this analytic standpoint allows for a certain moral relativism, conjoined with an absolutist higher-order morality. The particulars of a disciplinary system may be somewhat unimportant. The fact that adherence to such a system is necessary, however, cannot be disregarded.

Tags: Psychology,Book Summary,

Tuesday, August 8, 2023

Maps of Experience (Chapter 1)

Object and Meaning

The world can be validly construed as forum for action, or as place of things. The former manner of interpretation-more primordial, and less clearly understood-finds its expression in the arts or humanities, in ritual, drama, literature and mythology. The world as forum for action is a place of value, a place where all things have meaning. This meaning, which is shaped as a consequence of social interaction, is implication for action, or-at a higher level of analysis- implication for the configuration of the interpretive schema that produces or guides action. The latter manner of interpretation-the world as place of things- finds its formal expression in the methods and theories of science. Science allows for increasingly precise determination of the consensually validatable properties of things, and for efficient utilization of precisely determined things as tools (once the direction such use is to take has been determined, through application of more fundamental narrative processes). No complete world-picture can be generated without use of both modes of construal. The fact that one mode is generally set at odds with the other means only that the nature of their respective domains remains insufficiently discriminated. Adherents of the mythological worldview tend to regard the statements of their creeds as indistinguishable from empirical “fact,” even though such statements were generally formulated long before the notion of objective reality emerged. Those who, by contrast, accept the scientific perspective—who assume that it is, or might become, complete-forget that an impassable gulf currently divides what is from what should be. We need to know four things: what there is, what to do about what there is, that there is a difference between knowing what there is, and knowing "what to do about what there is" and what that difference is. To explore something, to “discover what it is”—that means most importantly to discover its significance for motor output, within a particular social context, and only more particularly to determine its precise objective sensory or material nature. This is knowledge in the most basic of senses—and often constitutes sufficient knowledge. Imagine that a baby girl, toddling around in the course of her initial tentative investigations, reaches up onto a countertop to touch a fragile and expensive glass sculpture. She observes its color, sees its shine, feels that it is smooth and cold and heavy to the touch. Suddenly her mother interferes, grasps her hand, tells her not to ever touch that object. The child has just learned a number of specifically consequential things about the sculpture—has identified its sensory properties, certainly. More importantly, however, she has determined that approached in the wrong manner, the sculpture is dangerous (at least in the presence of mother); has discovered as well that the sculpture is regarded more highly, in its present unaltered configuration, than the exploratory tendency—at least (once again) by mother. The baby girl has simultaneously encountered an object, from the empirical perspective, and its socioculturally determined status. The empirical object might be regarded as those sensory properties “intrinsic” to the object. The status of the object, by contrast, consists of its meaning—consists of its implication for behavior. Everything a child encounters has this dual nature, experienced by the child as part of a unified totality. Everything is something, and means something—and the distinction between essence and significance is not necessarily drawn. The significance of something—specified in actuality as a consequence of exploratory activity undertaken in its vicinity—tends “naturally” to become assimilated to the object itself. The object, after all, is the proximal cause or the stimulus that “gives rise” to action conducted in its presence. For people operating naturally, like the child, what something signifies is more or less inextricably part of the thing, part of its magic. The magic is of course due to apprehension of the specific cultural and intrapsychic significance of the thing, and not to its objectively determinable sensory qualities. Everyone understands the child who says, for example, “I saw a scary man”; the child’s description is immediate and concrete, even though he or she has attibuted to the object of perception a quality that is in fact context-dependent and subjective. It is difficult, after all, to realize the subjective nature of fear, and not to feel threat as part of the “real” world. The automatic attribution of meaning to things—or the failure to distinguish between them initially—is a characteristic of narrative, of myth, not of scientific thought. Narrative accurately captures the nature of raw experience. Things are scary, people are irritating, events are promising, food is satisfying—at least in terms of our basic experience. The modern mind, which regards itself as having transcended the domain of the magical, is nonetheless still endlessly capable of “irrational” (read motivated) reactions. We fall under the spell of experience whenever we attribute our frustration, aggression, devotion or lust to the person or situation that exists as the proximal “cause” of such agitation. We are not yet “objective,” even in our most clear-headed moments (and thank God for that). We become immediately immersed in a motion picture or a novel, and willingly suspend disbelief. We become impressed or terrified, despite ourselves, in the presence of a sufficiently powerful cultural figurehead (an intellectual idol, a sports superstar, a movie actor, a political leader, the pope, a famous beauty, even our superior at work)—in the presence, that is, of anyone who sufficiently embodies the oft-implicit values and ideals that protect us from disorder and lead us on. Like the medieval individual, we do not even need the person to generate such affect. The icon will suffice. We will pay vast sums of money for articles of clothing worn or personal items used or created by the famous and infamous of our time. The “natural,” pre-experimental, or mythical mind is in fact primarily concerned with meaning—which is essentially implication for action—and not with “objective” nature. The formal object, as conceptualized by modern scientifically oriented consciousness, might appear to those still possessed by the mythic imagination—if they could “see” it at all—as an irrelevant shell, as all that was left after everything intrinsically intriguing had been stripped away. For the pre-experimentalist, the thing is most truly the significance of its sensory properties, as they are experienced in subjective experience—in affect, or emotion. And, in truth—in real life—to know what something is still means to know two things about it: its motivational relevance, and the specific nature of its sensory qualities. The two forms of knowing are not identical; furthermore, experience and registration of the former necessarily precedes development of the latter. Something must have emotional impact before it will attract enough attention to be explored and mapped in accordance with its sensory properties. Those sensory properties—of prime import to the experimentalist or empiricist—are meaningful only insofar as they serve as cues for determining specific affective relevance or behavioral significance. We need to know what things are not to know what they are but to keep track of what they mean—to understand what they signify for our behavior. It has taken centuries of firm discipline and intellectual training, religious, proto- scientific and scientific, to produce a mind capable of concentrating on phenomena that are not yet or are no longer immediately intrinsically gripping—to produce a mind that regards real as something separable from relevant. Alternatively, it might be suggested that all the myth has not yet vanished from science, devoted as it is to human progress, and that it is this nontrivial remainder that enables the scientist to retain undimmed enthusiasm while endlessly studying his fruitflies. How, precisely, did people think, not so very long ago, before they were experimentalists? What were things before they were objective things? These are very difficult questions. The “things” that existed prior to the development of experimental science do not appear valid either as things or as the meaning of things to the modern mind. The question of the nature of the substance of sol—the sun—(to take a single example) occupied the minds of those who practiced the pre-experimental “science” of alchemy for many hundreds of years. We would no longer presume even that the sun has a uniform substance, unique to it, and would certainly take exception to the properties attributed to this hypothetical element by the medieval alchemist, if we allowed its existence. Carl Jung, who spent much of the latter part of his life studying medieval thought patterns, characterized sol: The sun signifies first of all gold, whose [alchemical] sign it shares. But just as the “philosophical” gold is not the “common” gold, so the sun is neither just the metallic gold nor the heavenly orb. Sometimes the sun is an active substance hidden in the gold and is extracted [alchemically] as the tinctura rubea (red tincture). Sometimes, as the heavenly body, it is the possessor of magically effective and transformative rays. As gold and a heavenly body it contains an active sulphur of a red colour, hot and dry. Because of this red sulphur the alchemical sun, like the corresponding gold, is red. As every alchemist knew, gold owes its red color to the admixture of Cu (copper), which he interpreted as Kypris (the Cyprian, Venus), mentioned in Greek alchemy as the transformative substance. Redness, heat, and dryness are the classical qualities of the Egyptian Set (Greek Typhon), the evil principle which, like the alchemical sulphur, is closely connected with the devil. And just as Typhon has his kingdom in the forbidden sea, so the sun, as sol centralis, has its sea, its “crude perceptible water,” and as sol coelestis its “subtle imperceptible water.” This sea water (aqua pontica) is extracted from sun and moon…. The active sun-substance also has favourable effects. As the so-called “balsam” it drips from the sun and produces lemons, oranges, wine, and, in the mineral kingdom, gold. We can barely understand such a description, contaminated as it is by imaginative and mythological associations peculiar to the medieval mind. It is precisely this fantastical contamination, however, that renders the alchemical description worth examining—not from the perspective of the history of science, concerned with the examination of outdated objective ideas, but from the perspective of psychology, focused on the interpretation of subjective frames of reference. “In it [the “Indian Ocean,” in this example] are images of heaven and earth, of summer, autumn, winter, and spring, male and female. If thou callest this spiritual, what thou doest is probable; if corporeal, thou sayest the truth; if heavenly, thou liest not; if earthly, thou hast well spoken.”11 The alchemist could not separate his subjective ideas about the nature of things—that is, his hypotheses—from the things themselves. His hypotheses, in turn—products of his imagination—were derived from the unquestioned and unrecognized “explanatory” presuppositions that made up his culture. The medieval man lived, for example, in a universe that was moral—where everything, even ores and metals, strived above all for perfection.12 Things, for the alchemical mind, were therefore characterized in large part by their moral nature—by their impact on what we would describe as affect, emotion or motivation; were therefore characterized by their relevance or value (which is impact on affect). Description of this relevance took narrative form, mythic form—as in the example drawn from Jung, where the sulphuric aspect of the sun’s substance is attributed negative, demonic characteristics. It was the great feat of science to strip affect from perception, so to speak, and to allow for the description of experiences purely in terms of their consensually apprehensible features. However, it is the case that the affects generated by experiences are real, as well. The alchemists, whose conceptualizations intermingled affect with sense, dealt with affect as a matter of course (although they did not “know” it—not explicitly). We have removed the affect from the thing, and can therefore brilliantly manipulate the thing. We are still victims, however, of the uncomprehended emotions generated by—we would say, in the presence of—the thing. We have lost the mythic universe of the pre-experimental mind, or have at least ceased to further its development. That loss has left our increased technological power ever more dangerously at the mercy of our still unconscious systems of valuation. Prior to the time of Descartes, Bacon and Newton, man lived in an animated, spiritual world, saturated with meaning, imbued with moral purpose. The nature of this purpose was revealed in the stories people told each other—stories about the structure of the cosmos and the place of man. But now we think empirically (at least we think we think empirically), and the spirits that once inhabited the universe have vanished. The forces released by the advent of the experiment have wreaked havoc within the mythic world. Jung states: How totally different did the world appear to medieval man! For him the earth was eternally fixed and at rest in the center of the universe, encircled by the course of a sun that solicitously bestowed its warmth. Men were all children of God under the loving care of the Most High, who prepared them for eternal blessedness; and all knew exactly what they should do and how they should conduct themselves in order to rise from a corruptible world to an incorruptible and joyous existence. Such a life no longer seems real to us, even in our dreams. Natural science has long ago torn this lovely veil to shreds. Even if the medieval individual was not in all cases tenderly and completely enraptured by his religious beliefs (he was a great believer in hell, for example), he was certainly not plagued by the plethora of rational doubts and moral uncertainties that beset his modern counterpart. Religion for the pre-experimental mind was not so much a matter of faith as a matter of fact—which means that the prevailing religious viewpoint was not merely one compelling theory among many. The capacity to maintain explicit belief in religious “fact,” however, has been severely undermined in the last few centuries—first in the West, and then everywhere else. A succession of great scientists and iconoclasts has demonstrated that the universe does not revolve around man, that our notion of separate status from and “superiority” to the animal has no empirical basis, and that there is no God in heaven (nor even a heaven, as far as the eye can see). In consequence, we no longer believe our own stories—no longer even believe that those stories served us well in the past. The objects of revolutionary scientific discovery—Galileo’s mountains on the lunar orb; Kepler’s elliptical planetary orbits—manifested themselves in apparent violation of mythic order, predicated as it was on the presumption of heavenly perfection. The new phenomena produced by the procedures of experimentalists could not be, could not exist, from the perspective defined by tradition. Furthermore—and more importantly—the new theories that arose to make sense of empirical reality posed a severe threat to the integrity of traditional models of reality, which had provided the world with determinate meaning. The mythological cosmos had man at its midpoint; the objective universe was heliocentric at first, and less than that later. Man no longer occupies center stage. The world is, in consequence, a completely different place. The mythological perspective has been overthrown by the empirical; or so it appears. This should mean that the morality predicated upon such myth should have disappeared, as well, as belief in comfortable illusion vanished. Friedrich Nietzsche made this point clearly, more than a hundred years ago: When one gives up Christian belief [for example] one thereby deprives oneself of the right to Christian morality.... Christianity is a system, a consistently thought out and complete view of things. If one breaks out of it a fundamental idea, the belief in God, one thereby breaks the whole thing to pieces: one has nothing of any consequence left in one’s hands. Christianity presupposes that man does not know, cannot know what is good for him and what evil: he believes in God, who alone knows. Christian morality is a command: its origin is transcendental; it is beyond all criticism, all right to criticize; it possesses truth only if God is truth—it stands or falls with the belief in God. If [modern Westerners] really do believe they know, of their own accord, “intuitively,” what is good and evil; if they consequently think they no longer have need of Christianity as a guarantee of morality; that is merely the consequence of the ascendancy of Christian evaluation and an expression of the strength and depth of this ascendancy: so that the origin of [modern] morality has been forgotten, so that the highly conditional nature of its right to exist is no longer felt. If the presuppositions of a theory have been invalidated, argues Nietzsche, then the theory has been invalidated. But in this case the “theory” survives. The fundamental tenets of the Judeo-Christian moral tradition continue to govern every aspect of the actual individual behavior and basic values of the typical Westerner—even if he is atheistic and well-educated, even if his abstract notions and utterances appear iconoclastic. He neither kills nor steals (or if he does, he hides his actions, even from his own awareness), and he tends, in theory, to treat his neighbor as himself. The principles that govern his society (and, increasingly, all others15) remain predicated on mythic notions of individual value—intrinsic right and responsibility—despite scientific evidence of causality and determinism in human motivation. Finally, in his mind—even when sporadically criminal—the victim of a crime still cries out to heaven for “justice,” and the conscious lawbreaker still deserves punishment for his or her actions. Our systems of post-experimental thought and our systems of motivation and action therefore co-exist in paradoxical union. One is “up-to-date”; the other, archaic. One is scientific; the other, traditional, even superstitious. We have become atheistic in our description, but remain evidently religious—that is, moral—in our disposition. What we accept as true and how we act are no longer commensurate. We carry on as if our experience has meaning—as if our activities have transcendent value—but we are unable to justify this belief intellectually. We have become trapped by our own capacity for abstraction: it provides us with accurate descriptive information but also undermines our belief in the utility and meaning of existence. This problem has frequently been regarded as tragic (it seems to me, at least, ridiculous)—and has been thoroughly explored in existential philosophy and literature. Nietzsche described this modern condition as the (inevitable and necessary) consequence of the “death of God”: Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly, “I seek God! I seek God!” As many of those who do not believe in God were standing around just then, he provoked much laughter. Why, did he get lost? said one. Did he lose his way like a child? said another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? or emigrated? Thus they yelled and laughed. The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his glances. “Whither is God,” he cried. “I shall tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how have we done this? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continuously? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night and more night coming on all the while? Must not lanterns be lit in the morning? Do we not hear anything yet of the noise of the grave-diggers who are burying God? Do we not smell anything yet of God’s decomposition? Gods too decompose. “God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we, the murderers of all murderers, comfort ourselves? What was holiest and most powerful of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives. Who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must not we ourselves become gods simply to seem worthy of it?” We find ourselves in an absurd and unfortunate situation—when our thoughts turn, involuntarily, to consideration of our situation. It seems impossible to believe that life is intrinsically, religiously meaningful. We continue to act and think “as if”—as if nothing fundamental has really changed. This does not change the fact that our integrity has vanished. The great forces of empiricism and rationality and the great technique of the experiment have killed myth, and it cannot be resurrected—or so it seems. We still act out the precepts of our forebears, nonetheless, although we can no longer justify our actions. Our behavior is shaped (at least in the ideal) by the same mythic rules—thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not covet—that guided our ancestors for the thousands of years they lived without benefit of formal empirical thought. This means that those rules are so powerful—so necessary, at least—that they maintain their existence (and expand their domain) even in the presence of explicit theories that undermine their validity. That is a mystery. And here is another: How is it that complex and admirable ancient civilizations could have developed and flourished, initially, if they were predicated upon nonsense? (If a culture survives, and grows, does that not indicate in some profound way that the ideas it is based upon are valid? If myths are mere superstitious proto-theories, why did they work? Why were they remembered? Our great rationalist ideologies, after all—fascist, say, or communist— demonstrated their essential uselessness within the space of mere generations, despite their intellectually compelling nature. Traditional societies, predicated on religious notions, have survived—essentially unchanged, in some cases, for tens of thousands of years. How can this longevity be understood?) Is it actually sensible to argue that persistently successful traditions are based on ideas that are simply wrong, regardless of their utility? Is it not more likely that we just do not know how it could be that traditional notions are right, given their appearance of extreme irrationality? Is it not likely that this indicates modern philosophical ignorance, rather than ancestral philosophical error? We have made the great mistake of assuming that the “world of spirit” described by those who preceded us was the modern “world of matter,” primitively conceptualized. This is not true—at least not in the simple manner we generally believe. The cosmos described by mythology was not the same place known to the practitioners of modern science—but that does not mean it was not real. We have not yet found God above, nor the devil below, because we do not yet understand where “above” and “below” might be found. We do not know what our ancestors were talking about. This is not surprising, because they did not “know,” either (and it didn’t really matter to them that they did not know). Consider this archaic creation myth17 from Sumer—the “birthplace of history”: So far, no cosmogonic text properly speaking has been discovered, but some allusions permit us to reconstruct the decisive moments of creation, as the Sumerians conceived it. The goddess Nammu (whose name is written with the pictograph representing the primordial sea) is presented as “the mother who gave birth to the Sky and the Earth” and the “ancestress who brought forth all the gods.” The theme of the primordial waters, imagined as a totality at once cosmic and divine, is quite frequent in archaic cosmogonies. In this case too, the watery mass is identified with the original Mother, who, by parthenogenesis, gave birth to the first couple, the Sky (An) and the Earth (Ki), incarnating the male and female principles. This first couple was united, to the point of merging, in the hieros gamos [mystical marriage]. From their union was born En-lil, the god of the atmosphere. Another fragment informs us that the latter separated his parents…. The cosmogonic theme of the separation of sky and earth is also widely disseminated. This myth is typical of archaic descriptions of reality. What does it mean to say that the Sumerians believed that the world emerged from a “primordial sea,” which was the mother of all, and that the sky and the earth were separated by the act of a deity? We do not know. Our abysmal ignorance in this regard has not been matched, however, by a suitable caution. We appear to have made the presumption that stories such as these— myths—were equivalent in function and intent (but were inferior methodologically) to empirical or post-experimental description. It is this fundamentally absurd insistence that, above all, has destabilized the effect of religious tradition upon the organization of modern human moral reasoning and behavior. The “world” of the Sumerians was not objective reality, as we presently construe it. It was simultaneously more and less—more, in that this “primitive” world contained phenomena that we do not consider part of “reality,” such as affect and meaning; less, in that the Sumerians could not describe (or conceive of) many of those things the processes of science have revealed to us. Myth is not primitive proto-science. It is a qualitatively different phenomenon. Science might be considered “description of the world with regards to those aspects that are consensually apprehensible” or “specification of the most effective mode of reaching an end (given a defined end).” Myth can be more accurately regarded as “description of the world as it signifies (for action).” The mythic universe is a place to act, not a place to perceive. Myth describes things in terms of their unique or shared affective valence, their value, their motivational significance. The Sky (An) and the Earth (Ki) of the Sumerians are not the sky and earth of modern man, therefore; they are the Great Father and Mother of all things (including the thing—En-lil, who is actually a process—that in some sense gave rise to them). We do not understand pre-experimental thinking, so we try to explain it in terms that we do understand—which means that we explain it away, define it as nonsense. After all, we think scientifically—so we believe—and we think we know what that means (since scientific thinking can in principle be defined). We are familiar with scientific thinking and value it highly—so we tend to presume that it is all there is to thinking (presume that all other “forms of thought” are approximations, at best, to the ideal of scientific thought). But this is not accurate. Thinking also and more fundamentally is specification of value, specification of implication for behavior. This means that categorization, with regards to value—determination (or even perception) of what constitutes a single thing, or class of things—is the act of grouping together according to implication for behavior. The Sumerian category of Sky (An), for example, is a domain of phenomena with similar implications for behavioral output, or for affect; the same can be said for the category of Earth (Ki), and all other mythic categories. The fact that the “domain of the Sky” has implications for action—has motivational significance—makes it a deity (which is something that controls behavior, or at least that must be served). Comprehension of the fact that such a classification system actually has meaning necessitates learning to think differently (necessitates, as well, learning to think about thinking differently). The Sumerians were concerned, above all, with how to act (were concerned with the value of things). Their descriptions of reality (to which we attribute the qualities of proto- science) in fact comprised their summary of the world as phenomenon—as place to act. They did not “know” this—not explicitly—any more than we do. But it was still true. The empirical endeavor is devoted to objective description of what is—to determination of what it is about a given phenomena that can be consensually validated and described. The objects of this process may be those of the past, the present, or the future, and may be static or dynamic in nature: a good scientific theory allows for prediction and control of becoming (of “transformation”) as well as being. However, the “affect” that an encounter with an “object” generates is not a part of what that object is, from this perspective, and therefore must be eliminated from further consideration (along with anything else subjective)—must be at least eliminated from definition as a real aspect of the object. The painstaking empirical process of identification, communication and comparison has proved to be a strikingly effective means for specifying the nature of the relatively invariant features of the collectively apprehensible world. Unfortunately, this useful methodology cannot be applied to determination of value—to consideration of what should be, to specification of the direction that things should take (which means, to description of the future we should construct, as a consequence of our actions). Such acts of valuation necessarily constitute moral decisions. We can use information generated in consequence of the application of science to guide those decisions, but not to tell us if they are correct. We lack a process of verification, in the moral domain, that is as powerful or as universally acceptable as the experimental (empirical) method in the realm of description. This absence does not allow us to sidestep the problem. No functioning society or individual can avoid rendering moral judgment, regardless of what might be said or imagined about the necessity of such judgment. Action presupposes valuation, or its implicit or “unconscious” equivalent. To act is literally to manifest preference about one set of possibilities, contrasted with an infinite set of alternatives. If we wish to live, we must act. Acting, we value. Lacking omniscience, painfully, we must make decisions, in the absence of sufficient information. It is, traditionally speaking, our knowledge of good and evil, our moral sensibility, that allows us this ability. It is our mythological conventions, operating implicitly or explicitly, that guide our choices. But what are these conventions? How are we to understand the fact of their existence? How are we to understand them? It was Nietzsche, once again, who put his finger on the modern problem, central to issues of valence or meaning: not, as before “how to act, from within the confines of a particular culture,” but “whether to believe that the question of how to act could even be reasonably asked, let alone answered”: Just because our moral philosophers knew the facts of morality only very approximately in arbitrary extracts or in accidental epitomes—for example, as the morality of their environment, their class, their church, the spirit of their time, their climate and part of the world—just because they were poorly informed and not even very curious about different peoples, times, and past ages—they never laid eyes on the real problems of morality; for these emerge only when we compare many moralities. In all “science of morals” so far one thing was lacking, strange as it may sound: the problem of morality itself; what was lacking was any suspicion that there was something problematic here. This “problem of morality”—is there anything moral, in any realistic general sense, and if so, how might it be comprehended?—is a question that has now attained paramount importance. We have the technological power to do anything we want (certainly, anything destructive; potentially, anything creative); commingled with that power, however, is an equally profound existential uncertainty, shallowness and confusion. Our constant cross-cultural interchanges and our capacity for critical reasoning have undermined our faith in the traditions of our forebears, perhaps for good reason. However, the individual cannot live without belief—without action and valuation—and science cannot provide that belief. We must nonetheless put our faith into something. Are the myths we have turned to since the rise of science more sophisticated, less dangerous, and more complete than those we rejected? The ideological structures that dominated social relations in the twentieth century appear no less absurd, on the face of it, than the older belief systems they supplanted; they lacked, in addition, any of the incomprehensible mystery that necessarily remains part of genuinely artistic and creative production. The fundamental propositions of fascism and communism were rational, logical, statable, comprehensible—and terribly wrong. No great ideological struggle presently tears at the soul of the world, but it is difficult to believe that we have outgrown our gullibility. The rise of the New Age movement in the West, for example—as compensation for the decline of traditional spirituality—provides sufficient evidence for our continued ability to swallow a camel, while straining at a gnat. Could we do better? Is it possible to understand what might reasonably, even admirably, be believed, after understanding that we must believe? Our vast power makes self-control (and, perhaps, self-comprehension) a necessity—so we have the motivation, at least in principle. Furthermore, the time is auspicious. The third Christian millennium is dawning—at the end of an era when we have demonstrated, to the apparent satisfaction of everyone, that certain forms of social regulation just do not work (even when judged by their own criteria for success). We live in the aftermath of the great statist experiments of the twentieth century, after all, conducted as Nietzsche prophesied: In the doctrine of socialism there is hidden, rather badly, a “will to negate life”; the human beings or races that think up such a doctrine must be bungled. Indeed, I should wish that a few great experiments might prove that in a socialist society life negates itself, cuts off its own roots. The earth is large enough and man still sufficiently unexhausted; hence such a practical instruction and demonstratio ad absurdum would not strike me as undesirable, even if it were gained and paid for with a tremendous expenditure of human lives. There appears to exist some “natural” or even—dare it be said?—some “absolute” constraints on the manner in which human beings may act as individuals and in society. Some moral presuppositions and theories are wrong; human nature is not infinitely malleable. It has become more or less evident, for example, that pure, abstract rationality, ungrounded in tradition—the rationality that defined Soviet-style communism from inception to dissolution—appears absolutely unable to determine and make explicit just what it is that should guide individual and social behavior. Some systems do not work, even though they make abstract sense (even more sense than alternative, currently operative, incomprehensible, haphazardly evolved systems). Some patterns of interpersonal interaction—which constitute the state, insofar as it exists as a model for social behavior—do not produce the ends they are supposed to produce, cannot sustain themselves over time, and may even produce contrary ends, devouring those who profess their value and enact them. Perhaps this is because planned, logical and intelligible systems fail to make allowance for the irrational, transcendent, incomprehensible and often ridiculous aspect of human character, as described by Dostoevsky: Now I ask you: what can be expected of man since he is a being endowed with such strange qualities? Shower upon him every earthly blessing, drown him in a sea of happiness, so that nothing but bubbles of bliss can be seen on the surface; give him economic prosperity, such that he should have nothing else to do but sleep, eat cakes and busy himself with the continuation of his species, and even then out of sheer ingratitude, sheer spite, man would play you some nasty trick. He would even risk his cakes and would deliberately desire the most fatal rubbish, the most uneconomical absurdity, simply to introduce into all this positive good sense his fatal fantastic element. It is just his fantastic dreams, his vulgar folly that he will desire to retain, simply in order to prove to himself—as though that were so necessary—that men still are men and not the keys of a piano, which the laws of nature threaten to control so completely that soon one will be able to desire nothing but by the calendar. And that is not all: even if man really were nothing but a piano-key, even if this were proved to him by natural science and mathematics, even then he would not become reasonable, but would purposely do something perverse out of simple ingratitude, simply to gain his point. And if he does not find means he will contrive destruction and chaos, will contrive sufferings of all sorts, only to gain his point! He will launch a curse upon the world, and as only man can curse (it is his privilege, the primary distinction between him and other animals), maybe by his curse alone he will attain his object—that is, convince himself that he is a man and not a piano-key! If you say that all this, too, can be calculated and tabulated, chaos and darkness and curses, so that the mere possibility of calculating it all beforehand would stop it all, and reason would reassert itself, then man would purposely go mad in order to be rid of reason and gain his point! I believe in it, I answer for it, for the whole work of man really seems to consist in nothing but proving to himself every minute that he is a man and not a piano-key! It may be at the cost of his skin, it may be by cannibalism! And this being so, can one help being tempted to rejoice that it has not yet come off, and that desire still depends on something we don’t know? We also presently possess in accessible and complete form the traditional wisdom of a large part of the human race—possess accurate description of the myths and rituals that contain and condition the implicit and explicit values of almost everyone who has ever lived. These myths are centrally and properly concerned with the nature of successful human existence. Careful comparative analysis of this great body of religious philosophy might allow us to provisionally determine the nature of essential human motivation and morality—if we were willing to admit our ignorance and take the risk. Accurate specification of underlying mythological commonalities might comprise the first developmental stage in the conscious evolution of a truly universal system of morality. The establishment of such a system, acceptable to empirical and religious minds alike, could prove of incalculable aid in the reduction of intrapsychic, interindividual and intergroup conflict. The grounding of such a compara-tive analysis within a psychology (or even a neuropsychology) informed by strict empirical research might offer us the possibility of a form of convergent validation, and help us overcome the age-old problem of deriving the ought from the is; help us see how what we must do might be inextricably associated with what it is that we are. Proper analysis of mythology, of the type proposed here, is not mere discussion of “historical” events enacted upon the world stage (as the traditionally religious might have it), and it is not mere investigation of primitive belief (as the traditionally scientific might presume). It is, instead, the examination, analysis and subsequent incorporation of an edifice of meaning, which contains within it hierarchical organization of experiential valence. The mythic imagination is concerned with the world in the manner of the phenomenologist, who seeks to discover the nature of subjective reality, instead of concerning himself with description of the objective world. Myth, and the drama that is part of myth, provide answers in image to the following question: “how can the current state of experience be conceptualized in abstraction, with regards to its meaning?” [which means its (subjective, biologically predicated, socially constructed) emotional relevance or motivational significance]. Meaning means implication for behavioral output; logically, therefore, myth presents information relevant to the most fundamental of moral problems: “what should be? (what should be done?)” The desirable future (the object of what should be) can be conceptualized only in relationship to the present, which serves at least as a necessary point of contrast and comparison. To get somewhere in the future presupposes being somewhere in the present; furthermore, the desirability of the place traveled to depends on the valence of the place vacated. The question of “what should be?” (what line should be traveled?) therefore has contained within it, so to speak, three subqueries, which might be formulated as follows: 1) What is? What is the nature (meaning, the significance) of the current state of experience? 2) What should be? To what (desirable, valuable) end should that state be moving? 3) How should we therefore act? What is the nature of the specific processes by which the present state might be transformed into that which is desired? Active apprehension of the goal of behavior, conceptualized in relationship to the interpreted present, serves to constrain or provide determinate framework for the evaluation of ongoing events, which emerge as a consequence of current behavior. The goal is an imaginary state, consisting of “a place” of desirable motivation or affect—a state that only exists in fantasy, as something (potentially) preferable to the present. (Construction of the goal therefore means establishment of a theory about the ideal relative status of motivational states—about the good.) This imagined future constitutes a vision of perfection, so to speak, generated in the light of all current knowledge (at least under optimal conditions), to which specific and general aspects of ongoing experience are continually compared. This vision of perfection is the promised land, mythologically speaking—conceptualized as a spiritual domain (a psychological state), a political utopia (a state, literally speaking), or both, simultaneously. We answer the question “what should be?” by formulating an image of the desired future. We cannot conceive of that future, except in relationship to the (interpreted) present— and it is our interpretation of the emotional acceptability of the present that comprises our answer to the question “what is?” [“what is the nature (meaning, the significance) of the current state of experience?”]. We answer the question “how then should we act?” by determining the most efficient and self-consistent strategy, all things considered, for bringing the preferred future into being. Our answers to these three fundamental questions—modified and constructed in the course of our social interactions—constitutes our knowledge, insofar as it has any behavioral relevance; constitutes our knowledge, from the mythological perspective. The structure of the mythic known—what is, what should be, and how to get from one to the other—is presented in Figure 1: The Domain and Constituent Elements of the Known. The known is explored territory, a place of stability and familiarity; it is the “city of God,” as profanely realized. It finds metaphorical embodiment in myths and narratives describing the community, the kingdom or the state. Such myths and narratives guide our ability to understand the particular, bounded motivational significance of the present, experienced in relation to some identifiable desired future, and allow us to construct and interpret appropriate patterns of action, from within the confines of that schema. We all produce determinate models of what is, and what should be, and how to transform one into the other. We produce these models by balancing our own desires, as they find expression in fantasy and action, with those of the others—individuals, families and communities—that we habitually encounter. “How to act,” constitutes the most essential aspect of the social contract; the domain of the known is, therefore, the “territory” we inhabit with all those who share our implicit and explicit traditions and beliefs. Myths describe the existence of this “shared and determinate territory” as a fixed aspect of existence—which it is, as the fact of culture is an unchanging aspect of the human environment. “Narratives of the known”—patriotic rituals, stories of ancestral heroes, myths and symbols of cultural or racial identity—describe established territory, weaving for us a web of meaning that, shared with others, eliminates the necessity of dispute over meaning. All those who know the rules, and accept them, can play the game—without fighting over the rules of the game. This makes for peace, stability, and potential prosperity—a good game. The good, however, is the enemy of the better; a more compelling game might always exist. Myth portrays what is known, and performs a function that if limited to that, might be regarded as paramount in importance. But myth also presents information that is far more profound—almost unutterably so, once (I would argue) properly understood. We all produce models of what is and what should be, and how to transform one into the other. We change our behavior, when the consequences of that behavior are not what we would like. But sometimes mere alteration in behavior is insufficient. We must change not only what we do, but what we think is important. This means reconsideration of the nature of the motivational significance of the present, and reconsideration of the ideal nature of the future. This is a radical, even revolutionary transformation, and it is a very complex process in its realization—but mythic thinking has represented the nature of such change in great and remarkable detail.
The basic grammatical structure of transformational mythology, so to speak, appears most clearly revealed in the form of the “way” (as in the “American Way of Life”). The great literary critic Northrop Frye comments upon the idea of the way, as it manifests itself in literature and religious writing: Following a narrative is closely connected with the central literary metaphor of the journey, where we have a person making the journey and the road, path, or direction taken, the simplest word for this being ‘way.’ Journey is a word connected with jour and journee, and metaphorical journeys, deriving as they mostly do from slower methods of getting around, usually have at their core the conception of the days journey, the amount of space we can cover under the cycle of the sun. By a very easy extension of metaphor we get the days cycle as a symbol for the whole of life. Thus in Housman’s poem “Reveille” (“Up, lad: when the journey’s over/There’ll be time enough to sleep”) the awakening in the morning is a metaphor of continuing the journey of life, a journey ending in death. The prototype for the image is the Book of Ecclesiastes, which urges us to work while it is day, before the night comes when no man can work…. The word “way” is a good example of the extent to which language is built up on a series of metaphorical analogies. The most common meaning of “way” in English is a method or manner of procedure, but method and manner imply some sequential repetition, and the repetition brings us to the metaphorical kernel of a road or path…. In the Bible “way” normally translates the Hebrew derek and the Greek hodos, and throughout the Bible there is a strong emphasis on the contrast between a straight way that takes us to our destination and a divergent way that misleads or confuses. This metaphorical contrast haunts the whole of Christian literature: we start reading Dante’s Commedia, and the third line speaks of a lost or erased way: “Che la diritta via era smarita.” Other religions have the same metaphor: Buddhism speaks of what is usually called in English an eightfold path. In Chinese Taoism the Tao is usually also rendered “way” by Arthur Waley and others, though I understand that the character representing the word is formed of radicals meaning something like “head-going.” The sacred book of Taoism, the Tao te Ching, begins by saying that the Tao that can be talked about is not the real Tao: in other words we are being warned to beware of the traps in metaphorical language, or, in a common Oriental phrase, of confusing the moon with the finger pointing at it. But as we read on we find that the Tao can, after all, be to some extent characterized: the way is specifically the “way of the valley,” the direction taken by humility, self-effacement, and the kind of relaxation, or non-action, that makes all action effective. The “way” is the path of life and its purpose. More accurately, the content of the way is the specific path of life. The form of the way, its most fundamental aspect, is the apparently intrinsic or heritable possibility of positing or of being guided by a central idea. This apparently intrinsic form finds its expression in the tendency of each individual, generation after generation, to first ask and subsequently seek an answer to the question “what is the meaning of life?” The central notion of the way underlies manifestation of four more specific myths, or classes of myths, and provides a more complete answer, in dramatic form, to the three questions posed previously [what is the nature (meaning, the significance) of current being?, to what (desirable) end should that state be moving? and, finally, what are the processes by which the present state might be transformed into that which is desired?] The four classes include: (1) myths describing a current or pre-existent stable state (sometimes a paradise, sometimes a tyranny); (2) myths describing the emergence of something anomalous, unexpected, threatening and promising into this initial state; (3) myths describing the dissolution of the pre-existent stable state into chaos, as a consequence of the anomalous or unexpected occurrence; (4) myths describing the regeneration of stability [paradise regained (or, tyranny regenerated)], from the chaotic mixture of dissolute previous experience and anomalous information. The metamythology of the way, so to speak, describes the manner in which specific ideas (myths) about the present, the future, and the mode of transforming one into the other areMaps of experience 17 initially constructed, and then reconstructed, in their entirety, when that becomes necessary.
The traditional Christian (and not just Christian) notion that man has fallen from an original “state of grace” into his current morally degenerate and emotionally unbearable condition—accompanied by a desire for the “return to Paradise”—constitutes a single example of this “metamyth.” Christian morality can therefore be reasonably regarded as the “plan of action” whose aim is re-establishment, or establishment, or attainment (sometimes in the “hereafter”) of the “kingdom of God,” the ideal future. The idea that man needs redemption—and that re-establishment of a long-lost Paradise might constitute such redemption—appear as common themes of mythology, among members of exceedingly diverse and long-separated human cultures.24 This commonality appears because man, eternally self-conscious, suffers eternally from his existence, and constantly longs for respite. Figure 2: The Metamythological Cycle of the Way schematically portrays the “circle” of the way, which “begins” and “ends” at the same point—with establishment of conditional, but determinate moral knowledge (belief). Belief is disruptible, because finite—which is to say that the infinite mystery surrounding human understanding may break into our provisional models of how to act at any time and point, and disrupt their structure. The manner in which we act as children, for example, may be perfectly appropriate for the conditions of childhood; the processes of maturation change the conditions of existence, introducing anomaly where only certainty once stood, making necessary not only a change of plans, but reconceptualization of where those plans might lead, and what or who they refer to, in the present. The known, our current story, protects us from the unknown, from chaos—which is to say, provides our experience with determinate and predictable structure. Chaos has a nature all of its own. That nature is experienced as affective valence, at first exposure, not as objective property. If something unknown or unpredictable occurs, while we are carrying out our motivated plans, we are first surprised. That surprise—which is a combination of apprehension and curiosity—comprises our instinctive emotional response to the occurrence of something we did not desire. The appearance of something unexpected is proof that we do not know how to act—by definition, as it is the production of what we want that we use as evidence for the integrity of our knowledge. If we are somewhere we don’t know how to act, we are (probably) in trouble—we might learn something new, but we are still in trouble. When we are in trouble, we get scared. When we are in the domain of the known, so to speak, there is no reason for fear. Outside that domain, panic reigns. It is for this reason that we dislike having our plans disrupted, and cling to what we understand. This conservative strategy does not always work, however, because what we understand about the present is not necessarily sufficient to deal with the future. This means that we have to be able to modify what we understand, even though to do so is to risk our own undoing. The trick, of course, is to modify and yet to remain secure. This is not so simple. Too much modification brings chaos. Too little modification brings stagnation (and then, when the future we are unprepared for appears—chaos). Involuntary exposure to chaos means accidental encounter with the forces that undermine the known world. The affective consequences of such encounter can be literally overwhelming. It is for this reason that individuals are highly motivated to avoid sudden manifestations of the unknown. And this is why individuals will go to almost any length to ensure that their protective cultural “stories” remain intact.
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